thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
3adc48ed82
Resolve every root by marker walk-up instead of a fixed depth that only lands on the app via the .specify compat symlink, so the harness runs correctly when invoked by its real packages/casan-harness path — proven by a full gate run via that path: 64/0/0. - 95 scripts/tests: PROJECT_ROOT/ROOT "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.."-style computations -> $CASAN_APP_ROOT. - 6 leaf scripts (infra-lab, context-validate, secrets-scan, path-guard, toolchain-verify, phase2-sourcegen) now source casan-paths + use CASAN_APP_ROOT. - run-casan4: source casan-paths as a package sibling (facade-independent), PROJECT_ROOT=CASAN_APP_ROOT. - 8 Python files: project_root()/REPO_ROOT/bundle_root walk UP for the .specify marker (control-plane-settings, loop_common, model-call, context-compress, test-integrity, bundle-integrity, traceability-matrix; generate-* fixed earlier). - evidence-pack-build.py + traceability-matrix.py: domain refs -> apps/okr/domain (input/, corpus/redteam-vectors.jsonl, traceability-map.json). - ci-harness-gate.sh: export CASAN_TESTS_DIR/CASAN_TEST_MANIFEST/CASAN_BUNDLE_ROOT so the integrity Python resolves via the harness root regardless of invocation path; ROOT=CASAN_APP_ROOT. - Remove the domain compat symlinks from packages/casan-harness/security (redteam-corpus, redteam-vectors, benign-corpus) — packages now holds NO domain data. Both invocation paths pass (compat facade still present): .specify/... and packages/... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
75 lines
3.6 KiB
Bash
75 lines
3.6 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-23 Phase 4+5-offline (MT-04 / MT-02):
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# * 23.9 signed tenant/project registry — a valid signature verifies; a tampered,
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# forged (wrong key), or UNSIGNED registry is REFUSED (fail-closed),
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# * 23.10 per-tenant encryption at rest — tenant A's state is ciphertext on disk;
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# A can decrypt its own; tenant B (different key) CANNOT read A's plaintext.
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#
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# Deterministic; hermetic; uses real openssl (skip-aware if absent).
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$CASAN_APP_ROOT"
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S="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
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RV="$S/tenant-registry-verify.sh"
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TC="$S/tenant-crypt.sh"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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export CASAN_TENANT_STATE_ROOT="$WORK/tenants"
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "SKIP: openssl unavailable"; exit 0; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-23 Phase 4+5-offline: signed registry + per-tenant crypt ====="
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# keys
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/reg.priv.pem" 2048 2>/dev/null
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openssl rsa -in "$WORK/reg.priv.pem" -pubout -out "$WORK/reg.pub.pem" 2>/dev/null
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openssl genrsa -out "$WORK/attacker.priv.pem" 2048 2>/dev/null
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# --- 23.9 registry sign/verify ---
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printf '{"tenants":["alpha","beta"]}\n' > "$WORK/reg1.json"
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bash "$RV" sign "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg.priv.pem" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$RV" verify "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg.pub.pem")" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "23.9 valid signed registry verifies" || fail "23.9 valid registry rejected"
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cp "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg2.json"; bash "$RV" sign "$WORK/reg2.json" "$WORK/reg.priv.pem" >/dev/null 2>&1
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printf '{"tenants":["alpha","beta","evil"]}\n' > "$WORK/reg2.json" # tamper after signing
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$RV" verify "$WORK/reg2.json" "$WORK/reg.pub.pem")" -eq 2 ]] \
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&& pass "23.9 tampered registry is REFUSED" || fail "23.9 tampered registry accepted"
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cp "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg3.json"; bash "$RV" sign "$WORK/reg3.json" "$WORK/attacker.priv.pem" >/dev/null 2>&1
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$RV" verify "$WORK/reg3.json" "$WORK/reg.pub.pem")" -eq 2 ]] \
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&& pass "23.9 forged (wrong-key) registry is REFUSED" || fail "23.9 forged registry accepted"
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cp "$WORK/reg1.json" "$WORK/reg4.json" # no .sig produced
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$RV" verify "$WORK/reg4.json" "$WORK/reg.pub.pem")" -eq 3 ]] \
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&& pass "23.9 UNSIGNED registry fails CLOSED (refused)" || fail "23.9 unsigned registry not refused"
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# --- 23.10 per-tenant encryption at rest ---
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SECRET="SECRET-A-audit-line-12345"
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printf '%s\n' "$SECRET" > "$WORK/pa.txt"
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CASAN_TENANT_ID=alpha bash "$TC" encrypt "$WORK/pa.txt" "$WORK/ca.enc" >/dev/null 2>&1
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grep -q "$SECRET" "$WORK/ca.enc" 2>/dev/null \
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&& fail "23.10 plaintext leaked into ciphertext" \
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|| pass "23.10 tenant A state is ciphertext on disk (no plaintext)"
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CASAN_TENANT_ID=alpha bash "$TC" decrypt "$WORK/ca.enc" "$WORK/da.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1
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grep -q "$SECRET" "$WORK/da.txt" 2>/dev/null \
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&& pass "23.10 tenant A decrypts its own state (roundtrip)" || fail "23.10 tenant A roundtrip failed"
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CASAN_TENANT_ID=beta bash "$TC" decrypt "$WORK/ca.enc" "$WORK/db.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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grep -q "$SECRET" "$WORK/db.txt" 2>/dev/null \
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&& fail "23.10 tenant B read tenant A's plaintext (isolation broken)" \
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|| pass "23.10 tenant B CANNOT read tenant A's plaintext (per-tenant key)"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-23 Phase 4+5-offline SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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