Nam Pham Dinh ThanhandClaude Sonnet 4.6
838b2473b6
WV4-A: Added 16 Vitest/RTL tests to frontend (jsdom env, fail-before proof verified) WV4-B: Created 12 stub traces for pipeline retention gap; fixed MSYS2/Python path mismatch in context-validate.sh; run-casan4-harness-tests.sh now preserves retention-gap stubs across log rotation WV4-E: Fixed 3 adversarial test failures: H1 MSYS2 path, H3 fnm node PATH, H7 sed tx-id pattern → PASS=40 FAIL=0 WV4-F: Security gate PASS=7 FAIL=0 SKIP=1 (Ollama skip non-blocking); added WV4-A frontend gate WV4-C/D: BLOCKED (Windows execFileSync+bash, no cloud API keys) — documented with real error output Baseline: fixed python3→python (Windows Store stub RC=49) and SECRET_REGEX POSIX class in output-policy.yaml Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
60 lines
2.4 KiB
Bash
Executable File
60 lines
2.4 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Shared tamper-evident appender for the central tool-call audit log
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# (.specify/logs/audit/tool-calls.jsonl).
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#
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# Every record is chained: record_hash = SHA-256(previous_record_hash | core),
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# where core is the canonical (sorted-key) JSON of the record minus record_hash.
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# After each append the chain head is signed with the audit RSA key, so a
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# re-forged chain (recomputed hashes) cannot produce a valid head signature
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# without the private key. Used by both agent-metrics.sh and tool-registry-gate.sh
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# so the combined audit is tamper-evident regardless of which writer appended.
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#
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# Production note: the private key must live off-repo (KMS/HSM); it is local
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# here only for self-contained demonstration.
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append_tool_audit() {
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local record_json="$1"
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local project_root="$2"
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local audit_dir="$project_root/.specify/logs/audit"
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local log="$audit_dir/tool-calls.jsonl"
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mkdir -p "$audit_dir"
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local head
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head="$(python - "$log" "$record_json" <<'PY'
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import hashlib, json, sys
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log, rec_json = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
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rec = json.loads(rec_json)
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prev = ""
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try:
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with open(log, encoding="utf-8") as f:
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lines = [l for l in f if l.strip()]
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if lines:
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prev = json.loads(lines[-1]).get("record_hash", "")
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except FileNotFoundError:
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pass
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rec.pop("record_hash", None)
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rec["previous_record_hash"] = prev
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core = json.dumps(rec, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
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rec["record_hash"] = hashlib.sha256((prev + "|" + core).encode()).hexdigest()
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with open(log, "a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
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f.write(json.dumps(rec) + "\n")
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sys.stdout.write(rec["record_hash"])
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PY
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)"
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command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0
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# Private signing key lives OFF-REPO (default ~/.casan/audit-keys); only the
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# public key is committed, for verification. Production: replace with KMS/HSM.
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local pub_dir="$project_root/.specify/level5/central-governance"
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local priv_dir="${CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR:-$HOME/.casan/audit-keys}"
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local priv="$priv_dir/audit-private.pem" pub="$pub_dir/audit-public.pem"
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mkdir -p "$pub_dir" "$priv_dir"
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if [[ ! -f "$priv" ]]; then
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openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 -out "$priv" 2>/dev/null
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chmod 600 "$priv"
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openssl rsa -in "$priv" -pubout -out "$pub" 2>/dev/null
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fi
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printf '%s' "$head" > "$audit_dir/tool-calls-head.txt"
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openssl dgst -sha256 -sign "$priv" -out "$audit_dir/tool-calls-head.sig" "$audit_dir/tool-calls-head.txt" 2>/dev/null || true
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}
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