- SEC-08 pii-mask: fail-closed on missing rules / broken regex (no unmasked leak) - SEC-09: input-size cap + fail-closed reads (security-check/drift-detect/context-compress); non-UTF8 no longer crashes - SEC-19: control-plane store POSIX flock + atomic tmp+rename write - SEC-20: new toolchain-verify.sh (missing/PATH-shadowed/in-workspace binary -> refuse); wired into harness-preflight - SEC-21: model-call timeout 180->60s configurable + per-run call budget - SEC-11 realized by SEC-17 prod profile (no code) - 5 fail-able test suites wired into ci-harness-gate.sh; test-integrity manifest regenerated Verify: SEC+integrity gate 16/0, run-casan4 0-FAIL, adversarial 44/44, no regressions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
86 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
Executable File
86 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
|
"""CASAN H4 PII masker driven by .specify/security/pii-rules.yaml.
|
|
|
|
Reads content on stdin, applies every `action: mask` rule from the rules
|
|
file, and writes the masked content to stdout. Type-specific replacement
|
|
tokens are preserved so downstream evidence stays stable
|
|
(***MASKED_EMAIL***, ***MASKED_PHONE***, ***MASKED_ID***).
|
|
|
|
This makes pii-rules.yaml the source of truth for PII masking instead of
|
|
dead config: editing/removing a rule changes runtime behavior.
|
|
"""
|
|
import re
|
|
import sys
|
|
|
|
REPLACEMENT_BY_TYPE = {
|
|
"email": "***MASKED_EMAIL***",
|
|
"phone": "***MASKED_PHONE***",
|
|
"personal_id": "***MASKED_ID***",
|
|
"address": "***MASKED_ADDRESS***",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def load_rules(path):
|
|
rules, cur = [], {}
|
|
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
|
for raw in fh:
|
|
s = raw.strip()
|
|
m = re.match(r"-\s*id:\s*(\S+)", s)
|
|
if m:
|
|
if cur:
|
|
rules.append(cur)
|
|
cur = {"id": m.group(1)}
|
|
continue
|
|
m = re.match(r'type:\s*"?([^"\s]+)"?', s)
|
|
if m:
|
|
cur["type"] = m.group(1)
|
|
continue
|
|
m = re.match(r'regex:\s*"(.*)"\s*$', s)
|
|
if m:
|
|
# YAML double-quoted: collapse \\ -> \ to recover the real regex.
|
|
cur["regex"] = m.group(1).replace("\\\\", "\\")
|
|
continue
|
|
m = re.match(r"action:\s*(\S+)", s)
|
|
if m:
|
|
cur["action"] = m.group(1)
|
|
continue
|
|
if cur:
|
|
rules.append(cur)
|
|
return rules
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main():
|
|
data = sys.stdin.read()
|
|
# SEC-08 (M-06): FAIL CLOSED. Previously a missing rules file, an unreadable
|
|
# file, or a broken rule regex all emitted the RAW data — so a mask rule that
|
|
# failed to load silently leaked the PII it was meant to hide. Now any such
|
|
# condition emits NOTHING and exits non-zero: no unmasked content ever escapes.
|
|
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
|
|
sys.stderr.write("PII_MASK_FAIL no rules file provided (fail-closed)\n")
|
|
return 1
|
|
try:
|
|
rules = load_rules(sys.argv[1])
|
|
except OSError as exc:
|
|
sys.stderr.write(f"PII_MASK_FAIL rules file unreadable (fail-closed): {exc}\n")
|
|
return 1
|
|
# Pre-compile every mask rule; a broken regex is fatal (that PII type would
|
|
# otherwise pass through unmasked). Validate all BEFORE emitting anything.
|
|
compiled = []
|
|
for rule in rules:
|
|
if rule.get("action") != "mask" or "regex" not in rule:
|
|
continue
|
|
token = REPLACEMENT_BY_TYPE.get(rule.get("type", ""), "***MASKED***")
|
|
try:
|
|
compiled.append((re.compile(rule["regex"]), token))
|
|
except re.error as exc:
|
|
sys.stderr.write(f"PII_MASK_FAIL bad regex in rule {rule.get('id')} (fail-closed): {exc}\n")
|
|
return 1
|
|
for rx, token in compiled:
|
|
data = rx.sub(token, data)
|
|
sys.stdout.write(data)
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
raise SystemExit(main())
|