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## Summary What changed and why? ## Change Type - [ ] Cowork feature - [ ] Bug fix - [ ] Core AI contribution - [ ] Test / hardening - [ ] Performance - [ ] Documentation ## Related Work Cowork Task: Core Repo: http://34.143.229.138/gitea-admin/fsg-ai-core-assets Core AI Issue: Core Task: Related PR: ## Scope What is intentionally included? What is intentionally NOT included? ## Validation - [ ] Unit tests - [ ] Integration tests - [ ] Manual verification - [ ] Regression check Commands / evidence: ## Security Impact Permission / credential / network / customer data impact: ## Compatibility - [ ] No breaking change - [ ] Breaking change documented ## Reviewer Notes Anything Cowork reviewers should pay attention to. Reviewed-on: #11 Co-authored-by: Duy Le Huu <duylh19@fpt.com>
147 lines
6.4 KiB
Python
147 lines
6.4 KiB
Python
"""Command tools - run_command, install_package (R05-T02).
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Moved verbatim out of ``core/tools.py`` (see ``file_tools.py`` for why). These
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two are the ones today's hand-written permission gate in
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``core/chat_agent.py`` singles out by literal name
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(``name in ("run_command", "install_package")``) — R05-T03 replaces that
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tuple with a capability lookup, but the tools themselves are unchanged here.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
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from .tool_context import CancelFn, ToolContext
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COMMAND_TIMEOUT = 120 # seconds
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_SNAPSHOT_SKIP = {".git", "__pycache__", "node_modules", ".scratch", ".venv",
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".idea", ".mypy_cache", ".pytest_cache"}
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def _snapshot(workdir: Path) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""Map of file path -> (mtime, size) under the workdir (noise dirs skipped)."""
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snap: Dict[str, Any] = {}
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try:
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for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(str(workdir)):
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dirnames[:] = [d for d in dirnames if d not in _SNAPSHOT_SKIP]
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for fn in filenames:
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full = os.path.join(dirpath, fn)
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try:
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st = os.stat(full)
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snap[full] = (st.st_mtime_ns, st.st_size)
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except OSError:
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pass
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if len(snap) > 5000:
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return snap
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except OSError:
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pass
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return snap
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def _sandbox_python(ctx: ToolContext, cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
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on_output=None) -> Optional[str]:
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"""Lazily create/reuse this ctx's project sandbox venv (Code tab only —
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``ctx.sandbox``); returns its python path, or None to use the app's own."""
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if not ctx.sandbox:
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return None
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from cowork_local.core.deps import ensure_project_venv
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py = ensure_project_venv(ctx.workdir, cancel=cancel, on_output=on_output)
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return str(py) if py else None
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def run_command(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any],
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cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
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on_output=None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""Chạy một lệnh shell trong thư mục làm việc, có hạn giờ và có sandbox.
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Biến môi trường được lọc và mạng bị chặn theo cấu hình an toàn — agent chạy
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lệnh không được thừa hưởng toàn bộ môi trường của người dùng.
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"""
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from cowork_local.core.deps import network_blocked_env, run_cancellable, sandbox_env
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from cowork_local.core.sandbox_manager import ExecutionConfig, SandboxManager
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from cowork_local.security.command_risk_classifier import (
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classify_command, command_bypasses_network_proxy,
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)
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command = str(args.get("command", "")).strip()
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if not command:
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return {"ok": False, "output": "Empty command."}
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# --- Security validation pipeline ---
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risk = classify_command(command, is_cowork_mode=ctx.flatten_writes)
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if risk.blocked:
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denial = "Command blocked by security policy: " + "; ".join(risk.reasons)
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return {"ok": False, "output": denial}
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# Every sandbox backend's network block is a proxy-env-var trick (see
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# core/deps.py::network_blocked_env) — it does nothing against a tool
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# that reaches the network without an HTTP proxy (ping/ICMP, nslookup/
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# direct DNS, ssh/ftp/raw TCP...). Deny those BY NAME here instead, so
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# "Chặn mạng cho lệnh do agent chạy" actually blocks them too.
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if ctx.block_network:
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bypass_tool = command_bypasses_network_proxy(command)
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if bypass_tool:
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return {"ok": False, "output": (
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f"Command blocked: '{bypass_tool}' can reach the network without going through "
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"an HTTP proxy, so the sandbox's network block (which only filters proxy-aware "
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"traffic) cannot stop it by itself — blocked by name instead while "
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"'Chặn mạng cho lệnh do agent chạy' is on."
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)}
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# Route through SandboxManager for risk-based isolation
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mgr = SandboxManager(ExecutionConfig(
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enabled=True,
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block_network_by_default=ctx.block_network,
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is_cowork_mode=ctx.flatten_writes,
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))
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sandbox_result = mgr.run(
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command=command,
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workdir=str(ctx.workdir),
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block_network=ctx.block_network,
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timeout_sec=COMMAND_TIMEOUT,
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cancel=cancel,
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)
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# Sandbox ALWAYS executes (never double-run). Return its result directly.
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if sandbox_result.get("sandbox") == "blocked":
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return {"ok": False, "output": sandbox_result.get("stderr", "Command blocked")}
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out = sandbox_result.get("stdout", "").strip() or "(no output)"
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err = sandbox_result.get("stderr", "")
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rc = sandbox_result.get("returncode", -1)
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if err:
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out = f"{out}\n{err}" if out else err
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return {"ok": sandbox_result.get("ok", False), "output": f"[exit {rc}]\n{out}"}
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def install_package(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any],
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cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
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on_output=None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""Cài một gói Python vào môi trường phụ trợ của lượt chạy.
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Cài vào venv riêng chứ không vào Python của hệ thống — một task không được
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phép làm hỏng môi trường của cả máy.
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"""
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from cowork_local.core.deps import pip_install
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package = str(args.get("package", "")).strip()
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if not package:
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return {"ok": False, "output": "No package specified."}
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# ``pip install`` bắt buộc phải ra internet, mà ``deps.pip_install`` chạy
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# subprocess với ``os.environ`` nguyên vẹn — biến proxy hố đen của
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# ``network_blocked_env`` không chạm tới nó. Từ chối thẳng ở đây (giống cách
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# run_command chặn theo tên các công cụ không đi qua proxy) thay vì để pip
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# thử 600 giây rồi báo một lỗi proxy khó hiểu.
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if ctx.block_network:
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return {"ok": False, "output": (
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"install_package: network access is blocked by the Sandbox Security Layer "
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"(\"Block network for agent-run commands\" is on in Settings).")}
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python = _sandbox_python(ctx, cancel, on_output)
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ok, detail = pip_install(package, cancel=cancel, on_output=on_output, python=python)
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head = f"Installed {package}." if ok else f"Could not install {package}."
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return {"ok": ok, "output": f"{head}\n{detail}"}
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__all__ = ["COMMAND_TIMEOUT", "run_command", "install_package", "_snapshot"]
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