fix(sandbox): "Chặn mạng" chặn mọi đường ra mạng, trừ nhà cung cấp AI

Trước đây công tắc chỉ chặn tool mạng của agent; lệnh shell chỉ bị proxy
giả, còn M365, Teams, nút Test, MCP đang chạy, task script, link đính kèm
task, pip tự cài và tài nguyên web trong xem trước HTML vẫn ra mạng tự do.

- Cổng chung application/network/network_guard.py, nối vào cấu hình sống
  ở Composition Root; nhà cung cấp AI (chat, danh sách model, thử model)
  không đi qua cổng này.
- Lệnh shell của agent và task script chạy trong Windows AppContainer
  không có quyền mạng (macOS: sandbox-exec, Linux: unshare --net);
  không cô lập được thì từ chối chạy.
- Không cấp quyền kế thừa của AppContainer lên thư mục chứa PySide6:
  Chromium không nạp được Qt6WebEngineCore.dll và tab Graph bị hỏng.
- Bật chặn thì dừng MCP đang chạy; tool OneDrive đồng bộ trên máy vẫn dùng.
- Mặc định tắt khi mở app lần đầu; nhãn và tooltip 3 ngôn ngữ cập nhật.
- Test: tests/test_network_guard_lanes.py (có bài AppContainer thật).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

core/chat_agent.py

@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ def run_cowork(
                     preview = {"kind": "info", "title": name, "text": str(args)}
                     emit({"type": "tool_proposed", "id": tc_id, "name": name, "args": args,
                           "preview": preview})
-                    if ctx.block_network:
+                    if ctx.block_network and not name.startswith("ms365_local__"):
                         result = {"ok": False, "output": (
                             f"{name}: network access is blocked by the Sandbox Security Layer "
                             '("Block network for agent-run commands" is on in Settings).')}

core/code_agent.py

@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ def run_code(
             else:
                 emit({"type": "tool_start", "id": tc_id, "name": name})
                 if is_extra and extra_executor is not None:
-                    if ctx.block_network:
+                    if ctx.block_network and not name.startswith("ms365_local__"):
                         result = {"ok": False, "output": (
                             f"{name}: network access is blocked by the Sandbox Security Layer "
                             '("Block network for agent-run commands" is on in Settings).')}

core/deps.py

@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ def run_cancellable(
     on_output: Optional[Callable[[str], None]] = None,
     env: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
     limits: Optional[Dict[str, float]] = None,
+    isolate_network: bool = False,
 ) -> Tuple[Optional[int], str, bool, bool, bool]:
     """Run a subprocess so the Stop button can actually interrupt it.
 
@@ -117,17 +118,27 @@ def run_cancellable(
     a failure to create/assign the job just means the existing taskkill
     fallback is used, same as before this was added.
 
+    ``isolate_network`` runs ``args`` as a shell command that the OS keeps
+    off the network (see ``infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py``);
+    if that isolation cannot be set up the command is NOT run.
+
     Returns ``(returncode, combined_output, cancelled, timed_out,
     resource_exceeded)``; on a failure to even launch the process,
     ``returncode`` is ``None`` and the output holds the launch error."""
     cancel = cancel or (lambda: False)
     popen_kwargs = {} if sys.platform == "win32" else {"start_new_session": True}
     try:
-        proc = subprocess.Popen(
-            args, shell=shell, cwd=cwd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
-            text=True, bufsize=1, env=env, **popen_kwargs,
-        )
-    except OSError as exc:
+        if isolate_network:
+            from ..infrastructure.sandbox.network_isolation import spawn_without_network
+
+            command = args if isinstance(args, str) else subprocess.list2cmdline(args)
+            proc = spawn_without_network(command, cwd, env)
+        else:
+            proc = subprocess.Popen(
+                args, shell=shell, cwd=cwd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+                text=True, bufsize=1, env=env, **popen_kwargs,
+            )
+    except (OSError, RuntimeError) as exc:   # RuntimeError: NetworkIsolationUnavailable
         return None, str(exc), False, False, False
 
     with _active_pids_lock:
@@ -266,6 +277,10 @@ def ensure_module(module: str, package: str | None = None):
     pkg = package or module
     if pkg in _FAILED or not _can_pip():
         return None
+    from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+    if network_guard.is_blocked():
+        return None  # not cached in _FAILED: retried once the network is back
     ok, _ = pip_install(pkg)
     if not ok:
         _FAILED.add(pkg)
@@ -339,6 +354,10 @@ def pip_install(package: str, cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
     name) is NOT retried, since repeating it would just waste time."""
     if not _can_pip():
         return False, "This packaged build can't install packages at runtime."
+    from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+    if network_guard.is_blocked():
+        return False, network_guard.refusal(f"pip install {package}")
     exe = python or sys.executable
     attempt = 0
     while True:

core/ext_connectors.py

@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ class RestApiConnector:
 
     def call(self, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
         """Gọi API theo tham số model đưa ra, đi qua lớp TLS có ghim chứng chỉ nội bộ."""
+        from ..application.network import network_guard
         from .tls_trust import request_any_method as tls_request
 
+        if network_guard.is_blocked():
+            return {"ok": False, "output": network_guard.refusal(self.display_name)}
         method = str(args.get("method", "GET")).upper()
         path = str(args.get("path", "")).lstrip("/")
         url = urljoin(self.base_url, path)
@@ -164,10 +167,13 @@ class RestApiConnector:
 
     def test_connection(self) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
         """Thử kết nối tới endpoint; trả về (thành công, thông điệp)."""
+        from ..application.network import network_guard
         from .tls_trust import request as tls_request
 
         if not self.base_url.strip("/"):
             return False, "No base URL configured."
+        if network_guard.is_blocked():
+            return False, network_guard.refusal(self.display_name)
         headers = {}
         if self.api_key:
             headers[self.auth_header] = (

core/jira_tool.py

@@ -85,8 +85,10 @@ def get_issue_by_url(config: Dict[str, Any] | None, url: str) -> str:
 
 def _get(config: Dict[str, Any], path: str, params: dict = None):
     """Gọi Jira REST API bằng xác thực cơ bản, qua lớp TLS có ghim chứng chỉ nội bộ."""
+    from ..application.network import network_guard
     from . import tls_trust
 
+    network_guard.ensure_allowed("Jira")
     c = _conf(config)
     url = c["base_url"].rstrip("/") + path
     # Same TLS auto-recovery the LLM provider calls get (core/tls_trust.py) —

core/link_fetch.py

@@ -147,6 +147,12 @@ def fetch_link_preview(url: str) -> str:
         return ""
     if not re.match(r"^https?://", url, re.IGNORECASE):
         return f"[Link: {url}] (not a fetchable http(s) URL — referenced by address only)"
+    # Every caller (fetch_url, task link attachments, ...) passes through here,
+    # so this one check covers the paths that never saw a ToolContext.
+    from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+    if network_guard.is_blocked():
+        return f"[Link: {url}] (not fetched — {network_guard.refusal('link fetch')})"
     # SharePoint / OneDrive share links are rewritten to their direct-download
     # form so the shared FILE itself is fetched and parsed (like an attachment),
     # not the share page's HTML shell.

core/mcp_client.py

@@ -88,7 +88,14 @@ class McpServerConnection:
     def start(self, timeout: float = 15.0) -> None:
         """Spawn the server subprocess and complete the MCP handshake.
         Raises :class:`McpServerError` on failure (bad command, the server
-        crashed on startup, the handshake timed out, ...)."""
+        crashed on startup, the handshake timed out, ...).
+
+        Refused while "Block network" is on: a server process is free to open
+        any socket it likes, so the only safe server is one never started."""
+        from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+        if network_guard.is_blocked():
+            raise McpServerError(network_guard.refusal(f"MCP server '{self.name}'"))
         self._thread = threading.Thread(target=self._run_loop, daemon=True)
         self._thread.start()
         if not self._ready.wait(timeout):
@@ -174,6 +181,10 @@ class McpServerConnection:
 
     def call_tool(self, qualified_name: str, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
         """``extra_executor``-shaped result: ``{"ok": bool, "output": str}``."""
+        from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+        if network_guard.is_blocked():
+            return {"ok": False, "output": network_guard.refusal(f"MCP server '{self.name}'")}
         tool_name = qualified_name.split(_SEP, 1)[1] if _SEP in qualified_name else qualified_name
         try:
             result = self._run_coro(self._session.call_tool(tool_name, args or {}))

core/ms365_auth.py

@@ -137,8 +137,34 @@ def _app(tenant_id: str, client_id: str):
     return app, cache
 
 
+def _cached_account_offline() -> Optional[dict]:
+    """First account in the saved token cache, read without any MSAL network setup."""
+    try:
+        import msal
+
+        accounts = _load_cache().find(msal.TokenCache.CredentialType.ACCOUNT)
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - no msal / unreadable cache = not signed in
+        return None
+    return accounts[0] if accounts else None
+
+
+def _ensure_network(action: str) -> None:
+    """Turn a "Block network" refusal into the error type callers already handle."""
+    from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+    if network_guard.is_blocked():
+        raise Ms365AuthError(network_guard.refusal(action))
+
+
 def signed_in_account(tenant_id: str, client_id: str) -> Optional[dict]:
     """The cached account, if any — a local cache lookup, no network call."""
+    from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+    if network_guard.is_blocked():
+        # Building the MSAL app fetches the tenant's OpenID configuration, so
+        # read the token cache directly instead: the UI still sees who is
+        # signed in without the app reaching login.microsoftonline.com.
+        return _cached_account_offline()
     try:
         app, _cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id)
     except Ms365AuthError:
@@ -156,6 +182,7 @@ def sign_in_device_code(tenant_id: str, client_id: str, on_code: Callable[[dict]
     ``verification_uri_complete`` (URL with the code pre-filled, when the tenant
     returns it) and ``message`` (the full human-readable instruction). Returns
     the MSAL token result dict; raises Ms365AuthError on failure/timeout."""
+    _ensure_network("Microsoft 365 sign-in")
     app, cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id)
     flow = app.initiate_device_flow(scopes=SCOPES)
     if "user_code" not in flow:
@@ -183,6 +210,7 @@ def get_access_token(tenant_id: str, client_id: str) -> str:
     """Silently reuse the cached sign-in. Raises Ms365AuthError when there is
     no valid session — the caller (a Graph call) should surface that as a
     normal tool failure telling the user to sign in again from Settings."""
+    _ensure_network("Microsoft 365")
     app, cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id)
     accounts = app.get_accounts()
     if not accounts:
@@ -228,6 +256,7 @@ def sign_out_default(config=None) -> None:
 def sign_out(tenant_id: str, client_id: str) -> None:
     """Đăng xuất và xoá token của một tenant/client khỏi kho."""
     try:
+        _ensure_network("Microsoft 365 sign-out")   # chặn mạng: chỉ xoá kho token bên dưới
         app, cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id)
         for acc in app.get_accounts():
             app.remove_account(acc)

core/ms365_graph.py

@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ def _request(method: str, url: str, token: str, **kwargs) -> requests.Response:
     """Gọi Graph API, tự ghép ``GRAPH_BASE`` cho đường dẫn tương đối và đổi lỗi HTTP
     thành :class:`Ms365GraphError` kèm thông điệp đọc được.
     """
+    from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+    if network_guard.is_blocked():
+        raise Ms365GraphError(network_guard.refusal("Microsoft 365 (Graph)"))
     if not url.startswith("http"):
         url = f"{GRAPH_BASE}{url}"
     headers = _headers(token, kwargs.pop("headers", None))

core/sandbox_manager.py

@@ -218,8 +218,13 @@ class SandboxManager:
         timeout_sec: int,
         cancel: Optional[Callable[[], bool]] = None,
     ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-        """Dispatch execution to the selected backend."""
-        if backend == "direct":
+        """Dispatch execution to the selected backend.
+
+        With the network blocked every backend is replaced by the same OS-level
+        isolation: the backends below only ever set proxy env vars, which
+        anything that ignores proxies (raw sockets, ping, .NET WebClient...)
+        walked straight past."""
+        if block_network or backend == "direct":
             return self._run_direct(command, workdir, block_network, timeout_sec, cancel)
 
         if backend == "integrity_job_wfp":
@@ -274,7 +279,8 @@ class SandboxManager:
         env = os.environ.copy()
         if block_network:
             from .deps import network_blocked_env
-            env = network_blocked_env(env)
+            env = network_blocked_env(env)   # belt and braces on top of the OS block
+            return self._run_network_isolated(command, workdir, env, timeout_sec, cancel)
 
         if cancel is not None:
             from .deps import run_cancellable
@@ -334,4 +340,42 @@ class SandboxManager:
                 "stderr": str(exc),
                 "returncode": -1,
                 "sandbox": "direct",
-            }
+            }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _run_network_isolated(
+        command: str,
+        workdir: str,
+        env: Dict[str, str],
+        timeout_sec: int,
+        cancel: Optional[Callable[[], bool]] = None,
+    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        """Run ``command`` in a process the OS keeps off the network.
+
+        Fail-closed: when the isolation cannot be set up the command is
+        refused (``sandbox == "blocked"``), never run with the network open."""
+        from .deps import run_cancellable
+
+        rc, output, cancelled, timed_out, exceeded = run_cancellable(
+            command, cwd=workdir or None, timeout=timeout_sec, cancel=cancel,
+            shell=True, env=env, isolate_network=True,
+        )
+        if rc is None and not (cancelled or timed_out or exceeded):
+            return {"ok": False, "stdout": "", "returncode": -1, "sandbox": "blocked",
+                    "stderr": ("Command refused: network is blocked and the command could "
+                               f"not be isolated from the network ({output.strip()}).")}
+        if cancelled:
+            stderr = "Cancelled by user."
+        elif timed_out:
+            stderr = f"Timeout after {timeout_sec}s"
+        elif exceeded:
+            stderr = "Resource limit exceeded."
+        else:
+            stderr = ""
+        return {
+            "ok": rc == 0 and not (cancelled or timed_out or exceeded),
+            "stdout": output,
+            "stderr": stderr,
+            "returncode": rc if rc is not None else -1,
+            "sandbox": "network_isolated",
+        }

core/task_executors.py

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ in Waiting Input), so executors here run with an auto gate.
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import subprocess
 import time
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime
@@ -30,6 +29,7 @@ from . import agent_roles
 from . import agent_security
 from . import projects
 from .permissions import PermissionGate
+from .task_script import run_script as _run_script
 from .tasks import ARTIFACTS_DIR, resolve_input_text
 from .tools import ToolContext
 
@@ -358,18 +358,6 @@ def _run_agent(ctx, task_type: str, prompt: str, out_dir: Path,
     return _last_assistant_text(messages), timed_out(), incomplete
 
 
-def _run_script(command: str, out_dir: Path, timeout_sec: int) -> str:
-    """Chạy một task kiểu script bằng shell trong thư mục kết quả, có hạn giờ."""
-    if not command.strip():
-        raise RuntimeError("Script task has no command configured.")
-    proc = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, cwd=str(out_dir),
-                          capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=max(1, timeout_sec))
-    output = (proc.stdout or "") + (("\n[stderr]\n" + proc.stderr) if proc.stderr else "")
-    if proc.returncode != 0:
-        raise RuntimeError(f"Script exited with code {proc.returncode}:\n{output[-2000:]}")
-    return output
-
-
 def execute_task(ctx, task: Dict[str, Any], run_id: str,
                  emit: Optional[EmitFn] = None, cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
                  tasks_dir: Path = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:

core/task_script.py

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+"""Run a scheduled task of type ``script`` (tách khỏi ``task_executors.py``).
+
+Khi công tắc "Chặn mạng" đang bật, lệnh của task chạy trong tiến trình bị hệ
+điều hành cắt mạng — giống ``run_command`` của agent. Trước đây task script
+chạy thẳng bằng ``subprocess.run``, không sandbox, nên lên mạng tự do.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def run_script(command: str, out_dir: Path, timeout_sec: int) -> str:
+    """Chạy một task kiểu script bằng shell trong thư mục kết quả, có hạn giờ."""
+    if not command.strip():
+        raise RuntimeError("Script task has no command configured.")
+    from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+    if network_guard.is_blocked():
+        return _run_script_without_network(command, out_dir, timeout_sec)
+    proc = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, cwd=str(out_dir),
+                          capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=max(1, timeout_sec))
+    output = (proc.stdout or "") + (("\n[stderr]\n" + proc.stderr) if proc.stderr else "")
+    if proc.returncode != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Script exited with code {proc.returncode}:\n{output[-2000:]}")
+    return output
+
+
+def _run_script_without_network(command: str, out_dir: Path, timeout_sec: int) -> str:
+    """Như :func:`run_script`, nhưng tiến trình không có mạng; không cô lập được thì không chạy."""
+    from .deps import network_blocked_env, run_cancellable
+
+    rc, output, _cancelled, timed_out, _exceeded = run_cancellable(
+        command, cwd=str(out_dir), timeout=max(1, timeout_sec), shell=True,
+        env=network_blocked_env(), isolate_network=True,
+    )
+    if timed_out:
+        raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(command, timeout_sec)
+    if rc is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("Script not run: network is blocked and the script could not be "
+                           f"isolated from the network ({output.strip()}).")
+    if rc != 0:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Script exited with code {rc} (network blocked):\n{output[-2000:]}")
+    return output
+
+
+__all__ = ["run_script"]

core/teams.py

@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ class TeamsNotifier:
         """Post a notification. Returns ``(ok, detail)``."""
         if not self.configured:
             return False, "Teams webhook URL is not configured."
+        from ..application.network import network_guard
+
+        if network_guard.is_blocked():
+            return False, network_guard.refusal("Teams notification")
 
         # Workflows webhooks expect an Adaptive Card; classic connectors expect a
         # MessageCard. Try both, then a plain-text fallback.