Files
CASAN/AINative_OKR_CASAN5/packages/casan-harness/tests/phase-sec23-rbac-tenant-tests.sh
T
thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8 3adc48ed82 feat(plan-01): Phase 4a — make harness location-independent (facade-free capable)
Resolve every root by marker walk-up instead of a fixed depth that only lands on the
app via the .specify compat symlink, so the harness runs correctly when invoked by its
real packages/casan-harness path — proven by a full gate run via that path: 64/0/0.

- 95 scripts/tests: PROJECT_ROOT/ROOT "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.."-style computations -> $CASAN_APP_ROOT.
- 6 leaf scripts (infra-lab, context-validate, secrets-scan, path-guard, toolchain-verify,
  phase2-sourcegen) now source casan-paths + use CASAN_APP_ROOT.
- run-casan4: source casan-paths as a package sibling (facade-independent), PROJECT_ROOT=CASAN_APP_ROOT.
- 8 Python files: project_root()/REPO_ROOT/bundle_root walk UP for the .specify marker
  (control-plane-settings, loop_common, model-call, context-compress, test-integrity,
  bundle-integrity, traceability-matrix; generate-* fixed earlier).
- evidence-pack-build.py + traceability-matrix.py: domain refs -> apps/okr/domain
  (input/, corpus/redteam-vectors.jsonl, traceability-map.json).
- ci-harness-gate.sh: export CASAN_TESTS_DIR/CASAN_TEST_MANIFEST/CASAN_BUNDLE_ROOT so the
  integrity Python resolves via the harness root regardless of invocation path; ROOT=CASAN_APP_ROOT.
- Remove the domain compat symlinks from packages/casan-harness/security (redteam-corpus,
  redteam-vectors, benign-corpus) — packages now holds NO domain data.

Both invocation paths pass (compat facade still present): .specify/... and packages/...

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 10:50:50 +09:00

71 lines
3.5 KiB
Bash

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -uo pipefail
# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-23 (23.13, MT-01) — RBAC tenant boundary at the DATA layer +
# casan-harness tenant-scoped state wiring.
#
# Proves:
# * a same-tenant authorized action is ALLOWED,
# * a cross-tenant request is DENIED even when role/project would allow it,
# * an ORG-ADMIN of tenant A cannot act on tenant B (tenant isolation > org wildcard),
# * org-admin within its own tenant is still ALLOWED,
# * with no tenant args the decision is backward compatible,
# * a casan-harness run under CASAN_TENANT_ID writes telemetry under the tenant
# partition (tenant-paths.sh is sourced by the harness).
#
# Deterministic; hermetic; no model/network for the RBAC checks.
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
PROJECT_ROOT="$CASAN_APP_ROOT"
S="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
RBAC="$S/rbac-check.py"
HARNESS="$S/casan-harness.sh"
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
export CASAN_TENANT_STATE_ROOT="$WORK/tenants"
PASS=0; FAIL=0
pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-23 (23.13): RBAC tenant boundary + harness wiring ====="
# --- same-tenant authorized action -> ALLOW ---
[[ "$(rc_of python3 "$RBAC" check --role project-admin --resource settings --action write \
--role-project P --target-project P --role-tenant alpha --target-tenant alpha)" -eq 0 ]] \
&& pass "same-tenant authorized action ALLOW" || fail "same-tenant action wrongly denied"
# --- cross-tenant -> DENY (data layer, before role grant) ---
rc=$(set +e; python3 "$RBAC" check --role project-admin --resource settings --action write \
--role-project P --target-project P --role-tenant alpha --target-tenant beta >/dev/null 2>"$WORK/e1"; echo $?)
{ [[ "$rc" -eq 1 ]] && grep -q CROSS_TENANT_DENY "$WORK/e1"; } \
&& pass "cross-tenant DENY at data layer" || fail "cross-tenant not denied (rc=$rc)"
# --- org-admin cannot cross tenant (stronger than the org wildcard) ---
rc=$(set +e; python3 "$RBAC" check --role org-admin --resource settings --action write \
--role-tenant alpha --target-tenant beta >/dev/null 2>"$WORK/e2"; echo $?)
{ [[ "$rc" -eq 1 ]] && grep -q CROSS_TENANT_DENY "$WORK/e2"; } \
&& pass "org-admin of A cannot act on tenant B" || fail "org-admin crossed tenant (rc=$rc)"
# --- org-admin within its own tenant -> ALLOW ---
[[ "$(rc_of python3 "$RBAC" check --role org-admin --resource settings --action write \
--role-tenant alpha --target-tenant alpha)" -eq 0 ]] \
&& pass "org-admin within its tenant ALLOW" || fail "org-admin within tenant wrongly denied"
# --- backward compatible with no tenant args ---
[[ "$(rc_of python3 "$RBAC" check --role org-admin --resource settings --action write)" -eq 0 ]] \
&& pass "no tenant args = backward compatible (org-admin ALLOW)" || fail "backward compat broken"
# --- harness wiring: run under a tenant -> telemetry under the tenant partition ---
printf 'a benign requirement line.\n' > "$WORK/in.txt"
CASAN_TENANT_ID=alpha bash "$HARNESS" "$WORK/in.txt" "$WORK/out.txt" act -- bash -c 'echo done' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
[[ -d "$WORK/tenants/alpha/telemetry/cost" ]] \
&& pass "casan-harness run under tenant scopes telemetry to the tenant partition" \
|| fail "harness did not tenant-scope telemetry (tenant-paths not wired)"
echo ""
echo "===== SEC-23 23.13 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1