thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
36a4812ef3
Standard production layout: the OKR app (was nested under AINative_OKR_CASAN5/) is now
the repository root. No more wrapper directory.
- Promote AINative_OKR_CASAN5/* -> repo root (backend/ frontend/ packages/ apps/
.specify/ docs/ infra/ nginx/ scripts/ + configs). Merge tool dirs: .gitea (kept the
active deploy ci.yml, added harness-ci.yml + runbooks), .claude (agents/commands +
launch.json), .github moved up.
- Remove redundant: 00_SUBMISSION_PACKAGE, scattered root notes (FPT_CASAN_Full.md,
tu-tuong-casan.md, casan-tu-sinh..., casan_harness_assessment.md, source-review...,
README_CASAN5_REFINED.md), casan-next-plans/ and optimize-docs/ (competition/planning
artifacts — roadmap + design history preserved in git log / commit messages).
- Update all references to the old layout:
- .gitea/workflows/{ci,harness-ci}.yml, .github/workflows/{ci,deploy}.yml:
working-directory .; drop AINative_OKR_CASAN5/ prefix; .specify/{tests,scripts}
-> packages/casan-harness/... (.specify/logs state kept)
- .claude/launch.json, .gitea/*-runbook.md: path prefixes
- CLAUDE.md, README.md: docs/input -> apps/okr/domain/input
- policy-bundle.yaml: 8 policy paths -> packages/casan-harness/...; manifest re-signed
- secrets-scan.sh: fixture excludes -> new package/domain paths.
Full gate from the new root: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
80 lines
3.8 KiB
Bash
80 lines
3.8 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-06 (H-06) — control-plane audit head is SIGNED.
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#
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# The control-plane audit chain is a recomputable hash chain: a file-writer who
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# edits the store could recompute every hash and the chain-only `verify-audit`
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# would still PASS, so governance-report would falsely report CERTIFIED. Signing
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# the head with an off-repo key closes this:
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# * an intact signed store verifies (permissive + strict),
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# * a recompute-tampered store FAILS (signature no longer matches the head),
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# * a fully unsigned store FAILS in enforced mode (governance-report inherits
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# CASAN_PROFILE=prod, so a certified run demands a signature).
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#
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# Deterministic; hermetic (temp store + temp keys + temp pubkey).
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$CASAN_APP_ROOT"
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CP="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash/control-plane-settings.py"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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export CASAN_CP_STORE_FILE="$WORK/store.json"
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export CASAN_CP_KEY_DIR="$WORK/keys"
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export CASAN_CP_PUB="$WORK/cp-public.pem" # provisioned out-of-band (attacker cannot rewrite in this test)
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-06: control-plane audit head signed ====="
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python3 "$CP" set compression.enabled true --actor a@x --reason r >/dev/null 2>&1
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python3 "$CP" set compression.mode structural --actor a@x --reason r >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of python3 "$CP" verify-audit)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "intact signed store verifies (permissive)" || fail "intact store rejected"
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 python3 "$CP" verify-audit)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "intact signed store verifies (strict)" || fail "intact store rejected in strict"
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# Recompute-attack: tamper a value AND recompute the entire hash chain so it is
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# internally consistent. The head signature (over the original head) must not match.
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python3 - "$CASAN_CP_STORE_FILE" <<'PY'
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import hashlib, json, sys
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p = sys.argv[1]; d = json.load(open(p))
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d["settings"]["compression.enabled"]["value"] = False
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prev = "0" * 64
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def he(e): return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(e, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False).encode()).hexdigest()
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for e in d["audit"]:
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if e.get("key") == "compression.enabled" and e.get("action") == "set":
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e["value"] = False
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rest = {k: v for k, v in e.items() if k != "hash"}; rest["prevHash"] = prev
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for k in list(e):
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if k != "hash": e[k] = rest[k]
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e["hash"] = he(rest); prev = e["hash"]
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json.dump(d, open(p, "w"), indent=2)
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PY
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[[ "$(rc_of python3 "$CP" verify-audit)" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "recompute-tampered store FAILS (head signature mismatch)" \
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|| fail "recompute attack passed verification (H-06 not closed!)"
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# Keyless attacker: delete the signature artifacts entirely. Enforced mode (what a
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# certified run / prod profile uses) must reject an unsigned store; dev stays lax.
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rm -f "$CASAN_CP_STORE_FILE.head" "$CASAN_CP_STORE_FILE.head.sig" "$CASAN_CP_PUB"
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# rebuild a clean, internally-valid but UNSIGNED store (fresh sets would re-sign, so
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# strip the signature after): easiest is to reuse the tampered chain which is
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# internally valid; with sig files gone it is "unsigned".
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[[ "$(rc_of env CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT=1 python3 "$CP" verify-audit)" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "unsigned store FAILS in enforced mode (prod / certified run)" \
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|| fail "unsigned store accepted in enforced mode"
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[[ "$(rc_of python3 "$CP" verify-audit)" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "unsigned store still OK in permissive dev mode (backward compat)" \
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|| fail "permissive mode wrongly rejected unsigned store"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-06 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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