- SEC-07 (M-08): real approval verification via approval-verify.sh in enforced mode
(CASAN_PROFILE=prod / CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1) for control-plane `set` (sensitive
keys), kill-switch `clear`, and self-improve (inherits control-plane). A bare or
forged approval string is now denied; dev mode stays backward-compatible.
- SEC-10 (M-05): non-spoofable agent identity. tool-registry-gate least-privilege no
longer trusts CASAN_AGENT env in enforced mode (CASAN_IDENTITY_STRICT=1) — the
caller must present a signed token (agent-identity-sign.sh) bound to agent id +
run id, verified against agent-identities.registry. Blocks env spoofing + replay.
Verify: SEC+integrity gate 18/0, run-casan4 0-FAIL, adversarial 44/44 (H2 intact),
control-plane 9/0, h5-approval 12/0, c7-incident 15/0, self-improve 7/0, track-c 29/0.
Plan-16 P0 + P1 now complete; remaining: P2 (SEC-12/13/14/15/22..30).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the last fully-[planned] Track-C dimension (was scored 1).
- incident.sh raise <event>: classify severity via incident-severity.map
(LOW/MED/HIGH/CRIT), record a structured entry (owner routing), and for
HIGH/CRIT auto-engage the scoped kill-switch + dispatch an alert (reuses H6
alert-dispatch.sh). Exit 2 on HIGH/CRIT so a pipeline gate goes red.
- kill-switch.sh engage/clear/check/status, scoped by project/model/provider
(+ global). `check` exits 2 when engaged so gates honor it.
- casan-harness.sh honors an engaged kill-switch before running (opt-in
CASAN_KILLSWITCH_ENFORCE=1, default OFF → baseline unchanged).
- incident-runbook.md: severity→owner→response + postmortem template + prod TODO.
- phase-c7-incident-tests.sh: 15 checks — severity grading, auto kill-switch on
HIGH/CRIT, MED-only records, lifecycle, global scope, structured record, and
the production wrapper refusing to run under an engaged switch.
Baselines: run-casan4 35/35, adversarial 44/44. New suite total: 175 → 190.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
thanhnv