thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
3adc48ed82
Resolve every root by marker walk-up instead of a fixed depth that only lands on the app via the .specify compat symlink, so the harness runs correctly when invoked by its real packages/casan-harness path — proven by a full gate run via that path: 64/0/0. - 95 scripts/tests: PROJECT_ROOT/ROOT "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.."-style computations -> $CASAN_APP_ROOT. - 6 leaf scripts (infra-lab, context-validate, secrets-scan, path-guard, toolchain-verify, phase2-sourcegen) now source casan-paths + use CASAN_APP_ROOT. - run-casan4: source casan-paths as a package sibling (facade-independent), PROJECT_ROOT=CASAN_APP_ROOT. - 8 Python files: project_root()/REPO_ROOT/bundle_root walk UP for the .specify marker (control-plane-settings, loop_common, model-call, context-compress, test-integrity, bundle-integrity, traceability-matrix; generate-* fixed earlier). - evidence-pack-build.py + traceability-matrix.py: domain refs -> apps/okr/domain (input/, corpus/redteam-vectors.jsonl, traceability-map.json). - ci-harness-gate.sh: export CASAN_TESTS_DIR/CASAN_TEST_MANIFEST/CASAN_BUNDLE_ROOT so the integrity Python resolves via the harness root regardless of invocation path; ROOT=CASAN_APP_ROOT. - Remove the domain compat symlinks from packages/casan-harness/security (redteam-corpus, redteam-vectors, benign-corpus) — packages now holds NO domain data. Both invocation paths pass (compat facade still present): .specify/... and packages/... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
49 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
49 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
set -uo pipefail
|
|
|
|
# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-28 (X-04) — path-traversal / symlink guard.
|
|
#
|
|
# path-guard.sh resolves the REAL path (following symlinks, normalizing "..") and
|
|
# refuses anything that escapes the allowed root — so a tool file argument cannot be
|
|
# a symlink to /etc/passwd or a ../.. escape. Proves in-root paths pass and escapes
|
|
# (via .. and via symlink) are rejected.
|
|
#
|
|
# Deterministic; hermetic.
|
|
|
|
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
|
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
|
|
PROJECT_ROOT="$CASAN_APP_ROOT"
|
|
PG="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash/path-guard.sh"
|
|
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
|
|
trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
|
|
|
|
PASS=0; FAIL=0
|
|
pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
|
|
fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
|
|
rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
|
|
|
|
echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-28: path-traversal / symlink guard ====="
|
|
|
|
mkdir -p "$WORK/root/sub"
|
|
[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/sub/out.txt" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
|
|
&& pass "in-root path accepted" || fail "in-root path rejected"
|
|
|
|
[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/../../etc/passwd" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
|
|
&& pass "'..' escape rejected" || fail "'..' escape accepted"
|
|
|
|
# A symlink inside the root that points OUTSIDE it must be rejected.
|
|
ln -s /etc/passwd "$WORK/root/evil-link"
|
|
[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/evil-link" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
|
|
&& pass "symlink escaping root rejected (realpath resolves the target)" \
|
|
|| fail "symlink escape accepted"
|
|
|
|
# A symlink that stays inside the root is fine.
|
|
echo hi > "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt"
|
|
ln -s "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt" "$WORK/root/ok-link"
|
|
[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/ok-link" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
|
|
&& pass "in-root symlink accepted" || fail "in-root symlink rejected"
|
|
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo "===== SEC-28 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
|
|
[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
|