thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
36a4812ef3
Standard production layout: the OKR app (was nested under AINative_OKR_CASAN5/) is now
the repository root. No more wrapper directory.
- Promote AINative_OKR_CASAN5/* -> repo root (backend/ frontend/ packages/ apps/
.specify/ docs/ infra/ nginx/ scripts/ + configs). Merge tool dirs: .gitea (kept the
active deploy ci.yml, added harness-ci.yml + runbooks), .claude (agents/commands +
launch.json), .github moved up.
- Remove redundant: 00_SUBMISSION_PACKAGE, scattered root notes (FPT_CASAN_Full.md,
tu-tuong-casan.md, casan-tu-sinh..., casan_harness_assessment.md, source-review...,
README_CASAN5_REFINED.md), casan-next-plans/ and optimize-docs/ (competition/planning
artifacts — roadmap + design history preserved in git log / commit messages).
- Update all references to the old layout:
- .gitea/workflows/{ci,harness-ci}.yml, .github/workflows/{ci,deploy}.yml:
working-directory .; drop AINative_OKR_CASAN5/ prefix; .specify/{tests,scripts}
-> packages/casan-harness/... (.specify/logs state kept)
- .claude/launch.json, .gitea/*-runbook.md: path prefixes
- CLAUDE.md, README.md: docs/input -> apps/okr/domain/input
- policy-bundle.yaml: 8 policy paths -> packages/casan-harness/...; manifest re-signed
- secrets-scan.sh: fixture excludes -> new package/domain paths.
Full gate from the new root: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
113 lines
5.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
113 lines
5.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Track C-MVP — Runtime sandbox scaffold (C6, V22).
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#
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# Generated code/tests must not read secrets, reach the network, fork-bomb, write
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# outside the workspace, or fill the disk. Full isolation needs a container with
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# namespaces/seccomp/network-off (documented below as the production target).
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# This scaffold provides two enforceable layers WITHOUT root/Docker:
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# 1. Static policy pre-check — refuse to launch a command that matches a known
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# dangerous operation (BLOCK before anything runs). This is the deterministic
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# gate the tests assert on.
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# 2. Runtime rlimits (ulimit) — file-size, CPU, and process caps as a backstop,
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# plus the existing wall-clock timeout (tool-exec.sh).
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#
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# HONEST SCOPE — this is NOT kernel isolation. A determined payload using a
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# syscall the static check doesn't model can still act within the rlimits. The
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# production requirement is: run inside `docker run --network=none --read-only
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# --pids-limit ... --memory ... -v <workspace>:/work:rw`. Do not present this as
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# a full sandbox. See TODO(C6-prod) below.
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#
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# Usage:
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# sandbox-run.sh --workspace <dir> [--max-file-kb N] [--cpu-seconds N]
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# [--max-procs N] [--timeout N] -- <command...>
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# Exit: 2 policy-blocked, 124 timeout, else the command's own exit code.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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# shellcheck source=casan-log.sh
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/casan-log.sh"
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WORKSPACE="$PWD"
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MAX_FILE_KB="${CASAN_SANDBOX_MAX_FILE_KB:-51200}" # 50 MB default
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CPU_SECONDS="${CASAN_SANDBOX_CPU_SECONDS:-30}"
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# Process cap is OPT-IN: `ulimit -u` is a per-USER limit, so forcing a low value
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# on a busy host makes legitimate commands fail to fork. The fork-bomb static
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# check is the real gate; a container --pids-limit is the production backstop.
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MAX_PROCS="${CASAN_SANDBOX_MAX_PROCS:-}"
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TIMEOUT="${CASAN_SANDBOX_TIMEOUT:-30}"
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while [[ "$#" -gt 0 ]]; do
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case "$1" in
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--workspace) WORKSPACE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
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--max-file-kb) MAX_FILE_KB="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
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--cpu-seconds) CPU_SECONDS="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
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--max-procs) MAX_PROCS="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
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--timeout) TIMEOUT="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
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--) shift; break ;;
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*) echo "sandbox-run.sh: unknown arg $1" >&2; exit 64 ;;
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esac
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done
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if [[ "$#" -eq 0 ]]; then
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echo "Usage: sandbox-run.sh --workspace <dir> -- <command...>" >&2
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exit 64
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fi
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# C6 production form: CASAN_SANDBOX_MODE=container runs under TRUE kernel
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# isolation (sandbox-container.sh: --network=none --read-only --pids-limit …).
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# Default stays the static-policy + ulimit scaffold so existing behaviour is
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# unchanged. Falls back to the scaffold if Docker is unavailable.
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if [[ "${CASAN_SANDBOX_MODE:-static}" == "container" ]] && command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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exec "$SCRIPT_DIR/sandbox-container.sh" --workspace "$WORKSPACE" --timeout "$TIMEOUT" -- "$@"
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fi
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CMD_STR="$*"
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low="$(printf '%s' "$CMD_STR" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"
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# ── 1. Static policy pre-check ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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block() {
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casan_log error sandbox "SANDBOX_BLOCKED reason=$1 cmd=${CMD_STR:0:120}"
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echo "SANDBOX_BLOCKED reason=$1" >&2
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exit 2
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}
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# Read of SSH / credential material.
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printf '%s' "$low" | grep -Eq '(\.ssh/|id_rsa|id_ed25519|authorized_keys|known_hosts|/etc/shadow|/etc/passwd|\.aws/credentials|\.netrc)' \
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&& block "read_sensitive_credentials"
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# Network egress of any kind (sandboxed code should be offline).
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printf '%s' "$low" | grep -Eq '(\bcurl\b|\bwget\b|\bnc\b|\bncat\b|\bscp\b|\bsftp\b|\bssh\b|\btelnet\b|\bftp\b|/dev/tcp/|\bnslookup\b|\bdig\b)' \
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&& block "network_egress"
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# Fork bomb / uncontrolled process spawning.
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printf '%s' "$CMD_STR" | grep -Eq ':\(\)\s*\{\s*:?\s*\|?\s*:?\s*&?\s*\}|\bfork\s*\(\)\s*while|while\s*\(\s*true\s*\)\s*\{\s*fork' \
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&& block "fork_bomb"
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# Huge-file / disk-fill.
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printf '%s' "$low" | grep -Eq '\bdd\b[^\n]*of=|truncate\s+-s\s*[0-9]+\s*[gt]|fallocate\s+-l\s*[0-9]+\s*[gt]|head\s+-c\s*[0-9]+\s*[gt]|\byes\b[^\n]*>' \
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&& block "huge_file_or_disk_fill"
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# Writes outside the workspace: redirection to an absolute path not under $WORKSPACE, or path traversal.
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WS_ABS="$(cd "$WORKSPACE" 2>/dev/null && pwd || echo "$WORKSPACE")"
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while read -r target; do
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[[ -z "$target" ]] && continue
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case "$target" in
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/*) [[ "$target" == "$WS_ABS"* || "$target" == /tmp/* || "$target" == /var/folders/* || "$target" == /dev/null ]] || block "write_outside_workspace:$target" ;;
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*"../"*) block "path_traversal_write:$target" ;;
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esac
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done < <(printf '%s\n' "$CMD_STR" | grep -oE '>>?[[:space:]]*[^[:space:];|&]+' | sed -E 's/^>>?[[:space:]]*//')
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# ── 2. Runtime rlimits + wall-clock timeout ─────────────────────────────────
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casan_log debug sandbox "SANDBOX_RUN workspace=$WS_ABS file_kb=$MAX_FILE_KB cpu=$CPU_SECONDS procs=$MAX_PROCS timeout=$TIMEOUT"
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(
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ulimit -f "$((MAX_FILE_KB * 2))" 2>/dev/null || true # ulimit -f is in 512-byte blocks
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ulimit -t "$CPU_SECONDS" 2>/dev/null || true
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[[ -n "$MAX_PROCS" ]] && { ulimit -u "$MAX_PROCS" 2>/dev/null || true; }
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cd "$WS_ABS" 2>/dev/null || true
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exec "$SCRIPT_DIR/tool-exec.sh" "$TIMEOUT" -- "$@"
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)
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rc=$?
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exit "$rc"
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# TODO(C6-prod): replace the rlimit backstop with true isolation:
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# docker run --rm --network=none --read-only --pids-limit=$MAX_PROCS \
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# --memory=512m --cpus=1 -v "$WORKSPACE":/work:rw -w /work <image> <cmd>
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# and/or bubblewrap/nsjail on Linux CI. Track as a Track-C production task.
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