- SEC-12: drift-detect adds semantic invariants — negation-flip detection (a dropped
"not" now FAILS despite high char-similarity) + env must-keep patterns.
- SEC-29 (X-05): governance-check audit write fails CLOSED — an unwritable audit log
denies the action and empties the output (no unaudited output).
- SEC-30 (X-06): approval-verify records a one-time-use nonce (sha of token/sig) and
rejects replays (enforced mode / when a nonce ledger is set); dev unchanged.
- SEC-15 (low): typosquat distance<=2 with the levenshtein length-sentinel bug fixed
(no false positives); tool-exec fails closed with no timeout backend in enforced
mode; validate-tool-input now validates nested objects/arrays recursively.
Verify: new SEC suites all green via gate, run-casan4 0-FAIL, adversarial 44/44,
track-c 29/0, h5-approval 12/0, no regressions.
Plan-16 P2 remaining: infra-gated only (SEC-14/22/23/24/25/26).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- SEC-07 (M-08): real approval verification via approval-verify.sh in enforced mode
(CASAN_PROFILE=prod / CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1) for control-plane `set` (sensitive
keys), kill-switch `clear`, and self-improve (inherits control-plane). A bare or
forged approval string is now denied; dev mode stays backward-compatible.
- SEC-10 (M-05): non-spoofable agent identity. tool-registry-gate least-privilege no
longer trusts CASAN_AGENT env in enforced mode (CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1) — the
caller must present a signed token (agent-identity-sign.sh) bound to agent id +
run id, verified against agent-identities.registry. Blocks env spoofing + replay.
Verify: SEC+integrity gate 18/0, run-casan4 0-FAIL, adversarial 44/44 (H2 intact),
control-plane 9/0, h5-approval 12/0, c7-incident 15/0, self-improve 7/0, track-c 29/0.
Plan-16 P0 + P1 now complete; remaining: P2 (SEC-12/13/14/15/22..30).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
