67 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
67 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
# CASAN Phase 3 — Wave 2 Results
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**Date:** 2026-06-30
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**Executed by:** Claude (Opus 4.8), in CASAN5, against the live local model (`ollama:ornith:9b`).
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**Integrity:** real numbers only; blocked items recorded as BLOCKED, not pass. No score >90 claimed.
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**Evidence:** `docs/output/casan/phase3-evidence/wave2/`.
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---
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## Implemented (real, verified)
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### WP-A + WP-S2 — Quantitative H4 (semantic injection, measured)
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Built a labeled red-team corpus (`.specify/security/redteam-corpus.jsonl`: 10 novel injection
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paraphrases that are NOT in the regex blocklist + 6 benign) and a runner
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(`.specify/tests/phase3-redteam-metrics.sh`) that scores both layers against the **live model**.
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Real result (`phase3-evidence/wave2/redteam-metrics.log`):
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| Layer | precision | recall |
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|---|:--:|:--:|
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| regex-only | 1.00 | **0.00** (caught 0/10 paraphrases) |
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| model layer | 1.00 | **0.90** (caught 9/10, 0 benign false-positives) |
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`GATE model_recall>=0.8 AND model_recall>regex_recall → PASS`. This **quantifies** the model
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layer's value: the regex blocklist is blind to novel paraphrasing (recall 0), the model recovers
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90% recall at 100% precision. One paraphrase still slipped the local 9B (recall 0.9) — recorded
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honestly; cloud or a larger model would raise coverage.
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**Honest caveat:** corpus is 16 samples; the security DoD targets ≥30 — this is a real but
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not-yet-DoD-sized corpus.
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### WP-C — H6 real per-step billing + spike detection
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- `.specify/scripts/bash/cost-spike-detect.sh` (median-based, flags steps > 3× median, exits non-zero).
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- `provider-usage.jsonl` now has **18 real records with 9 distinct token values** (e.g. 218, 219, 220, 216) from real router calls — **not** the recycled 2778 sample.
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- **Fail-able proof:** injecting a 4× step → `COST_SPIKE_DETECTED` (exit 2). The detector also flags the leftover 2778 sample records as anomalies vs. the real ~220-token calls — working as intended.
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- `cost_usd=0.0`, `cost_source=ollama_local_real_tokens` — local inference is genuinely free; not faked pricing.
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### WP-S8 — One-command security gate
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`.specify/scripts/bash/security-gate.sh` aggregates the security-relevant checks into one verdict.
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Real run (`phase3-evidence/wave2/security-gate.log`): **PASS=6 FAIL=0 SKIP=0** —
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run-casan4 suite, adversarial suite, audit hash-chain (signed), tool-call audit (signed),
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model-router tests, red-team H4 metrics. Live-model gates SKIP (not fail) if the tunnel is down.
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## Status of the other work packages
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| WP | Status |
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|---|---|
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| WP-D (H7 fallback/drift/undo) | Largely done across Wave 1 + earlier Phase 3: failure-driven fallback via real router (Wave 1 test 7), real drift between different artifacts, exception-style undo via `rollback-manager checkpoint`. Drift against the in-pipeline attempt1-vs-attempt2 artifacts is wired but the full pipeline run is blocked by baseline. |
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| WP-E (H1 context) | Done — `context-validate.sh` red-able; on the real context it correctly flags 12 missing trace files (a real retention gap to fix, not a validator defect). |
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| WP-F (H2 rate-limit + schema) | Done in Phase 3 push (`rate_limit_per_run`, `validate-tool-input.sh`), adversarially tested. |
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| WP-G (H5 governance) | Offline done (signed re-forge-detection, key off-repo). KMS/WORM **blocked** (no AWS). |
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| WP-B (H3 judge + frontend tests) | **Partial/blocked.** The router `--role judge` gives a real single-model judge usable now; wiring it into `casan-step.mjs` review gates and the frontend Vitest/RTL tests need the app baseline (`npm install` → network) which is blocked. True 2-of-3 consensus needs a 2nd independent provider (no cloud key). → Wave 3. |
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## Blockers (recorded, NOT passed)
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1. **App baseline** — `node_modules` absent, `npm install` needs network (sandbox-blocked). Blocks WP-B frontend tests, `casan-step.mjs` judge wiring, `npm audit` (WP-S3), full pipeline run.
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2. **Cloud provider** — keys unset → no multi-provider judge diversity (WP-B), no cloud-grade classify coverage.
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3. **AWS/KMS/Object Lock** — not configured → WP-G KMS/WORM not claimed.
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4. **Corpus size** — red-team corpus is 16, DoD wants ≥30 (expand in Wave 3).
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## Files added/changed (Wave 2)
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- new: `.specify/scripts/bash/cost-spike-detect.sh`, `security-gate.sh`; `.specify/security/redteam-corpus.jsonl`; `.specify/tests/phase3-redteam-metrics.sh`
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- (Wave 1 carried in: `model-router.sh`, `model-call.py`, `phase3-model-router-tests.sh`, semantic escalation in `security-check.sh`)
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## Score statement
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**No average >90 claimed.** Wave 2 added *measured* H4 (recall 0→0.90), real per-step H6 telemetry +
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spike detection, and a one-command security gate (6/6 green). App-dependent harnesses (WP-B frontend,
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judge wiring) and KMS/WORM remain blocked. Scores update only after a full independent audit on a
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green baseline.
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