feat: plan 16 P2 batch 1 (SEC-13 SSRF, SEC-27 log-escape, SEC-28 path-traversal)
- SEC-13 (M-09): SSRF allowlist on provider-usage-fetch (always block non-http(s) schemes; enforced mode blocks internal/link-local IPs + non-allowlisted hosts, dev keeps loopback mocks); dashboard refuses non-loopback bind in enforced mode. - SEC-27 (X-02): casan-log strips ESC/CSI + CR/LF (terminal-escape + fake-log-line injection) while keeping tab and visible text. - SEC-28 (X-04): new path-guard.sh — realpath resolve + reject symlink/.. escapes outside the allowed root. Verify: SEC-13 6/0, SEC-27 3/0, SEC-28 4/0, adversarial 44/44, run-casan4 0-FAIL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Claude Opus 4.8
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8c06a55aed
@@ -77,4 +77,11 @@ BIND = os.environ.get("CASAN_DASHBOARD_BIND", "127.0.0.1")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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# SEC-13 (M-09): the dashboard has no auth, so binding to all interfaces exposes
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# it to the network. In enforced mode refuse a non-loopback bind (fail-closed);
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# a real deployment must front it with TLS + auth (Plan-07 TIER 2), not 0.0.0.0.
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_enforced = os.environ.get("CASAN_PROFILE") == "prod" or os.environ.get("CASAN_DASHBOARD_STRICT") == "1"
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if _enforced and BIND not in ("127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"):
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sys.stderr.write(f"DASHBOARD_BIND_REFUSED bind={BIND} (loopback only in enforced mode)\n")
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raise SystemExit(1)
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HTTPServer((BIND, PORT), Handler).serve_forever()
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