Files
CASAN/packages/casan-harness/scripts/bash/tenant-registry-verify.sh
T
thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8 36a4812ef3 refactor(structure): promote app to repo root + remove redundant workspace cruft
Standard production layout: the OKR app (was nested under AINative_OKR_CASAN5/) is now
the repository root. No more wrapper directory.

- Promote AINative_OKR_CASAN5/* -> repo root (backend/ frontend/ packages/ apps/
  .specify/ docs/ infra/ nginx/ scripts/ + configs). Merge tool dirs: .gitea (kept the
  active deploy ci.yml, added harness-ci.yml + runbooks), .claude (agents/commands +
  launch.json), .github moved up.
- Remove redundant: 00_SUBMISSION_PACKAGE, scattered root notes (FPT_CASAN_Full.md,
  tu-tuong-casan.md, casan-tu-sinh..., casan_harness_assessment.md, source-review...,
  README_CASAN5_REFINED.md), casan-next-plans/ and optimize-docs/ (competition/planning
  artifacts — roadmap + design history preserved in git log / commit messages).
- Update all references to the old layout:
  - .gitea/workflows/{ci,harness-ci}.yml, .github/workflows/{ci,deploy}.yml:
    working-directory .; drop AINative_OKR_CASAN5/ prefix; .specify/{tests,scripts}
    -> packages/casan-harness/... (.specify/logs state kept)
  - .claude/launch.json, .gitea/*-runbook.md: path prefixes
  - CLAUDE.md, README.md: docs/input -> apps/okr/domain/input
  - policy-bundle.yaml: 8 policy paths -> packages/casan-harness/...; manifest re-signed
- secrets-scan.sh: fixture excludes -> new package/domain paths.

Full gate from the new root: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 13:26:36 +09:00

47 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -uo pipefail
# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-23 (23.9, MT-04) — sign + verify the tenant/project registry.
#
# An UNSIGNED registry lets an attacker register a fake tenant or swap another
# tenant's project mapping (bypassing every tenant boundary that trusts it). This
# signs the registry (detached signature) and verifies it on load. A tampered,
# forged (wrong key), or unsigned registry is REFUSED — fail-closed by default.
#
# Usage:
# tenant-registry-verify.sh sign <registry-file> <priv-key>
# tenant-registry-verify.sh verify <registry-file> <pub-key>
# Exit: 0 ok · 2 invalid/tampered/forged · 3 missing signature/file/openssl · 64 usage.
# (Production anchors the signature in KMS — see SEC-02; this is the offline form.)
CMD="${1:-}"; REG="${2:-}"; KEY="${3:-}"
command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "REGISTRY_OPENSSL_UNAVAILABLE" >&2; exit 3; }
case "$CMD" in
sign)
[[ -f "$REG" && -f "$KEY" ]] || { echo "usage: tenant-registry-verify.sh sign <registry> <priv-key>" >&2; exit 64; }
if openssl dgst -sha256 -sign "$KEY" -out "$REG.sig" "$REG" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "REGISTRY_SIGNED file=$REG sig=$REG.sig"
exit 0
fi
echo "REGISTRY_SIGN_FAILED file=$REG" >&2; exit 2
;;
verify)
[[ -f "$REG" ]] || { echo "REGISTRY_MISSING file=$REG" >&2; exit 3; }
[[ -f "$KEY" ]] || { echo "REGISTRY_PUBKEY_MISSING key=$KEY" >&2; exit 3; }
if [[ ! -f "$REG.sig" ]]; then
# SEC-23/SEC-01: unsigned registry is REFUSED (fail-closed), not trusted.
echo "REGISTRY_UNSIGNED file=$REG — refusing (fail-closed)" >&2; exit 3
fi
if openssl dgst -sha256 -verify "$KEY" -signature "$REG.sig" "$REG" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "REGISTRY_VERIFIED file=$REG"
exit 0
fi
echo "REGISTRY_INVALID file=$REG — tampered or forged signature" >&2; exit 2
;;
*)
echo "Usage: tenant-registry-verify.sh {sign|verify} <registry-file> <key>" >&2
exit 64
;;
esac