thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
664bd1f00c
Physically move the pure-code subtrees out of .specify into the package, leaving compat symlinks at the old .specify/<dir> paths so every existing reference (internal CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT + external CI/docker/mjs) keeps resolving. Runtime state stays put. Moved (git mv): scripts/ tests/ security/ templates/ config/ governance/ memory/ .specify/<dir> -> packages/casan-harness/<dir> (+ .specify/<dir> symlink) Stays in .specify (state/governance/domain, handled later): logs/ agentops/ level5/ init-options.json traceability-map.json Python `.resolve()` self-location followed the compat symlink into packages and lost the app root; generate-casan-demo-context.py, generate-agentops-dashboard.py and dashboard-server.py now walk UP for the `.specify` state marker instead of a fixed parent depth (fixes "missing trace files" in run-casan4). Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (CASAN_CI_STEP_TIMEOUT_SEC=1200 — track-a ~450s runs close to the 600s default and can tip over under load; this is timing variance, not a regression — it passed cleanly with headroom). Runtime log/audit artifacts kept unstaged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
47 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
47 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
set -uo pipefail
|
|
|
|
# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-23 (23.9, MT-04) — sign + verify the tenant/project registry.
|
|
#
|
|
# An UNSIGNED registry lets an attacker register a fake tenant or swap another
|
|
# tenant's project mapping (bypassing every tenant boundary that trusts it). This
|
|
# signs the registry (detached signature) and verifies it on load. A tampered,
|
|
# forged (wrong key), or unsigned registry is REFUSED — fail-closed by default.
|
|
#
|
|
# Usage:
|
|
# tenant-registry-verify.sh sign <registry-file> <priv-key>
|
|
# tenant-registry-verify.sh verify <registry-file> <pub-key>
|
|
# Exit: 0 ok · 2 invalid/tampered/forged · 3 missing signature/file/openssl · 64 usage.
|
|
# (Production anchors the signature in KMS — see SEC-02; this is the offline form.)
|
|
|
|
CMD="${1:-}"; REG="${2:-}"; KEY="${3:-}"
|
|
command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "REGISTRY_OPENSSL_UNAVAILABLE" >&2; exit 3; }
|
|
|
|
case "$CMD" in
|
|
sign)
|
|
[[ -f "$REG" && -f "$KEY" ]] || { echo "usage: tenant-registry-verify.sh sign <registry> <priv-key>" >&2; exit 64; }
|
|
if openssl dgst -sha256 -sign "$KEY" -out "$REG.sig" "$REG" 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
echo "REGISTRY_SIGNED file=$REG sig=$REG.sig"
|
|
exit 0
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "REGISTRY_SIGN_FAILED file=$REG" >&2; exit 2
|
|
;;
|
|
verify)
|
|
[[ -f "$REG" ]] || { echo "REGISTRY_MISSING file=$REG" >&2; exit 3; }
|
|
[[ -f "$KEY" ]] || { echo "REGISTRY_PUBKEY_MISSING key=$KEY" >&2; exit 3; }
|
|
if [[ ! -f "$REG.sig" ]]; then
|
|
# SEC-23/SEC-01: unsigned registry is REFUSED (fail-closed), not trusted.
|
|
echo "REGISTRY_UNSIGNED file=$REG — refusing (fail-closed)" >&2; exit 3
|
|
fi
|
|
if openssl dgst -sha256 -verify "$KEY" -signature "$REG.sig" "$REG" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
echo "REGISTRY_VERIFIED file=$REG"
|
|
exit 0
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "REGISTRY_INVALID file=$REG — tampered or forged signature" >&2; exit 2
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
echo "Usage: tenant-registry-verify.sh {sign|verify} <registry-file> <key>" >&2
|
|
exit 64
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|