thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
2c765c9a45
Task 1.2: introduce a single path resolver so no harness script hardcodes `.specify/...` scattered across the tree. casan-paths.sh resolves four roots (HARNESS/STATE/GOVERNANCE/APP) by marker-based walk-up from its own location — never `git rev-parse` (git root is the repo PARENT here, not the app dir). - 101 bash scripts/tests: 238 hardcoded `$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/...` refs rewritten to CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT (code) / CASAN_STATE_ROOT (logs,state) / CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT. Sandbox test vars ($WORK/$TP/$FP/$T1_WORK) left untouched. - Roots are NOT exported: each script/subprocess self-resolves from its own tree, matching the original per-script semantics and preserving hermetic sandbox isolation (node casan-step.mjs, copied telemetry/rollback scripts must not inherit real roots). - Sandbox tests that copy a harness script now also copy casan-paths.sh (its new sibling dependency): adversarial (verify-audit-chain/verify-tool-audit/rollback) + track-a (security-check/telemetry-integrity). - control-plane-settings.json reclassified as STATE (untracked runtime store). Roots all still resolve to `.specify` in this monolithic layout, so behavior is unchanged. Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (adversarial 44/0, track-a 25/0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
62 lines
3.0 KiB
Bash
62 lines
3.0 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-14 — RBAC decision engine (harness-owned core) tests.
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# Deterministic. Proves deny-by-default, action gating, tenant isolation,
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# sensitive-requires-org-admin, and Separation of Duties.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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RBAC="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash/rbac-check.py"
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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allow() { python3 "$RBAC" "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; } # rc 0 = allow
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deny() { ! python3 "$RBAC" "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; } # rc!=0 = deny
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echo "===== Plan-14 RBAC decision engine (harness core) ====="
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# org-admin can do anything
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allow check --role org-admin --resource settings --action write \
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&& pass "org-admin allowed settings:write" || fail "org-admin denied"
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# viewer can read but not write
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allow check --role viewer --resource monitoring --action read --role-project p1 --target-project p1 \
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&& pass "viewer allowed monitoring:read" || fail "viewer read denied"
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deny check --role viewer --resource settings --action write --role-project p1 --target-project p1 \
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&& pass "viewer denied settings:write (deny-by-default)" || fail "viewer write not denied"
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# unknown role denied
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deny check --role hacker --resource monitoring --action read \
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&& pass "unknown role denied" || fail "unknown role not denied"
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# tenant isolation: project-admin of p1 cannot touch p2
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deny check --role project-admin --resource settings --action write --role-project p1 --target-project p2 \
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&& pass "cross-tenant write denied" || fail "cross-tenant not denied"
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allow check --role project-admin --resource settings --action write --role-project p1 --target-project p1 \
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&& pass "same-tenant write allowed" || fail "same-tenant write denied"
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# sensitive settings write requires org-admin
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deny check --role project-admin --resource settings --action write --role-project p1 --target-project p1 --sensitive \
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&& pass "sensitive write denied for project-admin" || fail "sensitive write not denied"
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allow check --role org-admin --resource settings --action write --sensitive \
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&& pass "sensitive write allowed for org-admin" || fail "org-admin sensitive denied"
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# SoD: proposer cannot approve own request
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deny check-sod --proposer alice@x --approver alice@x \
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&& pass "SoD blocks self-approval" || fail "SoD did not block self-approval"
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allow check-sod --proposer alice@x --approver bob@x \
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&& pass "SoD allows distinct approver" || fail "SoD blocked distinct approver"
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# IdP claim → RBAC role mapping (deny-by-default on unknown claim)
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[[ "$(python3 "$RBAC" map-claim --claim casan-org-admin 2>/dev/null)" == "org-admin" ]] \
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&& pass "known IdP claim maps to RBAC role" || fail "known claim did not map"
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deny map-claim --claim casan-random-group \
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&& pass "unknown IdP claim denied (deny-by-default)" || fail "unknown claim not denied"
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echo ""
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echo "===== RBAC SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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