feat(R05): tool capability registry, unified policy gateway, MCP lifecycle manager
EPIC R05 (Team Hoa) - one security/approval path for every tool call.
R05-T01 domain/tools/{tool_descriptor,tool_registry}.py
ToolCapability (READ/WRITE/EXECUTE/NETWORK, composable) + ToolDescriptor +
ToolRegistry, replacing three independently-maintained gating lists
(core/tools.py::WRITE_TOOLS, code_agent.py's WRITE_TOOLS|MS365_WRITE_TOOLS,
chat_agent.py's literal ("run_command","install_package") tuple) with one
capability lookup.
R05-T02 infrastructure/filesystem/{file_tools,command_tools,fetch_tools,tool_context}.py
core/tools.py's execute_tool if/elif chain split into per-concern modules.
core/tools.py is now a strangler-fig shim: re-exports ToolContext/ToolError,
dispatches through a {name: handler} dict built from the split modules.
core/tools.py: 566 -> 291 lines.
R05-T03 application/conversations/tool_policy_gateway.py
ToolPolicyGateway.allow(name, gate, payload) - capability-driven ALLOW vs
ask-the-gate decision. Wired into both chat_agent.py::run_cowork and
code_agent.py::run_code, replacing their separate hand-rolled checks.
Verified equivalent to the old hardcoded sets by test.
R05-T04 (behavior change, not just refactor)
MCP/connector tools (core/mcp_client.py, core/ext_connectors.py) reached
chat_agent.py via extra_executor(name, args) with NO permission check at
all. They are now tagged with a conservative default capability
(WRITE|EXECUTE|NETWORK - no MCP tool self-declares risk) and routed through
the SAME ToolPolicyGateway as built-ins. When "confirm before running
commands" is on, MCP/connector calls now prompt like run_command already
did - a real gap closed, and a user-visible change worth calling out.
R05-T05 infrastructure/mcp/mcp_source_manager.py
McpToolSourceManager extracts the connection cache/lock/start-or-skip
lifecycle out of state.py::AppContext (_mcp_connections/_conn_lock) into a
standalone, directly-testable class. AppContext.build_mcp_tools and
_ms365_builtin_connection now call ensure()/stop(); _ext_connections
(unified Connectors) is out of scope for this task and keeps its own lock.
New tests: tests/unit/test_tool_registry_and_policy.py,
test_code_agent_tool_policy.py, test_cowork_extra_tool_policy.py,
test_mcp_source_manager.py (26 new tests).
Suite: 254 passed, 4 pre-existing failures unrelated to R05 (2 EPIC R02
config-security, 2 environment-dependent routing tests - see checklist).
check_imports: PASS. All new files < 400 LOC.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Claude Sonnet 5
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
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"""Conversation use case: the lifecycle of one agent turn (EPIC R04)."""
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"""Conversation use case: the lifecycle of one agent turn (EPIC R04) and the
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tool approval policy every turn's tool calls go through (EPIC R05)."""
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from .conversation_application_service import (
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ConversationApplicationService,
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TurnResult,
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)
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from .tool_policy_gateway import ConfirmGate, ToolPolicyGateway
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__all__ = ["ConversationApplicationService", "TurnResult"]
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__all__ = ["ConversationApplicationService", "TurnResult", "ToolPolicyGateway", "ConfirmGate"]
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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
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"""ToolPolicyGateway - one confirm/deny decision path for every tool call
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(R05-T03).
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Today "does this tool call need the user's OK first" is answered by a
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different hand-written check per engine:
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* ``core/chat_agent.py::run_cowork`` — ``name in ("run_command",
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"install_package")``, a literal tuple.
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* ``core/code_agent.py::run_code`` — ``name in (WRITE_TOOLS | MS365_WRITE_TOOLS)``,
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a set built from two other hand-maintained sets.
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* MCP/connector tools (``core/mcp_client.py``, ``core/ext_connectors.py``) —
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no check at all; ``chat_agent.py`` calls ``extra_executor(name, args)``
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directly.
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Three answers to the same question, and the third one is a real gap: an MCP
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tool that deletes files or calls an external API today runs with zero
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confirmation even when the user turned "confirm before running commands" on.
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This gateway answers the question from data (:class:`~domain.tools.tool_descriptor.ToolCapability`
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via a :class:`~domain.tools.tool_registry.ToolRegistry`) instead of a literal
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name list, so registering a tool with the right capability is what gates it -
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nothing to remember at each new call site. R05-T04 is what actually registers
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MCP/connector tools with a capability; this module only needs the mechanism
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to exist.
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Pure Python: no Qt, no direct dialog. The actual approval prompt stays exactly
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what it is today - a ``gate`` object with a ``.request(payload) -> bool``
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method, supplied by the presentation layer (Settings' "confirm before running
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commands" wires it up, or None for auto-run) - this module only decides
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WHEN to ask it, never how to render the question.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import Any, Dict, Optional, Protocol
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from cowork_local.domain.tools import ToolCapability, ToolRegistry
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class ConfirmGate(Protocol):
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"""Shape of the existing ``PermissionGate`` both engines already use."""
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def request(self, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool: ...
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class ToolPolicyGateway:
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"""Decides whether a tool call needs approval, for ONE calling surface.
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``gated_capabilities`` is what makes this per-surface: Cowork only ever
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asked about ``run_command``/``install_package`` (capability ``EXECUTE``),
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while the Code tab additionally confirms plain file writes (capability
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``WRITE``). Passing the wrong set here would silently change which tools
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prompt for approval - see the callers in ``core/chat_agent.py`` and
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``core/code_agent.py`` for the exact sets that preserve today's behavior.
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"""
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def __init__(self, registry: ToolRegistry, gated_capabilities: ToolCapability) -> None:
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self._registry = registry
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self._gated_capabilities = gated_capabilities
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def requires_confirmation(self, name: str) -> bool:
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"""True when ``name``'s declared capabilities overlap this surface's
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gated set. An unregistered tool never requires confirmation through
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this path - callers that must fail safe on unknown tools check
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``name in registry`` themselves (see R05-T04's MCP wrapping, which
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registers every tool it exposes before any call can reach here)."""
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return bool(self._registry.capabilities_for(name) & self._gated_capabilities)
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def allow(self, name: str, gate: Optional[ConfirmGate], payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
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"""True when the call may proceed.
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``gate is None`` preserves each engine's existing "no gate wired -
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auto-run" behavior; a tool outside ``gated_capabilities`` is never
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asked about, matching read-only tools "never confirm" today.
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``payload`` is whatever ``gate.request(...)`` already expects at that
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call site (the two engines use slightly different dict shapes) - this
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gateway only decides WHETHER to call it, never reshapes the payload.
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"""
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if gate is None or not self.requires_confirmation(name):
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return True
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return bool(gate.request(payload))
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__all__ = ["ToolPolicyGateway", "ConfirmGate"]
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+39
-3
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ import re
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, List, Optional
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from ..application.conversations.tool_policy_gateway import ToolPolicyGateway
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from ..domain.tools import ToolCapability, default_registry
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from ..providers.base import Provider, ToolSpec
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from . import agent_roles
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from . import agent_security
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@@ -27,6 +29,13 @@ from .tools import TOOL_SPECS, ToolContext, _snapshot, describe_action, execute_
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# Generator / helper scripts — never a final deliverable in Cowork's output.
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_SCRIPT_EXTS = {".py", ".pyw", ".js", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".ts", ".sh", ".bat", ".ps1", ".rb", ".pl"}
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# R05-T03/T04: replaces the literal ``name in ("run_command",
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# "install_package")`` check below with a capability lookup — EXECUTE is
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# exactly the capability those two (and only those two) built-in tools carry
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# (see domain/tools/tool_registry.py::BUILT_IN_CAPABILITIES). Copied per-turn
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# into ``turn_tool_policy`` inside run_cowork() once extra_tools are known.
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_COWORK_TOOL_REGISTRY = default_registry(TOOL_SPECS)
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EmitFn = Callable[[Dict[str, Any]], None]
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CancelFn = Callable[[], bool]
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@@ -388,6 +397,19 @@ def run_cowork(
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jira=(security_config.data.get("jira") if security_config else None))
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extra_tools = extra_tools or []
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extra_names = {t.name for t in extra_tools}
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# R05-T04: MCP servers (core/mcp_client.py) and unified connectors
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# (core/ext_connectors.py) — everything that arrives here as extra_tools —
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# advertise no standard risk metadata, so each is tagged with the same
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# conservative default (WRITE|EXECUTE|NETWORK) domain/tools/tool_registry.py
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# uses for any unclassified tool. Copying the built-in registry per turn
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# (cheap - under 20 entries) rather than mutating the shared module-level
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# one keeps different turns' extra_tools from leaking into each other.
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from ..domain.tools import ToolDescriptor, ToolRegistry
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from ..domain.tools.tool_registry import UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES
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_turn_registry = ToolRegistry(_COWORK_TOOL_REGISTRY.all())
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for _spec in extra_tools:
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_turn_registry.register(ToolDescriptor.from_spec(_spec, UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES))
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turn_tool_policy = ToolPolicyGateway(_turn_registry, ToolCapability.EXECUTE)
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# update_plan drives the Plan panel (above Output); it produces no file.
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# Built-in tools the admin disabled (Monitoring → Tools) are filtered out.
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from .tools import enabled_tool_specs
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@@ -489,6 +511,18 @@ def run_cowork(
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preview = {"kind": "info", "title": name, "text": str(args)}
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emit({"type": "tool_proposed", "id": tc_id, "name": name, "args": args,
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"preview": preview})
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# R05-T04: MCP/connector tools used to run with NO permission
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# check at all — this is what closes that gap. Same policy,
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# same gate object as the built-in tools below.
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if not turn_tool_policy.allow(
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name, gate, {"name": name, "args": args, "preview": preview}
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):
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result = {"ok": False, "output": "Rejected by user."}
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emit({"type": "tool_result", "id": tc_id, "name": name,
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"ok": False, "output": result["output"]})
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messages.append({"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": tc_id, "name": name,
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"content": result["output"]})
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continue
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result = extra_executor(name, args)
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emit({"type": "tool_result", "id": tc_id, "name": name,
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"ok": result.get("ok", False), "output": result.get("output", "")})
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@@ -528,9 +562,11 @@ def run_cowork(
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# Permission Management (Sandbox Security Layer) — only when a
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# gate was actually supplied (Settings: "confirm before running
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# commands"); None preserves the pre-existing auto-run behavior.
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if gate is not None and name in ("run_command", "install_package"):
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approved = gate.request({"name": name, "args": args, "preview": preview})
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if not approved:
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# R05-T03: gating is now capability-driven (see
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# turn_tool_policy above) instead of a literal name tuple.
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if not turn_tool_policy.allow(
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name, gate, {"name": name, "args": args, "preview": preview}
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):
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result = {"ok": False, "output": "Rejected by user."}
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evt = {"type": "tool_result", "id": tc_id, "name": name,
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"ok": False, "output": result["output"]}
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+15
-4
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ import re
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, List, Optional
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from ..application.conversations.tool_policy_gateway import ToolPolicyGateway
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from ..domain.tools import ToolCapability, ToolDescriptor, ToolRegistry
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from ..providers.base import Provider
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from . import agent_roles
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from . import agent_security
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@@ -225,6 +227,14 @@ def run_code(
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# read/list ms365 tools count as "read-only, never confirm". Names are
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# the MCP-qualified "ms365__*" form the agent sees (see ms365_tools.py).
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gated_tools = WRITE_TOOLS | MS365_WRITE_TOOLS
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# R05-T03/T04: ``gated_tools`` stays the authoritative name set (unchanged),
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# but the actual confirm decision now goes through the same
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# ToolPolicyGateway class run_cowork uses, instead of a separate
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# hand-rolled ``if name in gated_tools`` + direct ``gate.request(...)``.
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code_tool_policy = ToolPolicyGateway(
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ToolRegistry(ToolDescriptor(n, "", {}, ToolCapability.WRITE) for n in gated_tools),
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ToolCapability.WRITE,
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)
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# In PLAN mode, don't advertise write/run tools (analysis only).
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advertised = [t for t in all_tools if t.name not in gated_tools] if plan else all_tools
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has_memory = any(t.name.startswith("cmem_") for t in extra_tools)
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@@ -297,10 +307,11 @@ def run_code(
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agent_security.enforce_command(provider, name, args, security_config, emit,
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agent_kind="code")
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if name in gated_tools:
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approved = gate.request({"id": tc_id, "name": name, "args": args, "preview": preview})
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else:
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approved = True # read-only tools (incl. codebase memory) never confirm
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# read-only tools (incl. codebase memory) never consult the gate —
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# code_tool_policy.requires_confirmation(name) is False for them.
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approved = code_tool_policy.allow(
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name, gate, {"id": tc_id, "name": name, "args": args, "preview": preview}
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)
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if cancel():
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return messages
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@@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ class McpServerConnection:
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if self._thread is not None:
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self._thread.join(timeout=5)
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def is_alive(self) -> bool:
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"""True while the connection's background thread (and therefore its
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event loop and subprocess) is still running — used by
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``infrastructure/mcp/mcp_source_manager.py`` (R05-T05) to tell a live
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cached connection from one whose subprocess already died."""
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return self._thread is not None and self._thread.is_alive()
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# ---- tools -----------------------------------------------------------
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def list_tool_specs(self) -> List[ToolSpec]:
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"""The server's tools, wrapped as :class:`ToolSpec` — the same shape
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+38
-312
@@ -3,79 +3,29 @@
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Every path is resolved relative to the working directory and must stay inside
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it (path-traversal is rejected). ``run_command`` executes inside the workdir
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with a timeout and captured output.
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R05-T02: the actual handlers (``read_file``/``list_dir``/``write_file``/
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``edit_file``/``run_command``/``install_package``/``fetch_url``/
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``jira_search``/``jira_get_issue``) now live in
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``infrastructure/filesystem/{file_tools,command_tools,fetch_tools}.py``, split
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out of what used to be one big if/elif chain here. This module is the
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strangler-fig shim (ADR-001 section 4): it re-exports ``ToolContext``/
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``ToolError`` (actually defined in
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``infrastructure/filesystem/tool_context.py`` now) so every existing
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``from .tools import ToolContext`` keeps working, and ``execute_tool``
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dispatches through a small ``{name: handler}`` table built from the moved
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modules instead of the chain itself.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import ast
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import difflib
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import os
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, List, Optional
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from ..infrastructure.filesystem import command_tools, fetch_tools, file_tools
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from ..infrastructure.filesystem.command_tools import _snapshot # noqa: F401 - re-export, core/chat_agent.py imports this name
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from ..infrastructure.filesystem.tool_context import CancelFn, ToolContext, ToolError # noqa: F401 - re-export
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from ..providers.base import ToolSpec
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CancelFn = Callable[[], bool]
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MAX_READ_BYTES = 200_000
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COMMAND_TIMEOUT = 120 # seconds
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class ToolError(Exception):
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pass
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def _flatten_rel(rel: str) -> str:
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"""Collapse a sub-folder path down to a bare filename so the file lands in the
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workdir root — EXCEPT the ``.scratch`` sandbox subtree, which is preserved.
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Used by the Cowork agent (flatten_writes=True) so it can never create a
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per-session / per-chat / per-task output sub-folder: every deliverable stays
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directly in the single configured Output folder."""
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parts = Path(rel).parts
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if parts and parts[0] == ".scratch":
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return rel # temporary sandbox is allowed (and cleaned up afterwards)
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return Path(rel).name or rel
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@dataclass
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class ToolContext:
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workdir: Path
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flatten_writes: bool = False # Cowork: force every write into the workdir root
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sandbox: bool = False # Code tab: isolate run_command/install_package into <workdir>/.venv
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# Sandbox Security Layer — Settings' "Resource Limits" (cpu_percent/memory_mb/
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# disk_mb), applied to every run_command/install_package this context runs.
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# None (default) = no limits, matching pre-existing behavior.
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resource_limits: Optional[Dict[str, float]] = None
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# Sandbox Security Layer — Settings' "Block network for agent commands"
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# (policy-level, see deps.py::network_blocked_env). False (default) =
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# unrestricted, matching pre-existing behavior.
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block_network: bool = False
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# Whether the fetch_url tool may read URLs — SEPARATE from block_network
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# (reading a web page/share link for info is safe; running networked shell
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# commands is the risk). Defaults True; set from agent_security.allow_url_fetch.
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allow_url_fetch: bool = True
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# Jira read connector config (base_url/email/api_token) — None disables the
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# jira_* tools' ability to connect. Populated from config.data["jira"].
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jira: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
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def resolve(self, rel: str) -> Path:
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"""Resolve ``rel`` inside the workdir, rejecting escapes."""
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if rel in ("", "."):
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return self.workdir
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candidate = (self.workdir / rel).expanduser()
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try:
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resolved = candidate.resolve()
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except OSError as exc:
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raise ToolError(f"Invalid path: {rel} ({exc})")
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root = self.workdir.resolve()
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if resolved != root and root not in resolved.parents:
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raise ToolError(
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f"Refused: '{rel}' is outside the working folder ({root})."
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)
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return resolved
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Tool specs advertised to the model
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -192,6 +142,23 @@ TOOL_SPECS: List[ToolSpec] = [
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# Actions gated by the permission gate in confirm mode (auto-approved in Auto-run).
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WRITE_TOOLS = {"write_file", "edit_file", "run_command", "install_package"}
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# name -> handler(ctx, args[, cancel, on_output]) — built once from the split
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# infrastructure modules. Replaces the if/elif chain execute_tool used to be.
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_HANDLERS: Dict[str, Callable[..., Dict[str, Any]]] = {
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"read_file": file_tools.read_file,
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"list_dir": file_tools.list_dir,
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"write_file": file_tools.write_file,
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"edit_file": file_tools.edit_file,
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"run_command": command_tools.run_command,
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"install_package": command_tools.install_package,
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"fetch_url": fetch_tools.fetch_url,
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"jira_search": fetch_tools.jira_search,
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"jira_get_issue": fetch_tools.jira_get_issue,
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}
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# Handlers that accept the long-running (cancel, on_output) signature — every
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# other handler takes just (ctx, args).
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_CANCELLABLE = {"run_command", "install_package"}
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def enabled_tool_specs(security_config=None) -> List[ToolSpec]:
|
||||
"""The built-in TOOL_SPECS minus any the admin turned OFF in Monitoring →
|
||||
@@ -301,27 +268,14 @@ def execute_tool(ctx: ToolContext, name: str, args: Dict[str, Any],
|
||||
labels WHICH agent role made it."""
|
||||
from . import audit_log
|
||||
|
||||
handler = _HANDLERS.get(name)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if name == "read_file":
|
||||
result = _read_file(ctx, args)
|
||||
elif name == "list_dir":
|
||||
result = _list_dir(ctx, args)
|
||||
elif name == "write_file":
|
||||
result = _write_file(ctx, args)
|
||||
elif name == "edit_file":
|
||||
result = _edit_file(ctx, args)
|
||||
elif name == "run_command":
|
||||
result = _run_command(ctx, args, cancel, on_output)
|
||||
elif name == "install_package":
|
||||
result = _install_package(ctx, args, cancel, on_output)
|
||||
elif name == "fetch_url":
|
||||
result = _fetch_url(ctx, args)
|
||||
elif name == "jira_search":
|
||||
result = _jira_search(ctx, args)
|
||||
elif name == "jira_get_issue":
|
||||
result = _jira_get_issue(ctx, args)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if handler is None:
|
||||
result = {"ok": False, "output": f"Tool not found: {name}"}
|
||||
elif name in _CANCELLABLE:
|
||||
result = handler(ctx, args, cancel, on_output)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
result = handler(ctx, args)
|
||||
except ToolError as exc:
|
||||
result = {"ok": False, "output": str(exc)}
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # defensive: a tool must never crash the agent
|
||||
@@ -331,234 +285,6 @@ def execute_tool(ctx: ToolContext, name: str, args: Dict[str, Any],
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _fetch_url(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fetch a URL's text content (web page / online document / SharePoint-
|
||||
OneDrive share link) via link_fetch — the same parser task-link attachments
|
||||
use. Honors the Sandbox Security Layer's "Block network" policy."""
|
||||
url = str(args.get("url", "")).strip()
|
||||
if not url:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "fetch_url: 'url' is required."}
|
||||
if not url.lower().startswith(("http://", "https://")):
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": f"fetch_url: not an http(s) URL: {url}"}
|
||||
if not ctx.allow_url_fetch:
|
||||
return {"ok": False,
|
||||
"output": ("fetch_url: URL fetching is turned off in Settings → Security "
|
||||
"(\"Allow the agent to fetch URLs\").")}
|
||||
# A pasted Jira issue link on the CONNECTED Jira host is read via the
|
||||
# authenticated API (so private issues resolve, not a login page). Public
|
||||
# links / any other URL fall through to the normal fetcher below.
|
||||
from . import jira_tool
|
||||
if jira_tool.is_jira_issue_url(ctx.jira, url):
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": jira_tool.get_issue_by_url(ctx.jira, url)}
|
||||
from .link_fetch import fetch_link_preview
|
||||
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": fetch_link_preview(url)}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _jira_search(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
from . import jira_tool
|
||||
|
||||
out = jira_tool.search(ctx.jira, str(args.get("jql", "")),
|
||||
int(args.get("max_results", 25) or 25))
|
||||
return {"ok": not out.lower().startswith(("jira is not configured", "jira search failed")),
|
||||
"output": out}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _jira_get_issue(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
from . import jira_tool
|
||||
|
||||
out = jira_tool.get_issue(ctx.jira, str(args.get("key", "")))
|
||||
return {"ok": not out.lower().startswith(("jira is not configured", "could not fetch")),
|
||||
"output": out}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _read_file(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
target = ctx.resolve(str(args.get("path", "")))
|
||||
if not target.exists():
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": f"File not found: {args.get('path')}"}
|
||||
data = target.read_bytes()[:MAX_READ_BYTES]
|
||||
text = data.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": text}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _list_dir(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
rel = str(args.get("path", ".") or ".")
|
||||
target = ctx.resolve(rel)
|
||||
# A missing/not-yet-created path is NOT a tool failure — report it as an
|
||||
# ordinary result so the agent can create it or pick another path and keep
|
||||
# going. Returning ok=False here surfaced a false "tool failed: list_dir" in
|
||||
# Co4E flows and could stall a step on a recoverable situation.
|
||||
if not target.exists():
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": f"(path '{rel}' does not exist yet — create it or use another path)"}
|
||||
if target.is_file():
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": f"('{rel}' is a file, not a directory)"}
|
||||
entries = []
|
||||
for child in sorted(target.iterdir(), key=lambda p: (p.is_file(), p.name.lower())):
|
||||
marker = "/" if child.is_dir() else ""
|
||||
entries.append(f"{child.name}{marker}")
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": "\n".join(entries) or "(empty folder)"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _check_python_syntax(target: Path, content: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return a short warning if ``content`` is invalid Python, else ''.
|
||||
|
||||
Catches syntax errors the instant a .py file is written/edited — before the
|
||||
agent wastes a whole run_command round-trip just to get the same error back
|
||||
from a traceback."""
|
||||
if target.suffix.lower() not in (".py", ".pyw"):
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ast.parse(content, filename=str(target))
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
except SyntaxError as exc:
|
||||
return f"\n⚠ Syntax error at line {exc.lineno}: {exc.msg} — fix this before running the file."
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _write_file(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
rel = str(args.get("path", ""))
|
||||
if ctx.flatten_writes:
|
||||
rel = _flatten_rel(rel)
|
||||
target = ctx.resolve(rel)
|
||||
content = str(args.get("content", ""))
|
||||
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
# A .xlsx is a binary package — build a REAL workbook from the content
|
||||
# (CSV/TSV/Markdown-table/JSON) rather than writing raw text (which corrupts it).
|
||||
if target.suffix.lower() in (".xlsx", ".xlsm"):
|
||||
from . import xlsx_write
|
||||
if xlsx_write.build_xlsx_from_text(target, content):
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "path": str(target),
|
||||
"output": f"Wrote spreadsheet {rel} ({target.name})."}
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "Could not build the .xlsx (openpyxl unavailable) — "
|
||||
"write a .csv instead, or use a generator script."}
|
||||
target.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
warning = _check_python_syntax(target, content)
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "path": str(target),
|
||||
"output": f"Wrote {len(content)} chars to {rel}.{warning}"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _edit_file(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Replace an exact snippet inside an existing file (precise patch edit)."""
|
||||
rel = str(args.get("path", ""))
|
||||
if ctx.flatten_writes:
|
||||
rel = _flatten_rel(rel)
|
||||
target = ctx.resolve(rel)
|
||||
if not target.exists():
|
||||
return {"ok": False,
|
||||
"output": f"File not found: {rel} — use write_file to create it."}
|
||||
old = str(args.get("old_string", ""))
|
||||
new = str(args.get("new_string", ""))
|
||||
replace_all = bool(args.get("replace_all", False))
|
||||
if not old:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "old_string is empty — provide the exact text to replace."}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
text = target.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
except OSError as exc:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": f"Could not read file: {exc}"}
|
||||
count = text.count(old)
|
||||
if count == 0:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": ("old_string not found. Read the file and copy the exact "
|
||||
"text to replace, including indentation/whitespace.")}
|
||||
if count > 1 and not replace_all:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": (f"old_string appears {count} times — add surrounding "
|
||||
"context to make it unique, or set replace_all=true.")}
|
||||
updated = text.replace(old, new) if replace_all else text.replace(old, new, 1)
|
||||
target.write_text(updated, encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
n = count if replace_all else 1
|
||||
warning = _check_python_syntax(target, updated)
|
||||
return {"ok": True,
|
||||
"output": f"Edited {args.get('path')} ({n} replacement{'' if n == 1 else 's'}).{warning}"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sandbox_python(ctx: ToolContext, cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
|
||||
on_output: Optional[Callable[[str], None]] = None) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
"""Lazily create/reuse this ctx's project sandbox venv (Code tab only —
|
||||
``ctx.sandbox``); returns its python path, or None to use the app's own."""
|
||||
if not ctx.sandbox:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
from .deps import ensure_project_venv
|
||||
|
||||
py = ensure_project_venv(ctx.workdir, cancel=cancel, on_output=on_output)
|
||||
return str(py) if py else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _install_package(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any], cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
|
||||
on_output: Optional[Callable[[str], None]] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
from .deps import pip_install
|
||||
|
||||
package = str(args.get("package", "")).strip()
|
||||
if not package:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "No package specified."}
|
||||
python = _sandbox_python(ctx, cancel, on_output)
|
||||
ok, detail = pip_install(package, cancel=cancel, on_output=on_output, python=python)
|
||||
head = f"Installed {package}." if ok else f"Could not install {package}."
|
||||
return {"ok": ok, "output": f"{head}\n{detail}"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_SNAPSHOT_SKIP = {".git", "__pycache__", "node_modules", ".scratch", ".venv",
|
||||
".idea", ".mypy_cache", ".pytest_cache"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _snapshot(workdir: Path) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Map of file path -> (mtime, size) under the workdir (noise dirs skipped)."""
|
||||
snap: Dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(str(workdir)):
|
||||
dirnames[:] = [d for d in dirnames if d not in _SNAPSHOT_SKIP]
|
||||
for fn in filenames:
|
||||
full = os.path.join(dirpath, fn)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
st = os.stat(full)
|
||||
snap[full] = (st.st_mtime_ns, st.st_size)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if len(snap) > 5000:
|
||||
return snap
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return snap
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _run_command(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any],
|
||||
cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
|
||||
on_output: Optional[Callable[[str], None]] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
from .deps import network_blocked_env, run_cancellable, sandbox_env
|
||||
from .sandbox_manager import SandboxManager, ExecutionConfig
|
||||
from ..security.command_risk_classifier import classify_command
|
||||
|
||||
command = str(args.get("command", "")).strip()
|
||||
if not command:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "Empty command."}
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Security validation pipeline ---
|
||||
risk = classify_command(command, is_cowork_mode=ctx.flatten_writes)
|
||||
if risk.blocked:
|
||||
denial = "Command blocked by security policy: " + "; ".join(risk.reasons)
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": denial}
|
||||
|
||||
# Route through SandboxManager for risk-based isolation
|
||||
mgr = SandboxManager(ExecutionConfig(
|
||||
enabled=True,
|
||||
block_network_by_default=ctx.block_network,
|
||||
is_cowork_mode=ctx.flatten_writes,
|
||||
))
|
||||
sandbox_result = mgr.run(
|
||||
command=command,
|
||||
workdir=str(ctx.workdir),
|
||||
block_network=ctx.block_network,
|
||||
timeout_sec=COMMAND_TIMEOUT,
|
||||
cancel=cancel,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Sandbox ALWAYS executes (never double-run). Return its result directly.
|
||||
if sandbox_result.get("sandbox") == "blocked":
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": sandbox_result.get("stderr", "Command blocked")}
|
||||
out = sandbox_result.get("stdout", "").strip() or "(no output)"
|
||||
err = sandbox_result.get("stderr", "")
|
||||
rc = sandbox_result.get("returncode", -1)
|
||||
if err:
|
||||
out = f"{out}\n{err}" if out else err
|
||||
return {"ok": sandbox_result.get("ok", False), "output": f"[exit {rc}]\n{out}"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _short_json(obj: Any, limit: int = 500) -> str:
|
||||
import json
|
||||
text = json.dumps(obj, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -57,6 +57,34 @@
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 📊 TIẾN ĐỘ THỰC TẾ — TEAM HOA (cập nhật `2026-08-21 22:19`)
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> ### ✅ ĐÃ HOÀN TẤT: 5/5 task của **R05** — branch `feature/teamhoa/r05-r06` (tạo từ `origin/feature/deltateam/refactor-plan`, có sẵn nền R01/R03/R04)
|
||||
>
|
||||
> | EPIC | Task | Trạng thái |
|
||||
> | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|
||||
> | **R05** Tool, MCP & Connector Policy | T01 → T05 | ✅ 5/5 |
|
||||
> | **R06** Workspace, Filesystem & History Isolation | T01 → T05 | ⬜ chưa bắt đầu |
|
||||
>
|
||||
> **Kiểm chứng (chạy thật):**
|
||||
> * `pytest tests/` ➔ **254 pass / 4 fail** (+12 test mới cho R05: `tests/unit/test_tool_registry_and_policy.py`, `test_code_agent_tool_policy.py`, `test_cowork_extra_tool_policy.py`, `test_mcp_source_manager.py`)
|
||||
> * 4 fail là **lỗi có sẵn từ trước R05**, không liên quan tool/MCP: 2 trong `test_config_security.py` (EPIC R02, đã ghi nhận bởi Team Duy) + 2 trong `test_routing_wiring.py` (môi trường máy này có Ollama/llama3.1 thật + config routing cục bộ khác "fresh install" — không phải do R05).
|
||||
> * `python scripts/check_imports.py` ➔ **PASS** (0 Qt import trong `domain/`, `application/`)
|
||||
> * Mọi file mới **< 400 dòng** (lớn nhất: `domain/tools/tool_registry.py` 125 dòng). `core/tools.py` giảm từ 566 ➔ 291 dòng.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> ### 🔧 TÓM TẮT R05
|
||||
> * **R05-T01/T02**: `core/tools.py`'s if/elif dispatcher tách thành `infrastructure/filesystem/{file_tools,command_tools,fetch_tools,tool_context}.py` + `domain/tools/{tool_descriptor,tool_registry}.py`. `core/tools.py` còn lại là shim strangler-fig (re-export `ToolContext`/`ToolError`, dispatch qua dict).
|
||||
> * **R05-T03**: `application/conversations/tool_policy_gateway.py::ToolPolicyGateway` — thay `if gate is not None and name in ("run_command","install_package")` (chat_agent.py) và `if name in (WRITE_TOOLS|MS365_WRITE_TOOLS)` (code_agent.py) bằng một lookup capability chung. Đã verify bằng test: đúng 2 tool cũ vẫn được gate, không tool nào khác bị ảnh hưởng.
|
||||
> * **R05-T04 — ⚠️ THAY ĐỔI HÀNH VI CÓ CHỦ ĐÍCH**: trước đây MCP/connector/ext-connector tools (`core/mcp_client.py`, `core/ext_connectors.py`) chạy qua `extra_executor(name, args)` **không hề qua permission gate**. Giờ mọi `extra_tools` được gắn capability mặc định (`WRITE|EXECUTE|NETWORK`, vì MCP không có chuẩn khai báo rủi ro) và đi qua CÙNG `ToolPolicyGateway` như built-in tools. Khi Settings có "confirm before running commands" bật, tool MCP/connector giờ sẽ hỏi xác nhận — người dùng SẼ thấy thêm prompt so với trước. Test: `tests/unit/test_cowork_extra_tool_policy.py`.
|
||||
> * **R05-T05**: `infrastructure/mcp/mcp_source_manager.py::McpToolSourceManager` — tách lifecycle connection (cache/lock/start-or-skip) ra khỏi `state.py::AppContext` (trước đây inline trong `_mcp_connections`/`_conn_lock`). `AppContext` giờ chỉ gọi `self._mcp_manager.ensure/stop/stop_all`. `_ext_connections` (Connectors CAD/CAE/MS365/Other) KHÔNG thuộc phạm vi T05, vẫn giữ `_conn_lock` riêng như cũ.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> ### 📌 CÒN NỢ / CẦN QUYẾT ĐỊNH
|
||||
> 1. **Xung đột file với EPIC R02 (Team Nam)**: `docs/refactor/Refactoring_Checklist.md` dòng ~83 giao `infrastructure/persistence/json/atomic_json_file.py` cho Team Nam (R02-T01). R06-T02 (Team Hoa) cũng cần một helper ghi JSON atomic cho `WorkspaceRepository`/`ConversationRepository`. Để tránh 2 team cùng sửa 1 file, R06 sẽ dùng một helper atomic-write cục bộ trong `infrastructure/persistence/json/workspace_repository_impl.py`/`conversation_repository_impl.py` cho tới khi R02 xong, rồi hợp nhất vào `atomic_json_file.py` chung — **cần Team Nam xác nhận** khi họ bắt đầu R02-T01.
|
||||
> 2. Việc kế tiếp của Team Hoa là **R06** (Workspace, Filesystem & History Isolation).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 📌 PHẦN 1: CHECKLIST CHI TIẾT THEO 10 EPIC (R01 ➔ R10)
|
||||
|
||||
### 🔹 EPIC R01: Architecture Foundation & Characterization (Nền Tảng Kiến Trúc & Test Bảo Vệ)
|
||||
@@ -135,16 +163,16 @@
|
||||
* **Team chịu trách nhiệm**: 🟢 **Team Hoa** (Chủ trì) + Phối hợp Team Duy
|
||||
* **Mục tiêu**: Bóc tách monolithic `core/tools.py`, đưa toàn bộ Built-in tools, MCP tools và Connectors qua `ToolPolicyGateway` kiểm tra quyền phân tầng.
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **R05-T01 (Team Hoa)**: Định nghĩa `ToolDescriptor`, `ToolCapability` (read/write/execute/network) ➔ `domain/tools/tool_descriptor.py` & `domain/tools/tool_registry.py`
|
||||
*Start: `____-__-__ __:__` | End: `____-__-__ __:__`*
|
||||
- [ ] **R05-T02 (Team Hoa)**: Tách nhỏ các built-in handlers từ `core/tools.py` ➔ `infrastructure/filesystem/file_tools.py`, `command_tools.py`, `fetch_tools.py`
|
||||
*Start: `____-__-__ __:__` | End: `____-__-__ __:__`*
|
||||
- [ ] **R05-T03 (Team Hoa)**: Xây dựng `ToolPolicyGateway` (kiểm tra phân quyền allow/confirm/deny) ➔ `application/conversations/tool_policy_gateway.py`
|
||||
*Start: `____-__-__ __:__` | End: `____-__-__ __:__`*
|
||||
- [ ] **R05-T04 (Team Hoa)**: Chuẩn hóa MCP tools từ `core/mcp_client.py` đi qua `ToolPolicyGateway`
|
||||
*Start: `____-__-__ __:__` | End: `____-__-__ __:__`*
|
||||
- [ ] **R05-T05 (Team Hoa)**: Xây dựng `McpToolSourceManager` quản lý vòng đời tiến trình MCP ➔ `infrastructure/mcp/mcp_source_manager.py`
|
||||
*Start: `____-__-__ __:__` | End: `____-__-__ __:__`*
|
||||
- [x] **R05-T01 (Team Hoa)**: Định nghĩa `ToolDescriptor`, `ToolCapability` (read/write/execute/network) ➔ `domain/tools/tool_descriptor.py` & `domain/tools/tool_registry.py`
|
||||
*Start: `2026-08-21 21:40` | End: `2026-08-21 21:47`*
|
||||
- [x] **R05-T02 (Team Hoa)**: Tách nhỏ các built-in handlers từ `core/tools.py` ➔ `infrastructure/filesystem/file_tools.py`, `command_tools.py`, `fetch_tools.py`
|
||||
*Start: `2026-08-21 21:47` | End: `2026-08-21 21:56`*
|
||||
- [x] **R05-T03 (Team Hoa)**: Xây dựng `ToolPolicyGateway` (kiểm tra phân quyền allow/confirm/deny) ➔ `application/conversations/tool_policy_gateway.py`
|
||||
*Start: `2026-08-21 21:56` | End: `2026-08-21 22:04`*
|
||||
- [x] **R05-T04 (Team Hoa)**: Chuẩn hóa MCP tools từ `core/mcp_client.py` đi qua `ToolPolicyGateway`
|
||||
*Start: `2026-08-21 22:04` | End: `2026-08-21 22:12`*
|
||||
- [x] **R05-T05 (Team Hoa)**: Xây dựng `McpToolSourceManager` quản lý vòng đời tiến trình MCP ➔ `infrastructure/mcp/mcp_source_manager.py`
|
||||
*Start: `2026-08-21 22:12` | End: `2026-08-21 22:19`*
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
||||
"""Domain entities for tool risk classification and lookup (EPIC R05)."""
|
||||
|
||||
from .tool_descriptor import ToolCapability, ToolDescriptor
|
||||
from .tool_registry import (
|
||||
BUILT_IN_CAPABILITIES,
|
||||
UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES,
|
||||
ToolRegistry,
|
||||
default_registry,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = [
|
||||
"ToolCapability",
|
||||
"ToolDescriptor",
|
||||
"ToolRegistry",
|
||||
"BUILT_IN_CAPABILITIES",
|
||||
"UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES",
|
||||
"default_registry",
|
||||
]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
|
||||
"""ToolCapability / ToolDescriptor - the risk-tagged catalogue entry for one
|
||||
tool the agent loop can call (R05-T01).
|
||||
|
||||
Today a tool is just a name inside ``core/tools.py::TOOL_SPECS`` (a
|
||||
``providers.base.ToolSpec`` — name/description/JSON-schema parameters, with
|
||||
no notion of risk) plus a hand-written membership test wherever gating is
|
||||
needed: ``core/tools.py::WRITE_TOOLS``, ``core/code_agent.py``'s
|
||||
``WRITE_TOOLS | MS365_WRITE_TOOLS``, and ``core/chat_agent.py``'s literal
|
||||
``name in ("run_command", "install_package")``. Three call sites, three
|
||||
independently-maintained lists, and a new tool (or an MCP/connector tool,
|
||||
which has no list membership at all - see ``core/mcp_client.py``) is gated
|
||||
only if someone remembers to add it everywhere.
|
||||
|
||||
``ToolDescriptor`` makes the risk an attribute of the tool itself, declared
|
||||
once, so ``application/conversations/tool_policy_gateway.py`` (R05-T03) can
|
||||
decide ALLOW/CONFIRM/DENY from data instead of a growing set of literal
|
||||
tuples.
|
||||
|
||||
Pure domain code: stdlib only, no Qt, no I/O. ``to_spec``/``from_spec`` are
|
||||
the only place this module touches something outside domain/, and that
|
||||
something (``providers.base.ToolSpec``) is itself a plain dataclass with no
|
||||
further dependencies.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
from enum import Flag, auto
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict
|
||||
|
||||
from cowork_local.providers.base import ToolSpec
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ToolCapability(Flag):
|
||||
"""What calling a tool can do to the machine or the network.
|
||||
|
||||
A ``Flag`` (not a plain ``Enum``) because a single tool can combine risks
|
||||
- ``install_package`` writes to the environment, runs pip as a
|
||||
subprocess, AND needs network access. Composing three separate booleans
|
||||
per call site is exactly the duplication this type replaces.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
NONE = 0
|
||||
READ = auto()
|
||||
WRITE = auto()
|
||||
EXECUTE = auto()
|
||||
NETWORK = auto()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class ToolDescriptor:
|
||||
"""An immutable description of one callable tool.
|
||||
|
||||
Attributes:
|
||||
name: the identifier the model calls (``ToolSpec.name``).
|
||||
description: shown to the model, unchanged from ``ToolSpec``.
|
||||
parameters: JSON-Schema object for the call's arguments.
|
||||
capabilities: the risk this tool carries - see :class:`ToolCapability`.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
name: str
|
||||
description: str
|
||||
parameters: Dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
|
||||
capabilities: ToolCapability = ToolCapability.NONE
|
||||
|
||||
def has(self, capability: ToolCapability) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when this tool carries (any bit of) ``capability``."""
|
||||
return bool(self.capabilities & capability)
|
||||
|
||||
def to_spec(self) -> ToolSpec:
|
||||
"""Project back to the ``ToolSpec`` shape the model-facing catalogue
|
||||
and the provider call actually use - risk tagging is metadata the
|
||||
wire format has no room for."""
|
||||
return ToolSpec(name=self.name, description=self.description,
|
||||
parameters=self.parameters)
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def from_spec(cls, spec: ToolSpec,
|
||||
capabilities: ToolCapability = ToolCapability.NONE) -> "ToolDescriptor":
|
||||
"""Wrap an existing ``ToolSpec`` (built-in, MCP, or connector) with a
|
||||
capability tag. The one place callers attach risk to a spec they did
|
||||
not author themselves."""
|
||||
return cls(name=spec.name, description=spec.description,
|
||||
parameters=spec.parameters, capabilities=capabilities)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = ["ToolCapability", "ToolDescriptor"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
|
||||
"""ToolRegistry - the centralised catalogue every tool source registers into
|
||||
(R05-T01).
|
||||
|
||||
Built-in file/command/fetch tools (``core/tools.py``), MCP server tools
|
||||
(``core/mcp_client.py``) and unified connectors (``core/ext_connectors.py``)
|
||||
each produce their own ``List[ToolSpec]`` today, concatenated ad-hoc by
|
||||
``core/tools.py::combine_tool_sources``. None of that concatenation carries
|
||||
risk information, which is exactly why an MCP tool call reaches
|
||||
``core/chat_agent.py`` with no ``ToolDescriptor`` to consult and skips the
|
||||
permission gate entirely (the gap R05-T04 closes).
|
||||
|
||||
``ToolRegistry`` is the one place a :class:`~domain.tools.tool_descriptor.ToolDescriptor`
|
||||
is looked up by name, so a policy gateway - or anything else that needs to ask
|
||||
"what can this tool do" - has a single source of truth instead of re-deriving
|
||||
it from a spec list.
|
||||
|
||||
Pure domain code: stdlib only, no Qt, no I/O.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Dict, Iterable, List, Optional
|
||||
|
||||
from cowork_local.providers.base import ToolSpec
|
||||
|
||||
from .tool_descriptor import ToolCapability, ToolDescriptor
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ToolRegistry:
|
||||
"""An in-memory, name-keyed catalogue of :class:`ToolDescriptor`.
|
||||
|
||||
Deliberately mutable and unordered-by-name-only: a turn builds one
|
||||
registry from whichever tool sources it has (built-ins + whatever MCP
|
||||
servers/connectors are enabled), so re-registering the same name simply
|
||||
replaces the previous descriptor rather than raising - the same
|
||||
"last one wins" behaviour ``combine_tool_sources`` already has for
|
||||
duplicate tool names across sources.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, descriptors: Optional[Iterable[ToolDescriptor]] = None) -> None:
|
||||
self._by_name: Dict[str, ToolDescriptor] = {}
|
||||
for descriptor in descriptors or ():
|
||||
self.register(descriptor)
|
||||
|
||||
def register(self, descriptor: ToolDescriptor) -> None:
|
||||
self._by_name[descriptor.name] = descriptor
|
||||
|
||||
def get(self, name: str) -> Optional[ToolDescriptor]:
|
||||
return self._by_name.get(name)
|
||||
|
||||
def all(self) -> List[ToolDescriptor]:
|
||||
return list(self._by_name.values())
|
||||
|
||||
def specs(self) -> List[ToolSpec]:
|
||||
"""Every registered descriptor, projected back to ``ToolSpec`` - the
|
||||
shape the provider call and the model-facing catalogue need."""
|
||||
return [d.to_spec() for d in self._by_name.values()]
|
||||
|
||||
def capabilities_for(self, name: str) -> ToolCapability:
|
||||
"""The capability set for ``name``, or ``NONE`` for an unknown tool.
|
||||
|
||||
Returning ``NONE`` rather than raising lets a policy gateway treat an
|
||||
unregistered tool the same way as one with no declared risk - the
|
||||
gateway's DENY-on-unknown-name rule is a deliberate, separate check,
|
||||
not something this lookup should pre-empt.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
descriptor = self._by_name.get(name)
|
||||
return descriptor.capabilities if descriptor is not None else ToolCapability.NONE
|
||||
|
||||
def __contains__(self, name: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return name in self._by_name
|
||||
|
||||
def __len__(self) -> int:
|
||||
return len(self._by_name)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
||||
# Default capability map for this app's built-in tools (core/tools.py).
|
||||
# Kept here, next to the registry, rather than inside core/tools.py itself -
|
||||
# core/ is the legacy engine layer being strangled, not where new domain facts
|
||||
# should accumulate.
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
||||
_CAP = ToolCapability
|
||||
BUILT_IN_CAPABILITIES: Dict[str, ToolCapability] = {
|
||||
"read_file": _CAP.READ,
|
||||
"list_dir": _CAP.READ,
|
||||
"write_file": _CAP.WRITE,
|
||||
"edit_file": _CAP.WRITE,
|
||||
"run_command": _CAP.EXECUTE,
|
||||
"install_package": _CAP.WRITE | _CAP.EXECUTE | _CAP.NETWORK,
|
||||
"fetch_url": _CAP.NETWORK,
|
||||
"jira_search": _CAP.NETWORK,
|
||||
"jira_get_issue": _CAP.NETWORK,
|
||||
# Advertised by every engine but has no filesystem/process/network effect
|
||||
# of its own - it only drives the Plan panel (see core/chat_agent.py).
|
||||
"update_plan": _CAP.NONE,
|
||||
"save_file": _CAP.WRITE,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Tools with no standard, self-declared risk metadata (every MCP server tool,
|
||||
# every unified connector) are tagged with this conservative default - see
|
||||
# R05-T04. Better to over-gate an unknown remote tool than to silently let it
|
||||
# through as READ-only.
|
||||
UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES: ToolCapability = _CAP.WRITE | _CAP.EXECUTE | _CAP.NETWORK
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def default_registry(specs: Iterable[ToolSpec]) -> ToolRegistry:
|
||||
"""Build a registry from ``core/tools.py``'s own ``TOOL_SPECS`` (plus
|
||||
``save_file``/``update_plan``, which the engines add separately), using
|
||||
:data:`BUILT_IN_CAPABILITIES`. A spec with no entry in that map falls back
|
||||
to :data:`UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES` - the same conservative default
|
||||
applied to MCP/connector tools, so a built-in nobody has classified yet
|
||||
fails safe instead of silently ungated."""
|
||||
registry = ToolRegistry()
|
||||
for spec in specs:
|
||||
capability = BUILT_IN_CAPABILITIES.get(spec.name, UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES)
|
||||
registry.register(ToolDescriptor.from_spec(spec, capability))
|
||||
return registry
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = [
|
||||
"ToolRegistry",
|
||||
"BUILT_IN_CAPABILITIES",
|
||||
"UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES",
|
||||
"default_registry",
|
||||
]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
"""Filesystem/process/network tool adapters split out of ``core/tools.py``
|
||||
(EPIC R05) and the sandbox execution context they share."""
|
||||
|
||||
from .tool_context import CancelFn, ToolContext, ToolError
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = ["CancelFn", "ToolContext", "ToolError"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
|
||||
"""Command tools - run_command, install_package (R05-T02).
|
||||
|
||||
Moved verbatim out of ``core/tools.py`` (see ``file_tools.py`` for why). These
|
||||
two are the ones today's hand-written permission gate in
|
||||
``core/chat_agent.py`` singles out by literal name
|
||||
(``name in ("run_command", "install_package")``) — R05-T03 replaces that
|
||||
tuple with a capability lookup, but the tools themselves are unchanged here.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
|
||||
|
||||
from .tool_context import CancelFn, ToolContext
|
||||
|
||||
COMMAND_TIMEOUT = 120 # seconds
|
||||
|
||||
_SNAPSHOT_SKIP = {".git", "__pycache__", "node_modules", ".scratch", ".venv",
|
||||
".idea", ".mypy_cache", ".pytest_cache"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _snapshot(workdir: Path) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Map of file path -> (mtime, size) under the workdir (noise dirs skipped)."""
|
||||
snap: Dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(str(workdir)):
|
||||
dirnames[:] = [d for d in dirnames if d not in _SNAPSHOT_SKIP]
|
||||
for fn in filenames:
|
||||
full = os.path.join(dirpath, fn)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
st = os.stat(full)
|
||||
snap[full] = (st.st_mtime_ns, st.st_size)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if len(snap) > 5000:
|
||||
return snap
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return snap
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sandbox_python(ctx: ToolContext, cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
|
||||
on_output=None) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
"""Lazily create/reuse this ctx's project sandbox venv (Code tab only —
|
||||
``ctx.sandbox``); returns its python path, or None to use the app's own."""
|
||||
if not ctx.sandbox:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.deps import ensure_project_venv
|
||||
|
||||
py = ensure_project_venv(ctx.workdir, cancel=cancel, on_output=on_output)
|
||||
return str(py) if py else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def run_command(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any],
|
||||
cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
|
||||
on_output=None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.deps import network_blocked_env, run_cancellable, sandbox_env
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.sandbox_manager import ExecutionConfig, SandboxManager
|
||||
from cowork_local.security.command_risk_classifier import classify_command
|
||||
|
||||
command = str(args.get("command", "")).strip()
|
||||
if not command:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "Empty command."}
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Security validation pipeline ---
|
||||
risk = classify_command(command, is_cowork_mode=ctx.flatten_writes)
|
||||
if risk.blocked:
|
||||
denial = "Command blocked by security policy: " + "; ".join(risk.reasons)
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": denial}
|
||||
|
||||
# Route through SandboxManager for risk-based isolation
|
||||
mgr = SandboxManager(ExecutionConfig(
|
||||
enabled=True,
|
||||
block_network_by_default=ctx.block_network,
|
||||
is_cowork_mode=ctx.flatten_writes,
|
||||
))
|
||||
sandbox_result = mgr.run(
|
||||
command=command,
|
||||
workdir=str(ctx.workdir),
|
||||
block_network=ctx.block_network,
|
||||
timeout_sec=COMMAND_TIMEOUT,
|
||||
cancel=cancel,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Sandbox ALWAYS executes (never double-run). Return its result directly.
|
||||
if sandbox_result.get("sandbox") == "blocked":
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": sandbox_result.get("stderr", "Command blocked")}
|
||||
out = sandbox_result.get("stdout", "").strip() or "(no output)"
|
||||
err = sandbox_result.get("stderr", "")
|
||||
rc = sandbox_result.get("returncode", -1)
|
||||
if err:
|
||||
out = f"{out}\n{err}" if out else err
|
||||
return {"ok": sandbox_result.get("ok", False), "output": f"[exit {rc}]\n{out}"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_package(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any],
|
||||
cancel: Optional[CancelFn] = None,
|
||||
on_output=None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.deps import pip_install
|
||||
|
||||
package = str(args.get("package", "")).strip()
|
||||
if not package:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "No package specified."}
|
||||
python = _sandbox_python(ctx, cancel, on_output)
|
||||
ok, detail = pip_install(package, cancel=cancel, on_output=on_output, python=python)
|
||||
head = f"Installed {package}." if ok else f"Could not install {package}."
|
||||
return {"ok": ok, "output": f"{head}\n{detail}"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = ["COMMAND_TIMEOUT", "run_command", "install_package", "_snapshot"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
||||
"""Fetch tools - fetch_url, jira_search, jira_get_issue (R05-T02).
|
||||
|
||||
Moved verbatim out of ``core/tools.py`` (see ``file_tools.py`` for why). The
|
||||
network access these three carry is exactly what the ``ToolCapability.NETWORK``
|
||||
tag added in R05-T01/domain/tools/tool_registry.py describes.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict
|
||||
|
||||
from .tool_context import ToolContext
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def fetch_url(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fetch a URL's text content (web page / online document / SharePoint-
|
||||
OneDrive share link) via link_fetch — the same parser task-link attachments
|
||||
use. Honors the Sandbox Security Layer's "Block network" policy."""
|
||||
url = str(args.get("url", "")).strip()
|
||||
if not url:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "fetch_url: 'url' is required."}
|
||||
if not url.lower().startswith(("http://", "https://")):
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": f"fetch_url: not an http(s) URL: {url}"}
|
||||
if not ctx.allow_url_fetch:
|
||||
return {"ok": False,
|
||||
"output": ("fetch_url: URL fetching is turned off in Settings → Security "
|
||||
"(\"Allow the agent to fetch URLs\").")}
|
||||
# A pasted Jira issue link on the CONNECTED Jira host is read via the
|
||||
# authenticated API (so private issues resolve, not a login page). Public
|
||||
# links / any other URL fall through to the normal fetcher below.
|
||||
from cowork_local.core import jira_tool
|
||||
if jira_tool.is_jira_issue_url(ctx.jira, url):
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": jira_tool.get_issue_by_url(ctx.jira, url)}
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.link_fetch import fetch_link_preview
|
||||
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": fetch_link_preview(url)}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def jira_search(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
from cowork_local.core import jira_tool
|
||||
|
||||
out = jira_tool.search(ctx.jira, str(args.get("jql", "")),
|
||||
int(args.get("max_results", 25) or 25))
|
||||
return {"ok": not out.lower().startswith(("jira is not configured", "jira search failed")),
|
||||
"output": out}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def jira_get_issue(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
from cowork_local.core import jira_tool
|
||||
|
||||
out = jira_tool.get_issue(ctx.jira, str(args.get("key", "")))
|
||||
return {"ok": not out.lower().startswith(("jira is not configured", "could not fetch")),
|
||||
"output": out}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = ["fetch_url", "jira_search", "jira_get_issue"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
|
||||
"""File tools - read_file, list_dir, write_file, edit_file (R05-T02).
|
||||
|
||||
Moved verbatim out of ``core/tools.py``, whose ``execute_tool`` used to
|
||||
dispatch to these via a hand-written if/elif chain over every tool name it
|
||||
knew about. Splitting the built-in handlers into per-concern modules
|
||||
(this one, ``command_tools.py``, ``fetch_tools.py``) means adding a tool no
|
||||
longer means growing that one function; ``core/tools.py::execute_tool`` now
|
||||
looks the name up in a dict built from these modules instead.
|
||||
|
||||
Behavior is unchanged from before the split - this is a pure move, not a
|
||||
rewrite. Every existing characterization/contract test that exercises
|
||||
read_file/write_file/edit_file/list_dir through ``core.tools.execute_tool``
|
||||
still exercises the exact same code, just imported from here.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import ast
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict
|
||||
|
||||
from .tool_context import ToolContext
|
||||
|
||||
MAX_READ_BYTES = 200_000
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _flatten_rel(rel: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Collapse a sub-folder path down to a bare filename so the file lands in the
|
||||
workdir root — EXCEPT the ``.scratch`` sandbox subtree, which is preserved.
|
||||
|
||||
Used by the Cowork agent (flatten_writes=True) so it can never create a
|
||||
per-session / per-chat / per-task output sub-folder: every deliverable stays
|
||||
directly in the single configured Output folder."""
|
||||
parts = Path(rel).parts
|
||||
if parts and parts[0] == ".scratch":
|
||||
return rel # temporary sandbox is allowed (and cleaned up afterwards)
|
||||
return Path(rel).name or rel
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _check_python_syntax(target: Path, content: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return a short warning if ``content`` is invalid Python, else ''.
|
||||
|
||||
Catches syntax errors the instant a .py file is written/edited — before the
|
||||
agent wastes a whole run_command round-trip just to get the same error back
|
||||
from a traceback."""
|
||||
if target.suffix.lower() not in (".py", ".pyw"):
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ast.parse(content, filename=str(target))
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
except SyntaxError as exc:
|
||||
return f"\n⚠ Syntax error at line {exc.lineno}: {exc.msg} — fix this before running the file."
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def read_file(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
target = ctx.resolve(str(args.get("path", "")))
|
||||
if not target.exists():
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": f"File not found: {args.get('path')}"}
|
||||
data = target.read_bytes()[:MAX_READ_BYTES]
|
||||
text = data.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": text}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def list_dir(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
rel = str(args.get("path", ".") or ".")
|
||||
target = ctx.resolve(rel)
|
||||
# A missing/not-yet-created path is NOT a tool failure — report it as an
|
||||
# ordinary result so the agent can create it or pick another path and keep
|
||||
# going. Returning ok=False here surfaced a false "tool failed: list_dir" in
|
||||
# Co4E flows and could stall a step on a recoverable situation.
|
||||
if not target.exists():
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": f"(path '{rel}' does not exist yet — create it or use another path)"}
|
||||
if target.is_file():
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": f"('{rel}' is a file, not a directory)"}
|
||||
entries = []
|
||||
for child in sorted(target.iterdir(), key=lambda p: (p.is_file(), p.name.lower())):
|
||||
marker = "/" if child.is_dir() else ""
|
||||
entries.append(f"{child.name}{marker}")
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": "\n".join(entries) or "(empty folder)"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write_file(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
rel = str(args.get("path", ""))
|
||||
if ctx.flatten_writes:
|
||||
rel = _flatten_rel(rel)
|
||||
target = ctx.resolve(rel)
|
||||
content = str(args.get("content", ""))
|
||||
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
# A .xlsx is a binary package — build a REAL workbook from the content
|
||||
# (CSV/TSV/Markdown-table/JSON) rather than writing raw text (which corrupts it).
|
||||
if target.suffix.lower() in (".xlsx", ".xlsm"):
|
||||
from cowork_local.core import xlsx_write
|
||||
if xlsx_write.build_xlsx_from_text(target, content):
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "path": str(target),
|
||||
"output": f"Wrote spreadsheet {rel} ({target.name})."}
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "Could not build the .xlsx (openpyxl unavailable) — "
|
||||
"write a .csv instead, or use a generator script."}
|
||||
target.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
warning = _check_python_syntax(target, content)
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "path": str(target),
|
||||
"output": f"Wrote {len(content)} chars to {rel}.{warning}"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def edit_file(ctx: ToolContext, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Replace an exact snippet inside an existing file (precise patch edit)."""
|
||||
rel = str(args.get("path", ""))
|
||||
if ctx.flatten_writes:
|
||||
rel = _flatten_rel(rel)
|
||||
target = ctx.resolve(rel)
|
||||
if not target.exists():
|
||||
return {"ok": False,
|
||||
"output": f"File not found: {rel} — use write_file to create it."}
|
||||
old = str(args.get("old_string", ""))
|
||||
new = str(args.get("new_string", ""))
|
||||
replace_all = bool(args.get("replace_all", False))
|
||||
if not old:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": "old_string is empty — provide the exact text to replace."}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
text = target.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
except OSError as exc:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": f"Could not read file: {exc}"}
|
||||
count = text.count(old)
|
||||
if count == 0:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": ("old_string not found. Read the file and copy the exact "
|
||||
"text to replace, including indentation/whitespace.")}
|
||||
if count > 1 and not replace_all:
|
||||
return {"ok": False, "output": (f"old_string appears {count} times — add surrounding "
|
||||
"context to make it unique, or set replace_all=true.")}
|
||||
updated = text.replace(old, new) if replace_all else text.replace(old, new, 1)
|
||||
target.write_text(updated, encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
n = count if replace_all else 1
|
||||
warning = _check_python_syntax(target, updated)
|
||||
return {"ok": True,
|
||||
"output": f"Edited {args.get('path')} ({n} replacement{'' if n == 1 else 's'}).{warning}"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = ["MAX_READ_BYTES", "read_file", "list_dir", "write_file", "edit_file"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
||||
"""ToolContext / ToolError / CancelFn - the sandboxed execution context every
|
||||
built-in tool runs against (moved out of ``core/tools.py`` in R05-T02).
|
||||
|
||||
Kept as its own leaf module (no dependency on any sibling in this package) so
|
||||
``file_tools.py``, ``command_tools.py`` and ``fetch_tools.py`` can each import
|
||||
it without creating an import cycle back through ``core/tools.py``, which
|
||||
itself re-exports ``ToolContext``/``ToolError`` from here for the existing
|
||||
callers (``core/chat_agent.py``, ``core/code_agent.py``,
|
||||
``core/task_executors.py``) that do ``from .tools import ToolContext``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, Optional
|
||||
|
||||
CancelFn = Callable[[], bool]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ToolError(Exception):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class ToolContext:
|
||||
workdir: Path
|
||||
flatten_writes: bool = False # Cowork: force every write into the workdir root
|
||||
sandbox: bool = False # Code tab: isolate run_command/install_package into <workdir>/.venv
|
||||
# Sandbox Security Layer — Settings' "Resource Limits" (cpu_percent/memory_mb/
|
||||
# disk_mb), applied to every run_command/install_package this context runs.
|
||||
# None (default) = no limits, matching pre-existing behavior.
|
||||
resource_limits: Optional[Dict[str, float]] = None
|
||||
# Sandbox Security Layer — Settings' "Block network for agent commands"
|
||||
# (policy-level, see deps.py::network_blocked_env). False (default) =
|
||||
# unrestricted, matching pre-existing behavior.
|
||||
block_network: bool = False
|
||||
# Whether the fetch_url tool may read URLs — SEPARATE from block_network
|
||||
# (reading a web page/share link for info is safe; running networked shell
|
||||
# commands is the risk). Defaults True; set from agent_security.allow_url_fetch.
|
||||
allow_url_fetch: bool = True
|
||||
# Jira read connector config (base_url/email/api_token) — None disables the
|
||||
# jira_* tools' ability to connect. Populated from config.data["jira"].
|
||||
jira: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve(self, rel: str) -> Path:
|
||||
"""Resolve ``rel`` inside the workdir, rejecting escapes."""
|
||||
if rel in ("", "."):
|
||||
return self.workdir
|
||||
candidate = (self.workdir / rel).expanduser()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
resolved = candidate.resolve()
|
||||
except OSError as exc:
|
||||
raise ToolError(f"Invalid path: {rel} ({exc})")
|
||||
root = self.workdir.resolve()
|
||||
if resolved != root and root not in resolved.parents:
|
||||
raise ToolError(
|
||||
f"Refused: '{rel}' is outside the working folder ({root})."
|
||||
)
|
||||
return resolved
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = ["CancelFn", "ToolError", "ToolContext"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
"""MCP server connection lifecycle management (EPIC R05)."""
|
||||
|
||||
from .mcp_source_manager import McpToolSourceManager
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = ["McpToolSourceManager"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
|
||||
"""McpToolSourceManager - the MCP server connection lifecycle, extracted out
|
||||
of ``state.py::AppContext`` (R05-T05).
|
||||
|
||||
Today ``AppContext.build_mcp_tools`` inlines all of this: a ``_mcp_connections``
|
||||
dict, a ``_conn_lock`` guarding check-then-create against concurrent turns (a
|
||||
Cowork tab, a Co4E flow and a Scheduled Task can all call it at once), and a
|
||||
"start it, cache it, skip it on failure" loop repeated for both the
|
||||
admin-configured servers AND the built-in MS365 server
|
||||
(``_ms365_builtin_connection``). None of that logic touches Qt; it was only
|
||||
ever inline because ``AppContext`` is where the config lived.
|
||||
|
||||
This class owns the SAME cache/lock/start-or-skip behavior as a standalone,
|
||||
directly testable object — ``AppContext`` becomes a thin caller (one instance
|
||||
per app, same as it holds one ``RoutingApplicationService``).
|
||||
|
||||
Pure Python: no Qt. It DOES touch the network/filesystem via
|
||||
``core.mcp_client.McpServerConnection`` (a subprocess + asyncio loop), which is
|
||||
exactly what makes it infrastructure rather than domain.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
from typing import Dict, List, Optional
|
||||
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.mcp_client import McpServerConnection
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class McpToolSourceManager:
|
||||
"""Caches and supervises one :class:`McpServerConnection` per server name.
|
||||
|
||||
``connection_factory`` defaults to ``McpServerConnection`` itself; tests
|
||||
substitute a fake so no real subprocess is spawned (see
|
||||
``tests/unit/test_mcp_source_manager.py``).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, connection_factory=McpServerConnection) -> None:
|
||||
self._connections: Dict[str, McpServerConnection] = {}
|
||||
self._lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
self._connection_factory = connection_factory
|
||||
|
||||
def ensure(self, name: str, command: str, args: Optional[List[str]] = None,
|
||||
env: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None) -> Optional[McpServerConnection]:
|
||||
"""Return a live connection for ``name``, starting one if there is
|
||||
none cached or the cached one's subprocess has died.
|
||||
|
||||
Serialized under one lock so two turns racing to build their tool
|
||||
list at the same moment share one subprocess per server instead of
|
||||
each spawning their own (the bug this replaces:
|
||||
``AppContext._conn_lock``'s original docstring). Returns ``None`` -
|
||||
never raises - when the server fails to start, matching the existing
|
||||
"one broken server must not block the turn" behavior.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
existing = self._connections.get(name)
|
||||
if existing is not None and existing.is_alive():
|
||||
return existing
|
||||
if existing is not None:
|
||||
self._connections.pop(name, None)
|
||||
connection = self._connection_factory(name, command, args or [], env)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
connection.start()
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - one broken server must not block the turn
|
||||
return None
|
||||
self._connections[name] = connection
|
||||
return connection
|
||||
|
||||
def get(self, name: str) -> Optional[McpServerConnection]:
|
||||
"""The cached connection for ``name``, without starting one."""
|
||||
return self._connections.get(name)
|
||||
|
||||
def is_alive(self, name: str) -> bool:
|
||||
connection = self._connections.get(name)
|
||||
return connection is not None and connection.is_alive()
|
||||
|
||||
def restart(self, name: str, command: str, args: Optional[List[str]] = None,
|
||||
env: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None) -> Optional[McpServerConnection]:
|
||||
"""Force a fresh connection for ``name`` even if the cached one still
|
||||
looks alive - for a server the caller knows is misbehaving."""
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
self._connections.pop(name, None)
|
||||
return self.ensure(name, command, args, env)
|
||||
|
||||
def stop(self, name: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Stop and forget one connection - used when a server becomes
|
||||
unavailable by configuration (e.g. MS365 signed out) rather than by
|
||||
crashing."""
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
connection = self._connections.pop(name, None)
|
||||
if connection is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
connection.stop()
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - shutdown must never raise into the caller
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
def active(self) -> List[McpServerConnection]:
|
||||
"""Every currently cached connection - what
|
||||
``core/mcp_client.py::build_mcp_tools`` merges tool specs from."""
|
||||
return list(self._connections.values())
|
||||
|
||||
def stop_all(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Terminate every connection's subprocess - called on app shutdown
|
||||
so none of them linger as orphan processes."""
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
connections = list(self._connections.values())
|
||||
self._connections.clear()
|
||||
for connection in connections:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
connection.stop()
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = ["McpToolSourceManager"]
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import time
|
||||
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Optional, Tuple
|
||||
|
||||
from .config import AppConfig
|
||||
from .infrastructure.mcp import McpToolSourceManager
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_agent_default(
|
||||
@@ -38,18 +39,18 @@ class AppContext:
|
||||
def __init__(self, config: AppConfig):
|
||||
self.config = config
|
||||
self.started_at = time.time() # for Monitoring's Sandbox Details "Created"/"Uptime"
|
||||
self._mcp_connections: dict = {} # server name -> McpServerConnection
|
||||
# Admin-configured MCP servers + the built-in MS365 server (R05-T05):
|
||||
# connection caching/lifecycle (check-then-create, restart, shutdown)
|
||||
# now lives in McpToolSourceManager, extracted so it is testable
|
||||
# without an AppContext/Qt. See its docstring for why the check-then-
|
||||
# create race matters — several turns (multiple Cowork tabs, parallel
|
||||
# Co4E flows, scheduled tasks) can call build_mcp_tools() at once.
|
||||
self._mcp_manager = McpToolSourceManager()
|
||||
self._ext_connections: dict = {} # connector id -> McpServerConnection (mcp_stdio mode only)
|
||||
# Guards the two connection caches above. build_mcp_tools() runs on EVERY
|
||||
# chat turn's own AgentWorker thread, so several turns (multiple Cowork
|
||||
# tabs, parallel Co4E flows, scheduled tasks) can enter it at once. The
|
||||
# cache is populated check-then-create ("conn is None → spawn → store");
|
||||
# without this lock two concurrent turns both see None and each spawns a
|
||||
# subprocess for the SAME server — one leaks as an orphan and the wrong
|
||||
# object may be handed out. The lock makes connection setup atomic; the
|
||||
# provider/HTTP path itself is already thread-safe (a fresh provider per
|
||||
# call, module-level `requests`, MCP calls multiplexed on the server's
|
||||
# own event loop), so concurrent model calls never needed serializing.
|
||||
# Guards ``_ext_connections`` only now — unified Connectors (CAD/CAE/
|
||||
# MS365/Other) aren't covered by McpToolSourceManager (R05-T05 scoped
|
||||
# to MCP servers), so this cache still needs its own check-then-create
|
||||
# lock, the same race McpToolSourceManager guards against internally.
|
||||
self._conn_lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
self._routing_service = None # lazy RoutingService (Auto Model Routing)
|
||||
# Lazy RoutingApplicationService (R03-T03) — the Qt-free decision layer
|
||||
@@ -237,16 +238,12 @@ class AppContext:
|
||||
if not self.config.connect_external:
|
||||
return [], None
|
||||
from .core.ext_connectors import build_ext_connector_tools
|
||||
from .core.mcp_client import McpServerConnection
|
||||
from .core.mcp_client import build_mcp_tools as _merge_mcp_tools
|
||||
from .core.tools import combine_tool_sources
|
||||
|
||||
# Serialize the check-then-create against the connection caches so
|
||||
# concurrent turns share one subprocess per server instead of racing to
|
||||
# spawn duplicates (see _conn_lock in __init__). The lock is held while
|
||||
# connections are established (a one-time cost per server per app run);
|
||||
# once warm, every turn just finds the cached connection and returns.
|
||||
with self._conn_lock:
|
||||
# R05-T05: connection caching/check-then-create for admin-configured
|
||||
# servers + the MS365 builtin now lives in McpToolSourceManager (its
|
||||
# own lock guards the race — see its docstring).
|
||||
active = []
|
||||
for entry in self.config.mcp_servers:
|
||||
if not entry.get("enabled", True):
|
||||
@@ -255,21 +252,18 @@ class AppContext:
|
||||
command = entry.get("command", "")
|
||||
if not name or not command:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
conn = self._mcp_connections.get(name)
|
||||
if conn is None:
|
||||
conn = McpServerConnection(name, command, entry.get("args") or [],
|
||||
conn = self._mcp_manager.ensure(name, command, entry.get("args") or [],
|
||||
entry.get("env") or None)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn.start()
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - one broken server must not block the turn
|
||||
continue
|
||||
self._mcp_connections[name] = conn
|
||||
if conn is not None:
|
||||
active.append(conn)
|
||||
builtin = self._ms365_builtin_connection(skip={c.name for c in active})
|
||||
if builtin is not None:
|
||||
active.append(builtin)
|
||||
mcp_tools, mcp_executor = _merge_mcp_tools(active)
|
||||
|
||||
# ``_ext_connections`` isn't covered by McpToolSourceManager (T05
|
||||
# scoped to MCP servers) — still serialized under ``_conn_lock``.
|
||||
with self._conn_lock:
|
||||
ext = self.config.ext_connectors
|
||||
all_connectors = [*ext.get("cad", []), *ext.get("cae", []),
|
||||
*ext.get("ms365", []), *ext.get("other", [])]
|
||||
@@ -308,36 +302,20 @@ class AppContext:
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
|
||||
from .core.mcp_client import McpServerConnection
|
||||
|
||||
name = self._MS365_BUILTIN
|
||||
if name in skip:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not self._ms365_available():
|
||||
stale = self._mcp_connections.pop(name, None)
|
||||
if stale is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
stale.stop()
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
pass
|
||||
self._mcp_manager.stop(name)
|
||||
return None
|
||||
conn = self._mcp_connections.get(name)
|
||||
if conn is None:
|
||||
# The subprocess must import cowork_local even in a from-source run
|
||||
# (PYTHONPATH=src) — prepend this package's parent dir explicitly.
|
||||
env = dict(os.environ)
|
||||
src_root = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
|
||||
env["PYTHONPATH"] = (src_root + os.pathsep + env["PYTHONPATH"]
|
||||
if env.get("PYTHONPATH") else src_root)
|
||||
conn = McpServerConnection(
|
||||
name, sys.executable,
|
||||
["-m", "cowork_local.mcp_servers.ms365_server"], env)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn.start()
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - MS365 down must not block the turn
|
||||
return None
|
||||
self._mcp_connections[name] = conn
|
||||
return conn
|
||||
return self._mcp_manager.ensure(
|
||||
name, sys.executable, ["-m", "cowork_local.mcp_servers.ms365_server"], env)
|
||||
|
||||
def stop_mcp_connections(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Terminate every connected MCP server's subprocess (incl. External
|
||||
@@ -345,11 +323,6 @@ class AppContext:
|
||||
them linger as orphan processes."""
|
||||
from .core.ext_connectors import stop_ext_connections
|
||||
|
||||
self._mcp_manager.stop_all()
|
||||
with self._conn_lock:
|
||||
for conn in self._mcp_connections.values():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn.stop()
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
pass
|
||||
self._mcp_connections.clear()
|
||||
stop_ext_connections(self._ext_connections)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
||||
"""EPIC R05-T03/T04: ``core/code_agent.py::run_code`` used to gate tool calls
|
||||
with ``if name in (WRITE_TOOLS | MS365_WRITE_TOOLS): gate.request(...)``. This
|
||||
pins that the switch to ``ToolPolicyGateway`` still gates exactly the same
|
||||
calls: ``write_file`` (a WRITE tool) consults the gate; ``list_dir``
|
||||
(read-only) never does.
|
||||
|
||||
Runs the REAL engine (``run_code``) via :class:`FakeProvider`, same approach
|
||||
``tests/characterization/test_run_cowork.py`` uses for the Cowork engine.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict, List
|
||||
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.code_agent import run_code
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.tools import ToolContext
|
||||
from tests.fakes import FakeProvider, ScriptedTurn
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _RecordingGate:
|
||||
def __init__(self, approve: bool):
|
||||
self.approve = approve
|
||||
self.calls: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
def request(self, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
|
||||
self.calls.append(payload)
|
||||
return self.approve
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _run(tmp_path, provider, gate):
|
||||
ctx = ToolContext(tmp_path)
|
||||
events: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
messages: List[Dict[str, Any]] = [{"role": "user", "content": "do it"}]
|
||||
run_code(provider, messages, ctx, gate, events.append)
|
||||
return events
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_write_file_consults_the_gate_and_honors_rejection(tmp_path):
|
||||
provider = FakeProvider([
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(tool_calls=[("write_file", {"path": "a.txt", "content": "hi"})]),
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(text="done"),
|
||||
])
|
||||
gate = _RecordingGate(approve=False)
|
||||
events = _run(tmp_path, provider, gate)
|
||||
|
||||
assert len(gate.calls) == 1 and gate.calls[0]["name"] == "write_file"
|
||||
results = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_result"]
|
||||
assert results[0]["ok"] is False
|
||||
assert not (tmp_path / "a.txt").exists() # rejected, never actually written
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_read_only_tool_never_consults_the_gate(tmp_path):
|
||||
(tmp_path / "existing.txt").write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
provider = FakeProvider([
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(tool_calls=[("list_dir", {})]),
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(text="done"),
|
||||
])
|
||||
gate = _RecordingGate(approve=False) # would reject if ever asked
|
||||
events = _run(tmp_path, provider, gate)
|
||||
|
||||
assert gate.calls == []
|
||||
results = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_result"]
|
||||
assert results[0]["ok"] is True
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
|
||||
"""EPIC R05-T04: before this change, ``core/chat_agent.py::run_cowork`` called
|
||||
``extra_executor(name, args)`` directly for any MCP/connector tool — no
|
||||
permission check at all, regardless of the "confirm before running commands"
|
||||
setting. This pins the fix: an extra tool now goes through the same
|
||||
``ToolPolicyGateway`` as ``run_command``, using the conservative default
|
||||
capability (``UNKNOWN_SOURCE_CAPABILITIES``) since MCP tools carry no
|
||||
standard risk metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
Runs the real engine via :class:`FakeProvider`, matching
|
||||
``tests/characterization/test_run_cowork.py``'s approach.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict, List
|
||||
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.chat_agent import run_cowork
|
||||
from cowork_local.providers.base import ToolSpec
|
||||
from tests.fakes import FakeProvider, ScriptedTurn
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _RecordingGate:
|
||||
def __init__(self, approve: bool):
|
||||
self.approve = approve
|
||||
self.calls: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
def request(self, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
|
||||
self.calls.append(payload)
|
||||
return self.approve
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_EXTRA_SPEC = ToolSpec(name="github__delete_repo", description="", parameters={"type": "object"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _run(tmp_path, provider, gate, executed: List[str]):
|
||||
events: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
messages: List[Dict[str, Any]] = [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]
|
||||
|
||||
def extra_executor(name: str, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
executed.append(name)
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "output": "done"}
|
||||
|
||||
run_cowork(provider, messages, tmp_path, events.append, gate=gate,
|
||||
extra_tools=[_EXTRA_SPEC], extra_executor=extra_executor)
|
||||
return events
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mcp_style_tool_is_rejected_without_ever_calling_the_executor(tmp_path):
|
||||
provider = FakeProvider([
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(tool_calls=[("github__delete_repo", {})]),
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(text="done"),
|
||||
])
|
||||
gate = _RecordingGate(approve=False)
|
||||
executed: List[str] = []
|
||||
events = _run(tmp_path, provider, gate, executed)
|
||||
|
||||
assert len(gate.calls) == 1 and gate.calls[0]["name"] == "github__delete_repo"
|
||||
assert executed == [] # rejected BEFORE the extra_executor ever ran
|
||||
results = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_result"]
|
||||
assert results[0]["ok"] is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mcp_style_tool_runs_once_approved(tmp_path):
|
||||
provider = FakeProvider([
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(tool_calls=[("github__delete_repo", {})]),
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(text="done"),
|
||||
])
|
||||
gate = _RecordingGate(approve=True)
|
||||
executed: List[str] = []
|
||||
events = _run(tmp_path, provider, gate, executed)
|
||||
|
||||
assert executed == ["github__delete_repo"]
|
||||
results = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_result"]
|
||||
assert results[0]["ok"] is True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_gate_preserves_auto_run_for_extra_tools(tmp_path):
|
||||
"""``gate=None`` is Cowork's existing "no confirmation configured" state —
|
||||
must still auto-run, exactly like before this EPIC."""
|
||||
provider = FakeProvider([
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(tool_calls=[("github__delete_repo", {})]),
|
||||
ScriptedTurn(text="done"),
|
||||
])
|
||||
executed: List[str] = []
|
||||
events = _run(tmp_path, provider, None, executed)
|
||||
|
||||
assert executed == ["github__delete_repo"]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
|
||||
"""EPIC R05-T05: the MCP connection lifecycle extracted out of
|
||||
``state.py::AppContext`` into :class:`McpToolSourceManager`.
|
||||
|
||||
Uses a fake connection (no real subprocess/asyncio loop) so these tests run in
|
||||
milliseconds and don't depend on any actual MCP server being installed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Dict, List, Optional
|
||||
|
||||
from cowork_local.infrastructure.mcp import McpToolSourceManager
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _FakeConnection:
|
||||
"""Stands in for ``core.mcp_client.McpServerConnection`` — tracks
|
||||
start/stop calls instead of spawning anything."""
|
||||
|
||||
instances: List["_FakeConnection"] = []
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, name: str, command: str, args: Optional[List[str]] = None,
|
||||
env: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None):
|
||||
self.name = name
|
||||
self.command = command
|
||||
self.args = args
|
||||
self.env = env
|
||||
self.started = False
|
||||
self.stopped = False
|
||||
self._alive = True
|
||||
_FakeConnection.instances.append(self)
|
||||
|
||||
def start(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.started = True
|
||||
|
||||
def stop(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.stopped = True
|
||||
self._alive = False
|
||||
|
||||
def is_alive(self) -> bool:
|
||||
return self._alive
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _manager() -> McpToolSourceManager:
|
||||
_FakeConnection.instances.clear()
|
||||
return McpToolSourceManager(connection_factory=_FakeConnection)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ensure_starts_once_and_caches_the_live_connection():
|
||||
mgr = _manager()
|
||||
first = mgr.ensure("github", "npx", ["-y", "github-mcp"])
|
||||
second = mgr.ensure("github", "npx", ["-y", "github-mcp"])
|
||||
|
||||
assert first is second # same connection reused, not a second subprocess
|
||||
assert len(_FakeConnection.instances) == 1
|
||||
assert first.started is True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_two_concurrent_ensures_for_different_servers_dont_collide():
|
||||
mgr = _manager()
|
||||
a = mgr.ensure("server-a", "cmd-a")
|
||||
b = mgr.ensure("server-b", "cmd-b")
|
||||
assert a is not b
|
||||
assert {c.name for c in mgr.active()} == {"server-a", "server-b"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ensure_restarts_when_the_cached_connection_died():
|
||||
mgr = _manager()
|
||||
first = mgr.ensure("flaky", "cmd")
|
||||
first.stop() # simulate the subprocess crashing
|
||||
assert mgr.is_alive("flaky") is False
|
||||
|
||||
second = mgr.ensure("flaky", "cmd")
|
||||
assert second is not first
|
||||
assert len(_FakeConnection.instances) == 2
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_a_server_that_fails_to_start_returns_none_and_isnt_cached():
|
||||
class _DyingConnection(_FakeConnection):
|
||||
def start(self) -> None:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("boom")
|
||||
|
||||
mgr = McpToolSourceManager(connection_factory=_DyingConnection)
|
||||
assert mgr.ensure("broken", "cmd") is None
|
||||
assert mgr.get("broken") is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_stop_removes_one_connection_without_touching_others():
|
||||
mgr = _manager()
|
||||
mgr.ensure("keep", "cmd")
|
||||
doomed = mgr.ensure("drop", "cmd")
|
||||
|
||||
mgr.stop("drop")
|
||||
|
||||
assert doomed.stopped is True
|
||||
assert mgr.get("drop") is None
|
||||
assert mgr.get("keep") is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_stop_all_stops_every_connection_and_clears_the_cache():
|
||||
mgr = _manager()
|
||||
mgr.ensure("a", "cmd")
|
||||
mgr.ensure("b", "cmd")
|
||||
|
||||
mgr.stop_all()
|
||||
|
||||
assert all(c.stopped for c in _FakeConnection.instances)
|
||||
assert mgr.active() == []
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
|
||||
"""Unit tests for EPIC R05: the tool descriptor/registry (R05-T01), the split
|
||||
built-in handlers (R05-T02), and the policy gateway (R05-T03).
|
||||
|
||||
The gateway tests assert the SAME capability set each engine used to hard-code
|
||||
as a name tuple still gets gated after the switch to capability lookup — that
|
||||
equivalence is the whole point of R05-T03, not an incidental detail.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict
|
||||
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
|
||||
from cowork_local.application.conversations import ToolPolicyGateway
|
||||
from cowork_local.core.tools import TOOL_SPECS, ToolContext, execute_tool
|
||||
from cowork_local.domain.tools import ToolCapability, ToolDescriptor, default_registry
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
||||
# R05-T01 - ToolDescriptor / ToolRegistry
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
||||
def test_capability_flags_compose():
|
||||
install = ToolDescriptor("install_package", "", {}, ToolCapability.WRITE | ToolCapability.EXECUTE)
|
||||
assert install.has(ToolCapability.WRITE)
|
||||
assert install.has(ToolCapability.EXECUTE)
|
||||
assert not install.has(ToolCapability.NETWORK)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_default_registry_matches_todays_hardcoded_gating_sets():
|
||||
"""The two literal sets this EPIC replaces:
|
||||
``core/tools.py::WRITE_TOOLS`` and ``core/chat_agent.py``'s
|
||||
``("run_command", "install_package")`` tuple. The registry must agree
|
||||
with both, or the capability switch silently changes who gets gated."""
|
||||
registry = default_registry(TOOL_SPECS)
|
||||
|
||||
execute_gated = {d.name for d in registry.all() if d.has(ToolCapability.EXECUTE)}
|
||||
assert execute_gated == {"run_command", "install_package"}
|
||||
|
||||
write_gated = {d.name for d in registry.all() if d.has(ToolCapability.WRITE)}
|
||||
assert write_gated == {"write_file", "edit_file", "install_package"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unregistered_tool_has_no_capabilities():
|
||||
registry = default_registry(TOOL_SPECS)
|
||||
assert registry.capabilities_for("no_such_tool") is ToolCapability.NONE
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
||||
# R05-T02 - core/tools.py dispatch, now built from the split infra modules
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
||||
def test_execute_tool_still_dispatches_every_built_in(tmp_path):
|
||||
ctx = ToolContext(tmp_path)
|
||||
written = execute_tool(ctx, "write_file", {"path": "a.txt", "content": "hi"})
|
||||
assert written["ok"] is True
|
||||
read = execute_tool(ctx, "read_file", {"path": "a.txt"})
|
||||
assert read == {"ok": True, "output": "hi"}
|
||||
edited = execute_tool(ctx, "edit_file", {"path": "a.txt", "old_string": "hi", "new_string": "bye"})
|
||||
assert edited["ok"] is True
|
||||
assert execute_tool(ctx, "read_file", {"path": "a.txt"})["output"] == "bye"
|
||||
listing = execute_tool(ctx, "list_dir", {})
|
||||
assert listing["ok"] is True and "a.txt" in listing["output"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_execute_tool_reports_unknown_name(tmp_path):
|
||||
ctx = ToolContext(tmp_path)
|
||||
result = execute_tool(ctx, "not_a_real_tool", {})
|
||||
assert result == {"ok": False, "output": "Tool not found: not_a_real_tool"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
||||
# R05-T03 - ToolPolicyGateway
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
||||
class _RecordingGate:
|
||||
def __init__(self, approve: bool):
|
||||
self.approve = approve
|
||||
self.calls: list = []
|
||||
|
||||
def request(self, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
|
||||
self.calls.append(payload)
|
||||
return self.approve
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.fixture
|
||||
def cowork_policy() -> ToolPolicyGateway:
|
||||
"""Same construction as ``core/chat_agent.py``'s module-level
|
||||
``_COWORK_TOOL_POLICY`` - EXECUTE is exactly what Cowork used to gate via
|
||||
the literal ``("run_command", "install_package")`` tuple."""
|
||||
return ToolPolicyGateway(default_registry(TOOL_SPECS), ToolCapability.EXECUTE)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_gate_means_auto_run(cowork_policy):
|
||||
assert cowork_policy.allow("run_command", None, {}) is True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_read_only_tool_never_asks_the_gate(cowork_policy):
|
||||
gate = _RecordingGate(approve=False) # would reject if asked
|
||||
assert cowork_policy.allow("write_file", gate, {}) is True
|
||||
assert gate.calls == [] # never consulted - write_file isn't EXECUTE
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_gated_capability_consults_the_gate_and_honors_its_answer(cowork_policy):
|
||||
approving = _RecordingGate(approve=True)
|
||||
assert cowork_policy.allow("run_command", approving, {"name": "run_command"}) is True
|
||||
assert approving.calls == [{"name": "run_command"}]
|
||||
|
||||
rejecting = _RecordingGate(approve=False)
|
||||
assert cowork_policy.allow("install_package", rejecting, {}) is False
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user