thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
2c765c9a45
Task 1.2: introduce a single path resolver so no harness script hardcodes `.specify/...` scattered across the tree. casan-paths.sh resolves four roots (HARNESS/STATE/GOVERNANCE/APP) by marker-based walk-up from its own location — never `git rev-parse` (git root is the repo PARENT here, not the app dir). - 101 bash scripts/tests: 238 hardcoded `$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/...` refs rewritten to CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT (code) / CASAN_STATE_ROOT (logs,state) / CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT. Sandbox test vars ($WORK/$TP/$FP/$T1_WORK) left untouched. - Roots are NOT exported: each script/subprocess self-resolves from its own tree, matching the original per-script semantics and preserving hermetic sandbox isolation (node casan-step.mjs, copied telemetry/rollback scripts must not inherit real roots). - Sandbox tests that copy a harness script now also copy casan-paths.sh (its new sibling dependency): adversarial (verify-audit-chain/verify-tool-audit/rollback) + track-a (security-check/telemetry-integrity). - control-plane-settings.json reclassified as STATE (untracked runtime store). Roots all still resolve to `.specify` in this monolithic layout, so behavior is unchanged. Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (adversarial 44/0, track-a 25/0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
62 lines
2.9 KiB
Bash
62 lines
2.9 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-02 (H-02) — no local key auto-generation in enforced mode.
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#
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# The tamper-evidence of the audit chain rests on the head signature. If the
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# signer auto-generates a private key next to the data (as dev convenience does),
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# then any actor who can write the log can also mint a key and re-sign a forged
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# head. In enforced mode the signer must NOT auto-generate — the key is provisioned
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# out-of-band (KMS/HSM). This proves:
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# * permissive mode still auto-generates a local key (dev convenience),
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# * enforced mode does NOT create a key when none is provisioned, and the
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# resulting unsigned head then FAILS strict verification (fail-closed).
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#
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# Deterministic; hermetic (temp key dir + backup/restore of audit + gov dirs).
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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BASH_DIR="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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BK="$WORK/bak"; mkdir -p "$BK"
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cp -a "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit" "$BK/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
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cp -a "$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT" "$BK/cg" 2>/dev/null || true
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restore() {
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rm -rf "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit"; cp -a "$BK/audit" "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
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rm -rf "$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT"; cp -a "$BK/cg" "$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT" 2>/dev/null || true
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}
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trap 'restore; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-02: no local key auto-gen in enforced mode ====="
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echo "benign input" > "$WORK/in.txt"
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# 1) Permissive mode: a fresh key dir auto-generates a local key (dev convenience).
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KD1="$WORK/keys-permissive"
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env CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR="$KD1" bash "$BASH_DIR/governance-check.sh" "$WORK/in.txt" "$WORK/out1.txt" agent_step >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ -f "$KD1/audit-private.pem" ]] \
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&& pass "permissive mode auto-generates a local signing key" \
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|| fail "permissive mode did not auto-generate a key (dev convenience broken)"
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# 2) Enforced mode: a fresh key dir must NOT auto-generate a key.
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KD2="$WORK/keys-enforced"
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env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR="$KD2" bash "$BASH_DIR/governance-check.sh" "$WORK/in.txt" "$WORK/out2.txt" agent_step >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ ! -f "$KD2/audit-private.pem" ]] \
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&& pass "enforced mode does NOT auto-generate a local key (H-02 closed)" \
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|| fail "enforced mode auto-generated a local key (attacker could re-sign forgery)"
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# 3) The unsigned head produced in enforced mode fails strict verification.
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh")" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "unsigned head from enforced run FAILS strict verify (fail-closed)" \
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|| fail "unsigned head passed strict verify"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-02 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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