209 lines
7.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
209 lines
7.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -euo pipefail
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# CASAN H5 Governance Harness
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# Usage:
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# governance-check.sh <input-file> <output-file> [action-name]
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#
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# Non-interactive by default. High-risk actions are denied unless:
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# CASAN_APPROVAL_DECISION=approve CASAN_APPROVER=<name>
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INPUT_FILE="${1:-}"
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OUTPUT_FILE="${2:-}"
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ACTION_NAME="${3:-agent_step}"
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if [[ -z "$INPUT_FILE" || -z "$OUTPUT_FILE" ]]; then
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echo "Usage: governance-check.sh <input-file> <output-file> [action-name]" >&2
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exit 64
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fi
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd)"
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LOG_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs"
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TRACE_DIR="$LOG_DIR/trace"
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AUDIT_DIR="$LOG_DIR/audit"
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mkdir -p "$TRACE_DIR" "$AUDIT_DIR" "$(dirname "$OUTPUT_FILE")"
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if [[ ! -f "$INPUT_FILE" ]]; then
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echo "GOVERNANCE_DENIED: input file not found: $INPUT_FILE" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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timestamp() {
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date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"
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}
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new_trace_id() {
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if command -v uuidgen >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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uuidgen | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]'
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else
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printf 'trace-%s-%s\n' "$(date +%s)" "$$"
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fi
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}
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hash_text() {
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if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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sha256sum | awk '{print $1}'
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else
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shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}'
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fi
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}
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json_escape() {
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python -c 'import json,sys; print(json.dumps(sys.stdin.read()))' 2>/dev/null || sed 's/\\/\\\\/g; s/"/\\"/g'
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}
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TRACE_ID="$(new_trace_id)"
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TIMESTAMP="$(timestamp)"
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INPUT="$(cat "$INPUT_FILE")"
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LOWER_INPUT="$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"
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ACTOR="${CASAN_ACTOR:-developer}"
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APPROVER="${CASAN_APPROVER:-}"
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APPROVAL_DECISION="${CASAN_APPROVAL_DECISION:-auto}"
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AUDIT_LOG="$AUDIT_DIR/audit.jsonl"
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RISK_LEVEL="low"
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REASONS=()
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case "$ACTION_NAME" in
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deploy|launch|write_code|write_file|migration|db_write|external_api|tool_call)
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RISK_LEVEL="medium"
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REASONS+=("sensitive-action:$ACTION_NAME")
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;;
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esac
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if printf '%s' "$LOWER_INPUT" | grep -Eq "(delete|drop table|password|api[_-]?key|secret|token|credential|migration|deploy|external api|shutdown|dump database)"; then
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RISK_LEVEL="high"
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REASONS+=("high-risk-content")
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elif printf '%s' "$LOWER_INPUT" | grep -Eq "(internal|config|system|policy|permission)"; then
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[[ "$RISK_LEVEL" == "low" ]] && RISK_LEVEL="medium"
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REASONS+=("medium-risk-content")
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fi
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APPROVAL_STATUS="auto_approved"
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DECISION="approved"
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if [[ "$RISK_LEVEL" == "medium" ]]; then
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APPROVAL_STATUS="policy_auto_approved_with_audit"
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fi
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if [[ "$RISK_LEVEL" == "high" ]]; then
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if [[ "${CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
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# Approval-identity mode (V20): an env-var approver is NOT enough — the
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# reviewer must cryptographically SIGN this exact request and their role must
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# be authorized for the action. SoD (actor != approver) still enforced.
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if [[ "$APPROVAL_DECISION" == "approve" && -n "$APPROVER" && ( -n "${CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG:-}" || -n "${CASAN_APPROVAL_JWT:-}" ) ]]; then
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if [[ "$APPROVER" == "$ACTOR" ]]; then
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APPROVAL_STATUS="separation_of_duties_violation"
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DECISION="denied"
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REASONS+=("separation-of-duties:actor-equals-approver")
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else
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AV_RC=0
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AV_OUT="$(bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/approval-verify.sh" "$ACTION_NAME" "$ACTOR" "$INPUT_FILE" "$APPROVER" "${CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG:-"-"}" 2>/dev/null)" || AV_RC=$?
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if [[ "$AV_RC" -eq 0 ]]; then
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if printf '%s' "$AV_OUT" | grep -q "mechanism=oidc"; then
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APPROVAL_STATUS="human_approved_oidc"
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else
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APPROVAL_STATUS="human_approved_signed"
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fi
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DECISION="approved"
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REASONS+=("signed-approval:${AV_OUT#APPROVAL_OK }")
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else
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APPROVAL_STATUS="approval_signature_invalid"
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DECISION="denied"
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REASONS+=("signed-approval-failed")
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fi
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fi
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else
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APPROVAL_STATUS="approval_required_signed"
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DECISION="denied"
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REASONS+=("strict-requires-signed-approval")
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fi
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elif [[ "$APPROVAL_DECISION" == "approve" && -n "$APPROVER" ]]; then
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if [[ "$APPROVER" == "$ACTOR" ]]; then
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# Separation of duties: the submitter may not approve their own action.
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APPROVAL_STATUS="separation_of_duties_violation"
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DECISION="denied"
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REASONS+=("separation-of-duties:actor-equals-approver")
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else
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APPROVAL_STATUS="human_approved"
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DECISION="approved"
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fi
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else
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APPROVAL_STATUS="approval_required"
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DECISION="denied"
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fi
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fi
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INPUT_HASH="$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | hash_text)"
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OUTPUT_CONTENT="$INPUT"
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OUTPUT_HASH="$(printf '%s' "$OUTPUT_CONTENT" | hash_text)"
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PREV_HASH=""
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if [[ -s "$AUDIT_LOG" ]]; then
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PREV_HASH="$(tail -n 1 "$AUDIT_LOG" | sed -n 's/.*"record_hash":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')"
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fi
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REASONS_JSON="$(printf '%s\n' "${REASONS[@]:-}" | python -c 'import json,sys; print(json.dumps([x for x in sys.stdin.read().splitlines() if x]))')"
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# approver and output_hash are part of the hashed core so they cannot be
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# silently mutated after the fact.
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RECORD_CORE="$(printf '%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s' "$TIMESTAMP" "$TRACE_ID" "$ACTION_NAME" "$ACTOR" "$RISK_LEVEL" "$DECISION" "$APPROVAL_STATUS" "$APPROVER" "$INPUT_HASH" "$OUTPUT_HASH" "$PREV_HASH")"
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RECORD_HASH="$(printf '%s' "$RECORD_CORE" | hash_text)"
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TRACE_FILE="$TRACE_DIR/governance-$TRACE_ID.json"
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cat > "$TRACE_FILE" <<EOF
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{
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"trace_id": "$TRACE_ID",
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"timestamp": "$TIMESTAMP",
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"harness": "H5-governance",
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"action": "$ACTION_NAME",
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"actor": "$ACTOR",
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"risk_level": "$RISK_LEVEL",
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"decision": "$DECISION",
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"approval_status": "$APPROVAL_STATUS",
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"approver": "$APPROVER",
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"reasons": $REASONS_JSON,
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"input_hash": "$INPUT_HASH",
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"output_hash": "$OUTPUT_HASH",
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"previous_record_hash": "$PREV_HASH",
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"record_hash": "$RECORD_HASH"
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}
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EOF
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printf '{"timestamp":"%s","trace_id":"%s","harness":"H5-governance","action":"%s","actor":"%s","risk_level":"%s","decision":"%s","approval_status":"%s","approver":"%s","input_hash":"%s","output_hash":"%s","previous_record_hash":"%s","record_hash":"%s"}\n' \
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"$TIMESTAMP" "$TRACE_ID" "$ACTION_NAME" "$ACTOR" "$RISK_LEVEL" "$DECISION" "$APPROVAL_STATUS" "$APPROVER" "$INPUT_HASH" "$OUTPUT_HASH" "$PREV_HASH" "$RECORD_HASH" >> "$AUDIT_LOG"
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# --- External anchor: cryptographically sign the new chain head ---
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# A re-forged chain (recomputed hashes) changes the head; without the private
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# key the attacker cannot produce a matching signature, so verification fails.
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# Production note: the private key must live off-repo (KMS/HSM). It is local
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# here only for self-contained demonstration.
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if command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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# Private signing key lives OFF-REPO (default ~/.casan/audit-keys); only the
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# public key is committed. Production: replace with KMS/HSM.
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PUB_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance"
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PRIV_DIR="${CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR:-$HOME/.casan/audit-keys}"
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AUDIT_PRIV="$PRIV_DIR/audit-private.pem"
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AUDIT_PUB="$PUB_DIR/audit-public.pem"
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mkdir -p "$PUB_DIR" "$PRIV_DIR"
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if [[ ! -f "$AUDIT_PRIV" ]]; then
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openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 -out "$AUDIT_PRIV" 2>/dev/null
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chmod 600 "$AUDIT_PRIV"
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fi
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# Always re-export the public key so it matches the private key we sign with.
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# Without this, a private key that PERSISTS on a CI runner drifts out of sync
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# with a freshly checked-out audit-public.pem (e.g. one committed after a
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# Vault-KMS signing), and verify-audit-chain.sh would reject a genuine head.
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openssl rsa -in "$AUDIT_PRIV" -pubout -out "$AUDIT_PUB" 2>/dev/null || true
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printf '%s' "$RECORD_HASH" > "$AUDIT_DIR/audit-head.txt"
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openssl dgst -sha256 -sign "$AUDIT_PRIV" -out "$AUDIT_DIR/audit-head.sig" "$AUDIT_DIR/audit-head.txt" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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if [[ "$DECISION" != "approved" ]]; then
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: > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
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echo "GOVERNANCE_DENIED trace_id=$TRACE_ID risk=$RISK_LEVEL approval_status=$APPROVAL_STATUS" >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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printf '%s\n' "$OUTPUT_CONTENT" > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
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echo "GOVERNANCE_APPROVED trace_id=$TRACE_ID risk=$RISK_LEVEL approval_status=$APPROVAL_STATUS output=$OUTPUT_FILE"
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