thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
2c765c9a45
Task 1.2: introduce a single path resolver so no harness script hardcodes `.specify/...` scattered across the tree. casan-paths.sh resolves four roots (HARNESS/STATE/GOVERNANCE/APP) by marker-based walk-up from its own location — never `git rev-parse` (git root is the repo PARENT here, not the app dir). - 101 bash scripts/tests: 238 hardcoded `$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/...` refs rewritten to CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT (code) / CASAN_STATE_ROOT (logs,state) / CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT. Sandbox test vars ($WORK/$TP/$FP/$T1_WORK) left untouched. - Roots are NOT exported: each script/subprocess self-resolves from its own tree, matching the original per-script semantics and preserving hermetic sandbox isolation (node casan-step.mjs, copied telemetry/rollback scripts must not inherit real roots). - Sandbox tests that copy a harness script now also copy casan-paths.sh (its new sibling dependency): adversarial (verify-audit-chain/verify-tool-audit/rollback) + track-a (security-check/telemetry-integrity). - control-plane-settings.json reclassified as STATE (untracked runtime store). Roots all still resolve to `.specify` in this monolithic layout, so behavior is unchanged. Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (adversarial 44/0, track-a 25/0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
79 lines
3.4 KiB
Bash
79 lines
3.4 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-03 (H-03) — rollback-manager: no `bash -c`, structured argv only.
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#
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# The rollback `execute` path used to `bash -c "$rollback_command"` where the
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# command was read from the unsigned transaction log — arbitrary code execution
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# for anyone who can append a line. This proves:
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# * a genuine checkpoint still restores the file (regression),
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# * a forged free-form record with an RCE payload is REFUSED (not executed),
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# * a forged structured record whose backup points outside the controlled
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# backup dir is REFUSED (cannot copy an arbitrary source file).
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#
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# Deterministic; no model/app/network. Hermetic tx log via a temp workspace.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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RM="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash/rollback-manager.sh"
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TX_LOG="$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/level5/rollback-transactions.jsonl"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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# rollback-manager uses a fixed tx-log path; back it up and restore on exit.
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[[ -f "$TX_LOG" ]] && cp -p "$TX_LOG" "$WORK/tx.bak"
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restore_tx() { if [[ -f "$WORK/tx.bak" ]]; then cp -p "$WORK/tx.bak" "$TX_LOG"; else rm -f "$TX_LOG"; fi; }
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trap 'restore_tx; rm -f "$WORK/PWNED"; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-03: rollback-manager no bash -c (RCE) ====="
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# 1) Regression: genuine checkpoint -> execute restores exact content.
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TARGET="$WORK/plan.txt"; echo "ORIGINAL" > "$TARGET"
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TX="$(bash "$RM" checkpoint "$TARGET" | sed -n 's/.*transaction_id=\([^ ]*\).*/\1/p')"
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echo "OVERWRITTEN" > "$TARGET"
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bash "$RM" execute "$TX" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(cat "$TARGET")" == "ORIGINAL" ]] \
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&& pass "genuine checkpoint restores exact pre-overwrite content" \
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|| fail "checkpoint did not restore (got: $(cat "$TARGET"))"
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# 2) Fail-able: forged free-form record carrying an RCE payload must be REFUSED.
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rm -f "$WORK/PWNED"
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python3 - "$TX_LOG" "$WORK/PWNED" <<'PY'
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import json, sys
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log, marker = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
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open(log, "a", encoding="utf-8").write(json.dumps({
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"transaction_id": "evil-rce", "action": "checkpoint",
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"rollback_command": f"touch {marker}"}) + "\n")
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PY
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RC="$(rc_of bash "$RM" execute evil-rce)"
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if [[ "$RC" -ne 0 && ! -f "$WORK/PWNED" ]]; then
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pass "forged free-form rollback_command REFUSED, no code executed (rc=$RC)"
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else
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fail "RCE not prevented (rc=$RC, marker exists=$([[ -f "$WORK/PWNED" ]] && echo yes || echo no))"
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fi
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# 3) Fail-able: forged restore_file whose backup is outside the controlled dir.
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SECRET="$WORK/secret.txt"; echo "SECRET" > "$SECRET"
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python3 - "$TX_LOG" "$SECRET" "$WORK/stolen.txt" <<'PY'
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import json, sys
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log, backup, target = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3]
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open(log, "a", encoding="utf-8").write(json.dumps({
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"transaction_id": "evil-src", "action": "checkpoint", "op": "restore_file",
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"backup": backup, "target": target}) + "\n")
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PY
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RC="$(rc_of bash "$RM" execute evil-src)"
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if [[ "$RC" -ne 0 && ! -f "$WORK/stolen.txt" ]]; then
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pass "forged restore source outside backup dir REFUSED (rc=$RC)"
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else
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fail "arbitrary-source restore not prevented (rc=$RC)"
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fi
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-03 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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