thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
e21a1472b1
Under CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1, a high-risk approval is trusted ONLY when a REGISTERED reviewer cryptographically signs THIS exact request and their role is authorized for the action — a plain env-var CASAN_APPROVER is no longer enough. - approval-sign.sh: reviewer signs assertion "casan-approval|v1|<action>|<actor>|<input_sha256>|<approver_id>" with their key. - approval-verify.sh: gate looks up reviewer role+pubkey in reviewers.registry, enforces role→action authorization, verifies the RSA signature (fail-closed). - governance-check.sh: strict branch requires a valid signed approval; SoD still enforced; default (non-strict) env-var path UNCHANGED (baseline preserved). - reviewers.registry: role-scoped reviewer identity registry (pubkeys off-repo; production replaces with OIDC/JWT from a real IdP). - phase-h5-approval-tests.sh: 8 checks — valid/authorized approve; unsigned, wrong-role, forged-key, unregistered, replay-to-other-request, self-approval all denied; non-strict backward-compat. Baselines: run-casan4 35/35, adversarial 44/44. Lifts H5 policy-approval (C4) 2.5 -> ~3.5-4 / 5. Total suites now 6 (+8 checks = 148). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
40 lines
1.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
40 lines
1.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN H5 — Reviewer-side approval signer (Approval-identity MVP · C4 / V20).
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#
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# A reviewer runs this to APPROVE a specific high-risk request by signing the
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# canonical assertion with THEIR OWN private key. The resulting signature is
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# handed to governance-check.sh via CASAN_APPROVAL_SIG (with CASAN_APPROVER=<id>
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# and CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1). The private key stays with the reviewer / in an
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# IdP-issued credential — never in the pipeline env.
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#
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# Assertion (must match approval-verify.sh):
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# casan-approval|v1|<action>|<actor>|<input_sha256>|<approver_id>
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#
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# Usage:
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# approval-sign.sh <action> <actor> <input-file> <approver-id> <privkey> <out-sig>
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# Exit: 0 signed, 64 usage, 1 sign error.
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ACTION="${1:-}"; ACTOR="${2:-}"; INPUT_FILE="${3:-}"; APPROVER="${4:-}"; PRIV="${5:-}"; OUT="${6:-}"
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if [[ -z "$ACTION" || -z "$ACTOR" || -z "$INPUT_FILE" || -z "$APPROVER" || -z "$PRIV" || -z "$OUT" ]]; then
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echo "Usage: approval-sign.sh <action> <actor> <input-file> <approver-id> <privkey> <out-sig>" >&2
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exit 64
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fi
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[[ -f "$INPUT_FILE" ]] || { echo "approval-sign: input file not found: $INPUT_FILE" >&2; exit 1; }
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[[ -f "$PRIV" ]] || { echo "approval-sign: private key not found: $PRIV" >&2; exit 1; }
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command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "approval-sign: openssl required" >&2; exit 1; }
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hash_file() {
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if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then sha256sum "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
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else shasum -a 256 "$1" | awk '{print $1}'; fi
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}
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INPUT_SHA="$(hash_file "$INPUT_FILE")"
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MSG="casan-approval|v1|$ACTION|$ACTOR|$INPUT_SHA|$APPROVER"
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TMP="$(mktemp)"; trap 'rm -f "$TMP"' EXIT
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printf '%s' "$MSG" > "$TMP"
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openssl dgst -sha256 -sign "$PRIV" -out "$OUT" "$TMP" \
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|| { echo "approval-sign: signing failed" >&2; exit 1; }
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echo "APPROVAL_SIGNED approver=$APPROVER action=$ACTION sig=$OUT"
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