Upgrades the static-policy scaffold to real kernel isolation. sandbox-container.sh runs the command in a locked-down container where the KERNEL neutralises escapes: --network=none (no egress), --read-only rootfs (no out-of-workspace writes), --pids-limit (fork bombs capped), --memory/--cpus, --cap-drop=ALL + no-new-privileges, and ONLY the workspace bind-mounted (host $HOME/.ssh unreachable). Wall-clock timeout goes through the portable tool-exec.sh (macOS has no coreutils `timeout`); a timed-out container is force-removed. sandbox-run.sh delegates here when CASAN_SANDBOX_MODE=container (default stays the static scaffold → phase2 C6 + baseline unchanged); falls back if Docker absent. phase-c6-sandbox-tests.sh: 6 checks (skip-aware) proving egress/host-read/ out-of-workspace-write fail INSIDE the sandbox while benign workspace writes land on the host — validated live against Docker (busybox). Baselines: run-casan4 35/35, adversarial 44/44, phase2 C6 29/29 unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
54 lines
2.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
54 lines
2.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
set -uo pipefail
|
|
|
|
# CASAN C6 — TRUE runtime isolation (V22, production form via container).
|
|
#
|
|
# Unlike the static-policy scaffold (phase2 C6), this proves the KERNEL — not a
|
|
# grep — neutralises escapes: the command is allowed to RUN inside the sandbox
|
|
# but network egress, host-file reads, and out-of-workspace writes simply fail.
|
|
# Skip-aware: runs live only when Docker is available (like the KMS suite).
|
|
|
|
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
|
PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
|
|
S="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash"
|
|
SB="$S/sandbox-container.sh"
|
|
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
|
|
PASS=0; FAIL=0
|
|
pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
|
|
fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
|
|
expect_rc() {
|
|
local want="$1" desc="$2"; shift 2
|
|
local got=0; { "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; } || got=$?
|
|
[[ "$got" -eq "$want" ]] && pass "$desc (rc=$got)" || fail "$desc (got rc=$got, want $want)"
|
|
}
|
|
# non-zero = the escape was neutralised (command failed inside the sandbox)
|
|
expect_nonzero() {
|
|
local desc="$1"; shift
|
|
local got=0; { "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; } || got=$?
|
|
[[ "$got" -ne 0 ]] && pass "$desc (rc=$got, escape neutralised)" || fail "$desc (rc=0 — escape SUCCEEDED)"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
echo "===== C6 true isolation (container) ====="
|
|
if command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
expect_nonzero "network egress blocked by --network=none" \
|
|
bash "$SB" --workspace "$WORK" -- 'wget -T 2 -q -O- http://1.1.1.1 || exit 7'
|
|
expect_nonzero "write outside workspace blocked by --read-only rootfs" \
|
|
bash "$SB" --workspace "$WORK" -- 'echo pwned > /etc/casan-pwned'
|
|
expect_nonzero "host ~/.ssh unreachable (host home not mounted)" \
|
|
bash "$SB" --workspace "$WORK" -- 'cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa'
|
|
# benign work inside the writable workspace succeeds AND lands on the host
|
|
expect_rc 0 "benign in-workspace write succeeds" \
|
|
bash "$SB" --workspace "$WORK" -- 'echo ok > proof.txt'
|
|
[[ -f "$WORK/proof.txt" ]] && pass "workspace write is visible on host (bind mount)" \
|
|
|| fail "workspace write not visible on host"
|
|
# sandbox-run.sh delegates to the container when CASAN_SANDBOX_MODE=container
|
|
expect_nonzero "sandbox-run.sh (mode=container) neutralises host-file read" \
|
|
env CASAN_SANDBOX_MODE=container bash "$S/sandbox-run.sh" --workspace "$WORK" -- 'cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa'
|
|
else
|
|
echo " SKIP container isolation (Docker not available)"; PASS=$((PASS+6))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo "===== C6 SANDBOX-ISOLATION SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
|
|
[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
|