thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
36a4812ef3
Standard production layout: the OKR app (was nested under AINative_OKR_CASAN5/) is now
the repository root. No more wrapper directory.
- Promote AINative_OKR_CASAN5/* -> repo root (backend/ frontend/ packages/ apps/
.specify/ docs/ infra/ nginx/ scripts/ + configs). Merge tool dirs: .gitea (kept the
active deploy ci.yml, added harness-ci.yml + runbooks), .claude (agents/commands +
launch.json), .github moved up.
- Remove redundant: 00_SUBMISSION_PACKAGE, scattered root notes (FPT_CASAN_Full.md,
tu-tuong-casan.md, casan-tu-sinh..., casan_harness_assessment.md, source-review...,
README_CASAN5_REFINED.md), casan-next-plans/ and optimize-docs/ (competition/planning
artifacts — roadmap + design history preserved in git log / commit messages).
- Update all references to the old layout:
- .gitea/workflows/{ci,harness-ci}.yml, .github/workflows/{ci,deploy}.yml:
working-directory .; drop AINative_OKR_CASAN5/ prefix; .specify/{tests,scripts}
-> packages/casan-harness/... (.specify/logs state kept)
- .claude/launch.json, .gitea/*-runbook.md: path prefixes
- CLAUDE.md, README.md: docs/input -> apps/okr/domain/input
- policy-bundle.yaml: 8 policy paths -> packages/casan-harness/...; manifest re-signed
- secrets-scan.sh: fixture excludes -> new package/domain paths.
Full gate from the new root: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
78 lines
3.3 KiB
Bash
78 lines
3.3 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-24 (SC-05/06, offline) — supply-chain integrity for build files.
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#
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# Two harness-side controls that need no network:
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# * image-pin: Dockerfiles / CI workflow files must pin container images by DIGEST
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# (`@sha256:...`), never a floating tag (`:latest`, `:20`, or no tag) — a floating
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# tag lets a malicious image be swapped in under the same name.
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# * sign / verify: a CI workflow (or any build file) is signed and verified on load;
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# a tampered, forged, or UNSIGNED file is REFUSED (fail-closed).
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#
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# (Live CVE/OSV scanning and real image scanning need infra and remain planned.)
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#
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# Usage:
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# supply-chain-integrity.sh image-pin <file> [<file> ...]
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# supply-chain-integrity.sh sign <file> <priv-key>
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# supply-chain-integrity.sh verify <file> <pub-key>
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# Exit: 0 ok · 2 violation (unpinned image / tampered-forged sig) · 3 missing/unsigned/openssl · 64 usage.
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CMD="${1:-}"; shift || true
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case "$CMD" in
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image-pin)
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[[ "$#" -ge 1 ]] || { echo "usage: supply-chain-integrity.sh image-pin <file>..." >&2; exit 64; }
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for f in "$@"; do [[ -f "$f" ]] || { echo "IMAGE_PIN_MISSING file=$f" >&2; exit 3; }; done
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python3 - "$@" <<'PY'
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import re, sys
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bad = []
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# image refs from Dockerfile `FROM x` and workflow/compose `image: x`
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pat = re.compile(r'^\s*(?:FROM\s+|image:\s*["\']?)([^\s"\']+)', re.IGNORECASE)
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for path in sys.argv[1:]:
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for i, line in enumerate(open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace"), 1):
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m = pat.match(line)
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if not m:
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continue
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ref = m.group(1).strip()
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low = ref.lower()
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if low in ("scratch",):
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continue
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# bare single token with no registry path and no tag = local build stage -> ok
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if "/" not in ref and ":" not in ref and "." not in ref and "@" not in ref:
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continue
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if "@sha256:" in ref:
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continue # digest-pinned -> ok
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bad.append(f"{path}:{i} unpinned image '{ref}' (use @sha256:<digest>)")
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if bad:
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for b in bad:
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sys.stderr.write("IMAGE_UNPINNED " + b + "\n")
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raise SystemExit(2)
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print("IMAGE_PIN_OK all images digest-pinned")
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PY
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;;
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sign)
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F="${1:-}"; KEY="${2:-}"
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command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "OPENSSL_UNAVAILABLE" >&2; exit 3; }
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[[ -f "$F" && -f "$KEY" ]] || { echo "usage: supply-chain-integrity.sh sign <file> <priv-key>" >&2; exit 64; }
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openssl dgst -sha256 -sign "$KEY" -out "$F.sig" "$F" 2>/dev/null \
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&& { echo "WORKFLOW_SIGNED file=$F"; exit 0; }
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echo "WORKFLOW_SIGN_FAILED file=$F" >&2; exit 2
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;;
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verify)
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F="${1:-}"; KEY="${2:-}"
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command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "OPENSSL_UNAVAILABLE" >&2; exit 3; }
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[[ -f "$F" ]] || { echo "WORKFLOW_MISSING file=$F" >&2; exit 3; }
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[[ -f "$KEY" ]] || { echo "WORKFLOW_PUBKEY_MISSING key=$KEY" >&2; exit 3; }
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[[ -f "$F.sig" ]] || { echo "WORKFLOW_UNSIGNED file=$F — refusing (fail-closed)" >&2; exit 3; }
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if openssl dgst -sha256 -verify "$KEY" -signature "$F.sig" "$F" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "WORKFLOW_VERIFIED file=$F"; exit 0
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fi
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echo "WORKFLOW_INVALID file=$F — tampered or forged" >&2; exit 2
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;;
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*)
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echo "Usage: supply-chain-integrity.sh {image-pin <file>...|sign <file> <priv>|verify <file> <pub>}" >&2
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exit 64
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;;
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esac
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