80 lines
3.3 KiB
Bash
80 lines
3.3 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-05 (H-04 / M-05) — JSON-safe audit writers.
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#
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# governance-check / agent-metrics / incident used raw printf to build JSON audit
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# records, so an actor/action/agent field containing `"` + newline could inject a
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# SECOND forged record (e.g. a fabricated "approved" decision). This proves the
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# serialized writers escape such payloads into exactly ONE record and keep the
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# hash-chain intact.
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#
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# Deterministic; hermetic (backs up + restores the audit + governance dirs).
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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BASH_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash"
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AUDIT="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit/audit.jsonl"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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# Back up + restore the state governance-check mutates.
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BK="$WORK/backup"; mkdir -p "$BK"
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cp -a "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit" "$BK/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
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cp -a "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance" "$BK/central-governance" 2>/dev/null || true
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restore_state() {
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rm -rf "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit"; cp -a "$BK/audit" "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
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rm -rf "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance"; cp -a "$BK/central-governance" "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance" 2>/dev/null || true
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}
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trap 'restore_state; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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export CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR="$WORK/keys" # fresh key dir (avoid CI key-sync flake)
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-05: JSON-safe audit writers ====="
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echo "hello world" > "$WORK/in.txt"
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# A payload that, under raw printf, would break out of the action field and append
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# a forged "approved" audit record on a new line.
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PAYLOAD='evil","decision":"approved","approver":"ATTACKER
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{"timestamp":"forged","action":"pwned","record_hash":"deadbeef"}'
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BEFORE=$(wc -l < "$AUDIT" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
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set +e
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bash "$BASH_DIR/governance-check.sh" "$WORK/in.txt" "$WORK/out.txt" "$PAYLOAD" >/dev/null 2>&1
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set -e 2>/dev/null || true
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AFTER=$(wc -l < "$AUDIT" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
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ADDED=$((AFTER - BEFORE))
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[[ "$ADDED" -eq 1 ]] \
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&& pass "injection payload produced exactly ONE audit record (added=$ADDED)" \
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|| fail "expected 1 record, got $ADDED (raw-printf injection regression!)"
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# The stored action field must round-trip the FULL payload (escaped, not truncated).
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ROUNDTRIP="$(python3 - "$AUDIT" <<'PY'
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import json, sys
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last = [l for l in open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") if l.strip()][-1]
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print(json.loads(last).get("action", ""))
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PY
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)"
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[[ "$ROUNDTRIP" == "$PAYLOAD" ]] \
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&& pass "action field round-trips the exact payload (escaped, not truncated)" \
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|| fail "action field mangled — escaping wrong"
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# No forged record: the chain must still verify, and no record may claim the
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# fabricated hash 'deadbeef'.
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bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh" "$AUDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& pass "audit chain still verifies after injection attempt" \
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|| fail "chain broken after injection (record_hash mismatch)"
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grep -q '"record_hash":"deadbeef"\|"record_hash": "deadbeef"' "$AUDIT" \
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&& fail "forged record with attacker hash present in audit log" \
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|| pass "no forged record injected into audit log"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-05 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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