thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
664bd1f00c
Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put. Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/ .specify/<dir> -> packages/casan-harness/<dir> (+ .specify/<dir> symlink) Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/ init-options.json traceability-map.json Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4). Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
133 lines
6.3 KiB
Bash
Executable File
133 lines
6.3 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN H5 — Approval-identity MVP tests (C4 / V20).
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#
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# Proves that under CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 a high-risk approval is trusted ONLY
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# when a REGISTERED reviewer cryptographically signs THIS request and their role
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# is authorized — a plain env-var approver is no longer enough. Also proves the
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# default (non-strict) path is unchanged (backward compatible).
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#
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# Self-contained: generates ephemeral reviewer keypairs into a temp reviewers
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# dir and uses the committed reviewers.registry (pubkey filenames match).
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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S="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
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REG="$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT/reviewers.registry"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; RV="$WORK/reviewers"; mkdir -p "$RV"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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expect_rc() {
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local want="$1" desc="$2"; shift 2
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local got=0
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{ "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; } || got=$?
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[[ "$got" -eq "$want" ]] && pass "$desc (rc=$got)" || fail "$desc (got rc=$got, want $want)"
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}
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# Ephemeral reviewer keypairs (filenames match reviewers.registry).
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for r in ops-owner tech-lead security-lead; do
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/$r.priv.pem" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl rsa -in "$WORK/$r.priv.pem" -pubout -out "$RV/$r.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
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done
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/attacker.priv.pem" 2048 2>/dev/null
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REQ="$WORK/req.txt"
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printf 'deploy to production and run database migration\n' > "$REQ"
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OTHER="$WORK/other.txt"
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printf 'deploy a different unrelated change to production\n' > "$OTHER"
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sign() { bash "$S/approval-sign.sh" "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
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# gc <extra-env...> — run governance-check in STRICT mode for a high-risk deploy
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gc() {
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env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 CASAN_REVIEWERS_FILE="$REG" CASAN_REVIEWERS_DIR="$RV" \
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CASAN_ACTOR=alice CASAN_APPROVAL_DECISION=approve "$@" \
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bash "$S/governance-check.sh" "$REQ" "$WORK/out.txt" deploy
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}
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echo "===== H5 approval-identity (CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1) ====="
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# 1. Valid signed approval by an authorized role -> APPROVED
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sign deploy alice "$REQ" ops-owner "$WORK/ops-owner.priv.pem" "$WORK/ops.sig"
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OUT="$(gc CASAN_APPROVER=ops-owner CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/ops.sig" 2>/dev/null)"; RC=$?
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{ [[ "$RC" -eq 0 ]] && printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -q "human_approved_signed"; } \
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&& pass "valid signed approval by authorized reviewer -> APPROVED" \
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|| fail "valid signed approval rejected (rc=$RC out=$OUT)"
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# 2. Env-var approver but NO signature -> DENY (the core fix)
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expect_rc 2 "env-var approver without signature is denied" \
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gc CASAN_APPROVER=ops-owner
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# 3. Registered reviewer, but role not authorized for this action -> DENY
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sign deploy alice "$REQ" tech-lead "$WORK/tech-lead.priv.pem" "$WORK/tech.sig"
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expect_rc 2 "reviewer whose role is not authorized for deploy is denied" \
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gc CASAN_APPROVER=tech-lead CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/tech.sig"
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# 4. Forged signature (attacker key, claims to be ops-owner) -> DENY
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sign deploy alice "$REQ" ops-owner "$WORK/attacker.priv.pem" "$WORK/forged.sig"
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expect_rc 2 "forged signature (unregistered key) is denied" \
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gc CASAN_APPROVER=ops-owner CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/forged.sig"
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# 5. Unregistered approver id -> DENY
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sign deploy alice "$REQ" ghost "$WORK/attacker.priv.pem" "$WORK/ghost.sig"
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expect_rc 2 "unregistered approver id is denied" \
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gc CASAN_APPROVER=ghost CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/ghost.sig"
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# 6. Replay: a signature bound to a DIFFERENT request cannot approve this one
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sign deploy alice "$OTHER" ops-owner "$WORK/ops-owner.priv.pem" "$WORK/replay.sig"
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expect_rc 2 "signature bound to another request cannot be replayed" \
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gc CASAN_APPROVER=ops-owner CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/replay.sig"
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# 7. Separation of duties still enforced even with a valid signature
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sign deploy ops-owner "$REQ" ops-owner "$WORK/ops-owner.priv.pem" "$WORK/sod.sig"
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expect_rc 2 "self-approval denied even with a valid signature (SoD)" \
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env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 CASAN_REVIEWERS_FILE="$REG" CASAN_REVIEWERS_DIR="$RV" \
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CASAN_ACTOR=ops-owner CASAN_APPROVAL_DECISION=approve \
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CASAN_APPROVER=ops-owner CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/sod.sig" \
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bash "$S/governance-check.sh" "$REQ" "$WORK/out.txt" deploy
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# 8. Backward compatibility: default (non-strict) env approval still works
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expect_rc 0 "non-strict env approval unchanged (backward compatible)" \
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env CASAN_ACTOR=alice CASAN_APPROVAL_DECISION=approve CASAN_APPROVER=bob \
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bash "$S/governance-check.sh" "$REQ" "$WORK/out.txt" deploy
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echo "===== H5 OIDC approval via mock IdP JWT (CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1) ====="
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/idp.priv.pem" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl rsa -in "$WORK/idp.priv.pem" -pubout -out "$WORK/idp.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/fake-idp.priv.pem" 2048 2>/dev/null
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mint_jwt() {
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python3 "$S/approval-jwt-mint.py" --key "$1" --sub "$2" --role "$3" \
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--action deploy --actor alice --input "$REQ" --exp-offset "$4"
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}
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# 9. Valid IdP-signed JWT by an authorized role -> APPROVED
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OIDC_JWT="$(mint_jwt "$WORK/idp.priv.pem" oidc-ops ops 300)"
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OUT="$(gc CASAN_APPROVER=oidc-ops CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT="$OIDC_JWT" CASAN_IDP_PUBLIC_KEY="$WORK/idp.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null)"; RC=$?
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{ [[ "$RC" -eq 0 ]] && printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -q "human_approved_oidc"; } \
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&& pass "valid IdP JWT by authorized role -> APPROVED" \
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|| fail "valid IdP JWT rejected (rc=$RC out=$OUT)"
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# 10. Expired JWT -> DENY
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EXPIRED_JWT="$(mint_jwt "$WORK/idp.priv.pem" oidc-ops ops -60)"
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expect_rc 2 "expired IdP JWT is denied" \
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gc CASAN_APPROVER=oidc-ops CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT="$EXPIRED_JWT" CASAN_IDP_PUBLIC_KEY="$WORK/idp.pub.pem"
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# 11. Role not authorized for deploy -> DENY
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WRONG_ROLE_JWT="$(mint_jwt "$WORK/idp.priv.pem" oidc-tech tech_lead 300)"
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expect_rc 2 "IdP JWT with unauthorized role is denied" \
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gc CASAN_APPROVER=oidc-tech CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT="$WRONG_ROLE_JWT" CASAN_IDP_PUBLIC_KEY="$WORK/idp.pub.pem"
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# 12. JWT signed by a different key than the trusted IdP pubkey -> DENY
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FORGED_JWT="$(mint_jwt "$WORK/fake-idp.priv.pem" oidc-ops ops 300)"
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expect_rc 2 "JWT with forged IdP signature is denied" \
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gc CASAN_APPROVER=oidc-ops CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT="$FORGED_JWT" CASAN_IDP_PUBLIC_KEY="$WORK/idp.pub.pem"
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echo ""
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echo "===== H5 APPROVAL-IDENTITY SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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