From b78d48320c822b93d595a637a0b7a701010a032c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: minhanhpkpro Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 22:32:44 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?fix(sandbox):=20"Ch=E1=BA=B7n=20m=E1=BA=A1ng"?= =?UTF-8?q?=20ch=E1=BA=B7n=20m=E1=BB=8Di=20=C4=91=C6=B0=E1=BB=9Dng=20ra=20?= =?UTF-8?q?m=E1=BA=A1ng,=20tr=E1=BB=AB=20nh=C3=A0=20cung=20c=E1=BA=A5p=20A?= =?UTF-8?q?I?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Trước đây công tắc chỉ chặn tool mạng của agent; lệnh shell chỉ bị proxy giả, còn M365, Teams, nút Test, MCP đang chạy, task script, link đính kèm task, pip tự cài và tài nguyên web trong xem trước HTML vẫn ra mạng tự do. - Cổng chung application/network/network_guard.py, nối vào cấu hình sống ở Composition Root; nhà cung cấp AI (chat, danh sách model, thử model) không đi qua cổng này. - Lệnh shell của agent và task script chạy trong Windows AppContainer không có quyền mạng (macOS: sandbox-exec, Linux: unshare --net); không cô lập được thì từ chối chạy. - Không cấp quyền kế thừa của AppContainer lên thư mục chứa PySide6: Chromium không nạp được Qt6WebEngineCore.dll và tab Graph bị hỏng. - Bật chặn thì dừng MCP đang chạy; tool OneDrive đồng bộ trên máy vẫn dùng. - Mặc định tắt khi mở app lần đầu; nhãn và tooltip 3 ngôn ngữ cập nhật. - Test: tests/test_network_guard_lanes.py (có bài AppContainer thật). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- application/network/__init__.py | 5 + application/network/network_guard.py | 61 +++ .../workspaces/file_preview_helpers.py | 9 +- config.py | 10 +- core/chat_agent.py | 2 +- core/code_agent.py | 2 +- core/deps.py | 29 +- core/ext_connectors.py | 6 + core/jira_tool.py | 2 + core/link_fetch.py | 6 + core/mcp_client.py | 13 +- core/ms365_auth.py | 29 ++ core/ms365_graph.py | 4 + core/sandbox_manager.py | 52 ++- core/task_executors.py | 14 +- core/task_script.py | 47 +++ core/teams.py | 4 + i18n/settings_dialog.py | 34 +- infrastructure/filesystem/command_tools.py | 10 +- .../sandbox/appcontainer_process.py | 392 ++++++++++++++++++ infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py | 46 ++ .../folder/office_document_renderer.py | 3 + presentation/folder/offline_web_page.py | 39 ++ presentation/shell/bootstrap.py | 13 +- state.py | 12 +- tests/conftest.py | 14 + tests/test_network_guard_lanes.py | 389 +++++++++++++++++ ui/settings_dialog.py | 9 +- 28 files changed, 1198 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) create mode 100644 application/network/__init__.py create mode 100644 application/network/network_guard.py create mode 100644 core/task_script.py create mode 100644 infrastructure/sandbox/appcontainer_process.py create mode 100644 infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py create mode 100644 presentation/folder/offline_web_page.py create mode 100644 tests/test_network_guard_lanes.py diff --git a/application/network/__init__.py b/application/network/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1abf7e --- /dev/null +++ b/application/network/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +"""Application services for the "Block network" switch (Sandbox Security Layer).""" + +from .network_guard import NetworkBlockedError, bind, ensure_allowed, is_blocked, refusal + +__all__ = ["NetworkBlockedError", "bind", "ensure_allowed", "is_blocked", "refusal"] diff --git a/application/network/network_guard.py b/application/network/network_guard.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d655f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/application/network/network_guard.py @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +"""One gate for every outbound connection the app makes on its own. + +The "Block network" switch (``agent_security.block_network``) used to be read +only where agent tools run, so Microsoft 365, Teams, connector test buttons, +scheduled task scripts, pip auto-installs and HTML previews still reached the +internet while Monitoring said "Network: blocked". Each of those now asks +this module first. + +The AI provider path (chat, model list, model test) deliberately does NOT go +through here: with the switch on the user still talks to the model, but the +app fetches nothing else on the model's or its own behalf. + +The module holds a *reader*, not a copy of the flag: the Composition Root +binds it to the live config once (``presentation/shell/bootstrap.py``), so a +change saved in Settings takes effect on the very next call. Nothing bound +(unit tests, helper subprocesses) means "not blocked", the pre-switch default. +""" +from __future__ import annotations + +import threading +from typing import Callable, Optional + +_lock = threading.Lock() +_reader: Optional[Callable[[], bool]] = None + + +class NetworkBlockedError(PermissionError): + """Raised by :func:`ensure_allowed` while the switch is on.""" + + +def bind(reader: Optional[Callable[[], bool]]) -> None: + """Install the callable that says whether the network is blocked right now.""" + global _reader + with _lock: + _reader = reader + + +def is_blocked() -> bool: + """True while "Block network" is on. A failing reader counts as blocked.""" + reader = _reader + if reader is None: + return False + try: + return bool(reader()) + except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - fail closed: an unreadable switch must not open the network + return True + + +def refusal(purpose: str) -> str: + """The message shown (to the user or the model) when ``purpose`` is refused.""" + return (f"{purpose}: network access is blocked by the Sandbox Security Layer " + "(\"Block network\" is on in Settings). Only the AI provider may be reached.") + + +def ensure_allowed(purpose: str) -> None: + """Raise :class:`NetworkBlockedError` if ``purpose`` may not go online now.""" + if is_blocked(): + raise NetworkBlockedError(refusal(purpose)) + + +__all__ = ["NetworkBlockedError", "bind", "ensure_allowed", "is_blocked", "refusal"] diff --git a/application/workspaces/file_preview_helpers.py b/application/workspaces/file_preview_helpers.py index 3f1c78f..868db5c 100644 --- a/application/workspaces/file_preview_helpers.py +++ b/application/workspaces/file_preview_helpers.py @@ -21,9 +21,14 @@ def pptx_available() -> bool: try: from cowork_local.core.deps import ensure_module - _PPTX_READY = ensure_module("pptx", "python-pptx") is not None + ready = ensure_module("pptx", "python-pptx") is not None except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - _PPTX_READY = False + ready = False + from ..network import network_guard + + if ready or not network_guard.is_blocked(): + _PPTX_READY = ready # a refusal under "Block network" is retried later + return ready return _PPTX_READY diff --git a/config.py b/config.py index e40be0c..b05951e 100644 --- a/config.py +++ b/config.py @@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG: Dict[str, Any] = { "resource_limit_cpu_percent": 80, # 0 = unlimited; caps a run_command/install_package process TREE's total CPU% "resource_limit_memory_mb": 2048, # 0 = unlimited; caps total RSS memory (MB) "resource_limit_disk_mb": 512, # 0 = unlimited; caps total disk read+write (MB) - # Cut the agent off the network: proxy env pointed at a black hole for - # agent-run shell commands, PLUS a flat refusal from every tool tagged - # ToolCapability.NETWORK (fetch_url, jira_*, install_package) — those - # reach the net in-process, where the proxy trick has nothing to act on. - "block_network": True, + # "Block network": every outbound connection except the AI provider is + # refused (application/network/network_guard.py), and agent shell + # commands / task scripts run in a network-less AppContainer. + # OFF on first launch — the user turns it on in Settings. + "block_network": False, # Allow the agent's fetch_url tool to read web pages / online documents / # SharePoint-OneDrive share links. Its own toggle — reading a URL for info # is safe and useful, so this defaults ON — but block_network outranks it: diff --git a/core/chat_agent.py b/core/chat_agent.py index 1157059..4cdb452 100644 --- a/core/chat_agent.py +++ b/core/chat_agent.py @@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ def run_cowork( preview = {"kind": "info", "title": name, "text": str(args)} emit({"type": "tool_proposed", "id": tc_id, "name": name, "args": args, "preview": preview}) - if ctx.block_network: + if ctx.block_network and not name.startswith("ms365_local__"): result = {"ok": False, "output": ( f"{name}: network access is blocked by the Sandbox Security Layer " '("Block network for agent-run commands" is on in Settings).')} diff --git a/core/code_agent.py b/core/code_agent.py index a31cdc3..f65259d 100644 --- a/core/code_agent.py +++ b/core/code_agent.py @@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ def run_code( else: emit({"type": "tool_start", "id": tc_id, "name": name}) if is_extra and extra_executor is not None: - if ctx.block_network: + if ctx.block_network and not name.startswith("ms365_local__"): result = {"ok": False, "output": ( f"{name}: network access is blocked by the Sandbox Security Layer " '("Block network for agent-run commands" is on in Settings).')} diff --git a/core/deps.py b/core/deps.py index 8ec5d10..dfc99c7 100644 --- a/core/deps.py +++ b/core/deps.py @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ def run_cancellable( on_output: Optional[Callable[[str], None]] = None, env: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None, limits: Optional[Dict[str, float]] = None, + isolate_network: bool = False, ) -> Tuple[Optional[int], str, bool, bool, bool]: """Run a subprocess so the Stop button can actually interrupt it. @@ -117,17 +118,27 @@ def run_cancellable( a failure to create/assign the job just means the existing taskkill fallback is used, same as before this was added. + ``isolate_network`` runs ``args`` as a shell command that the OS keeps + off the network (see ``infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py``); + if that isolation cannot be set up the command is NOT run. + Returns ``(returncode, combined_output, cancelled, timed_out, resource_exceeded)``; on a failure to even launch the process, ``returncode`` is ``None`` and the output holds the launch error.""" cancel = cancel or (lambda: False) popen_kwargs = {} if sys.platform == "win32" else {"start_new_session": True} try: - proc = subprocess.Popen( - args, shell=shell, cwd=cwd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, - text=True, bufsize=1, env=env, **popen_kwargs, - ) - except OSError as exc: + if isolate_network: + from ..infrastructure.sandbox.network_isolation import spawn_without_network + + command = args if isinstance(args, str) else subprocess.list2cmdline(args) + proc = spawn_without_network(command, cwd, env) + else: + proc = subprocess.Popen( + args, shell=shell, cwd=cwd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, + text=True, bufsize=1, env=env, **popen_kwargs, + ) + except (OSError, RuntimeError) as exc: # RuntimeError: NetworkIsolationUnavailable return None, str(exc), False, False, False with _active_pids_lock: @@ -266,6 +277,10 @@ def ensure_module(module: str, package: str | None = None): pkg = package or module if pkg in _FAILED or not _can_pip(): return None + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + return None # not cached in _FAILED: retried once the network is back ok, _ = pip_install(pkg) if not ok: _FAILED.add(pkg) @@ -339,6 +354,10 @@ def pip_install(package: str, cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None, name) is NOT retried, since repeating it would just waste time.""" if not _can_pip(): return False, "This packaged build can't install packages at runtime." + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + return False, network_guard.refusal(f"pip install {package}") exe = python or sys.executable attempt = 0 while True: diff --git a/core/ext_connectors.py b/core/ext_connectors.py index ea2cd27..5d4890e 100644 --- a/core/ext_connectors.py +++ b/core/ext_connectors.py @@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ class RestApiConnector: def call(self, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]: """Gọi API theo tham số model đưa ra, đi qua lớp TLS có ghim chứng chỉ nội bộ.""" + from ..application.network import network_guard from .tls_trust import request_any_method as tls_request + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + return {"ok": False, "output": network_guard.refusal(self.display_name)} method = str(args.get("method", "GET")).upper() path = str(args.get("path", "")).lstrip("/") url = urljoin(self.base_url, path) @@ -164,10 +167,13 @@ class RestApiConnector: def test_connection(self) -> Tuple[bool, str]: """Thử kết nối tới endpoint; trả về (thành công, thông điệp).""" + from ..application.network import network_guard from .tls_trust import request as tls_request if not self.base_url.strip("/"): return False, "No base URL configured." + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + return False, network_guard.refusal(self.display_name) headers = {} if self.api_key: headers[self.auth_header] = ( diff --git a/core/jira_tool.py b/core/jira_tool.py index ef5db00..167724c 100644 --- a/core/jira_tool.py +++ b/core/jira_tool.py @@ -85,8 +85,10 @@ def get_issue_by_url(config: Dict[str, Any] | None, url: str) -> str: def _get(config: Dict[str, Any], path: str, params: dict = None): """Gọi Jira REST API bằng xác thực cơ bản, qua lớp TLS có ghim chứng chỉ nội bộ.""" + from ..application.network import network_guard from . import tls_trust + network_guard.ensure_allowed("Jira") c = _conf(config) url = c["base_url"].rstrip("/") + path # Same TLS auto-recovery the LLM provider calls get (core/tls_trust.py) — diff --git a/core/link_fetch.py b/core/link_fetch.py index 455e5b4..0344e31 100644 --- a/core/link_fetch.py +++ b/core/link_fetch.py @@ -147,6 +147,12 @@ def fetch_link_preview(url: str) -> str: return "" if not re.match(r"^https?://", url, re.IGNORECASE): return f"[Link: {url}] (not a fetchable http(s) URL — referenced by address only)" + # Every caller (fetch_url, task link attachments, ...) passes through here, + # so this one check covers the paths that never saw a ToolContext. + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + return f"[Link: {url}] (not fetched — {network_guard.refusal('link fetch')})" # SharePoint / OneDrive share links are rewritten to their direct-download # form so the shared FILE itself is fetched and parsed (like an attachment), # not the share page's HTML shell. diff --git a/core/mcp_client.py b/core/mcp_client.py index aa4c9de..37bf990 100644 --- a/core/mcp_client.py +++ b/core/mcp_client.py @@ -88,7 +88,14 @@ class McpServerConnection: def start(self, timeout: float = 15.0) -> None: """Spawn the server subprocess and complete the MCP handshake. Raises :class:`McpServerError` on failure (bad command, the server - crashed on startup, the handshake timed out, ...).""" + crashed on startup, the handshake timed out, ...). + + Refused while "Block network" is on: a server process is free to open + any socket it likes, so the only safe server is one never started.""" + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + raise McpServerError(network_guard.refusal(f"MCP server '{self.name}'")) self._thread = threading.Thread(target=self._run_loop, daemon=True) self._thread.start() if not self._ready.wait(timeout): @@ -174,6 +181,10 @@ class McpServerConnection: def call_tool(self, qualified_name: str, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]: """``extra_executor``-shaped result: ``{"ok": bool, "output": str}``.""" + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + return {"ok": False, "output": network_guard.refusal(f"MCP server '{self.name}'")} tool_name = qualified_name.split(_SEP, 1)[1] if _SEP in qualified_name else qualified_name try: result = self._run_coro(self._session.call_tool(tool_name, args or {})) diff --git a/core/ms365_auth.py b/core/ms365_auth.py index 693640e..0a7fd88 100644 --- a/core/ms365_auth.py +++ b/core/ms365_auth.py @@ -137,8 +137,34 @@ def _app(tenant_id: str, client_id: str): return app, cache +def _cached_account_offline() -> Optional[dict]: + """First account in the saved token cache, read without any MSAL network setup.""" + try: + import msal + + accounts = _load_cache().find(msal.TokenCache.CredentialType.ACCOUNT) + except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - no msal / unreadable cache = not signed in + return None + return accounts[0] if accounts else None + + +def _ensure_network(action: str) -> None: + """Turn a "Block network" refusal into the error type callers already handle.""" + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + raise Ms365AuthError(network_guard.refusal(action)) + + def signed_in_account(tenant_id: str, client_id: str) -> Optional[dict]: """The cached account, if any — a local cache lookup, no network call.""" + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + # Building the MSAL app fetches the tenant's OpenID configuration, so + # read the token cache directly instead: the UI still sees who is + # signed in without the app reaching login.microsoftonline.com. + return _cached_account_offline() try: app, _cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id) except Ms365AuthError: @@ -156,6 +182,7 @@ def sign_in_device_code(tenant_id: str, client_id: str, on_code: Callable[[dict] ``verification_uri_complete`` (URL with the code pre-filled, when the tenant returns it) and ``message`` (the full human-readable instruction). Returns the MSAL token result dict; raises Ms365AuthError on failure/timeout.""" + _ensure_network("Microsoft 365 sign-in") app, cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id) flow = app.initiate_device_flow(scopes=SCOPES) if "user_code" not in flow: @@ -183,6 +210,7 @@ def get_access_token(tenant_id: str, client_id: str) -> str: """Silently reuse the cached sign-in. Raises Ms365AuthError when there is no valid session — the caller (a Graph call) should surface that as a normal tool failure telling the user to sign in again from Settings.""" + _ensure_network("Microsoft 365") app, cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id) accounts = app.get_accounts() if not accounts: @@ -228,6 +256,7 @@ def sign_out_default(config=None) -> None: def sign_out(tenant_id: str, client_id: str) -> None: """Đăng xuất và xoá token của một tenant/client khỏi kho.""" try: + _ensure_network("Microsoft 365 sign-out") # chặn mạng: chỉ xoá kho token bên dưới app, cache = _app(tenant_id, client_id) for acc in app.get_accounts(): app.remove_account(acc) diff --git a/core/ms365_graph.py b/core/ms365_graph.py index 402ae16..1b00012 100644 --- a/core/ms365_graph.py +++ b/core/ms365_graph.py @@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ def _request(method: str, url: str, token: str, **kwargs) -> requests.Response: """Gọi Graph API, tự ghép ``GRAPH_BASE`` cho đường dẫn tương đối và đổi lỗi HTTP thành :class:`Ms365GraphError` kèm thông điệp đọc được. """ + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + raise Ms365GraphError(network_guard.refusal("Microsoft 365 (Graph)")) if not url.startswith("http"): url = f"{GRAPH_BASE}{url}" headers = _headers(token, kwargs.pop("headers", None)) diff --git a/core/sandbox_manager.py b/core/sandbox_manager.py index 6264106..0a4c665 100644 --- a/core/sandbox_manager.py +++ b/core/sandbox_manager.py @@ -218,8 +218,13 @@ class SandboxManager: timeout_sec: int, cancel: Optional[Callable[[], bool]] = None, ) -> Dict[str, Any]: - """Dispatch execution to the selected backend.""" - if backend == "direct": + """Dispatch execution to the selected backend. + + With the network blocked every backend is replaced by the same OS-level + isolation: the backends below only ever set proxy env vars, which + anything that ignores proxies (raw sockets, ping, .NET WebClient...) + walked straight past.""" + if block_network or backend == "direct": return self._run_direct(command, workdir, block_network, timeout_sec, cancel) if backend == "integrity_job_wfp": @@ -274,7 +279,8 @@ class SandboxManager: env = os.environ.copy() if block_network: from .deps import network_blocked_env - env = network_blocked_env(env) + env = network_blocked_env(env) # belt and braces on top of the OS block + return self._run_network_isolated(command, workdir, env, timeout_sec, cancel) if cancel is not None: from .deps import run_cancellable @@ -334,4 +340,42 @@ class SandboxManager: "stderr": str(exc), "returncode": -1, "sandbox": "direct", - } \ No newline at end of file + } + + @staticmethod + def _run_network_isolated( + command: str, + workdir: str, + env: Dict[str, str], + timeout_sec: int, + cancel: Optional[Callable[[], bool]] = None, + ) -> Dict[str, Any]: + """Run ``command`` in a process the OS keeps off the network. + + Fail-closed: when the isolation cannot be set up the command is + refused (``sandbox == "blocked"``), never run with the network open.""" + from .deps import run_cancellable + + rc, output, cancelled, timed_out, exceeded = run_cancellable( + command, cwd=workdir or None, timeout=timeout_sec, cancel=cancel, + shell=True, env=env, isolate_network=True, + ) + if rc is None and not (cancelled or timed_out or exceeded): + return {"ok": False, "stdout": "", "returncode": -1, "sandbox": "blocked", + "stderr": ("Command refused: network is blocked and the command could " + f"not be isolated from the network ({output.strip()}).")} + if cancelled: + stderr = "Cancelled by user." + elif timed_out: + stderr = f"Timeout after {timeout_sec}s" + elif exceeded: + stderr = "Resource limit exceeded." + else: + stderr = "" + return { + "ok": rc == 0 and not (cancelled or timed_out or exceeded), + "stdout": output, + "stderr": stderr, + "returncode": rc if rc is not None else -1, + "sandbox": "network_isolated", + } diff --git a/core/task_executors.py b/core/task_executors.py index 57de9a9..1147f10 100644 --- a/core/task_executors.py +++ b/core/task_executors.py @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ in Waiting Input), so executors here run with an auto gate. """ from __future__ import annotations -import subprocess import time import uuid from datetime import datetime @@ -30,6 +29,7 @@ from . import agent_roles from . import agent_security from . import projects from .permissions import PermissionGate +from .task_script import run_script as _run_script from .tasks import ARTIFACTS_DIR, resolve_input_text from .tools import ToolContext @@ -358,18 +358,6 @@ def _run_agent(ctx, task_type: str, prompt: str, out_dir: Path, return _last_assistant_text(messages), timed_out(), incomplete -def _run_script(command: str, out_dir: Path, timeout_sec: int) -> str: - """Chạy một task kiểu script bằng shell trong thư mục kết quả, có hạn giờ.""" - if not command.strip(): - raise RuntimeError("Script task has no command configured.") - proc = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, cwd=str(out_dir), - capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=max(1, timeout_sec)) - output = (proc.stdout or "") + (("\n[stderr]\n" + proc.stderr) if proc.stderr else "") - if proc.returncode != 0: - raise RuntimeError(f"Script exited with code {proc.returncode}:\n{output[-2000:]}") - return output - - def execute_task(ctx, task: Dict[str, Any], run_id: str, emit: Optional[EmitFn] = None, cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None, tasks_dir: Path = None) -> Dict[str, Any]: diff --git a/core/task_script.py b/core/task_script.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..213ac59 --- /dev/null +++ b/core/task_script.py @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +"""Run a scheduled task of type ``script`` (tách khỏi ``task_executors.py``). + +Khi công tắc "Chặn mạng" đang bật, lệnh của task chạy trong tiến trình bị hệ +điều hành cắt mạng — giống ``run_command`` của agent. Trước đây task script +chạy thẳng bằng ``subprocess.run``, không sandbox, nên lên mạng tự do. +""" +from __future__ import annotations + +import subprocess +from pathlib import Path + + +def run_script(command: str, out_dir: Path, timeout_sec: int) -> str: + """Chạy một task kiểu script bằng shell trong thư mục kết quả, có hạn giờ.""" + if not command.strip(): + raise RuntimeError("Script task has no command configured.") + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + return _run_script_without_network(command, out_dir, timeout_sec) + proc = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, cwd=str(out_dir), + capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=max(1, timeout_sec)) + output = (proc.stdout or "") + (("\n[stderr]\n" + proc.stderr) if proc.stderr else "") + if proc.returncode != 0: + raise RuntimeError(f"Script exited with code {proc.returncode}:\n{output[-2000:]}") + return output + + +def _run_script_without_network(command: str, out_dir: Path, timeout_sec: int) -> str: + """Như :func:`run_script`, nhưng tiến trình không có mạng; không cô lập được thì không chạy.""" + from .deps import network_blocked_env, run_cancellable + + rc, output, _cancelled, timed_out, _exceeded = run_cancellable( + command, cwd=str(out_dir), timeout=max(1, timeout_sec), shell=True, + env=network_blocked_env(), isolate_network=True, + ) + if timed_out: + raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(command, timeout_sec) + if rc is None: + raise RuntimeError("Script not run: network is blocked and the script could not be " + f"isolated from the network ({output.strip()}).") + if rc != 0: + raise RuntimeError(f"Script exited with code {rc} (network blocked):\n{output[-2000:]}") + return output + + +__all__ = ["run_script"] diff --git a/core/teams.py b/core/teams.py index fd3fe92..578cc0e 100644 --- a/core/teams.py +++ b/core/teams.py @@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ class TeamsNotifier: """Post a notification. Returns ``(ok, detail)``.""" if not self.configured: return False, "Teams webhook URL is not configured." + from ..application.network import network_guard + + if network_guard.is_blocked(): + return False, network_guard.refusal("Teams notification") # Workflows webhooks expect an Adaptive Card; classic connectors expect a # MessageCard. Try both, then a plain-text fallback. diff --git a/i18n/settings_dialog.py b/i18n/settings_dialog.py index 2544101..6ffb9d3 100644 --- a/i18n/settings_dialog.py +++ b/i18n/settings_dialog.py @@ -10,22 +10,22 @@ from typing import Dict STRINGS: Dict[str, Dict[str, str]] = { "settings.sandbox_block_network": { - "en": "Block network for agent-run commands", - "ja": "エージェントが実行するコマンドのネットワークをブロック", - "vi": "Chặn mạng cho lệnh do agent chạy"}, + "en": "Block network (AI provider still allowed)", + "ja": "ネットワークをブロック（AIプロバイダーのみ許可）", + "vi": "Chặn mạng (vẫn cho gọi nhà cung cấp AI)"}, "settings.allow_url_fetch": { "en": "Allow the agent to fetch URLs (web pages, SharePoint / OneDrive links)", "ja": "エージェントによるURL取得を許可（Webページ、SharePoint / OneDriveリンク）", "vi": "Cho phép agent lấy dữ liệu từ URL (trang web, link SharePoint / OneDrive)"}, "settings.allow_url_fetch_tooltip": { "en": ("Lets the agent's fetch_url tool read web pages, online documents and " - "SharePoint/OneDrive share links to search & process them. Separate from " - "'Block network' (which only sandboxes shell commands). Default: on."), + "SharePoint/OneDrive share links to search & process them. 'Block network' " + "overrides this switch. Default: on."), "ja": "エージェントのfetch_urlツールがWebページ・オンライン文書・SharePoint/OneDrive共有リンクを" - "読み取れるようにします。「ネットワークをブロック」（シェルコマンド用）とは別です。既定: オン。", + "読み取れるようにします。「ネットワークをブロック」がオンの場合はそちらが優先されます。既定: オン。", "vi": ("Cho phép tool fetch_url của agent đọc trang web, tài liệu online và link chia sẻ " - "SharePoint/OneDrive để tìm kiếm & xử lý. Tách biệt với 'Chặn mạng' (chỉ áp cho lệnh " - "shell). Mặc định: bật.")}, + "SharePoint/OneDrive để tìm kiếm & xử lý. 'Chặn mạng' được ưu tiên hơn công tắc " + "này. Mặc định: bật.")}, "settings.test_internet": { "en": "Test Internet", "ja": "インターネット接続テスト", "vi": "Kiểm tra Internet"}, "settings.test_internet_tooltip": { @@ -39,12 +39,18 @@ STRINGS: Dict[str, Dict[str, str]] = { "en": "Testing internet access…", "ja": "インターネット接続をテスト中…", "vi": "Đang kiểm tra truy cập internet…"}, "settings.sandbox_block_network_tooltip": { - "en": ("Policy-level control (proxy env vars point at a black hole) — not a kernel " - "firewall. Combine with the command whitelist above for defense in depth."), - "ja": "ポリシーレベルの制御です（プロキシ環境変数をブラックホールに向ける）— カーネルレベルの" - "ファイアウォールではありません。上のコマンドホワイトリストと併用してください。", - "vi": "Kiểm soát ở tầng chính sách (trỏ biến môi trường proxy vào hố đen) — không phải " - "firewall tầng kernel. Kết hợp với whitelist lệnh ở trên để phòng thủ nhiều lớp."}, + "en": ("Only the AI provider (chat, model list, model test) may reach the network. " + "Agent shell commands and task scripts run in a Windows AppContainer with no " + "network access; fetch_url, Jira, connectors/MCP, Microsoft 365, Teams, " + "connector tests, pip auto-install and remote content in HTML previews are refused."), + "ja": "ネットワークに接続できるのはAIプロバイダー（チャット・モデル一覧・モデルテスト）のみです。" + "エージェントのシェルコマンドとタスクスクリプトはネットワークなしのWindows AppContainerで実行され、" + "fetch_url・Jira・コネクタ/MCP・Microsoft 365・Teams・接続テスト・pip自動インストール・" + "HTMLプレビューの外部リソースは拒否されます。", + "vi": "Chỉ nhà cung cấp AI (chat, tải danh sách model, thử model) được ra mạng. Lệnh shell " + "của agent và task script chạy trong Windows AppContainer không có mạng; fetch_url, " + "Jira, connector/MCP, Microsoft 365, Teams, nút Test, tự cài thư viện và tài nguyên " + "web trong xem trước HTML đều bị từ chối."}, "settings.sandbox_unlimited": {"en": "Unlimited", "ja": "無制限", "vi": "Không giới hạn"}, "settings.sandbox_cpu_label": {"en": "CPU limit", "ja": "CPU 制限", "vi": "Giới hạn CPU"}, "settings.sandbox_memory_label": {"en": "Memory limit", "ja": "メモリ制限", "vi": "Giới hạn bộ nhớ"}, diff --git a/infrastructure/filesystem/command_tools.py b/infrastructure/filesystem/command_tools.py index 8d88e40..06f6a39 100644 --- a/infrastructure/filesystem/command_tools.py +++ b/infrastructure/filesystem/command_tools.py @@ -76,11 +76,11 @@ def run_command(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any], denial = "Command blocked by security policy: " + "; ".join(risk.reasons) return {"ok": False, "output": denial} - # Every sandbox backend's network block is a proxy-env-var trick (see - # core/deps.py::network_blocked_env) — it does nothing against a tool - # that reaches the network without an HTTP proxy (ping/ICMP, nslookup/ - # direct DNS, ssh/ftp/raw TCP...). Deny those BY NAME here instead, so - # "Chặn mạng cho lệnh do agent chạy" actually blocks them too. + # With the network blocked, SandboxManager runs the command in an OS-level + # network-less process (AppContainer on Windows — see + # infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py). Tools that exist only to + # reach the network (ping, nslookup, ssh...) are still denied BY NAME + # first: the model gets a clear reason instead of a cryptic socket error. if ctx.block_network: bypass_tool = command_bypasses_network_proxy(command) if bypass_tool: diff --git a/infrastructure/sandbox/appcontainer_process.py b/infrastructure/sandbox/appcontainer_process.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04a8e61 --- /dev/null +++ b/infrastructure/sandbox/appcontainer_process.py @@ -0,0 +1,392 @@ +"""Spawn a shell command inside a Windows AppContainer with NO network capability. + +Why this exists +--------------- +The old "block network" for agent shell commands only pointed the proxy env +vars at a dead port (``core/deps.py::network_blocked_env``). Anything that +ignores proxies (``Invoke-WebRequest -NoProxy``, raw sockets, ``certutil``, +.NET ``WebClient``...) still reached the internet. An AppContainer token that +is granted no ``internetClient``/``privateNetworkClientServer`` capability is +refused by the kernel firewall for every outbound connection, loopback +included, no matter which tool makes it. No admin rights are needed. + +An AppContainer can only open files whose ACL admits its SID (or ALL +APPLICATION PACKAGES). System32 and Program Files already do; the workdir and +the app's own Python install do not, so :func:`spawn` grants the profile SID +access to those folders first (an extra ACE, nothing is removed). + +:class:`AppContainerProcess` quacks like ``subprocess.Popen`` for the subset +``core/deps.py::_run_cancellable_body`` uses (``pid``, ``stdout``/``stderr`` +text streams, ``poll``/``wait``/``kill``/``returncode``), so the Stop button, +timeouts, Job Objects and resource limits keep working unchanged. +""" +from __future__ import annotations + +import io +import locale +import os +import subprocess +import sys +import threading +from typing import Dict, Iterable, Optional + +PROFILE_NAME = "cowork_local.agent_netblock" +_IS_WINDOWS = sys.platform == "win32" + +if _IS_WINDOWS: + import ctypes + import msvcrt + from ctypes import wintypes + + _k32 = ctypes.WinDLL("kernel32", use_last_error=True) + _adv = ctypes.WinDLL("advapi32", use_last_error=True) + _uenv = ctypes.WinDLL("userenv", use_last_error=True) + + class _SECURITY_CAPABILITIES(ctypes.Structure): + _fields_ = [("AppContainerSid", ctypes.c_void_p), ("Capabilities", ctypes.c_void_p), + ("CapabilityCount", wintypes.DWORD), ("Reserved", wintypes.DWORD)] + + class _STARTUPINFOW(ctypes.Structure): + _fields_ = [("cb", wintypes.DWORD), ("lpReserved", wintypes.LPWSTR), + ("lpDesktop", wintypes.LPWSTR), ("lpTitle", wintypes.LPWSTR), + ("dwX", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwY", wintypes.DWORD), + ("dwXSize", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwYSize", wintypes.DWORD), + ("dwXCountChars", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwYCountChars", wintypes.DWORD), + ("dwFillAttribute", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwFlags", wintypes.DWORD), + ("wShowWindow", wintypes.WORD), ("cbReserved2", wintypes.WORD), + ("lpReserved2", ctypes.c_void_p), ("hStdInput", wintypes.HANDLE), + ("hStdOutput", wintypes.HANDLE), ("hStdError", wintypes.HANDLE)] + + class _STARTUPINFOEXW(ctypes.Structure): + _fields_ = [("StartupInfo", _STARTUPINFOW), ("lpAttributeList", ctypes.c_void_p)] + + class _PROCESS_INFORMATION(ctypes.Structure): + _fields_ = [("hProcess", wintypes.HANDLE), ("hThread", wintypes.HANDLE), + ("dwProcessId", wintypes.DWORD), ("dwThreadId", wintypes.DWORD)] + + class _SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES(ctypes.Structure): + _fields_ = [("nLength", wintypes.DWORD), ("lpSecurityDescriptor", ctypes.c_void_p), + ("bInheritHandle", wintypes.BOOL)] + + _uenv.CreateAppContainerProfile.restype = ctypes.c_long + _uenv.CreateAppContainerProfile.argtypes = [ + wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.LPCWSTR, ctypes.c_void_p, + wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_void_p)] + _uenv.DeriveAppContainerSidFromAppContainerName.restype = ctypes.c_long + _uenv.DeriveAppContainerSidFromAppContainerName.argtypes = [ + wintypes.LPCWSTR, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_void_p)] + _uenv.GetAppContainerFolderPath.restype = ctypes.c_long + _uenv.GetAppContainerFolderPath.argtypes = [ + wintypes.LPCWSTR, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_wchar_p)] + _adv.ConvertSidToStringSidW.restype = wintypes.BOOL + _adv.ConvertSidToStringSidW.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_wchar_p)] + _k32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList.restype = wintypes.BOOL + _k32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList.argtypes = [ + ctypes.c_void_p, wintypes.DWORD, wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_size_t)] + _k32.UpdateProcThreadAttribute.restype = wintypes.BOOL + _k32.UpdateProcThreadAttribute.argtypes = [ + ctypes.c_void_p, wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.c_size_t, ctypes.c_void_p, + ctypes.c_size_t, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p] + _k32.DeleteProcThreadAttributeList.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p] + _k32.CreatePipe.restype = wintypes.BOOL + _k32.CreatePipe.argtypes = [ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.HANDLE), ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.HANDLE), + ctypes.POINTER(_SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), wintypes.DWORD] + _k32.SetHandleInformation.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, wintypes.DWORD, wintypes.DWORD] + _k32.CreateProcessW.restype = wintypes.BOOL + _k32.CreateProcessW.argtypes = [ + wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.LPWSTR, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p, wintypes.BOOL, + wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.c_void_p, wintypes.LPCWSTR, ctypes.POINTER(_STARTUPINFOEXW), + ctypes.POINTER(_PROCESS_INFORMATION)] + _k32.ResumeThread.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE] + _k32.WaitForSingleObject.restype = wintypes.DWORD + _k32.WaitForSingleObject.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, wintypes.DWORD] + _k32.GetExitCodeProcess.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.DWORD)] + _k32.TerminateProcess.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, wintypes.UINT] + _k32.CloseHandle.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE] + _k32.GetStdHandle.restype = wintypes.HANDLE + _k32.OpenProcess.restype = wintypes.HANDLE + + _ALREADY_EXISTS = ctypes.c_long(0x800700B7).value + _PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_HANDLE_LIST = 0x00020002 + _PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES = 0x00020009 + _EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT = 0x00080000 + _CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT = 0x00000400 + _CREATE_NO_WINDOW = 0x08000000 + _CREATE_SUSPENDED = 0x00000004 + _STARTF_USESTDHANDLES = 0x00000100 + _HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT = 0x00000001 + _STILL_ACTIVE = 259 + +_profile_lock = threading.Lock() +_profile: Dict[str, object] = {} +_granted: set = set() + + +class NetworkIsolationUnavailable(RuntimeError): + """This machine cannot start a network-less process — callers must refuse to run.""" + + +def is_supported() -> bool: + """True on Windows builds that ship the AppContainer API (Windows 8+).""" + if not _IS_WINDOWS: + return False + try: + return bool(_uenv.CreateAppContainerProfile) + except AttributeError: + return False + + +def _profile_sid(): + """``(sid pointer, sid string, temp folder)`` of the shared no-network profile.""" + with _profile_lock: + if _profile: + return _profile["sid"], _profile["sid_str"], _profile["temp"] + sid = ctypes.c_void_p() + hr = _uenv.CreateAppContainerProfile(PROFILE_NAME, "Cowork Local agent (no network)", + "Agent shell commands with the network blocked", + None, 0, ctypes.byref(sid)) + if hr == _ALREADY_EXISTS: + hr = _uenv.DeriveAppContainerSidFromAppContainerName(PROFILE_NAME, ctypes.byref(sid)) + if hr != 0 or not sid.value: + raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable(f"AppContainer profile error 0x{hr & 0xFFFFFFFF:08X}") + text = ctypes.c_wchar_p() + if not _adv.ConvertSidToStringSidW(sid, ctypes.byref(text)): + raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable("Could not read the AppContainer SID") + sid_str = text.value + folder = ctypes.c_wchar_p() + temp = "" + if _uenv.GetAppContainerFolderPath(sid_str, ctypes.byref(folder)) == 0 and folder.value: + temp = os.path.join(folder.value, "Temp") + os.makedirs(temp, exist_ok=True) + _profile.update(sid=sid, sid_str=sid_str, temp=temp) + return sid, sid_str, temp + + +_PERMS = {"write": "(OI)(CI)(M)", "read": "(OI)(CI)(RX)", "read_here": "(OI)(NP)(RX)"} + + +def _qt_package_dir() -> str: + """Folder of the installed PySide6/Qt binaries ('' if PySide6 is absent).""" + try: + import importlib.util + + spec = importlib.util.find_spec("PySide6") + except (ImportError, ValueError): + return "" + return os.path.dirname(spec.origin) if spec and spec.origin else "" + + +def _covers(folder: str, target: str) -> bool: + """True if ``target`` is ``folder`` itself or lies somewhere below it.""" + if not folder or not target: + return False + folder, target = os.path.normcase(folder), os.path.normcase(target) + return target == folder or target.startswith(folder.rstrip("\\/") + os.sep) + + +def _icacls(*args: str) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess: + return subprocess.run(["icacls", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, + creationflags=_CREATE_NO_WINDOW) + + +def grant_access(path: str, sid_str: str, mode: str) -> None: + """Let the AppContainer SID open ``path``. + + ``mode`` is ``"write"``/``"read"`` (inherited by everything below) or + ``"read_here"`` (this folder and the files directly in it, no deeper). + + An inherited ACE must never reach the Qt WebEngine binaries: Chromium's + sandboxed render process then fails to load Qt6WebEngineCore.dll + (STATUS_DLL_NOT_FOUND) and every web view in the app goes blank. A folder + that contains the PySide6 install is therefore refused. + """ + path = os.path.abspath(path) + key = (os.path.normcase(path), mode) + if key in _granted or not os.path.exists(path): + return + if mode != "read_here" and _covers(path, _qt_package_dir()): + raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable( + f"Refusing to sandbox a folder that contains the app's Qt runtime: {path}") + perm = _PERMS[mode] + listing = (_icacls(path).stdout or "").lower() + if f"{sid_str}:{perm}".lower() not in listing: + done = _icacls(path, "/grant", f"*{sid_str}:{perm}", "/Q", "/C") + if done.returncode != 0: + raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable( + f"Could not grant the sandbox access to {path}: {(done.stderr or done.stdout).strip()}") + _granted.add(key) + + +def _repair_inherited_grant(path: str, sid_str: str) -> None: + """Drop an inherited grant that an earlier build put on the app's venv.""" + key = (os.path.normcase(os.path.abspath(path)), "repaired") + if key in _granted or not os.path.isdir(path): + return + listing = (_icacls(path).stdout or "").lower() + if f"{sid_str}:(oi)(ci)".lower() in listing: + _icacls(path, "/remove:g", f"*{sid_str}", "/Q", "/C") + _granted.add(key) + + +def _interpreter_grants(): + """``(folder, mode)`` pairs that let the sandbox run the app's Python. + + The base install is read-only and holds no Qt; a venv only needs its root + (``pyvenv.cfg``) and ``Scripts`` — never ``Lib/site-packages``. + """ + qt_dir = _qt_package_dir() + if _covers(sys.base_prefix, qt_dir): + # PySide6 lives in the base install itself: expose only the executable + # and the compiled stdlib modules, never the tree holding Qt. + grants = [(sys.base_prefix, "read_here"), (os.path.join(sys.base_prefix, "DLLs"), "read")] + else: + grants = [(sys.base_prefix, "read")] + if os.path.normcase(sys.prefix) != os.path.normcase(sys.base_prefix): + grants += [(sys.prefix, "read_here"), (os.path.join(sys.prefix, "Scripts"), "read")] + return [(folder, mode) for folder, mode in grants + if mode == "read_here" or not _covers(folder, qt_dir)] + + +def _env_block(env: Dict[str, str]) -> ctypes.Array: + """Sorted, double-NUL-terminated UTF-16 environment block for CreateProcessW.""" + items = sorted(env.items(), key=lambda kv: kv[0].upper()) + text = "".join(f"{k}={v}\0" for k, v in items if k and "=" not in k) + "\0" + return ctypes.create_unicode_buffer(text, len(text)) + + +def _pipe(): + """Anonymous pipe; only the child's (write) end is inheritable.""" + sa = _SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES(ctypes.sizeof(_SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), None, True) + read, write = wintypes.HANDLE(), wintypes.HANDLE() + if not _k32.CreatePipe(ctypes.byref(read), ctypes.byref(write), ctypes.byref(sa), 0): + raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error()) + _k32.SetHandleInformation(read, _HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0) + return read, write + + +class AppContainerProcess: + """The ``subprocess.Popen`` subset that ``deps._run_cancellable_body`` relies on.""" + + def __init__(self, handle, pid: int, stdout: io.TextIOBase, stderr: io.TextIOBase): + """Wrap an already-started process handle and its two output streams.""" + self._handle = handle + self.pid = pid + self.stdout = stdout + self.stderr = stderr + self.returncode: Optional[int] = None + + def poll(self) -> Optional[int]: + """Exit code if the process has finished, else None.""" + if self.returncode is None and self._handle: + code = wintypes.DWORD() + if _k32.GetExitCodeProcess(self._handle, ctypes.byref(code)) and code.value != _STILL_ACTIVE: + self.returncode = ctypes.c_int32(code.value).value + _k32.CloseHandle(self._handle) + self._handle = None + return self.returncode + + def wait(self, timeout: Optional[float] = None) -> int: + """Block until exit; raise ``subprocess.TimeoutExpired`` like Popen does.""" + if self.returncode is None and self._handle: + ms = 0xFFFFFFFF if timeout is None else int(timeout * 1000) + if _k32.WaitForSingleObject(self._handle, ms) != 0: + raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired("appcontainer", timeout) + return self.poll() + + def kill(self) -> None: + """Terminate the process (the Job Object in deps kills its children).""" + if self.returncode is None and self._handle: + _k32.TerminateProcess(self._handle, 1) + + def communicate(self, timeout: Optional[float] = None): + """Read both streams to the end and wait; returns ``(stdout, stderr)``.""" + chunks: Dict[str, str] = {} + + def _drain(name, stream): + chunks[name] = stream.read() + + readers = [threading.Thread(target=_drain, args=(n, s), daemon=True) + for n, s in (("out", self.stdout), ("err", self.stderr))] + for t in readers: + t.start() + for t in readers: + t.join(timeout) + self.wait(timeout) + return chunks.get("out", ""), chunks.get("err", "") + + +def spawn(command: str, cwd: Optional[str], env: Optional[Dict[str, str]], + readable_dirs: Iterable[str] = ()) -> AppContainerProcess: + """Start ``cmd.exe /c command`` in the no-network AppContainer. + + Raises :class:`NetworkIsolationUnavailable` when that cannot be done — + callers must then refuse the command rather than run it with the network on. + """ + if not is_supported(): + raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable("AppContainer is only available on Windows") + sid, sid_str, temp = _profile_sid() + cwd = os.path.abspath(cwd or os.getcwd()) + _repair_inherited_grant(sys.prefix, sid_str) + grant_access(cwd, sid_str, "write") + for folder, mode in [*_interpreter_grants(), *((d, "read") for d in readable_dirs if d)]: + grant_access(folder, sid_str, mode) + + child_env = dict(os.environ if env is None else env) + if temp: + child_env["TEMP"] = child_env["TMP"] = temp + child_env.setdefault("PYTHONIOENCODING", "utf-8") + env_block = _env_block(child_env) + + out_r, out_w = _pipe() + err_r, err_w = _pipe() + handles = (wintypes.HANDLE * 2)(out_w, err_w) + caps = _SECURITY_CAPABILITIES(sid, None, 0, 0) + size = ctypes.c_size_t() + _k32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(None, 2, 0, ctypes.byref(size)) + attr = ctypes.create_string_buffer(size.value) + pi = _PROCESS_INFORMATION() + try: + if not (_k32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(attr, 2, 0, ctypes.byref(size)) + and _k32.UpdateProcThreadAttribute( + attr, 0, _PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES, ctypes.byref(caps), + ctypes.sizeof(caps), None, None) + and _k32.UpdateProcThreadAttribute( + attr, 0, _PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_HANDLE_LIST, handles, + ctypes.sizeof(handles), None, None)): + raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable(str(ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error()))) + si = _STARTUPINFOEXW() + si.StartupInfo.cb = ctypes.sizeof(si) + si.StartupInfo.dwFlags = _STARTF_USESTDHANDLES + si.StartupInfo.hStdOutput = out_w + si.StartupInfo.hStdError = err_w + si.lpAttributeList = ctypes.addressof(attr) + comspec = os.environ.get("COMSPEC") or r"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" + cmdline = ctypes.create_unicode_buffer(f'"{comspec}" /d /s /c "{command}"') + flags = (_EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT | _CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT + | _CREATE_NO_WINDOW | _CREATE_SUSPENDED) + if not _k32.CreateProcessW(None, cmdline, None, None, True, flags, + ctypes.addressof(env_block), cwd, + ctypes.byref(si), ctypes.byref(pi)): + raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable( + f"Could not start the sandboxed command: {ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())}") + _k32.ResumeThread(pi.hThread) + _k32.CloseHandle(pi.hThread) + except BaseException: + for h in (out_r, err_r): + _k32.CloseHandle(h) + raise + finally: + _k32.DeleteProcThreadAttributeList(attr) + _k32.CloseHandle(out_w) + _k32.CloseHandle(err_w) + + def _stream(handle) -> io.TextIOBase: + fd = msvcrt.open_osfhandle(handle.value, os.O_RDONLY) + return io.TextIOWrapper(io.FileIO(fd, "rb"), encoding=locale.getpreferredencoding(False), + errors="replace") + + return AppContainerProcess(pi.hProcess, pi.dwProcessId, _stream(out_r), _stream(err_r)) + + +__all__ = ["AppContainerProcess", "NetworkIsolationUnavailable", "PROFILE_NAME", + "grant_access", "is_supported", "spawn"] diff --git a/infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py b/infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..210e7d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/infrastructure/sandbox/network_isolation.py @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +"""Start a shell command that the operating system keeps off the network. + +Used whenever "Block network" is on for agent ``run_command`` calls and for +scheduled script tasks. The contract is fail-closed: if isolation cannot be +set up, :class:`NetworkIsolationUnavailable` is raised and the caller refuses +the command instead of running it with the network open. + +* Windows: an AppContainer with no network capability + (:mod:`.appcontainer_process`). +* macOS: ``sandbox-exec`` with a profile that denies every network operation. +* Linux: ``unshare --net`` in a new user namespace (an empty network namespace + has only a downed loopback). If unprivileged namespaces are disabled, + ``unshare`` itself fails and the command never runs. +""" +from __future__ import annotations + +import shutil +import subprocess +import sys +from typing import Dict, Optional + +from .appcontainer_process import NetworkIsolationUnavailable + +_MACOS_PROFILE = "(version 1)(allow default)(deny network*)" + + +def spawn_without_network(command: str, cwd: Optional[str], env: Optional[Dict[str, str]]): + """A ``Popen``-like process running ``command`` through the shell, with no network.""" + if sys.platform == "win32": + from . import appcontainer_process + + return appcontainer_process.spawn(command, cwd, env) + if sys.platform == "darwin" and shutil.which("sandbox-exec"): + argv = ["sandbox-exec", "-p", _MACOS_PROFILE, "/bin/sh", "-c", command] + elif sys.platform.startswith("linux") and shutil.which("unshare"): + argv = ["unshare", "--user", "--map-root-user", "--net", "/bin/sh", "-c", command] + else: + raise NetworkIsolationUnavailable( + "No network isolation is available on this system (needs AppContainer, " + "sandbox-exec or unshare).") + return subprocess.Popen(argv, cwd=cwd, env=env, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, bufsize=1, + start_new_session=True) + + +__all__ = ["NetworkIsolationUnavailable", "spawn_without_network"] diff --git a/presentation/folder/office_document_renderer.py b/presentation/folder/office_document_renderer.py index ea6985d..3aef705 100644 --- a/presentation/folder/office_document_renderer.py +++ b/presentation/folder/office_document_renderer.py @@ -110,7 +110,10 @@ class OfficeDocumentRenderer: if self._engine is None: try: from PySide6.QtWebEngineWidgets import QWebEngineView + + from .offline_web_page import install_offline_page self._engine = QWebEngineView() + install_offline_page(self._engine) self._owner.stack.addWidget(self._engine) except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 self._engine = None diff --git a/presentation/folder/offline_web_page.py b/presentation/folder/offline_web_page.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44c96ee --- /dev/null +++ b/presentation/folder/offline_web_page.py @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +"""HTML preview page that loads nothing from the web while "Block network" is on. + +``QWebEngineView.setHtml`` happily fetches every ````, +``