thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
d695a598ee
- SEC-12: drift-detect adds semantic invariants — negation-flip detection (a dropped "not" now FAILS despite high char-similarity) + env must-keep patterns. - SEC-29 (X-05): governance-check audit write fails CLOSED — an unwritable audit log denies the action and empties the output (no unaudited output). - SEC-30 (X-06): approval-verify records a one-time-use nonce (sha of token/sig) and rejects replays (enforced mode / when a nonce ledger is set); dev unchanged. - SEC-15 (low): typosquat distance<=2 with the levenshtein length-sentinel bug fixed (no false positives); tool-exec fails closed with no timeout backend in enforced mode; validate-tool-input now validates nested objects/arrays recursively. Verify: new SEC suites all green via gate, run-casan4 0-FAIL, adversarial 44/44, track-c 29/0, h5-approval 12/0, no regressions. Plan-16 P2 remaining: infra-gated only (SEC-14/22/23/24/25/26). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
52 lines
2.5 KiB
Bash
52 lines
2.5 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-30 (X-06) — approval replay prevention (one-time-use nonce).
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#
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# A verified approval (offline signature or IdP JWT) is valid for its whole exp
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# window, so it could be replayed to approve repeatedly. approval-verify now records
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# a per-token nonce and rejects any repeat (in enforced mode / when a nonce ledger
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# is configured). Proves first use is accepted, replay is denied, and dev mode
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# (no ledger) is unchanged.
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#
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# Self-contained: ephemeral reviewer key + committed registry.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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S="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash"
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REG="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance/reviewers.registry"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; RV="$WORK/reviewers"; mkdir -p "$RV"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/sl.priv" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl rsa -in "$WORK/sl.priv" -pubout -out "$RV/security-lead.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
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printf 'security.strict' > "$WORK/inp"
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bash "$S/approval-sign.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/sl.priv" "$WORK/a.sig" >/dev/null 2>&1
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export CASAN_REVIEWERS_FILE="$REG" CASAN_REVIEWERS_DIR="$RV"
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-30: approval replay prevention ====="
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# With a nonce ledger configured, the first use is accepted, a replay is denied.
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_NONCE_FILE="$WORK/nonces.txt" bash "$S/approval-verify.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/a.sig")" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "first use of a valid approval accepted" || fail "first use rejected"
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_APPROVAL_NONCE_FILE="$WORK/nonces.txt" bash "$S/approval-verify.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/a.sig")" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "replay of the same approval DENIED (one-time-use)" || fail "replay accepted"
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# Dev default (no ledger, no prod profile): no replay tracking (backward compatible).
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R1="$(rc_of bash "$S/approval-verify.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/a.sig")"
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R2="$(rc_of bash "$S/approval-verify.sh" policy_change alice "$WORK/inp" security-lead "$WORK/a.sig")"
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[[ "$R1" -eq 0 && "$R2" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "dev mode: no nonce ledger → replay allowed (backward compatible)" \
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|| fail "dev mode changed (r1=$R1 r2=$R2)"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-30 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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