thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
2c765c9a45
Task 1.2: introduce a single path resolver so no harness script hardcodes `.specify/...` scattered across the tree. casan-paths.sh resolves four roots (HARNESS/STATE/GOVERNANCE/APP) by marker-based walk-up from its own location — never `git rev-parse` (git root is the repo PARENT here, not the app dir). - 101 bash scripts/tests: 238 hardcoded `$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/...` refs rewritten to CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT (code) / CASAN_STATE_ROOT (logs,state) / CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT. Sandbox test vars ($WORK/$TP/$FP/$T1_WORK) left untouched. - Roots are NOT exported: each script/subprocess self-resolves from its own tree, matching the original per-script semantics and preserving hermetic sandbox isolation (node casan-step.mjs, copied telemetry/rollback scripts must not inherit real roots). - Sandbox tests that copy a harness script now also copy casan-paths.sh (its new sibling dependency): adversarial (verify-audit-chain/verify-tool-audit/rollback) + track-a (security-check/telemetry-integrity). - control-plane-settings.json reclassified as STATE (untracked runtime store). Roots all still resolve to `.specify` in this monolithic layout, so behavior is unchanged. Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (adversarial 44/0, track-a 25/0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
72 lines
3.6 KiB
Bash
72 lines
3.6 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-13 — Control Plane governed settings store (harness-owned core).
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# Deterministic; no model/app required. Proves deny-by-default, approval gating,
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# versioning/rollback, and audit hash-chain tamper detection.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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CP="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash/control-plane-settings.py"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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export CASAN_CP_STORE_FILE="$WORK/store.json"
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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echo "===== Plan-13 Control Plane governed settings (harness core) ====="
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# 1) deny-by-default
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set +e
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python3 "$CP" set not.allowed.key 1 --actor a@x --reason r >/dev/null 2>"$WORK/1.err"; RC=$?
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set -e 2>/dev/null || true
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[[ "$RC" -eq 2 ]] && grep -q "SETTING_NOT_ALLOWED" "$WORK/1.err" \
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&& pass "deny-by-default rejects unknown key" || fail "unknown key not rejected (rc=$RC)"
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# 2) non-sensitive set + version increment
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python3 "$CP" set compression.enabled true --actor a@x --reason enable >/dev/null 2>&1
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V2="$(python3 "$CP" set compression.enabled false --actor a@x --reason disable 2>/dev/null | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["version"])')"
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[[ "$V2" == "2" ]] && pass "non-sensitive set versioned (version=$V2)" || fail "versioning wrong (version=$V2)"
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# 3) security-sensitive requires approval
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set +e
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python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor a@x --reason r >/dev/null 2>"$WORK/3.err"; RC=$?
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set -e 2>/dev/null || true
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[[ "$RC" -eq 3 ]] && grep -q "APPROVAL_REQUIRED" "$WORK/3.err" \
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&& pass "security-sensitive set denied without approval" || fail "approval gate missing (rc=$RC)"
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python3 "$CP" set security.strict true --actor a@x --reason r --approval jwt-tok >/dev/null 2>&1 \
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&& pass "security-sensitive set allowed with approval" || fail "approved sensitive set failed"
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# 4) rollback restores previous value
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python3 "$CP" set cost.absolute_cap_usd 1 --actor a@x --reason first >/dev/null 2>&1
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python3 "$CP" set cost.absolute_cap_usd 5 --actor a@x --reason second >/dev/null 2>&1
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RB="$(python3 "$CP" rollback cost.absolute_cap_usd --actor a@x --reason revert 2>/dev/null | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["value"])')"
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[[ "$RB" == "1" ]] && pass "rollback restores previous value" || fail "rollback wrong (value=$RB)"
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# 5) audit verifies intact, then detects tampering (fail-able)
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python3 "$CP" verify-audit >/dev/null 2>&1 && pass "audit chain verifies intact" || fail "intact audit reported broken"
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python3 - "$CASAN_CP_STORE_FILE" <<'PY'
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import json, sys
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d = json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))
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d["audit"][0]["value"] = "tampered"
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json.dump(d, open(sys.argv[1], "w"))
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PY
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set +e
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python3 "$CP" verify-audit >/dev/null 2>"$WORK/5.err"; RC=$?
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set -e 2>/dev/null || true
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[[ "$RC" -eq 1 ]] && pass "audit chain detects tampering (fail-able gate)" || fail "tamper not detected (rc=$RC)"
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# 6) effective: default when unset, override when set
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[[ "$(python3 "$CP" effective compression.mode --default extractive 2>/dev/null)" == "extractive" ]] \
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&& pass "effective returns default when unset" || fail "effective default wrong"
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python3 "$CP" set compression.mode structural --actor a@x --reason r >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(python3 "$CP" effective compression.mode --default extractive 2>/dev/null)" == "structural" ]] \
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&& pass "effective returns override when set" || fail "effective override wrong"
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echo ""
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echo "===== CONTROL-PLANE SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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