vudt15andClaude Sonnet 5
ae4fe72b2e
EPIC R05 (Team Hoa) - one security/approval path for every tool call.
R05-T01 domain/tools/{tool_descriptor,tool_registry}.py
ToolCapability (READ/WRITE/EXECUTE/NETWORK, composable) + ToolDescriptor +
ToolRegistry, replacing three independently-maintained gating lists
(core/tools.py::WRITE_TOOLS, code_agent.py's WRITE_TOOLS|MS365_WRITE_TOOLS,
chat_agent.py's literal ("run_command","install_package") tuple) with one
capability lookup.
R05-T02 infrastructure/filesystem/{file_tools,command_tools,fetch_tools,tool_context}.py
core/tools.py's execute_tool if/elif chain split into per-concern modules.
core/tools.py is now a strangler-fig shim: re-exports ToolContext/ToolError,
dispatches through a {name: handler} dict built from the split modules.
core/tools.py: 566 -> 291 lines.
R05-T03 application/conversations/tool_policy_gateway.py
ToolPolicyGateway.allow(name, gate, payload) - capability-driven ALLOW vs
ask-the-gate decision. Wired into both chat_agent.py::run_cowork and
code_agent.py::run_code, replacing their separate hand-rolled checks.
Verified equivalent to the old hardcoded sets by test.
R05-T04 (behavior change, not just refactor)
MCP/connector tools (core/mcp_client.py, core/ext_connectors.py) reached
chat_agent.py via extra_executor(name, args) with NO permission check at
all. They are now tagged with a conservative default capability
(WRITE|EXECUTE|NETWORK - no MCP tool self-declares risk) and routed through
the SAME ToolPolicyGateway as built-ins. When "confirm before running
commands" is on, MCP/connector calls now prompt like run_command already
did - a real gap closed, and a user-visible change worth calling out.
R05-T05 infrastructure/mcp/mcp_source_manager.py
McpToolSourceManager extracts the connection cache/lock/start-or-skip
lifecycle out of state.py::AppContext (_mcp_connections/_conn_lock) into a
standalone, directly-testable class. AppContext.build_mcp_tools and
_ms365_builtin_connection now call ensure()/stop(); _ext_connections
(unified Connectors) is out of scope for this task and keeps its own lock.
New tests: tests/unit/test_tool_registry_and_policy.py,
test_code_agent_tool_policy.py, test_cowork_extra_tool_policy.py,
test_mcp_source_manager.py (26 new tests).
Suite: 254 passed, 4 pre-existing failures unrelated to R05 (2 EPIC R02
config-security, 2 environment-dependent routing tests - see checklist).
check_imports: PASS. All new files < 400 LOC.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
87 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
87 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
"""EPIC R05-T04: before this change, ``core/chat_agent.py::run_cowork`` called
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``extra_executor(name, args)`` directly for any MCP/connector tool — no
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permission check at all, regardless of the "confirm before running commands"
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setting. This pins the fix: an extra tool now goes through the same
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``ToolPolicyGateway`` as ``run_command``, using the conservative default
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capability (``UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES``) since MCP tools carry no
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standard risk metadata.
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Runs the real engine via :class:`FakeProvider`, matching
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``tests/characterization/test_run_cowork.py``'s approach.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import Any, Dict, List
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from cowork_local.core.chat_agent import run_cowork
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from cowork_local.providers.base import ToolSpec
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from tests.fakes import FakeProvider, ScriptedTurn
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class _RecordingGate:
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def __init__(self, approve: bool):
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self.approve = approve
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self.calls: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
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def request(self, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
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self.calls.append(payload)
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return self.approve
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_EXTRA_SPEC = ToolSpec(name="github__delete_repo", description="", parameters={"type": "object"})
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def _run(tmp_path, provider, gate, executed: List[str]):
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events: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
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messages: List[Dict[str, Any]] = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]
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def extra_executor(name: str, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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executed.append(name)
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return {"ok": True, "output": "done"}
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run_cowork(provider, messages, tmp_path, events.append, gate=gate,
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extra_tools=[_EXTRA_SPEC], extra_executor=extra_executor)
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return events
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def test_mcp_style_tool_is_rejected_without_ever_calling_the_executor(tmp_path):
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provider = FakeProvider([
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ScriptedTurn(tool_calls=[("github__delete_repo", {})]),
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ScriptedTurn(text="done"),
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])
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gate = _RecordingGate(approve=False)
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executed: List[str] = []
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events = _run(tmp_path, provider, gate, executed)
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assert len(gate.calls) == 1 and gate.calls[0]["name"] == "github__delete_repo"
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assert executed == [] # rejected BEFORE the extra_executor ever ran
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results = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_result"]
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assert results[0]["ok"] is False
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def test_mcp_style_tool_runs_once_approved(tmp_path):
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provider = FakeProvider([
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ScriptedTurn(tool_calls=[("github__delete_repo", {})]),
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ScriptedTurn(text="done"),
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])
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gate = _RecordingGate(approve=True)
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executed: List[str] = []
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events = _run(tmp_path, provider, gate, executed)
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assert executed == ["github__delete_repo"]
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results = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_result"]
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assert results[0]["ok"] is True
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def test_no_gate_preserves_auto_run_for_extra_tools(tmp_path):
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"""``gate=None`` is Cowork's existing "no confirmation configured" state —
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must still auto-run, exactly like before this EPIC."""
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provider = FakeProvider([
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ScriptedTurn(tool_calls=[("github__delete_repo", {})]),
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ScriptedTurn(text="done"),
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])
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executed: List[str] = []
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events = _run(tmp_path, provider, None, executed)
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assert executed == ["github__delete_repo"]
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