thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
2c765c9a45
Task 1.2: introduce a single path resolver so no harness script hardcodes `.specify/...` scattered across the tree. casan-paths.sh resolves four roots (HARNESS/STATE/GOVERNANCE/APP) by marker-based walk-up from its own location — never `git rev-parse` (git root is the repo PARENT here, not the app dir). - 101 bash scripts/tests: 238 hardcoded `$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/...` refs rewritten to CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT (code) / CASAN_STATE_ROOT (logs,state) / CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT. Sandbox test vars ($WORK/$TP/$FP/$T1_WORK) left untouched. - Roots are NOT exported: each script/subprocess self-resolves from its own tree, matching the original per-script semantics and preserving hermetic sandbox isolation (node casan-step.mjs, copied telemetry/rollback scripts must not inherit real roots). - Sandbox tests that copy a harness script now also copy casan-paths.sh (its new sibling dependency): adversarial (verify-audit-chain/verify-tool-audit/rollback) + track-a (security-check/telemetry-integrity). - control-plane-settings.json reclassified as STATE (untracked runtime store). Roots all still resolve to `.specify` in this monolithic layout, so behavior is unchanged. Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (adversarial 44/0, track-a 25/0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
72 lines
3.6 KiB
Bash
72 lines
3.6 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-10 (M-05) — non-spoofable agent identity.
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#
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# tool-registry-gate least-privilege trusted CASAN_AGENT (a plain env var anyone can
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# set → privilege spoofing). In enforced mode the caller must present a signed token
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# proving it is that agent (bound to agent id + run id). Proves:
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# * dev mode still trusts CASAN_AGENT (backward compatible),
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# * enforced mode denies an env-only claim (no token),
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# * a valid token is accepted,
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# * a forged token (unregistered key) is denied,
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# * a token minted for a different run is denied (no replay).
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#
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# Self-contained: ephemeral agent keypair + temp registry.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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S="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
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GATE="$S/tool-registry-gate.sh"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'git -C "$PROJECT_ROOT" checkout -- .specify/logs/ 2>/dev/null; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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AK="$WORK/agents"; mkdir -p "$AK"
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/rm.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl rsa -in "$WORK/rm.priv" -pubout -out "$AK/release-manager.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/atk.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
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printf 'agent release-manager release-manager.pub.pem\n' > "$WORK/reg"
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export CASAN_AGENT_REGISTRY="$WORK/reg" CASAN_AGENT_KEYS_DIR="$AK" CASAN_RUN_ID=run-sec10
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export CASAN_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY=k # deploy is side-effecting + idempotency-required
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-10: non-spoofable agent identity ====="
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# Dev (default): CASAN_AGENT is trusted (backward compatible).
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_AGENT=release-manager bash "$GATE" deploy)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "dev mode: authorized CASAN_AGENT approved (backward compatible)" \
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|| fail "dev-mode agent authz broke"
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# Enforced: env-only claim (no token) is denied.
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AGENT=release-manager bash "$GATE" deploy)" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: env-only agent claim DENIED (spoof blocked)" \
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|| fail "enforced mode trusted a bare CASAN_AGENT env"
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# Enforced: a valid signed token is accepted.
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bash "$S/agent-identity-sign.sh" release-manager run-sec10 "$WORK/rm.priv" "$WORK/rm.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AGENT=release-manager CASAN_AGENT_SIG="$WORK/rm.sig" bash "$GATE" deploy)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: valid signed agent token ACCEPTED" \
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|| fail "enforced mode rejected a valid agent token"
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# Enforced: a forged token (attacker key claiming to be release-manager) is denied.
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bash "$S/agent-identity-sign.sh" release-manager run-sec10 "$WORK/atk.priv" "$WORK/forged.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AGENT=release-manager CASAN_AGENT_SIG="$WORK/forged.sig" bash "$GATE" deploy)" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: forged agent token DENIED" \
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|| fail "enforced mode accepted a forged agent token"
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# Enforced: a token minted for a DIFFERENT run cannot be replayed.
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bash "$S/agent-identity-sign.sh" release-manager other-run "$WORK/rm.priv" "$WORK/replay.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AGENT=release-manager CASAN_AGENT_SIG="$WORK/replay.sig" bash "$GATE" deploy)" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "enforced: token bound to another run DENIED (no replay)" \
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|| fail "enforced mode allowed a cross-run token replay"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-10 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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