thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
dbeb8e89d2
C3 (V19) data-exfil-guard.sh: destination-aware egress checkpoint built on the H4 detectors. cloud/artifact boundaries fail closed on any secret; audit boundary emits a PII-masked copy (fail closed on an unmaskable secret). Covers secret-to-cloud, artifact-leaks-env, and PII-in-audit. C6 (V22) sandbox-run.sh: static policy pre-check (BLOCK on reading ~/.ssh/creds, network egress, fork bomb, writes outside workspace, huge-file/disk-fill) plus ulimit file-size/CPU backstops and the wall-clock timeout. HONEST SCOPE: this is not kernel isolation — the production target (docker --network=none --read-only --pids-limit / nsjail) is documented as TODO(C6-prod). Process cap is opt-in so it never breaks legitimate commands on a busy host. phase2-track-c-tests.sh: 29 adversarial checks (C1 13, C2 6, C3 4, C6 6). Baselines preserved: run-casan4 35/35, adversarial 44/44. Running total: 35 + 44 + 25 + 29 = 133 checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>