feat: plan 16 P1 complete (SEC-07 approval + SEC-10 agent identity)
- SEC-07 (M-08): real approval verification via approval-verify.sh in enforced mode (CASAN_PROFILE=prod / CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1) for control-plane `set` (sensitive keys), kill-switch `clear`, and self-improve (inherits control-plane). A bare or forged approval string is now denied; dev mode stays backward-compatible. - SEC-10 (M-05): non-spoofable agent identity. tool-registry-gate least-privilege no longer trusts CASAN_AGENT env in enforced mode (CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1) — the caller must present a signed token (agent-identity-sign.sh) bound to agent id + run id, verified against agent-identities.registry. Blocks env spoofing + replay. Verify: SEC+integrity gate 18/0, run-casan4 0-FAIL, adversarial 44/44 (H2 intact), control-plane 9/0, h5-approval 12/0, c7-incident 15/0, self-improve 7/0, track-c 29/0. Plan-16 P0 + P1 now complete; remaining: P2 (SEC-12/13/14/15/22..30). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
thanhnv
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
e70f0815ab
commit
3432ae59e1
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-10 — agent-identity registry (non-spoofable least-privilege).
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#
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# tool-registry-gate.sh least-privilege used to trust CASAN_AGENT (a plain env var
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# anyone can set). Under CASAN_PROFILE=prod (or CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1) the caller
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# must instead present a signed token proving it is that agent — verified against
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# one of the PUBLIC keys below. Private keys live OFF-REPO (with the agent runner /
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# issued by an IdP); only public keys are provisioned here (same policy as the audit
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# and reviewer signing keys).
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#
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# Line format (no yaml dependency):
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# agent <agent-id> <pubkey-file> # pubkey-file relative to the agents/ dir
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#
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# Token minted with: agent-identity-sign.sh <agent-id> <run-id> <priv> <sig-out>
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# Presented via: CASAN_AGENT=<id> CASAN_AGENT_SIG=<sig> CASAN_RUN_ID=<run>
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#
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# NOTE: pubkeys under agents/ are provisioned out-of-band by ops. Until then,
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# enforced mode fails CLOSED (an unproven agent is denied every restricted tool).
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agent release-manager release-manager.pub.pem
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agent implement-agent implement-agent.pub.pem
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agent design-agent design-agent.pub.pem
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agent review-agent review-agent.pub.pem
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -euo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-10 — mint a signed agent-identity token.
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#
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# Proves a caller really IS a given agent (instead of just setting CASAN_AGENT).
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# The signed assertion is bound to the agent id AND the run id, so a token cannot
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# be replayed for a different run:
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# casan-agent|v1|<agent-id>|<run-id>
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#
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# Usage: agent-identity-sign.sh <agent-id> <run-id> <private-key> <sig-out>
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# The matching PUBLIC key must be registered in agent-identities.registry.
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AGENT="${1:-}"; RUN="${2:-}"; PRIV="${3:-}"; SIG_OUT="${4:-}"
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if [[ -z "$AGENT" || -z "$RUN" || -z "$PRIV" || -z "$SIG_OUT" ]]; then
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echo "Usage: agent-identity-sign.sh <agent-id> <run-id> <private-key> <sig-out>" >&2
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exit 64
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fi
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command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "openssl_unavailable" >&2; exit 1; }
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TMP="$(mktemp)"; trap 'rm -f "$TMP"' EXIT
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printf '%s' "casan-agent|v1|$AGENT|$RUN" > "$TMP"
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openssl dgst -sha256 -sign "$PRIV" -out "$SIG_OUT" "$TMP"
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echo "AGENT_IDENTITY_SIGNED agent=$AGENT run=$RUN sig=$SIG_OUT"
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@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ run "phase-sec09-input-caps" bash "$TESTS/phase-sec09-tests.sh"
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run "phase-sec19-atomic-store" bash "$TESTS/phase-sec19-tests.sh"
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run "phase-sec20-toolchain" bash "$TESTS/phase-sec20-tests.sh"
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run "phase-sec21-model-budget" bash "$TESTS/phase-sec21-tests.sh"
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run "phase-sec07-approval" bash "$TESTS/phase-sec07-tests.sh"
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run "phase-sec10-agent-identity" bash "$TESTS/phase-sec10-tests.sh"
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# ARCH-02: coverage cannot silently drop; ARCH-01: harness/policy cannot silently
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# drift. Both SKIP cleanly when no manifest is provisioned (non-strict dev/CI).
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@@ -187,14 +187,51 @@ def verify_signature(store):
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return ("signed", "ok") if res.returncode == 0 else ("invalid", "signature verify failed")
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def _approval_enforced() -> bool:
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return os.environ.get("CASAN_PROFILE") == "prod" or os.environ.get("CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT") == "1"
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def check_approval(key, actor, approval):
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"""SEC-07 (M-08): a security-sensitive setting change needs a REAL approval.
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Dev (default) keeps the backward-compatible "any non-empty --approval" gate;
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enforced mode requires a REGISTERED reviewer to cryptographically sign this
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change (verified by approval-verify.sh), so a bare string can no longer approve.
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Env contract mirrors governance-check: CASAN_APPROVER + CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG (or
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CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT). The signed assertion is bound to the key being changed."""
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if not _approval_enforced():
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return bool((approval or "").strip()), "dev_nonstrict"
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approver = os.environ.get("CASAN_APPROVER", "")
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if not approver:
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return False, "no_registered_approver"
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verifier = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "approval-verify.sh")
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if not os.path.isfile(verifier):
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return False, "approval_verifier_missing"
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import tempfile
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fd, inp = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".approval-input")
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try:
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with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
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fh.write(key) # the approval is bound to the key under change
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sig = os.environ.get("CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG", "-")
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rc = subprocess.run(["bash", verifier, "policy_change", actor, inp, approver, sig],
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capture_output=True).returncode
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finally:
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try:
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os.unlink(inp)
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except OSError:
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pass
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return rc == 0, f"approval_verify_rc={rc}"
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def do_set(key, value, actor, reason, approval):
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policy = SETTINGS_POLICY.get(key)
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if policy is None:
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print(f"SETTING_NOT_ALLOWED {key}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 2
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if policy["securitySensitive"] and not (approval or "").strip():
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print(f"APPROVAL_REQUIRED {key}", file=sys.stderr)
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return 3
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if policy["securitySensitive"]:
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ok, reason_ = check_approval(key, actor, approval)
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if not ok:
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print(f"APPROVAL_REQUIRED {key} ({reason_})", file=sys.stderr)
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return 3
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with store_lock(): # SEC-19: atomic read-modify-write
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store = load_store()
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prev = store["settings"].get(key)
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@@ -34,6 +34,21 @@ case "$CMD" in
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;;
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clear)
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[[ -n "$SCOPE" && -n "$ID" ]] || { echo "usage: kill-switch.sh clear <scope> <id> [reason]" >&2; exit 64; }
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# SEC-07 (M-08): clearing an emergency stop is a high-trust action. In enforced
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# mode it needs a REGISTERED reviewer's verified approval (approval-verify.sh),
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# not just "anyone who can run the script". Dev (default) stays unchanged.
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if [[ "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "prod" || "${CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT:-}" == "1" ]]; then
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APPROVER="${CASAN_APPROVER:-}"
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KS_INP="$(mktemp)"; printf '%s/%s' "$SCOPE" "$ID" > "$KS_INP"
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if [[ -z "$APPROVER" ]] || \
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! bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/approval-verify.sh" kill_switch "${CASAN_ACTOR:-system}" \
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"$KS_INP" "$APPROVER" "${CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG:--}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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rm -f "$KS_INP"
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echo "KILL_SWITCH_CLEAR_DENIED scope=$SCOPE id=$ID reason=approval_required" >&2
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exit 3
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fi
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rm -f "$KS_INP"
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fi
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f="$KS_DIR/$(safe "$SCOPE")-$(safe "$ID").on"
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if [[ -f "$f" ]]; then
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printf '%s cleared_by=%s reason=%s at=%s\n' "$(cat "$f")" "${CASAN_ACTOR:-system}" "$REASON" "$(ts)" \
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@@ -25,7 +25,33 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/tool-audit-lib.sh"
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AUDIT_TMP="$(mktemp)"
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trap 'rm -f "$AUDIT_TMP"' EXIT
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DECISION_LINE="$(python - "$REGISTRY" "$TOOL_ID" "${CASAN_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY:-}" "$LOG_DIR/tool-registry.jsonl" "$TRACE_ID" "${CASAN_AGENT:-}" "$AUDIT_TMP" "${CASAN_RUN_ID:-adhoc-$$}" <<'PY'
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# SEC-10 (M-05): the effective agent identity used for least-privilege authz.
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# Dev (default) trusts CASAN_AGENT (backward compatible). In enforced mode the env
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# is NOT trusted — the caller must present a signed token proving it is that agent
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# (bound to agent id + run id); otherwise it is treated as UNAUTHENTICATED (empty),
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# which denies any restricted tool. This stops `CASAN_AGENT=release-manager` spoofing.
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RUN_ID="${CASAN_RUN_ID:-adhoc-$$}"
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EFFECTIVE_AGENT="${CASAN_AGENT:-}"
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if [[ "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "prod" || "${CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT:-}" == "1" ]]; then
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EFFECTIVE_AGENT="" # unauthenticated until a valid token proves otherwise
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CLAIM="${CASAN_AGENT:-}"
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SIG="${CASAN_AGENT_SIG:-}"
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REG="${CASAN_AGENT_REGISTRY:-$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance/agent-identities.registry}"
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KEYS_DIR="${CASAN_AGENT_KEYS_DIR:-$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance/agents}"
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if [[ -n "$CLAIM" && -n "$SIG" && -f "$SIG" && -f "$REG" ]] && command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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PUB_REL="$(awk -v id="$CLAIM" '$1=="agent" && $2==id {print $3; exit}' "$REG")"
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if [[ -n "$PUB_REL" ]]; then
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PUB="$PUB_REL"; [[ "$PUB" = /* ]] || PUB="$KEYS_DIR/$PUB_REL"
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TMPM="$(mktemp)"; printf '%s' "casan-agent|v1|$CLAIM|$RUN_ID" > "$TMPM"
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if [[ -f "$PUB" ]] && openssl dgst -sha256 -verify "$PUB" -signature "$SIG" "$TMPM" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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EFFECTIVE_AGENT="$CLAIM"
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fi
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rm -f "$TMPM"
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fi
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fi
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fi
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DECISION_LINE="$(python - "$REGISTRY" "$TOOL_ID" "${CASAN_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY:-}" "$LOG_DIR/tool-registry.jsonl" "$TRACE_ID" "$EFFECTIVE_AGENT" "$AUDIT_TMP" "$RUN_ID" <<'PY'
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import json
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import os
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import re
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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-07 (M-08) — real approval on the remaining approval sites.
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#
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# control-plane `set` (sensitive), self-improve `apply`, and kill-switch `clear`
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# used to accept ANY non-empty approval string. In enforced mode they now require a
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# REGISTERED reviewer to cryptographically sign the request (verified by
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# approval-verify.sh) — a bare/forged string is denied. Dev mode stays unchanged.
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#
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# Self-contained: ephemeral reviewer keypair into a temp reviewers dir, using the
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# committed reviewers.registry (security-lead → security role; policy_change needs
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# security; kill_switch falls back to the default roles).
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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S="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash"
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REG="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance/reviewers.registry"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; RV="$WORK/reviewers"; mkdir -p "$RV"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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# Ephemeral keys: a registered reviewer (security-lead) and an unregistered attacker.
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/sl.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl rsa -in "$WORK/sl.priv" -pubout -out "$RV/security-lead.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/atk.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
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export CASAN_REVIEWERS_FILE="$REG" CASAN_REVIEWERS_DIR="$RV"
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export CASAN_CP_STORE_FILE="$WORK/store.json" CASAN_CP_KEY_DIR="$WORK/cpk" CASAN_CP_PUB="$WORK/cp.pub"
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-07: real approval verification ====="
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# ---- control-plane set (security-sensitive) ----
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CP="$S/control-plane-settings.py"
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# Backward compat: dev (non-strict) accepts a plain --approval string.
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[[ "$(rc_of python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor alice --reason r --approval tok)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "dev mode: plain --approval string still works (backward compatible)" \
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|| fail "dev-mode approval broke"
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# Enforced: bare string is NOT enough.
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor alice --reason r --approval bogus)" -eq 3 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: bare approval string is DENIED" \
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|| fail "enforced mode accepted a bare approval string"
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# Enforced: a valid signed approval by the registered reviewer is accepted.
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printf 'security.strict' > "$WORK/keyin"
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bash "$S/approval-sign.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/keyin" security-lead "$WORK/sl.priv" "$WORK/ok.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 CASAN_ACTOR=alice CASAN_APPROVER=security-lead CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/ok.sig" \
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python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor alice --reason r --approval x)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: valid reviewer signature is ACCEPTED" \
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|| fail "enforced mode rejected a valid signed approval"
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# Enforced: a forged signature (attacker key claiming to be the reviewer) is denied.
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bash "$S/approval-sign.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/keyin" security-lead "$WORK/atk.priv" "$WORK/forged.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 CASAN_ACTOR=alice CASAN_APPROVER=security-lead CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/forged.sig" \
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python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor alice --reason r --approval x)" -eq 3 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: forged signature is DENIED" \
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|| fail "enforced mode accepted a forged signature"
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# ---- kill-switch clear ----
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export CASAN_KILLSWITCH_DIR="$WORK/ks"
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bash "$S/kill-switch.sh" engage project ks7 "t" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 bash "$S/kill-switch.sh" clear project ks7 r)" -eq 3 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: kill-switch clear without approval is DENIED" \
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|| fail "enforced kill-switch clear allowed without approval"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$S/kill-switch.sh" check project ks7)" -eq 2 ]] \
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&& pass "kill-switch remained engaged after denied clear" || fail "switch cleared despite denial"
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printf 'project/ks7' > "$WORK/ksin"
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bash "$S/approval-sign.sh" kill_switch admin "$WORK/ksin" security-lead "$WORK/sl.priv" "$WORK/ks.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1 CASAN_ACTOR=admin CASAN_APPROVER=security-lead CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG="$WORK/ks.sig" \
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bash "$S/kill-switch.sh" clear project ks7 r)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: kill-switch clear WITH valid approval succeeds" \
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|| fail "enforced kill-switch clear rejected a valid approval"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-07 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-10 (M-05) — non-spoofable agent identity.
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#
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# tool-registry-gate least-privilege trusted CASAN_AGENT (a plain env var anyone can
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# set → privilege spoofing). In enforced mode the caller must present a signed token
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# proving it is that agent (bound to agent id + run id). Proves:
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# * dev mode still trusts CASAN_AGENT (backward compatible),
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# * enforced mode denies an env-only claim (no token),
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# * a valid token is accepted,
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# * a forged token (unregistered key) is denied,
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# * a token minted for a different run is denied (no replay).
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#
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# Self-contained: ephemeral agent keypair + temp registry.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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S="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash"
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GATE="$S/tool-registry-gate.sh"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'git -C "$PROJECT_ROOT" checkout -- .specify/logs/ 2>/dev/null; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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AK="$WORK/agents"; mkdir -p "$AK"
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/rm.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl rsa -in "$WORK/rm.priv" -pubout -out "$AK/release-manager.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/atk.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
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printf 'agent release-manager release-manager.pub.pem\n' > "$WORK/reg"
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export CASAN_AGENT_REGISTRY="$WORK/reg" CASAN_AGENT_KEYS_DIR="$AK" CASAN_RUN_ID=run-sec10
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export CASAN_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY=k # deploy is side-effecting + idempotency-required
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-10: non-spoofable agent identity ====="
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# Dev (default): CASAN_AGENT is trusted (backward compatible).
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_AGENT=release-manager bash "$GATE" deploy)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "dev mode: authorized CASAN_AGENT approved (backward compatible)" \
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|| fail "dev-mode agent authz broke"
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# Enforced: env-only claim (no token) is denied.
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AGENT=release-manager bash "$GATE" deploy)" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: env-only agent claim DENIED (spoof blocked)" \
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|| fail "enforced mode trusted a bare CASAN_AGENT env"
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# Enforced: a valid signed token is accepted.
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bash "$S/agent-identity-sign.sh" release-manager run-sec10 "$WORK/rm.priv" "$WORK/rm.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AGENT=release-manager CASAN_AGENT_SIG="$WORK/rm.sig" bash "$GATE" deploy)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: valid signed agent token ACCEPTED" \
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|| fail "enforced mode rejected a valid agent token"
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# Enforced: a forged token (attacker key claiming to be release-manager) is denied.
|
||||
bash "$S/agent-identity-sign.sh" release-manager run-sec10 "$WORK/atk.priv" "$WORK/forged.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
|
||||
[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AGENT=release-manager CASAN_AGENT_SIG="$WORK/forged.sig" bash "$GATE" deploy)" -ne 0 ]] \
|
||||
&& pass "enforced: forged agent token DENIED" \
|
||||
|| fail "enforced mode accepted a forged agent token"
|
||||
|
||||
# Enforced: a token minted for a DIFFERENT run cannot be replayed.
|
||||
bash "$S/agent-identity-sign.sh" release-manager other-run "$WORK/rm.priv" "$WORK/replay.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
|
||||
[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AGENT=release-manager CASAN_AGENT_SIG="$WORK/replay.sig" bash "$GATE" deploy)" -ne 0 ]] \
|
||||
&& pass "enforced: token bound to another run DENIED (no replay)" \
|
||||
|| fail "enforced mode allowed a cross-run token replay"
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "===== SEC-10 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
|
||||
[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@
|
||||
"sha256": "71e04cba738f501e79dd6b2c02aa86c7434c5ce541af5c7e512a2c94219f1c33",
|
||||
"checks": 5
|
||||
},
|
||||
"phase-sec07-tests.sh": {
|
||||
"sha256": "9d8857bbfb374eb4db130344fb00da1c13801d90b092253725d7f63f45edea81",
|
||||
"checks": 7
|
||||
},
|
||||
"phase-sec08-tests.sh": {
|
||||
"sha256": "ae4df77eed43cf235198c2489cc89a9fa083a66133137b3eb61b42fd021fd3c3",
|
||||
"checks": 4
|
||||
@@ -88,6 +92,10 @@
|
||||
"sha256": "7d98d0a5a646d1500e4701710ceb4009eea22deb266c3b27b5f7b2850efc2f4a",
|
||||
"checks": 7
|
||||
},
|
||||
"phase-sec10-tests.sh": {
|
||||
"sha256": "099c81a0a37b51137dbf328dbe2ef778226d0716b97660d083c1fcc6a4aecd19",
|
||||
"checks": 5
|
||||
},
|
||||
"phase-sec16-tests.sh": {
|
||||
"sha256": "3d826ca4f5c8f98837cc70846b8e2f2f83d5a598c2a5907795e8b9cc9db448c2",
|
||||
"checks": 6
|
||||
@@ -153,6 +161,6 @@
|
||||
"checks": 10
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"total_checks": 331,
|
||||
"suite_count": 38
|
||||
"total_checks": 343,
|
||||
"suite_count": 40
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
||||
30124645ed601ca08017707be27592b23c98c35dff08cb419362d585cffa0daf
|
||||
5a25c53485019236dc7383f714812f2ed455c09dde2316e7ce6a9f4a4c58a852
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +1 @@
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
�Bָ��ק³מ�‘wvם»ָ«4״ה4"ק.=nN;␍ֹ'�b™A(װBֺdiS�Rq±�ס3¥\V×ַָp²כֽw¬'שwצ-¦ב�kֵ�¯Xoֿ€×Ru™�n~רמ� |�C -O°}´�lםS% z��j�תG�Tז`�e] V־™␍�¯שיה ¯f₪³_}ףקכױK¼t!<קB ␍q hה1ך₪Eהל`z“iס´whיס�?ְִֵ¿~ִmCַ/…׃cֲבQ ׂ¨�‘]¹¶s �yb„�„¥'�ֹ2ץו4עZx?»^קמ_×הֳWײO
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user