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a03a740ea1 Feature/perf ui logic (#13)
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## Summary

Nhánh `feature/perf-ui-logic`: tối ưu hiệu năng/UI, sửa lỗi workspace và điều hướng, và làm cho công tắc **"Block network for agent-run commands"** chặn thật mọi đường ra mạng của app, **trừ nhà cung cấp AI**.

**Chặn mạng (b78d483, 8c497cf, 10b8379)**
- Bộ kiểm tra chung `application/network/network_guard.py`, nối vào cấu hình đang chạy ở Composition Root: đổi công tắc trong Settings là có hiệu lực ngay.
- Lệnh shell của agent và task script chạy trong **Windows AppContainer không có quyền mạng**: kernel chặn socket, ping, DNS, Invoke-WebRequest… Không cần quyền admin. Không cô lập được thì lệnh bị từ chối, không chạy khi mạng còn mở. macOS dùng `sandbox-exec`, Linux dùng `unshare --net`.
- Bật chặn thì: dừng MCP đang chạy, không khởi động server mới, từ chối lời gọi connector; Microsoft 365 (đăng nhập, Graph, đồng bộ cloud, rules, mail), Teams, nút Test REST/Jira/MCP, link đính kèm task, pip tự cài và tài nguyên web trong xem trước HTML đều bị từ chối.
- Vẫn dùng được: chat, tải danh sách model, thử model; tool OneDrive đã đồng bộ trên máy.
- Công tắc **mặc định tắt** khi mở app lần đầu; nhãn giữ nguyên như cũ.
- Xem trước HTML trong tab Folder giờ hiện được ảnh/CSS/JS từ web khi mạng mở (trước đây trang `file://` không tải được).
- Sửa lỗi app văng khi chuyển tab Graph → Folder: profile WebEngine của trang xem trước bị huỷ trước trang (`0xc0000409` trong Qt6Core.dll); giờ dùng một profile chung thuộc QApplication.
- Không cấp quyền AppContainer kế thừa lên thư mục chứa PySide6 (nếu có, Chromium không nạp được `Qt6WebEngineCore.dll` và tab Graph trắng).
- Cột mục lục trong Settings tính độ rộng theo kiểu chữ của mục đang chọn, "Sandbox Security Layer" không còn bị cắt.

**Các commit khác trong nhánh**
- `b7a41b3` mỗi thư mục làm việc chỉ thuộc về một project · `bbdf146` bật nút Sửa project khi đã có project đang mở
- `35f24e0`, `cc8d5c8`, `2e3e719`, `c699beb` canh hàng / khoảng cách thanh điều hướng
- `2759ed9` không refresh workspace khi chuyển tab Cowork · `7607f44` checkpoint hiệu năng và UI
- `8548c1e` chặn tool mạng của agent · `caf3b74` renderer GraphRAG native trên macOS · `c00b83c` khoảng cách metadata hàng project · `a04f8a9` ẩn picker workspace cloud

## Change Type

- [x] Cowork feature
- [x] Bug fix
- [ ] Core AI contribution
- [x] Test / hardening
- [x] Performance
- [ ] Documentation

## Related Work

Cowork Task:

Core Repo: http://34.143.229.138/gitea-admin/fsg-ai-core-assets

Core AI Issue:

Core Task:

Related PR:

## Scope

What is intentionally included?
- Mọi đường ra mạng do app tự mở, trừ nhà cung cấp AI (xem Summary).
- Test: `tests/test_network_guard_lanes.py` (có bài chạy AppContainer thật trên Windows), `tests/ui/test_html_preview_remote_images.py`.

What is intentionally NOT included?
- Chặn cả nhà cung cấp AI / chạy model trên máy (Phương án 2).
- Terminal người dùng tự gõ trong tab Folder, sinh ảnh, cơ chế tự tin chứng chỉ lạ (`tls_trust`).
- Huy hiệu trạng thái "đang chặn" trên thanh trên cùng.

## Validation

- [x] Unit tests
- [x] Integration tests
- [x] Manual verification
- [x] Regression check

Commands / evidence:
- `python -m pytest tests/test_network_guard_lanes.py tests/test_sandbox_block_network.py tests/ui -q` → chỉ còn 1 bài fail, fail cả trên `b7a41b3` (nhãn `ProjectRow` 'Project' chưa dịch, `tests/ui/test_i18n_khong_con_chu_cu.py`).
- `python -m pytest tests -q --ignore=tests/ui` → 4 bài fail, cả 4 cũng fail trên `b7a41b3` (`test_canonical_audit_logger`, 2 bài `test_mcp_audit_security`, `test_monitoring_tab_container`).
- Chạy cả `tests` trong một lượt thì treo ở các test dựng MainWindow trong `tests/ui`; `b7a41b3` cũng treo đúng chỗ đó.
- `check_imports.py` và `check_orphan_modules.py` PASS. `check_loc.py` báo 9 file quá dài, giống hệt trước khi sửa (không file nào do nhánh này làm dài thêm).
- Kiểm tra tay trên Windows 11: trong AppContainer, Python báo `WinError 10013`, ping/nslookup/PowerShell/curl đều không ra được mạng; cmd, git, python chạy bình thường.
- Kiểm tra tay trên Windows 11: xem trước HTML tải được 4/4 tài nguyên web khi mạng mở, 0/4 khi bật chặn; tab Graph hoạt động; tạo/huỷ trang xem trước nhiều lần không còn cảnh báo profile của Qt.

## Security Impact

Permission / credential / network / customer data impact:
- Network: khi bật công tắc, chỉ nhà cung cấp AI còn ra mạng; nội dung chat vẫn gửi tới nhà cung cấp AI.
- Permission: lần đầu chạy lệnh trong sandbox, app **thêm quyền (ACE) cho SID AppContainer** trên thư mục làm việc (ghi), thư mục cài Python gốc (đọc), gốc venv và `Scripts` (đọc). Không xoá quyền nào. Thư mục chứa PySide6 không bao giờ nhận quyền kế thừa; một quyền kế thừa sai trên venv (từ bản dev trước) được tự gỡ.
- Credential: không đổi. Khi chặn, trạng thái đăng nhập M365 được đọc thẳng từ kho token trên máy, không dựng MSAL.

## Compatibility

- [x] No breaking change
- [ ] Breaking change documented

Ghi chú: `block_network` mặc định đổi từ bật sang tắt cho cấu hình mới; máy đã lưu `true` thì giữ nguyên. Khi đang chặn, lệnh dùng công cụ cài trong thư mục người dùng (ngoài Program Files) có thể báo Access denied; thư viện trong venv của app không dùng được trong sandbox.

## Reviewer Notes

- `infrastructure/sandbox/appcontainer_process.py` gọi Win32 bằng ctypes (CreateAppContainerProfile, CreateProcessW với SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) và dùng `icacls` để cấp quyền: nên xem kỹ phần cấp quyền.
- `tests/conftest.py` thêm fixture autouse gỡ `network_guard` sau mỗi test, vì `build_context()` gắn cổng này ở mức process.
- `core/task_executors.py` đang đúng bằng trần LOC nên `_run_script` được tách sang `core/task_script.py`.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: minhanhpkpro <minhanhpkpro@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Duy Le Huu <duylh19@fpt.com>
Co-authored-by: thanhnv <thanhnv.ip@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #13
2026-09-20 12:26:03 +00:00
32 changed files with 1385 additions and 57 deletions
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@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
# CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Project
Cowork Local (user-facing brand "Cowork-Local BamBOO") is a local-first PySide6 desktop app: multi-turn AI agents, per-project workspaces with GraphRAG, scheduled agent tasks (Kanban), MCP connectors, a sandbox security layer, model routing, and a monitoring dashboard. User config lives in `~/.cowork_local`. The internal name `cowork_local` / `APP_NAME` must not be rebranded. Only `DISPLAY_NAME` is the brand.
## The package-name quirk (read first)
The repository root **is** the `cowork_local` package: `__init__.py` and `__main__.py` sit at the root, and code imports itself as `cowork_local.*` or through relative imports. This checkout's folder is not named `cowork_local`, so:
- **Running the app:** `python -m cowork_local` works only from the parent of a folder literally named `cowork_local`. On Windows, `install.bat` (once; add `--dev` for test deps, `--system` to skip the venv) builds a venv under `%LOCALAPPDATA%\CoworkLocal` and creates a junction `%LOCALAPPDATA%\CoworkLocal\launcher\<key>\cowork_local` pointing at this checkout. After that, use `run.bat`. The MS365 MCP server is spawned as `python -m cowork_local.mcp_servers.ms365_server`, so the junction is needed for subprocesses too.
- **Never create a `.venv` inside the repo.** The quality gates walk the whole tree.
- **Tests:** the root `conftest.py` and `tests/conftest.py` bind `sys.modules["cowork_local"]` to this checkout, so pytest works whatever the folder is named. Tests use both import styles: top-level (`from providers.base import ...`) and qualified (`from cowork_local.core... import ...`). Characterization tests that spawn `python -c "from cowork_local..."` subprocesses still need a real `cowork_local` directory on `PYTHONPATH`. CI checks out into `cowork_local/` for this reason.
## Commands
```bash
python -m pip install -r requirements.txt # single requirements file (includes pytest)
python -m pytest tests -q # full suite (what CI runs)
python -m pytest tests/unit/test_schedule_calculator.py -q # one file
python -m pytest tests/unit/test_schedule_calculator.py -k name -q # one test
python -m pytest tests/e2e/test_smoke.py -v # release smoke test
python scripts/run_quality_gate.py # all CASAN gates + pytest
python scripts/run_quality_gate.py --skip-tests # static gates only
python scripts/check_imports.py # domain/ + application/ must not import PySide6/PyQt/ui/app
python scripts/audit_security.py # no plaintext credentials (CI also runs --self-test)
python scripts/check_loc.py # <= 400 lines per production file
python scripts/check_orphan_modules.py # every production module must be reachable by import
```
Widget tests run headless with `QT_QPA_PLATFORM=offscreen`. `tools/check_*.py` are standalone offscreen smoke checkers against a real `MainWindow` built on a copy of `~/.cowork_local` (for example `python tools/check_nav.py`). Some of them still import private names re-exported from `app.py`, so keep those re-exports. Set `COWORK_PERF_TRACE=1` to log timing spans from `performance.py`.
## Architecture
Target design is 4-tier Clean Architecture (`docs/architecture/ADR-001-layered-architecture.md`):
- `domain/`: pure stdlib entities, frozen request snapshots (`ConversationExecutionRequest`), `AgentEvent`, tool/provider descriptors, `ScheduleCalculator`.
- `application/`: pure-Python use-case services (conversations, model_routing, scheduling, workspaces, monitoring, workflows). **No Qt.** Must run headless.
- `infrastructure/`: adapters: config (`JsonConfigRepository` over `AtomicJsonFile`), OS-keyring `SecretStore`, providers, MCP (`McpToolSourceManager`), sandbox, filesystem, telemetry, and Qt bridges (`infrastructure/qt`).
- `presentation/`: PySide6 widgets by feature (`shell`, `chat`, `co4e`, `dashboard`, `scheduling`, `workspace`, `monitoring`, `graph`, `settings`, ...). Widgets call `application/` services. They don't touch persistence or run LLM calls on the GUI thread. Agent work runs in worker threads and reaches the UI as `AgentEvent`s through Qt signal bridges.
The refactor is **incomplete**. Legacy top-level packages are still live and imported by the app:
- `ui/`: older tabs such as `cowork_tab`, `workspace_tab`, `monitoring_tab`, `settings_dialog`, `chat_panel`, and `co4e_*`.
- `core/`: agents, the Co4E flow runner, task scheduler, skills, tools, audit/usage tracking, routing.
- `providers/`: `base`, `anthropic`, `openai_compat`, `factory`.
- `security/`: validators, command risk classifier.
- Root modules: `config.py`, `state.py`.
`docs/architecture/dormant-code.md` lists deprecated pieces, such as `state.py::active_project_id` and the monolithic `core/tools.py`. New layers must not import dormant code.
Wiring:
- `__main__.py` → `app.run()`.
- `presentation/shell/bootstrap.py` is the **Composition Root**. It builds `AppContext` (`state.py`) around `JsonConfigRepository` plus `KeyringAdapter`, falling back to the config file when no keyring exists.
- `run()` then seeds the built-in skills (`skill_library/*.skill`) and the Co4E flows, applies the theme, and opens `presentation/shell/main_window.MainWindow`.
- Pages are registered in `presentation/shell/page_registry.py`.
Other cross-cutting pieces:
- `i18n/`: `tr(key, **kw)` with en/ja/vi (default `vi`). Long-lived widgets must use `bind_text(...)` or `on_language_changed(...)` so a language switch re-applies their text. Transient dialogs just call `tr()` at construction.
- `theme/`: palettes and QSS. Use theme tokens, not hard-coded colors.
- `mcp_servers/`: bundled MCP servers (MS365, project_context).
- `agent/`: a markdown instruction library for UI/UX bug-fix agents, not runtime code.
Step-by-step recipes for adding a provider, a tool or MCP server, or a screen are in `docs/governance/contributor-recipes.md`.
## Rules enforced by gates and review
- **400-line limit** for every production file. This covers `domain`, `application`, `infrastructure`, `presentation`, `ui`, `core`, `providers`, `security`, `mcp_servers`, `i18n`, `theme`, and root `.py` files. Legacy oversized files have per-file caps in `scripts/check_loc.py` that may only go down. Split files; never raise a cap.
- **No orphan modules.** `check_orphan_modules.py` has an `ALLOWLIST` that may only shrink. Wire up or delete a module instead of allowlisting it.
- **Secrets** belong in the OS keyring, never in `config.json` or the code. `.env.example` is not auto-loaded. Tests never use live provider credentials (use `tests/fakes/`: `FakeProvider`, `FakeToolExecutor`, `FakeToolPolicyGateway`, `FakeConfigRepository`/`FakeSecretStore`, `FakeClock`, ...).
- **Test layout:** `tests/unit` (fast, no I/O), `tests/contracts`, `tests/integration` (Qt offscreen), `tests/characterization` (pinned legacy behavior during refactors), `tests/e2e`, `tests/ui`, plus flat `tests/test_*.py`.
- **Startup housekeeping** (seeding, pruning) is wrapped in `try/except` and must never block app launch.
- **Comments:** the ADR asks for English comments. Existing code mixes English and Vietnamese docstrings and comments, so match the surrounding file.
## Git workflow
- Branches: `feat/`, `fix/`, `test/`, `docs/`, `perf/`, `refactor/<short-desc>`. Core AI work uses `core-ai/<task-id>-<name>`.
- Commits use Conventional Commit prefixes (`feat:`, `fix:`, `test:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`, `perf:`, `chore:`).
- One logical change per PR, using `.gitea/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md`. The remote is a Gitea instance, and CI (`.gitea/workflows/ci.yaml`, Python 3.11) runs on PRs to `main`.
- Critical areas listed in `SECURITY.md` get extra review.
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
"""Application services for the "Block network" switch (Sandbox Security Layer)."""
from .network_guard import NetworkBlockedError, bind, ensure_allowed, is_blocked, refusal
__all__ = ["NetworkBlockedError", "bind", "ensure_allowed", "is_blocked", "refusal"]
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@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
"""One gate for every outbound connection the app makes on its own.
The "Block network" switch (``agent_security.block_network``) used to be read
only where agent tools run, so Microsoft 365, Teams, connector test buttons,
scheduled task scripts, pip auto-installs and HTML previews still reached the
internet while Monitoring said "Network: blocked". Each of those now asks
this module first.
The AI provider path (chat, model list, model test) deliberately does NOT go
through here: with the switch on the user still talks to the model, but the
app fetches nothing else on the model's or its own behalf.
The module holds a *reader*, not a copy of the flag: the Composition Root
binds it to the live config once (``presentation/shell/bootstrap.py``), so a
change saved in Settings takes effect on the very next call. Nothing bound
(unit tests, helper subprocesses) means "not blocked", the pre-switch default.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import threading
from typing import Callable, Optional
_lock = threading.Lock()
_reader: Optional[Callable[[], bool]] = None
class NetworkBlockedError(PermissionError):
"""Raised by :func:`ensure_allowed` while the switch is on."""
def bind(reader: Optional[Callable[[], bool]]) -> None:
"""Install the callable that says whether the network is blocked right now."""
global _reader
with _lock:
_reader = reader
def is_blocked() -> bool:
"""True while "Block network" is on. A failing reader counts as blocked."""
reader = _reader
if reader is None:
return False
try:
return bool(reader())
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - fail closed: an unreadable switch must not open the network
return True
def refusal(purpose: str) -> str:
"""The message shown (to the user or the model) when ``purpose`` is refused."""
return (f"{purpose}: network access is blocked by the Sandbox Security Layer "
"(\"Block network\" is on in Settings). Only the AI provider may be reached.")
def ensure_allowed(purpose: str) -> None:
"""Raise :class:`NetworkBlockedError` if ``purpose`` may not go online now."""
if is_blocked():
raise NetworkBlockedError(refusal(purpose))
__all__ = ["NetworkBlockedError", "bind", "ensure_allowed", "is_blocked", "refusal"]
@@ -21,9 +21,14 @@ def pptx_available() -> bool:
try:
from cowork_local.core.deps import ensure_module
_PPTX_READY = ensure_module("pptx", "python-pptx") is not None
ready = ensure_module("pptx", "python-pptx") is not None
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
_PPTX_READY = False
ready = False
from ..network import network_guard
if ready or not network_guard.is_blocked():
_PPTX_READY = ready # a refusal under "Block network" is retried later
return ready
return _PPTX_READY
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@@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG: Dict[str, Any] = {
"resource_limit_cpu_percent": 80, # 0 = unlimited; caps a run_command/install_package process TREE's total CPU%
"resource_limit_memory_mb": 2048, # 0 = unlimited; caps total RSS memory (MB)
"resource_limit_disk_mb": 512, # 0 = unlimited; caps total disk read+write (MB)
# Cut the agent off the network: proxy env pointed at a black hole for
# agent-run shell commands, PLUS a flat refusal from every tool tagged
# ToolCapability.NETWORK (fetch_url, jira_*, install_package) — those
# reach the net in-process, where the proxy trick has nothing to act on.
"block_network": True,
# "Block network": every outbound connection except the AI provider is
# refused (application/network/network_guard.py), and agent shell
# commands / task scripts run in a network-less AppContainer.
# OFF on first launch — the user turns it on in Settings.
"block_network": False,
# Allow the agent's fetch_url tool to read web pages / online documents /
# SharePoint-OneDrive share links. Its own toggle — reading a URL for info
# is safe and useful, so this defaults ON — but block_network outranks it:
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@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ def run_cowork(
preview = {"kind": "info", "title": name, "text": str(args)}
emit({"type": "tool_proposed", "id": tc_id, "name": name, "args": args,
"preview": preview})
if ctx.block_network:
if ctx.block_network and not name.startswith("ms365_local__"):
result = {"ok": False, "output": (
f"{name}: network access is blocked by the Sandbox Security Layer "
'("Block network for agent-run commands" is on in Settings).')}
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@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ def run_code(
else:
emit({"type": "tool_start", "id": tc_id, "name": name})
if is_extra and extra_executor is not None:
if ctx.block_network:
if ctx.block_network and not name.startswith("ms365_local__"):
result = {"ok": False, "output": (
f"{name}: network access is blocked by the Sandbox Security Layer "
'("Block network for agent-run commands" is on in Settings).')}
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@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ def run_cancellable(
on_output: Optional[Callable[[str], None]] = None,
env: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
limits: Optional[Dict[str, float]] = None,
isolate_network: bool = False,
) -> Tuple[Optional[int], str, bool, bool, bool]:
"""Run a subprocess so the Stop button can actually interrupt it.
@@ -117,17 +118,27 @@ def run_cancellable(
a failure to create/assign the job just means the existing taskkill
fallback is used, same as before this was added.
``isolate_network`` runs ``args`` as a shell command that the OS keeps
off the network (see ``infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py``);
if that isolation cannot be set up the command is NOT run.
Returns ``(returncode, combined_output, cancelled, timed_out,
resource_exceeded)``; on a failure to even launch the process,
``returncode`` is ``None`` and the output holds the launch error."""
cancel = cancel or (lambda: False)
popen_kwargs = {} if sys.platform == "win32" else {"start_new_session": True}
try:
proc = subprocess.Popen(
args, shell=shell, cwd=cwd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
text=True, bufsize=1, env=env, **popen_kwargs,
)
except OSError as exc:
if isolate_network:
from ..infrastructure.sandbox.network_isolation import spawn_without_network
command = args if isinstance(args, str) else subprocess.list2cmdline(args)
proc = spawn_without_network(command, cwd, env)
else:
proc = subprocess.Popen(
args, shell=shell, cwd=cwd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
text=True, bufsize=1, env=env, **popen_kwargs,
)
except (OSError, RuntimeError) as exc: # RuntimeError: NetworkIsolationUnavailable
return None, str(exc), False, False, False
with _active_pids_lock:
@@ -266,6 +277,10 @@ def ensure_module(module: str, package: str | None = None):
pkg = package or module
if pkg in _FAILED or not _can_pip():
return None
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
return None # not cached in _FAILED: retried once the network is back
ok, _ = pip_install(pkg)
if not ok:
_FAILED.add(pkg)
@@ -339,6 +354,10 @@ def pip_install(package: str, cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
name) is NOT retried, since repeating it would just waste time."""
if not _can_pip():
return False, "This packaged build can't install packages at runtime."
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
return False, network_guard.refusal(f"pip install {package}")
exe = python or sys.executable
attempt = 0
while True:
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@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ class RestApiConnector:
def call(self, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Gọi API theo tham số model đưa ra, đi qua lớp TLS có ghim chứng chỉ nội bộ."""
from ..application.network import network_guard
from .tls_trust import request_any_method as tls_request
if network_guard.is_blocked():
return {"ok": False, "output": network_guard.refusal(self.display_name)}
method = str(args.get("method", "GET")).upper()
path = str(args.get("path", "")).lstrip("/")
url = urljoin(self.base_url, path)
@@ -164,10 +167,13 @@ class RestApiConnector:
def test_connection(self) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
"""Thử kết nối tới endpoint; trả về (thành công, thông điệp)."""
from ..application.network import network_guard
from .tls_trust import request as tls_request
if not self.base_url.strip("/"):
return False, "No base URL configured."
if network_guard.is_blocked():
return False, network_guard.refusal(self.display_name)
headers = {}
if self.api_key:
headers[self.auth_header] = (
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@@ -85,8 +85,10 @@ def get_issue_by_url(config: Dict[str, Any] | None, url: str) -> str:
def _get(config: Dict[str, Any], path: str, params: dict = None):
"""Gọi Jira REST API bằng xác thực cơ bản, qua lớp TLS có ghim chứng chỉ nội bộ."""
from ..application.network import network_guard
from . import tls_trust
network_guard.ensure_allowed("Jira")
c = _conf(config)
url = c["base_url"].rstrip("/") + path
# Same TLS auto-recovery the LLM provider calls get (core/tls_trust.py) —
+6
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@@ -147,6 +147,12 @@ def fetch_link_preview(url: str) -> str:
return ""
if not re.match(r"^https?://", url, re.IGNORECASE):
return f"[Link: {url}] (not a fetchable http(s) URL — referenced by address only)"
# Every caller (fetch_url, task link attachments, ...) passes through here,
# so this one check covers the paths that never saw a ToolContext.
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
return f"[Link: {url}] (not fetched — {network_guard.refusal('link fetch')})"
# SharePoint / OneDrive share links are rewritten to their direct-download
# form so the shared FILE itself is fetched and parsed (like an attachment),
# not the share page's HTML shell.
+12 -1
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@@ -88,7 +88,14 @@ class McpServerConnection:
def start(self, timeout: float = 15.0) -> None:
"""Spawn the server subprocess and complete the MCP handshake.
Raises :class:`McpServerError` on failure (bad command, the server
crashed on startup, the handshake timed out, ...)."""
crashed on startup, the handshake timed out, ...).
Refused while "Block network" is on: a server process is free to open
any socket it likes, so the only safe server is one never started."""
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
raise McpServerError(network_guard.refusal(f"MCP server '{self.name}'"))
self._thread = threading.Thread(target=self._run_loop, daemon=True)
self._thread.start()
if not self._ready.wait(timeout):
@@ -174,6 +181,10 @@ class McpServerConnection:
def call_tool(self, qualified_name: str, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""``extra_executor``-shaped result: ``{"ok": bool, "output": str}``."""
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
return {"ok": False, "output": network_guard.refusal(f"MCP server '{self.name}'")}
tool_name = qualified_name.split(_SEP, 1)[1] if _SEP in qualified_name else qualified_name
try:
result = self._run_coro(self._session.call_tool(tool_name, args or {}))
+29
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@@ -137,8 +137,34 @@ def _app(tenant_id: str, client_id: str):
return app, cache
def _cached_account_offline() -> Optional[dict]:
"""First account in the saved token cache, read without any MSAL network setup."""
try:
import msal
accounts = _load_cache().find(msal.TokenCache.CredentialType.ACCOUNT)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - no msal / unreadable cache = not signed in
return None
return accounts[0] if accounts else None
def _ensure_network(action: str) -> None:
"""Turn a "Block network" refusal into the error type callers already handle."""
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
raise Ms365AuthError(network_guard.refusal(action))
def signed_in_account(tenant_id: str, client_id: str) -> Optional[dict]:
"""The cached account, if any — a local cache lookup, no network call."""
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
# Building the MSAL app fetches the tenant's OpenID configuration, so
# read the token cache directly instead: the UI still sees who is
# signed in without the app reaching login.microsoftonline.com.
return _cached_account_offline()
try:
app, _cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id)
except Ms365AuthError:
@@ -156,6 +182,7 @@ def sign_in_device_code(tenant_id: str, client_id: str, on_code: Callable[[dict]
``verification_uri_complete`` (URL with the code pre-filled, when the tenant
returns it) and ``message`` (the full human-readable instruction). Returns
the MSAL token result dict; raises Ms365AuthError on failure/timeout."""
_ensure_network("Microsoft 365 sign-in")
app, cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id)
flow = app.initiate_device_flow(scopes=SCOPES)
if "user_code" not in flow:
@@ -183,6 +210,7 @@ def get_access_token(tenant_id: str, client_id: str) -> str:
"""Silently reuse the cached sign-in. Raises Ms365AuthError when there is
no valid session — the caller (a Graph call) should surface that as a
normal tool failure telling the user to sign in again from Settings."""
_ensure_network("Microsoft 365")
app, cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id)
accounts = app.get_accounts()
if not accounts:
@@ -228,6 +256,7 @@ def sign_out_default(config=None) -> None:
def sign_out(tenant_id: str, client_id: str) -> None:
"""Đăng xuất và xoá token của một tenant/client khỏi kho."""
try:
_ensure_network("Microsoft 365 sign-out") # chặn mạng: chỉ xoá kho token bên dưới
app, cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id)
for acc in app.get_accounts():
app.remove_account(acc)
+4
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@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ def _request(method: str, url: str, token: str, **kwargs) -> requests.Response:
"""Gọi Graph API, tự ghép ``GRAPH_BASE`` cho đường dẫn tương đối và đổi lỗi HTTP
thành :class:`Ms365GraphError` kèm thông điệp đọc được.
"""
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
raise Ms365GraphError(network_guard.refusal("Microsoft 365 (Graph)"))
if not url.startswith("http"):
url = f"{GRAPH_BASE}{url}"
headers = _headers(token, kwargs.pop("headers", None))
+48 -4
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@@ -218,8 +218,13 @@ class SandboxManager:
timeout_sec: int,
cancel: Optional[Callable[[], bool]] = None,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Dispatch execution to the selected backend."""
if backend == "direct":
"""Dispatch execution to the selected backend.
With the network blocked every backend is replaced by the same OS-level
isolation: the backends below only ever set proxy env vars, which
anything that ignores proxies (raw sockets, ping, .NET WebClient...)
walked straight past."""
if block_network or backend == "direct":
return self._run_direct(command, workdir, block_network, timeout_sec, cancel)
if backend == "integrity_job_wfp":
@@ -274,7 +279,8 @@ class SandboxManager:
env = os.environ.copy()
if block_network:
from .deps import network_blocked_env
env = network_blocked_env(env)
env = network_blocked_env(env) # belt and braces on top of the OS block
return self._run_network_isolated(command, workdir, env, timeout_sec, cancel)
if cancel is not None:
from .deps import run_cancellable
@@ -334,4 +340,42 @@ class SandboxManager:
"stderr": str(exc),
"returncode": -1,
"sandbox": "direct",
}
}
@staticmethod
def _run_network_isolated(
command: str,
workdir: str,
env: Dict[str, str],
timeout_sec: int,
cancel: Optional[Callable[[], bool]] = None,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Run ``command`` in a process the OS keeps off the network.
Fail-closed: when the isolation cannot be set up the command is
refused (``sandbox == "blocked"``), never run with the network open."""
from .deps import run_cancellable
rc, output, cancelled, timed_out, exceeded = run_cancellable(
command, cwd=workdir or None, timeout=timeout_sec, cancel=cancel,
shell=True, env=env, isolate_network=True,
)
if rc is None and not (cancelled or timed_out or exceeded):
return {"ok": False, "stdout": "", "returncode": -1, "sandbox": "blocked",
"stderr": ("Command refused: network is blocked and the command could "
f"not be isolated from the network ({output.strip()}).")}
if cancelled:
stderr = "Cancelled by user."
elif timed_out:
stderr = f"Timeout after {timeout_sec}s"
elif exceeded:
stderr = "Resource limit exceeded."
else:
stderr = ""
return {
"ok": rc == 0 and not (cancelled or timed_out or exceeded),
"stdout": output,
"stderr": stderr,
"returncode": rc if rc is not None else -1,
"sandbox": "network_isolated",
}
+1 -13
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@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ in Waiting Input), so executors here run with an auto gate.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
import time
import uuid
from datetime import datetime
@@ -30,6 +29,7 @@ from . import agent_roles
from . import agent_security
from . import projects
from .permissions import PermissionGate
from .task_script import run_script as _run_script
from .tasks import ARTIFACTS_DIR, resolve_input_text
from .tools import ToolContext
@@ -358,18 +358,6 @@ def _run_agent(ctx, task_type: str, prompt: str, out_dir: Path,
return _last_assistant_text(messages), timed_out(), incomplete
def _run_script(command: str, out_dir: Path, timeout_sec: int) -> str:
"""Chạy một task kiểu script bằng shell trong thư mục kết quả, có hạn giờ."""
if not command.strip():
raise RuntimeError("Script task has no command configured.")
proc = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, cwd=str(out_dir),
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=max(1, timeout_sec))
output = (proc.stdout or "") + (("\n[stderr]\n" + proc.stderr) if proc.stderr else "")
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise RuntimeError(f"Script exited with code {proc.returncode}:\n{output[-2000:]}")
return output
def execute_task(ctx, task: Dict[str, Any], run_id: str,
emit: Optional[EmitFn] = None, cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
tasks_dir: Path = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+47
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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
"""Run a scheduled task of type ``script`` (tách khỏi ``task_executors.py``).
Khi công tắc "Chặn mạng" đang bật, lệnh của task chạy trong tiến trình bị hệ
điều hành cắt mạng — giống ``run_command`` của agent. Trước đây task script
chạy thẳng bằng ``subprocess.run``, không sandbox, nên lên mạng tự do.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
def run_script(command: str, out_dir: Path, timeout_sec: int) -> str:
"""Chạy một task kiểu script bằng shell trong thư mục kết quả, có hạn giờ."""
if not command.strip():
raise RuntimeError("Script task has no command configured.")
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
return _run_script_without_network(command, out_dir, timeout_sec)
proc = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, cwd=str(out_dir),
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=max(1, timeout_sec))
output = (proc.stdout or "") + (("\n[stderr]\n" + proc.stderr) if proc.stderr else "")
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise RuntimeError(f"Script exited with code {proc.returncode}:\n{output[-2000:]}")
return output
def _run_script_without_network(command: str, out_dir: Path, timeout_sec: int) -> str:
"""Như :func:`run_script`, nhưng tiến trình không có mạng; không cô lập được thì không chạy."""
from .deps import network_blocked_env, run_cancellable
rc, output, _cancelled, timed_out, _exceeded = run_cancellable(
command, cwd=str(out_dir), timeout=max(1, timeout_sec), shell=True,
env=network_blocked_env(), isolate_network=True,
)
if timed_out:
raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(command, timeout_sec)
if rc is None:
raise RuntimeError("Script not run: network is blocked and the script could not be "
f"isolated from the network ({output.strip()}).")
if rc != 0:
raise RuntimeError(f"Script exited with code {rc} (network blocked):\n{output[-2000:]}")
return output
__all__ = ["run_script"]
+4
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@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ class TeamsNotifier:
"""Post a notification. Returns ``(ok, detail)``."""
if not self.configured:
return False, "Teams webhook URL is not configured."
from ..application.network import network_guard
if network_guard.is_blocked():
return False, network_guard.refusal("Teams notification")
# Workflows webhooks expect an Adaptive Card; classic connectors expect a
# MessageCard. Try both, then a plain-text fallback.
+17 -11
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@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ STRINGS: Dict[str, Dict[str, str]] = {
"vi": "Cho phép agent lấy dữ liệu từ URL (trang web, link SharePoint / OneDrive)"},
"settings.allow_url_fetch_tooltip": {
"en": ("Lets the agent's fetch_url tool read web pages, online documents and "
"SharePoint/OneDrive share links to search & process them. Separate from "
"'Block network' (which only sandboxes shell commands). Default: on."),
"SharePoint/OneDrive share links to search & process them. 'Block network' "
"overrides this switch. Default: on."),
"ja": "エージェントのfetch_urlツールがWebページ・オンライン文書・SharePoint/OneDrive共有リンクを"
"読み取れるようにします。「ネットワークをブロック」(シェルコマンド用)とは別です。既定: オン。",
"読み取れるようにします。「ネットワークをブロック」がオンの場合はそちらが優先されます。既定: オン。",
"vi": ("Cho phép tool fetch_url của agent đọc trang web, tài liệu online và link chia sẻ "
"SharePoint/OneDrive để tìm kiếm & xử lý. Tách biệt với 'Chặn mạng' (chỉ áp cho lệnh "
"shell). Mặc định: bật.")},
"SharePoint/OneDrive để tìm kiếm & xử lý. 'Chặn mạng' được ưu tiên hơn công tắc "
"này. Mặc định: bật.")},
"settings.test_internet": {
"en": "Test Internet", "ja": "インターネット接続テスト", "vi": "Kiểm tra Internet"},
"settings.test_internet_tooltip": {
@@ -39,12 +39,18 @@ STRINGS: Dict[str, Dict[str, str]] = {
"en": "Testing internet access…", "ja": "インターネット接続をテスト中…",
"vi": "Đang kiểm tra truy cập internet…"},
"settings.sandbox_block_network_tooltip": {
"en": ("Policy-level control (proxy env vars point at a black hole) — not a kernel "
"firewall. Combine with the command whitelist above for defense in depth."),
"ja": "ポリシーレベルの制御です(プロキシ環境変数をブラックホールに向ける)— カーネルレベルの"
"ファイアウォールではありません。上のコマンドホワイトリストと併用してください。",
"vi": "Kiểm soát ở tầng chính sách (trỏ biến môi trường proxy vào hố đen) — không phải "
"firewall tầng kernel. Kết hợp với whitelist lệnh ở trên để phòng thủ nhiều lớp."},
"en": ("Only the AI provider (chat, model list, model test) may reach the network. "
"Agent shell commands and task scripts run in a Windows AppContainer with no "
"network access; fetch_url, Jira, connectors/MCP, Microsoft 365, Teams, "
"connector tests, pip auto-install and remote content in HTML previews are refused."),
"ja": "ネットワークに接続できるのはAIプロバイダー(チャット・モデル一覧・モデルテスト)のみです。"
"エージェントのシェルコマンドとタスクスクリプトはネットワークなしのWindows AppContainerで実行され、"
"fetch_url・Jira・コネクタ/MCP・Microsoft 365・Teams・接続テスト・pip自動インストール・"
"HTMLプレビューの外部リソースは拒否されます。",
"vi": "Chỉ nhà cung cấp AI (chat, tải danh sách model, thử model) được ra mạng. Lệnh shell "
"của agent và task script chạy trong Windows AppContainer không có mạng; fetch_url, "
"Jira, connector/MCP, Microsoft 365, Teams, nút Test, tự cài thư viện và tài nguyên "
"web trong xem trước HTML đều bị từ chối."},
"settings.sandbox_unlimited": {"en": "Unlimited", "ja": "無制限", "vi": "Không giới hạn"},
"settings.sandbox_cpu_label": {"en": "CPU limit", "ja": "CPU 制限", "vi": "Giới hạn CPU"},
"settings.sandbox_memory_label": {"en": "Memory limit", "ja": "メモリ制限", "vi": "Giới hạn bộ nhớ"},
+5 -5
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@@ -76,11 +76,11 @@ def run_command(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any],
denial = "Command blocked by security policy: " + "; ".join(risk.reasons)
return {"ok": False, "output": denial}
# Every sandbox backend's network block is a proxy-env-var trick (see
# core/deps.py::network_blocked_env) — it does nothing against a tool
# that reaches the network without an HTTP proxy (ping/ICMP, nslookup/
# direct DNS, ssh/ftp/raw TCP...). Deny those BY NAME here instead, so
# "Chặn mạng cho lệnh do agent chạy" actually blocks them too.
# With the network blocked, SandboxManager runs the command in an OS-level
# network-less process (AppContainer on Windows — see
# infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py). Tools that exist only to
# reach the network (ping, nslookup, ssh...) are still denied BY NAME
# first: the model gets a clear reason instead of a cryptic socket error.
if ctx.block_network:
bypass_tool = command_bypasses_network_proxy(command)
if bypass_tool:
@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
"""Spawn a shell command inside a Windows AppContainer with NO network capability.
Why this exists
---------------
The old "block network" for agent shell commands only pointed the proxy env
vars at a dead port (``core/deps.py::network_blocked_env``). Anything that
ignores proxies (``Invoke-WebRequest -NoProxy``, raw sockets, ``certutil``,
.NET ``WebClient``...) still reached the internet. An AppContainer token that
is granted no ``internetClient``/``privateNetworkClientServer`` capability is
refused by the kernel firewall for every outbound connection, loopback
included, no matter which tool makes it. No admin rights are needed.
An AppContainer can only open files whose ACL admits its SID (or ALL
APPLICATION PACKAGES). System32 and Program Files already do; the workdir and
the app's own Python install do not, so :func:`spawn` grants the profile SID
access to those folders first (an extra ACE, nothing is removed).
:class:`AppContainerProcess` quacks like ``subprocess.Popen`` for the subset
``core/deps.py::_run_cancellable_body`` uses (``pid``, ``stdout``/``stderr``
text streams, ``poll``/``wait``/``kill``/``returncode``), so the Stop button,
timeouts, Job Objects and resource limits keep working unchanged.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import io
import locale
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
from typing import Dict, Iterable, Optional
PROFILE_NAME = "cowork_local.agent_netblock"
_IS_WINDOWS = sys.platform == "win32"
if _IS_WINDOWS:
import ctypes
import msvcrt
from ctypes import wintypes
_k32 = ctypes.WinDLL("kernel32", use_last_error=True)
_adv = ctypes.WinDLL("advapi32", use_last_error=True)
_uenv = ctypes.WinDLL("userenv", use_last_error=True)
class _SECURITY_CAPABILITIES(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("AppContainerSid", ctypes.c_void_p), ("Capabilities", ctypes.c_void_p),
("CapabilityCount", wintypes.DWORD), ("Reserved", wintypes.DWORD)]
class _STARTUPINFOW(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("cb", wintypes.DWORD), ("lpReserved", wintypes.LPWSTR),
("lpDesktop", wintypes.LPWSTR), ("lpTitle", wintypes.LPWSTR),
("dwX", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwY", wintypes.DWORD),
("dwXSize", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwYSize", wintypes.DWORD),
("dwXCountChars", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwYCountChars", wintypes.DWORD),
("dwFillAttribute", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwFlags", wintypes.DWORD),
("wShowWindow", wintypes.WORD), ("cbReserved2", wintypes.WORD),
("lpReserved2", ctypes.c_void_p), ("hStdInput", wintypes.HANDLE),
("hStdOutput", wintypes.HANDLE), ("hStdError", wintypes.HANDLE)]
class _STARTUPINFOEXW(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("StartupInfo", _STARTUPINFOW), ("lpAttributeList", ctypes.c_void_p)]
class _PROCESS_INFORMATION(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("hProcess", wintypes.HANDLE), ("hThread", wintypes.HANDLE),
("dwProcessId", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwThreadId", wintypes.DWORD)]
class _SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("nLength", wintypes.DWORD), ("lpSecurityDescriptor", ctypes.c_void_p),
("bInheritHandle", wintypes.BOOL)]
_uenv.CreateAppContainerProfile.restype = ctypes.c_long
_uenv.CreateAppContainerProfile.argtypes = [
wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.LPCWSTR, ctypes.c_void_p,
wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_void_p)]
_uenv.DeriveAppContainerSidFromAppContainerName.restype = ctypes.c_long
_uenv.DeriveAppContainerSidFromAppContainerName.argtypes = [
wintypes.LPCWSTR, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_void_p)]
_uenv.GetAppContainerFolderPath.restype = ctypes.c_long
_uenv.GetAppContainerFolderPath.argtypes = [
wintypes.LPCWSTR, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_wchar_p)]
_adv.ConvertSidToStringSidW.restype = wintypes.BOOL
_adv.ConvertSidToStringSidW.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_wchar_p)]
_k32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList.restype = wintypes.BOOL
_k32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList.argtypes = [
ctypes.c_void_p, wintypes.DWORD, wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_size_t)]
_k32.UpdateProcThreadAttribute.restype = wintypes.BOOL
_k32.UpdateProcThreadAttribute.argtypes = [
ctypes.c_void_p, wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.c_size_t, ctypes.c_void_p,
ctypes.c_size_t, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p]
_k32.DeleteProcThreadAttributeList.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p]
_k32.CreatePipe.restype = wintypes.BOOL
_k32.CreatePipe.argtypes = [ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.HANDLE), ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.HANDLE),
ctypes.POINTER(_SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), wintypes.DWORD]
_k32.SetHandleInformation.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, wintypes.DWORD, wintypes.DWORD]
_k32.CreateProcessW.restype = wintypes.BOOL
_k32.CreateProcessW.argtypes = [
wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.LPWSTR, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p, wintypes.BOOL,
wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.c_void_p, wintypes.LPCWSTR, ctypes.POINTER(_STARTUPINFOEXW),
ctypes.POINTER(_PROCESS_INFORMATION)]
_k32.ResumeThread.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE]
_k32.WaitForSingleObject.restype = wintypes.DWORD
_k32.WaitForSingleObject.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, wintypes.DWORD]
_k32.GetExitCodeProcess.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.DWORD)]
_k32.TerminateProcess.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, wintypes.UINT]
_k32.CloseHandle.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE]
_k32.GetStdHandle.restype = wintypes.HANDLE
_k32.OpenProcess.restype = wintypes.HANDLE
_ALREADY_EXISTS = ctypes.c_long(0x800700B7).value
_PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_HANDLE_LIST = 0x00020002
_PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES = 0x00020009
_EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT = 0x00080000
_CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT = 0x00000400
_CREATE_NO_WINDOW = 0x08000000
_CREATE_SUSPENDED = 0x00000004
_STARTF_USESTDHANDLES = 0x00000100
_HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT = 0x00000001
_STILL_ACTIVE = 259
_profile_lock = threading.Lock()
_profile: Dict[str, object] = {}
_granted: set = set()
class NetworkIsolationUnavailable(RuntimeError):
"""This machine cannot start a network-less process — callers must refuse to run."""
def is_supported() -> bool:
"""True on Windows builds that ship the AppContainer API (Windows 8+)."""
if not _IS_WINDOWS:
return False
try:
return bool(_uenv.CreateAppContainerProfile)
except AttributeError:
return False
def _profile_sid():
"""``(sid pointer, sid string, temp folder)`` of the shared no-network profile."""
with _profile_lock:
if _profile:
return _profile["sid"], _profile["sid_str"], _profile["temp"]
sid = ctypes.c_void_p()
hr = _uenv.CreateAppContainerProfile(PROFILE_NAME, "Cowork Local agent (no network)",
"Agent shell commands with the network blocked",
None, 0, ctypes.byref(sid))
if hr == _ALREADY_EXISTS:
hr = _uenv.DeriveAppContainerSidFromAppContainerName(PROFILE_NAME, ctypes.byref(sid))
if hr != 0 or not sid.value:
raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable(f"AppContainer profile error 0x{hr & 0xFFFFFFFF:08X}")
text = ctypes.c_wchar_p()
if not _adv.ConvertSidToStringSidW(sid, ctypes.byref(text)):
raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable("Could not read the AppContainer SID")
sid_str = text.value
folder = ctypes.c_wchar_p()
temp = ""
if _uenv.GetAppContainerFolderPath(sid_str, ctypes.byref(folder)) == 0 and folder.value:
temp = os.path.join(folder.value, "Temp")
os.makedirs(temp, exist_ok=True)
_profile.update(sid=sid, sid_str=sid_str, temp=temp)
return sid, sid_str, temp
_PERMS = {"write": "(OI)(CI)(M)", "read": "(OI)(CI)(RX)", "read_here": "(OI)(NP)(RX)"}
def _qt_package_dir() -> str:
"""Folder of the installed PySide6/Qt binaries ('' if PySide6 is absent)."""
try:
import importlib.util
spec = importlib.util.find_spec("PySide6")
except (ImportError, ValueError):
return ""
return os.path.dirname(spec.origin) if spec and spec.origin else ""
def _covers(folder: str, target: str) -> bool:
"""True if ``target`` is ``folder`` itself or lies somewhere below it."""
if not folder or not target:
return False
folder, target = os.path.normcase(folder), os.path.normcase(target)
return target == folder or target.startswith(folder.rstrip("\\/") + os.sep)
def _icacls(*args: str) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
return subprocess.run(["icacls", *args], capture_output=True, text=True,
creationflags=_CREATE_NO_WINDOW)
def grant_access(path: str, sid_str: str, mode: str) -> None:
"""Let the AppContainer SID open ``path``.
``mode`` is ``"write"``/``"read"`` (inherited by everything below) or
``"read_here"`` (this folder and the files directly in it, no deeper).
An inherited ACE must never reach the Qt WebEngine binaries: Chromium's
sandboxed render process then fails to load Qt6WebEngineCore.dll
(STATUS_DLL_NOT_FOUND) and every web view in the app goes blank. A folder
that contains the PySide6 install is therefore refused.
"""
path = os.path.abspath(path)
key = (os.path.normcase(path), mode)
if key in _granted or not os.path.exists(path):
return
if mode != "read_here" and _covers(path, _qt_package_dir()):
raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable(
f"Refusing to sandbox a folder that contains the app's Qt runtime: {path}")
perm = _PERMS[mode]
listing = (_icacls(path).stdout or "").lower()
if f"{sid_str}:{perm}".lower() not in listing:
done = _icacls(path, "/grant", f"*{sid_str}:{perm}", "/Q", "/C")
if done.returncode != 0:
raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable(
f"Could not grant the sandbox access to {path}: {(done.stderr or done.stdout).strip()}")
_granted.add(key)
def _repair_inherited_grant(path: str, sid_str: str) -> None:
"""Drop an inherited grant that an earlier build put on the app's venv."""
key = (os.path.normcase(os.path.abspath(path)), "repaired")
if key in _granted or not os.path.isdir(path):
return
listing = (_icacls(path).stdout or "").lower()
if f"{sid_str}:(oi)(ci)".lower() in listing:
_icacls(path, "/remove:g", f"*{sid_str}", "/Q", "/C")
_granted.add(key)
def _interpreter_grants():
"""``(folder, mode)`` pairs that let the sandbox run the app's Python.
The base install is read-only and holds no Qt; a venv only needs its root
(``pyvenv.cfg``) and ``Scripts`` — never ``Lib/site-packages``.
"""
qt_dir = _qt_package_dir()
if _covers(sys.base_prefix, qt_dir):
# PySide6 lives in the base install itself: expose only the executable
# and the compiled stdlib modules, never the tree holding Qt.
grants = [(sys.base_prefix, "read_here"), (os.path.join(sys.base_prefix, "DLLs"), "read")]
else:
grants = [(sys.base_prefix, "read")]
if os.path.normcase(sys.prefix) != os.path.normcase(sys.base_prefix):
grants += [(sys.prefix, "read_here"), (os.path.join(sys.prefix, "Scripts"), "read")]
return [(folder, mode) for folder, mode in grants
if mode == "read_here" or not _covers(folder, qt_dir)]
def _env_block(env: Dict[str, str]) -> ctypes.Array:
"""Sorted, double-NUL-terminated UTF-16 environment block for CreateProcessW."""
items = sorted(env.items(), key=lambda kv: kv[0].upper())
text = "".join(f"{k}={v}\0" for k, v in items if k and "=" not in k) + "\0"
return ctypes.create_unicode_buffer(text, len(text))
def _pipe():
"""Anonymous pipe; only the child's (write) end is inheritable."""
sa = _SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES(ctypes.sizeof(_SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), None, True)
read, write = wintypes.HANDLE(), wintypes.HANDLE()
if not _k32.CreatePipe(ctypes.byref(read), ctypes.byref(write), ctypes.byref(sa), 0):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
_k32.SetHandleInformation(read, _HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0)
return read, write
class AppContainerProcess:
"""The ``subprocess.Popen`` subset that ``deps._run_cancellable_body`` relies on."""
def __init__(self, handle, pid: int, stdout: io.TextIOBase, stderr: io.TextIOBase):
"""Wrap an already-started process handle and its two output streams."""
self._handle = handle
self.pid = pid
self.stdout = stdout
self.stderr = stderr
self.returncode: Optional[int] = None
def poll(self) -> Optional[int]:
"""Exit code if the process has finished, else None."""
if self.returncode is None and self._handle:
code = wintypes.DWORD()
if _k32.GetExitCodeProcess(self._handle, ctypes.byref(code)) and code.value != _STILL_ACTIVE:
self.returncode = ctypes.c_int32(code.value).value
_k32.CloseHandle(self._handle)
self._handle = None
return self.returncode
def wait(self, timeout: Optional[float] = None) -> int:
"""Block until exit; raise ``subprocess.TimeoutExpired`` like Popen does."""
if self.returncode is None and self._handle:
ms = 0xFFFFFFFF if timeout is None else int(timeout * 1000)
if _k32.WaitForSingleObject(self._handle, ms) != 0:
raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired("appcontainer", timeout)
return self.poll()
def kill(self) -> None:
"""Terminate the process (the Job Object in deps kills its children)."""
if self.returncode is None and self._handle:
_k32.TerminateProcess(self._handle, 1)
def communicate(self, timeout: Optional[float] = None):
"""Read both streams to the end and wait; returns ``(stdout, stderr)``."""
chunks: Dict[str, str] = {}
def _drain(name, stream):
chunks[name] = stream.read()
readers = [threading.Thread(target=_drain, args=(n, s), daemon=True)
for n, s in (("out", self.stdout), ("err", self.stderr))]
for t in readers:
t.start()
for t in readers:
t.join(timeout)
self.wait(timeout)
return chunks.get("out", ""), chunks.get("err", "")
def spawn(command: str, cwd: Optional[str], env: Optional[Dict[str, str]],
readable_dirs: Iterable[str] = ()) -> AppContainerProcess:
"""Start ``cmd.exe /c command`` in the no-network AppContainer.
Raises :class:`NetworkIsolationUnavailable` when that cannot be done —
callers must then refuse the command rather than run it with the network on.
"""
if not is_supported():
raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable("AppContainer is only available on Windows")
sid, sid_str, temp = _profile_sid()
cwd = os.path.abspath(cwd or os.getcwd())
_repair_inherited_grant(sys.prefix, sid_str)
grant_access(cwd, sid_str, "write")
for folder, mode in [*_interpreter_grants(), *((d, "read") for d in readable_dirs if d)]:
grant_access(folder, sid_str, mode)
child_env = dict(os.environ if env is None else env)
if temp:
child_env["TEMP"] = child_env["TMP"] = temp
child_env.setdefault("PYTHONIOENCODING", "utf-8")
env_block = _env_block(child_env)
out_r, out_w = _pipe()
err_r, err_w = _pipe()
handles = (wintypes.HANDLE * 2)(out_w, err_w)
caps = _SECURITY_CAPABILITIES(sid, None, 0, 0)
size = ctypes.c_size_t()
_k32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(None, 2, 0, ctypes.byref(size))
attr = ctypes.create_string_buffer(size.value)
pi = _PROCESS_INFORMATION()
try:
if not (_k32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(attr, 2, 0, ctypes.byref(size))
and _k32.UpdateProcThreadAttribute(
attr, 0, _PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES, ctypes.byref(caps),
ctypes.sizeof(caps), None, None)
and _k32.UpdateProcThreadAttribute(
attr, 0, _PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_HANDLE_LIST, handles,
ctypes.sizeof(handles), None, None)):
raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable(str(ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())))
si = _STARTUPINFOEXW()
si.StartupInfo.cb = ctypes.sizeof(si)
si.StartupInfo.dwFlags = _STARTF_USESTDHANDLES
si.StartupInfo.hStdOutput = out_w
si.StartupInfo.hStdError = err_w
si.lpAttributeList = ctypes.addressof(attr)
comspec = os.environ.get("COMSPEC") or r"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"
cmdline = ctypes.create_unicode_buffer(f'"{comspec}" /d /s /c "{command}"')
flags = (_EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT | _CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT
| _CREATE_NO_WINDOW | _CREATE_SUSPENDED)
if not _k32.CreateProcessW(None, cmdline, None, None, True, flags,
ctypes.addressof(env_block), cwd,
ctypes.byref(si), ctypes.byref(pi)):
raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable(
f"Could not start the sandboxed command: {ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())}")
_k32.ResumeThread(pi.hThread)
_k32.CloseHandle(pi.hThread)
except BaseException:
for h in (out_r, err_r):
_k32.CloseHandle(h)
raise
finally:
_k32.DeleteProcThreadAttributeList(attr)
_k32.CloseHandle(out_w)
_k32.CloseHandle(err_w)
def _stream(handle) -> io.TextIOBase:
fd = msvcrt.open_osfhandle(handle.value, os.O_RDONLY)
return io.TextIOWrapper(io.FileIO(fd, "rb"), encoding=locale.getpreferredencoding(False),
errors="replace")
return AppContainerProcess(pi.hProcess, pi.dwProcessId, _stream(out_r), _stream(err_r))
__all__ = ["AppContainerProcess", "NetworkIsolationUnavailable", "PROFILE_NAME",
"grant_access", "is_supported", "spawn"]
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
"""Start a shell command that the operating system keeps off the network.
Used whenever "Block network" is on for agent ``run_command`` calls and for
scheduled script tasks. The contract is fail-closed: if isolation cannot be
set up, :class:`NetworkIsolationUnavailable` is raised and the caller refuses
the command instead of running it with the network open.
* Windows: an AppContainer with no network capability
(:mod:`.appcontainer_process`).
* macOS: ``sandbox-exec`` with a profile that denies every network operation.
* Linux: ``unshare --net`` in a new user namespace (an empty network namespace
has only a downed loopback). If unprivileged namespaces are disabled,
``unshare`` itself fails and the command never runs.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
from typing import Dict, Optional
from .appcontainer_process import NetworkIsolationUnavailable
_MACOS_PROFILE = "(version 1)(allow default)(deny network*)"
def spawn_without_network(command: str, cwd: Optional[str], env: Optional[Dict[str, str]]):
"""A ``Popen``-like process running ``command`` through the shell, with no network."""
if sys.platform == "win32":
from . import appcontainer_process
return appcontainer_process.spawn(command, cwd, env)
if sys.platform == "darwin" and shutil.which("sandbox-exec"):
argv = ["sandbox-exec", "-p", _MACOS_PROFILE, "/bin/sh", "-c", command]
elif sys.platform.startswith("linux") and shutil.which("unshare"):
argv = ["unshare", "--user", "--map-root-user", "--net", "/bin/sh", "-c", command]
else:
raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable(
"No network isolation is available on this system (needs AppContainer, "
"sandbox-exec or unshare).")
return subprocess.Popen(argv, cwd=cwd, env=env, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, bufsize=1,
start_new_session=True)
__all__ = ["NetworkIsolationUnavailable", "spawn_without_network"]
@@ -110,7 +110,10 @@ class OfficeDocumentRenderer:
if self._engine is None:
try:
from PySide6.QtWebEngineWidgets import QWebEngineView
from .offline_web_page import install_offline_page
self._engine = QWebEngineView()
install_offline_page(self._engine)
self._owner.stack.addWidget(self._engine)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
self._engine = None
+66
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
"""HTML preview page that loads nothing from the web while "Block network" is on.
``QWebEngineView.setHtml`` happily fetches every ``<img src="https://...">``,
``<script src>`` and stylesheet the previewed file references — an outbound
connection the user never asked for, made by the app itself. The preview gets
its own off-the-record profile (so the interceptor below touches no other web
view, e.g. the GraphRAG renderer) and every remote request is refused while
the switch is on. Local files, ``data:`` and ``qrc:`` URLs still load.
Lifetime rule: a ``QWebEngineProfile`` must outlive every page that uses it.
A profile owned by the view is destroyed *before* the page (children die in
creation order) — Qt then warns "Release of profile requested but
WebEnginePage still not deleted" and the app can abort later (0xc0000409 in
Qt6Core.dll, seen when switching tabs). So there is ONE profile for the whole
app, owned by the QApplication, and each page is owned by its view.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Optional
from PySide6.QtWebEngineCore import (
QWebEnginePage, QWebEngineProfile, QWebEngineSettings, QWebEngineUrlRequestInterceptor,
)
from PySide6.QtWidgets import QApplication
from cowork_local.application.network import network_guard
_REMOTE_SCHEMES = frozenset({"http", "https", "ws", "wss", "ftp"})
_profile: Optional[QWebEngineProfile] = None
_blocker: Optional["RemoteRequestBlocker"] = None # Python must hold it, or it is collected
class RemoteRequestBlocker(QWebEngineUrlRequestInterceptor):
"""Refuses remote URLs whenever the network guard says the network is blocked."""
def interceptRequest(self, info) -> None: # noqa: N802 - Qt override
"""Called by WebEngine for every request the page makes."""
if info.requestUrl().scheme().lower() in _REMOTE_SCHEMES and network_guard.is_blocked():
info.block(True)
def preview_profile() -> QWebEngineProfile:
"""The app-wide off-the-record profile shared by every HTML preview."""
global _profile, _blocker
if _profile is None:
_profile = QWebEngineProfile(QApplication.instance()) # no storage name = off the record
_blocker = RemoteRequestBlocker(_profile)
_profile.setUrlRequestInterceptor(_blocker)
_profile.settings().setAttribute(
QWebEngineSettings.WebAttribute.LocalContentCanAccessRemoteUrls, True)
return _profile
def install_offline_page(view) -> None:
"""Give ``view`` a page on the shared preview profile.
The previewed file is loaded with a ``file://`` base URL, and Qt refuses
every remote resource of such a page unless
``LocalContentCanAccessRemoteUrls`` is on — so web images never showed,
even with the network open. The switch is turned on for the profile; the
interceptor is what keeps remote content out while "Block network" is on.
"""
view.setPage(QWebEnginePage(preview_profile(), view))
__all__ = ["RemoteRequestBlocker", "install_offline_page", "preview_profile"]
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
"""Width of a navigation list whose current row is drawn bold.
The theme draws the selected ``sectionIndex`` row with ``font-weight: 600``
and 10px padding each side (``theme/qss.py``). Sizing the list from the plain
font left the selected label too wide for its row, so "Sandbox Security
Layer" was cut off in Settings as soon as it was picked.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Iterable
from PySide6.QtGui import QFont, QFontMetrics
#: Item padding (10px x 2) + item radius + list frame, with a little slack.
ROW_CHROME_PX = 48
def selected_label_width(widget, labels: Iterable[str]) -> int:
"""Pixels needed to show the widest of ``labels`` in the bold selected style."""
widget.ensurePolished()
bold = QFont(widget.font())
bold.setWeight(QFont.Weight.DemiBold)
metrics = QFontMetrics(bold)
return max((metrics.horizontalAdvance(label) for label in labels), default=0) + ROW_CHROME_PX
__all__ = ["ROW_CHROME_PX", "selected_label_width"]
+11 -2
View File
@@ -42,5 +42,14 @@ def build_config(path: Path | None = None) -> JsonConfigRepository:
def build_context(path: Path | None = None) -> AppContext:
"""Dựng AppContext hoàn chỉnh — điểm vào cho ``app.run()`` và cho checker."""
return AppContext(build_config(path))
"""Dựng AppContext hoàn chỉnh — điểm vào cho ``app.run()`` và cho checker.
Nối luôn cổng mạng chung vào cấu hình SỐNG của context: đổi công tắc
"Chặn mạng" trong Settings là có hiệu lực ngay ở lời gọi mạng kế tiếp.
"""
from ...application.network import network_guard
from ...core.agent_security import sandbox_settings
ctx = AppContext(build_config(path))
network_guard.bind(lambda: sandbox_settings(ctx.config)[1])
return ctx
+8 -4
View File
@@ -234,14 +234,19 @@ class AppContext:
be slow and wasteful). A server/connector that fails to connect is
skipped, not a hard failure for the turn."""
# Sandbox Security Layer blocks agent-owned network connectors before
# they can spawn a server or issue a REST request.
if self.config.agent_security.get("block_network", False):
return [], None
# they can spawn a server or issue a REST request — and stops the ones
# already running, which could otherwise keep talking to the network.
blocked = bool(self.config.agent_security.get("block_network", False))
if blocked:
self.stop_mcp_connections()
# Master switch (Monitoring → Tools → Connector): when the admin turns
# "Connect to external" off, the agent connects to NO external
# connectors/MCP at all — no subprocesses spawned, no REST calls.
if not self.config.connect_external:
return [], None
from .core.ms365_local import build_ms365_local_tools
if blocked: # the locally-synced OneDrive folders need no network
return build_ms365_local_tools(self.config)
from .core.ext_connectors import build_ext_connector_tools
from .core.mcp_client import build_mcp_tools as _merge_mcp_tools
from .core.tools import combine_tool_sources
@@ -276,7 +281,6 @@ class AppContext:
# Locally-synced OneDrive/SharePoint (no sign-in) — reads/writes the
# OneDrive-desktop-synced folders directly, gated on ms365.connectors.
from .core.ms365_local import build_ms365_local_tools
local_tools, local_executor = build_ms365_local_tools(self.config)
return combine_tool_sources((mcp_tools, mcp_executor), (ext_tools, ext_executor),
+14
View File
@@ -73,3 +73,17 @@ def _bind_checkout_as_package() -> None:
_bind_checkout_as_package()
import pytest # noqa: E402 - after the package binding above
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _reset_network_guard():
"""``build_context()`` binds the process-wide "Block network" gate to that
context's config (default: blocked). Unbind after every test so one test
that built a real context cannot silently block the network for the rest."""
yield
from cowork_local.application.network import network_guard
network_guard.bind(None)
+389
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
"""Công tắc "Chặn mạng" phải chặn mọi đường ra mạng của app, TRỪ nhà cung cấp AI.
Bản đồ ``infura/network-map.html`` liệt kê các làn trước đây "không kiểm soát"
hoặc chỉ chặn một phần: M365, Teams và nút Test, connector/MCP đang chạy,
task script và link đính kèm task, tự cài thư viện, xem trước HTML, lệnh shell
chỉ bị proxy giả. Mỗi làn có ít nhất một bài ở đây:
* **bật** — làn từ chối TRƯỚC khi chạm mạng (mọi lời gọi HTTP thật đều nổ);
* **tắt** — đường cũ giữ nguyên, vì chặn một chiều là hỏng tính năng.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import socket
import sys
import threading
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from cowork_local.application.network import network_guard
def _no_network(*args, **kwargs):
raise AssertionError("đã chạm mạng dù 'Chặn mạng' đang bật")
@pytest.fixture
def chan_mang(monkeypatch):
"""Bật công tắc qua cổng chung và làm nổ mọi lời gọi HTTP thật."""
import requests
from cowork_local.core import tls_trust
for name in ("request", "get", "post", "put", "patch", "delete"):
monkeypatch.setattr(requests, name, _no_network)
monkeypatch.setattr(tls_trust, "request", _no_network)
monkeypatch.setattr(tls_trust, "request_any_method", _no_network)
network_guard.bind(lambda: True)
yield
network_guard.bind(None)
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _go_cong_sau_moi_bai():
yield
network_guard.bind(None)
# ---- cổng chung ------------------------------------------------------------
def test_chua_noi_day_thi_khong_chan():
network_guard.bind(None)
assert network_guard.is_blocked() is False
network_guard.ensure_allowed("x")
def test_doc_cong_tac_loi_thi_coi_nhu_dang_chan():
"""Không đọc được công tắc thì đóng cửa, không mở toang."""
def hong():
raise KeyError("agent_security")
network_guard.bind(hong)
with pytest.raises(network_guard.NetworkBlockedError):
network_guard.ensure_allowed("Teams")
def test_cong_doc_cau_hinh_song_khong_chup_lai(tmp_path):
"""Đổi công tắc trong Settings có hiệu lực ngay, không cần mở lại app."""
from cowork_local.presentation.shell.bootstrap import build_context
ctx = build_context(tmp_path / "config.json")
ctx.config.agent_security["block_network"] = True
assert network_guard.is_blocked() is True
ctx.config.agent_security["block_network"] = False
assert network_guard.is_blocked() is False
# ---- Microsoft 365 -----------------------------------------------------------
def test_graph_tu_choi_bang_loi_ma_noi_goi_da_bat(chan_mang):
from cowork_local.core import ms365_graph
with pytest.raises(ms365_graph.Ms365GraphError, match="Sandbox Security Layer"):
ms365_graph.list_onedrive_files("token")
def test_dang_nhap_va_lay_token_tu_choi(chan_mang, monkeypatch):
from cowork_local.core import ms365_auth
monkeypatch.setattr(ms365_auth, "_app", _no_network)
with pytest.raises(ms365_auth.Ms365AuthError, match="blocked"):
ms365_auth.get_access_token("", "")
with pytest.raises(ms365_auth.Ms365AuthError, match="blocked"):
ms365_auth.sign_in_device_code("", "", lambda flow: None)
def test_kiem_tra_da_dang_nhap_khong_dung_msal_khi_chan(chan_mang, monkeypatch):
"""Dựng app MSAL là tải cấu hình OpenID của tenant — phải đọc kho token trực tiếp."""
from cowork_local.core import ms365_auth
monkeypatch.setattr(ms365_auth, "_app", _no_network)
monkeypatch.setattr(ms365_auth, "_cached_account_offline",
lambda: {"username": "a@b.c"})
assert ms365_auth.signed_in_account("", "") == {"username": "a@b.c"}
def test_mail_canh_bao_khong_gui_khi_chan(chan_mang, monkeypatch):
from types import SimpleNamespace
from cowork_local.core import agent_security_alert, ms365_auth
from cowork_local.core.agent_security_types import SecurityVerdict
monkeypatch.setattr(ms365_auth, "_app", _no_network)
config = SimpleNamespace(data={"agent_security": {"admin_email": "admin@x.y"}}, ms365={})
verdict = SecurityVerdict(allowed=False, layer="command", reason="test")
sent, note = agent_security_alert.notify_admin(config, verdict)
assert sent is False
assert "blocked" in note
# ---- Teams, connector REST, Jira, nút Test ---------------------------------
def test_teams_tu_choi(chan_mang):
from cowork_local.core.teams import TeamsNotifier
ok, detail = TeamsNotifier("https://x.webhook.office.com/hook").send("t", "b")
assert ok is False
assert "blocked" in detail
def test_connector_rest_va_nut_test_tu_choi(chan_mang):
from cowork_local.core.ext_connectors import RestApiConnector
rc = RestApiConnector({"id": "erp", "name": "ERP", "base_url": "https://erp.example"})
assert rc.call({"method": "GET", "path": "items"})["ok"] is False
ok, message = rc.test_connection()
assert ok is False and "blocked" in message
def test_nut_test_jira_tu_choi(chan_mang):
from cowork_local.core import jira_tool
cfg = {"base_url": "https://jira.example", "email": "a@b.c", "api_token": "t"}
out = jira_tool.search(cfg, "order by created DESC", 1)
assert out.startswith("Jira search failed") and "blocked" in out
# ---- MCP -------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_mcp_khong_khoi_dong_va_khong_goi_khi_chan(chan_mang):
from cowork_local.core.mcp_client import McpServerConnection, McpServerError
conn = McpServerConnection("srv", "definitely-not-run")
with pytest.raises(McpServerError, match="blocked"):
conn.start(timeout=1)
assert conn.call_tool("srv__search", {})["ok"] is False
def _context(tmp_path, block: bool):
from cowork_local.config import AppConfig
from cowork_local.state import AppContext
ctx = AppContext(AppConfig.load(tmp_path / "config.json"))
ctx.config.agent_security["block_network"] = block
return ctx
def test_chuan_bi_connector_dung_mcp_dang_chay_va_giu_onedrive_cuc_bo(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
from cowork_local.core import ms365_local
ctx = _context(tmp_path, block=True)
stopped = []
monkeypatch.setattr(ctx, "stop_mcp_connections", lambda: stopped.append(True))
local = (["ms365_local__onedrive_list"], object())
monkeypatch.setattr(ms365_local, "build_ms365_local_tools", lambda config: local)
monkeypatch.setattr(ctx._mcp_manager, "ensure", _no_network)
assert ctx.build_mcp_tools() == local
assert stopped == [True]
# ---- task lập lịch -----------------------------------------------------------
def test_link_dinh_kem_task_khong_tai(chan_mang):
from cowork_local.core.tasks import resolve_input_text
text = resolve_input_text({"input": {"mode": "empty", "links": ["https://example.com/a"]}})
assert "not fetched" in text
def test_task_script_chay_trong_tien_trinh_khong_mang(chan_mang, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
from cowork_local.core import deps, task_script
calls = []
def fake_run(command, **kwargs):
calls.append(kwargs)
return 0, "done", False, False, False
monkeypatch.setattr(deps, "run_cancellable", fake_run)
assert task_script.run_script("echo hi", tmp_path, 30) == "done"
assert calls and calls[0]["isolate_network"] is True
def test_task_script_khong_co_lap_duoc_thi_khong_chay(chan_mang, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
from cowork_local.core import deps, task_script
monkeypatch.setattr(deps, "run_cancellable",
lambda command, **kw: (None, "no AppContainer", False, False, False))
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="could not be isolated"):
task_script.run_script("echo hi", tmp_path, 30)
def test_tat_chan_mang_thi_task_script_chay_nhu_cu(tmp_path):
from cowork_local.core import task_script
assert "hi" in task_script.run_script("echo hi", tmp_path, 30)
# ---- tự cài thư viện ---------------------------------------------------------
def test_khong_tu_cai_thu_vien_khi_chan(chan_mang, monkeypatch):
from cowork_local.core import deps
monkeypatch.setattr(deps, "run_cancellable", _no_network)
assert deps.ensure_module("khong_ton_tai_xyz_123") is None
assert "khong_ton_tai_xyz_123" not in deps._FAILED # thử lại khi mở mạng
ok, detail = deps.pip_install("requests")
assert ok is False and "blocked" in detail
def test_pptx_khong_bi_nho_la_thieu_khi_chi_do_chan_mang(chan_mang, monkeypatch):
from cowork_local.application.workspaces import file_preview_helpers as fph
from cowork_local.core import deps
monkeypatch.setattr(fph, "_PPTX_READY", None)
monkeypatch.setattr(deps, "ensure_module", lambda *a, **k: None)
assert fph.pptx_available() is False
assert fph._PPTX_READY is None
# ---- lệnh shell của agent ----------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize("backend", ["direct", "integrity_job_wfp", "appcontainer", "windows_sandbox"])
def test_moi_backend_deu_chay_co_lap_mang(monkeypatch, tmp_path, backend):
"""Các backend cũ chỉ đặt biến proxy — khi chặn mạng, tất cả đi qua lớp cô lập của OS."""
from cowork_local.core import deps
from cowork_local.core.sandbox_manager import SandboxManager
calls = []
def fake_run(command, **kwargs):
calls.append(kwargs)
return 0, "ok", False, False, False
monkeypatch.setattr(deps, "run_cancellable", fake_run)
result = SandboxManager()._execute_with_backend(backend, "echo hi", str(tmp_path), True, 30)
assert calls and calls[0]["isolate_network"] is True
assert result["ok"] is True and result["sandbox"] == "network_isolated"
def test_lenh_khong_co_lap_duoc_thi_bi_tu_choi(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
from cowork_local.core import deps
from cowork_local.core.sandbox_manager import SandboxManager
monkeypatch.setattr(deps, "run_cancellable",
lambda command, **kw: (None, "no isolation", False, False, False))
result = SandboxManager()._execute_with_backend("direct", "echo hi", str(tmp_path), True, 30)
assert result["ok"] is False and result["sandbox"] == "blocked"
def test_he_dieu_hanh_khong_ho_tro_thi_bao_loi_khong_chay(monkeypatch):
from cowork_local.infrastructure.sandbox import network_isolation
monkeypatch.setattr(network_isolation.sys, "platform", "sunos5")
with pytest.raises(network_isolation.NetworkIsolationUnavailable):
network_isolation.spawn_without_network("echo hi", None, None)
def _listening_socket():
server = socket.socket()
server.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
server.listen(4)
def serve():
try:
for _ in range(4):
server.accept()
except OSError:
pass # socket closed at the end of the test
threading.Thread(target=serve, daemon=True).start()
return server
@pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform != "win32", reason="AppContainer chỉ có trên Windows")
def test_appcontainer_that_su_cat_mang_nhung_van_ghi_duoc_thu_muc(tmp_path):
"""Bài thật, không giả lập: cùng một lệnh Python nối tới một cổng đang nghe,
ngoài sandbox thì được, trong sandbox thì bị kernel từ chối."""
from cowork_local.core.deps import run_cancellable
server = _listening_socket()
port = server.getsockname()[1]
probe = (f'"{sys.executable}" -c "import socket;'
"print('PYTHON'+'_RAN');"
f"socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1',{port}),5);print('CONN'+'ECTED')\"")
try:
rc, out, *_ = run_cancellable(probe, cwd=str(tmp_path), timeout=60, shell=True)
assert rc == 0 and "CONNECTED" in out
rc, out, *_ = run_cancellable(probe + " & echo written> marker.txt",
cwd=str(tmp_path), timeout=60, isolate_network=True)
assert "PYTHON_RAN" in out, out # Python itself starts in the sandbox
assert "CONNECTED" not in out, out
assert (Path(tmp_path) / "marker.txt").read_text().strip() == "written"
finally:
server.close()
# ---- xem trước HTML ------------------------------------------------------------
class _FakeUrl:
def __init__(self, scheme):
self._scheme = scheme
def scheme(self):
return self._scheme
class _FakeRequest:
def __init__(self, scheme):
self._url = _FakeUrl(scheme)
self.blocked = False
def requestUrl(self): # noqa: N802 - Qt name
return self._url
def block(self, flag):
self.blocked = flag
@pytest.mark.parametrize("scheme,expected", [
("https", True), ("http", True), ("wss", True), ("file", False), ("data", False),
])
def test_xem_truoc_html_chan_tai_nguyen_web(chan_mang, scheme, expected):
pytest.importorskip("PySide6.QtWebEngineCore")
from cowork_local.presentation.folder.offline_web_page import RemoteRequestBlocker
req = _FakeRequest(scheme)
RemoteRequestBlocker().interceptRequest(req)
assert req.blocked is expected
def test_xem_truoc_html_tai_binh_thuong_khi_tat():
pytest.importorskip("PySide6.QtWebEngineCore")
from cowork_local.presentation.folder.offline_web_page import RemoteRequestBlocker
req = _FakeRequest("https")
RemoteRequestBlocker().interceptRequest(req)
assert req.blocked is False
@pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform != "win32", reason="AppContainer chỉ có trên Windows")
def test_khong_cap_quyen_ke_thua_len_thu_muc_chua_qt(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Quyền AppContainer kế thừa xuống Qt6WebEngineCore.dll làm tiến trình render
của WebEngine không nạp được DLL — tab Graph và xem trước HTML trắng trơn."""
from cowork_local.infrastructure.sandbox import appcontainer_process as ac
qt_dir = tmp_path / "venv" / "Lib" / "site-packages" / "PySide6"
qt_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
monkeypatch.setattr(ac, "_qt_package_dir", lambda: str(qt_dir))
monkeypatch.setattr(ac, "_icacls", _no_network)
with pytest.raises(ac.NetworkIsolationUnavailable, match="Qt runtime"):
ac.grant_access(str(tmp_path / "venv"), "S-1-15-2-1", "read")
with pytest.raises(ac.NetworkIsolationUnavailable, match="Qt runtime"):
ac.grant_access(str(tmp_path), "S-1-15-2-1", "write")
def test_quyen_cho_python_khong_bao_gio_phu_len_thu_vien_qt(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
from cowork_local.infrastructure.sandbox import appcontainer_process as ac
venv, base = tmp_path / "venv", tmp_path / "base"
monkeypatch.setattr(ac.sys, "prefix", str(venv))
monkeypatch.setattr(ac.sys, "base_prefix", str(base))
for qt_dir in (venv / "Lib" / "site-packages" / "PySide6",
base / "Lib" / "site-packages" / "PySide6"):
monkeypatch.setattr(ac, "_qt_package_dir", lambda d=qt_dir: str(d))
for folder, mode in ac._interpreter_grants():
assert mode == "read_here" or not ac._covers(folder, str(qt_dir)), (folder, mode)
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
"""Xem trước HTML trong tab Folder phải hiện được ảnh lấy từ web khi mạng mở.
Tệp được nạp với base URL ``file://``; Qt mặc định cấm trang cục bộ tải bất kỳ
tài nguyên web nào nếu ``LocalContentCanAccessRemoteUrls`` tắt, nên ảnh
``<img src="https://...">`` không bao giờ hiện, kể cả khi đã mở Internet.
Việc chặn khi bật "Chặn mạng" là của bộ chặn request, không phải của cờ này.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
pytest.importorskip("PySide6.QtWebEngineWidgets", reason="cần Qt WebEngine")
from cowork_local.presentation.shared import HAS_WEB_ENGINE # noqa: E402
pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(not HAS_WEB_ENGINE, reason="WebEngine không dùng được ở đây")
def test_trang_xem_truoc_cho_phep_tai_anh_tu_web(qapp):
from PySide6.QtWebEngineCore import QWebEngineSettings
from PySide6.QtWebEngineWidgets import QWebEngineView
from cowork_local.presentation.folder import offline_web_page as owp
view = QWebEngineView()
try:
owp.install_offline_page(view)
profile = view.page().profile()
assert profile is owp.preview_profile()
assert profile.settings().testAttribute(
QWebEngineSettings.WebAttribute.LocalContentCanAccessRemoteUrls)
assert isinstance(owp._blocker, owp.RemoteRequestBlocker)
finally:
view.deleteLater()
def test_profile_song_lau_hon_moi_trang(qapp):
"""Profile do view sở hữu bị huỷ TRƯỚC trang: Qt cảnh báo "Release of
profile requested but WebEnginePage still not deleted" rồi app có thể văng
(0xc0000409 trong Qt6Core.dll) khi chuyển tab. Profile phải thuộc về app."""
from PySide6.QtWebEngineWidgets import QWebEngineView
from cowork_local.presentation.folder import offline_web_page as owp
view = QWebEngineView()
try:
owp.install_offline_page(view)
assert view.page().parent() is view
assert owp.preview_profile().parent() is qapp
finally:
view.deleteLater()
+8 -1
View File
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ class SettingsDialog(QDialog):
sbl.addWidget(self.sandbox_confirm)
self.sandbox_block_network = ToggleSwitch(tr("settings.sandbox_block_network"))
self.sandbox_block_network.setChecked(bool(sec.get("block_network", True)))
self.sandbox_block_network.setChecked(bool(sec.get("block_network", False)))
self.sandbox_block_network.setToolTip(tr("settings.sandbox_block_network_tooltip"))
sbl.addWidget(self.sandbox_block_network)
@@ -277,4 +277,11 @@ class SettingsDialog(QDialog):
self.ctx.config._data = None # invalidate cache
self.ctx.config._agent_security = None
stop_mcp = getattr(self.ctx, "stop_mcp_connections", None)
if self.sandbox_block_network.isChecked() and stop_mcp is not None:
# A running MCP server is its own process and may keep using the
# network — stop them now, off the UI thread (each stop may wait).
import threading
threading.Thread(target=stop_mcp, daemon=True).start()
self.accept()
+3 -2
View File
@@ -490,8 +490,9 @@ def section_panels(sections, width: int = 260):
index.currentRowChanged.connect(stack.setCurrentIndex)
index.setCurrentRow(0)
natural = max(index.fontMetrics().horizontalAdvance(lab) for lab, _w in sections) + 36
index.setFixedWidth(max(120, min(width, natural)))
# Sized for the SELECTED look (bold + padding), or the picked label is cut.
from ..presentation.shared.list_sizing import selected_label_width
index.setFixedWidth(max(120, min(width, selected_label_width(index, [lab for lab, _w in sections]))))
return index, stack