thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
3432ae59e1
- SEC-07 (M-08): real approval verification via approval-verify.sh in enforced mode (CASAN_PROFILE=prod / CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1) for control-plane `set` (sensitive keys), kill-switch `clear`, and self-improve (inherits control-plane). A bare or forged approval string is now denied; dev mode stays backward-compatible. - SEC-10 (M-05): non-spoofable agent identity. tool-registry-gate least-privilege no longer trusts CASAN_AGENT env in enforced mode (CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1) — the caller must present a signed token (agent-identity-sign.sh) bound to agent id + run id, verified against agent-identities.registry. Blocks env spoofing + replay. Verify: SEC+integrity gate 18/0, run-casan4 0-FAIL, adversarial 44/44 (H2 intact), control-plane 9/0, h5-approval 12/0, c7-incident 15/0, self-improve 7/0, track-c 29/0. Plan-16 P0 + P1 now complete; remaining: P2 (SEC-12/13/14/15/22..30). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
84 lines
4.5 KiB
Bash
84 lines
4.5 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-07 (M-08) — real approval on the remaining approval sites.
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#
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# control-plane `set` (sensitive), self-improve `apply`, and kill-switch `clear`
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# used to accept ANY non-empty approval string. In enforced mode they now require a
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# REGISTERED reviewer to cryptographically sign the request (verified by
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# approval-verify.sh) — a bare/forged string is denied. Dev mode stays unchanged.
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#
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# Self-contained: ephemeral reviewer keypair into a temp reviewers dir, using the
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# committed reviewers.registry (security-lead → security role; policy_change needs
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# security; kill_switch falls back to the default roles).
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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S="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash"
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REG="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance/reviewers.registry"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; RV="$WORK/reviewers"; mkdir -p "$RV"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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# Ephemeral keys: a registered reviewer (security-lead) and an unregistered attacker.
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/sl.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl rsa -in "$WORK/sl.priv" -pubout -out "$RV/security-lead.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/atk.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
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export CASAN_REVIEWERS_FILE="$REG" CASAN_REVIEWERS_DIR="$RV"
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export CASAN_CP_STORE_FILE="$WORK/store.json" CASAN_CP_KEY_DIR="$WORK/cpk" CASAN_CP_PUB="$WORK/cp.pub"
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-07: real approval verification ====="
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# ---- control-plane set (security-sensitive) ----
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CP="$S/control-plane-settings.py"
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# Backward compat: dev (non-strict) accepts a plain --approval string.
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[[ "$(rc_of python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor alice --reason r --approval tok)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "dev mode: plain --approval string still works (backward compatible)" \
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|| fail "dev-mode approval broke"
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# Enforced: bare string is NOT enough.
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor alice --reason r --approval bogus)" -eq 3 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: bare approval string is DENIED" \
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|| fail "enforced mode accepted a bare approval string"
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# Enforced: a valid signed approval by the registered reviewer is accepted.
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printf 'security.strict' > "$WORK/keyin"
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bash "$S/approval-sign.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/keyin" security-lead "$WORK/sl.priv" "$WORK/ok.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 CASAN_ACTOR=alice CASAN_APPROVER=security-lead CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/ok.sig" \
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python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor alice --reason r --approval x)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: valid reviewer signature is ACCEPTED" \
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|| fail "enforced mode rejected a valid signed approval"
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# Enforced: a forged signature (attacker key claiming to be the reviewer) is denied.
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bash "$S/approval-sign.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/keyin" security-lead "$WORK/atk.priv" "$WORK/forged.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 CASAN_ACTOR=alice CASAN_APPROVER=security-lead CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/forged.sig" \
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python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor alice --reason r --approval x)" -eq 3 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: forged signature is DENIED" \
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|| fail "enforced mode accepted a forged signature"
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# ---- kill-switch clear ----
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export CASAN_KILLSWITCH_DIR="$WORK/ks"
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bash "$S/kill-switch.sh" engage project ks7 "t" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 bash "$S/kill-switch.sh" clear project ks7 r)" -eq 3 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: kill-switch clear without approval is DENIED" \
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|| fail "enforced kill-switch clear allowed without approval"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$S/kill-switch.sh" check project ks7)" -eq 2 ]] \
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&& pass "kill-switch remained engaged after denied clear" || fail "switch cleared despite denial"
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printf 'project/ks7' > "$WORK/ksin"
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bash "$S/approval-sign.sh" kill_switch admin "$WORK/ksin" security-lead "$WORK/sl.priv" "$WORK/ks.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 CASAN_ACTOR=admin CASAN_APPROVER=security-lead CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/ks.sig" \
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bash "$S/kill-switch.sh" clear project ks7 r)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: kill-switch clear WITH valid approval succeeds" \
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|| fail "enforced kill-switch clear rejected a valid approval"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-07 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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