thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
8c06a55aed
- SEC-13 (M-09): SSRF allowlist on provider-usage-fetch (always block non-http(s) schemes; enforced mode blocks internal/link-local IPs + non-allowlisted hosts, dev keeps loopback mocks); dashboard refuses non-loopback bind in enforced mode. - SEC-27 (X-02): casan-log strips ESC/CSI + CR/LF (terminal-escape + fake-log-line injection) while keeping tab and visible text. - SEC-28 (X-04): new path-guard.sh — realpath resolve + reject symlink/.. escapes outside the allowed root. Verify: SEC-13 6/0, SEC-27 3/0, SEC-28 4/0, adversarial 44/44, run-casan4 0-FAIL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
48 lines
1.8 KiB
Bash
48 lines
1.8 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-28 (X-04) — path-traversal / symlink guard.
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#
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# path-guard.sh resolves the REAL path (following symlinks, normalizing "..") and
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# refuses anything that escapes the allowed root — so a tool file argument cannot be
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# a symlink to /etc/passwd or a ../.. escape. Proves in-root paths pass and escapes
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# (via .. and via symlink) are rejected.
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#
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# Deterministic; hermetic.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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PG="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash/path-guard.sh"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-28: path-traversal / symlink guard ====="
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mkdir -p "$WORK/root/sub"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/sub/out.txt" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "in-root path accepted" || fail "in-root path rejected"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/../../etc/passwd" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "'..' escape rejected" || fail "'..' escape accepted"
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# A symlink inside the root that points OUTSIDE it must be rejected.
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ln -s /etc/passwd "$WORK/root/evil-link"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/evil-link" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "symlink escaping root rejected (realpath resolves the target)" \
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|| fail "symlink escape accepted"
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# A symlink that stays inside the root is fine.
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echo hi > "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt"
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ln -s "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt" "$WORK/root/ok-link"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/ok-link" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "in-root symlink accepted" || fail "in-root symlink rejected"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-28 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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