thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
664bd1f00c
Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put. Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/ .specify/<dir> -> packages/casan-harness/<dir> (+ .specify/<dir> symlink) Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/ init-options.json traceability-map.json Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4). Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
49 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
49 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-28 (X-04) — path-traversal / symlink guard.
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#
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# path-guard.sh resolves the REAL path (following symlinks, normalizing "..") and
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# refuses anything that escapes the allowed root — so a tool file argument cannot be
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# a symlink to /etc/passwd or a ../.. escape. Proves in-root paths pass and escapes
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# (via .. and via symlink) are rejected.
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#
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# Deterministic; hermetic.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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PG="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash/path-guard.sh"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-28: path-traversal / symlink guard ====="
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mkdir -p "$WORK/root/sub"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/sub/out.txt" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "in-root path accepted" || fail "in-root path rejected"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/../../etc/passwd" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "'..' escape rejected" || fail "'..' escape accepted"
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# A symlink inside the root that points OUTSIDE it must be rejected.
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ln -s /etc/passwd "$WORK/root/evil-link"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/evil-link" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "symlink escaping root rejected (realpath resolves the target)" \
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|| fail "symlink escape accepted"
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# A symlink that stays inside the root is fine.
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echo hi > "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt"
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ln -s "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt" "$WORK/root/ok-link"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/ok-link" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "in-root symlink accepted" || fail "in-root symlink rejected"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-28 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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