Files
CASAN/AINative_OKR_CASAN5/packages/casan-harness/tests/phase-sec05-tests.sh
T
thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8 3adc48ed82 feat(plan-01): Phase 4a — make harness location-independent (facade-free capable)
Resolve every root by marker walk-up instead of a fixed depth that only lands on the
app via the .specify compat symlink, so the harness runs correctly when invoked by its
real packages/casan-harness path — proven by a full gate run via that path: 64/0/0.

- 95 scripts/tests: PROJECT_ROOT/ROOT "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.."-style computations -> $CASAN_APP_ROOT.
- 6 leaf scripts (infra-lab, context-validate, secrets-scan, path-guard, toolchain-verify,
  phase2-sourcegen) now source casan-paths + use CASAN_APP_ROOT.
- run-casan4: source casan-paths as a package sibling (facade-independent), PROJECT_ROOT=CASAN_APP_ROOT.
- 8 Python files: project_root()/REPO_ROOT/bundle_root walk UP for the .specify marker
  (control-plane-settings, loop_common, model-call, context-compress, test-integrity,
  bundle-integrity, traceability-matrix; generate-* fixed earlier).
- evidence-pack-build.py + traceability-matrix.py: domain refs -> apps/okr/domain
  (input/, corpus/redteam-vectors.jsonl, traceability-map.json).
- ci-harness-gate.sh: export CASAN_TESTS_DIR/CASAN_TEST_MANIFEST/CASAN_BUNDLE_ROOT so the
  integrity Python resolves via the harness root regardless of invocation path; ROOT=CASAN_APP_ROOT.
- Remove the domain compat symlinks from packages/casan-harness/security (redteam-corpus,
  redteam-vectors, benign-corpus) — packages now holds NO domain data.

Both invocation paths pass (compat facade still present): .specify/... and packages/...

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 10:50:50 +09:00

81 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -uo pipefail
# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-05 (H-04 / M-05) — JSON-safe audit writers.
#
# governance-check / agent-metrics / incident used raw printf to build JSON audit
# records, so an actor/action/agent field containing `"` + newline could inject a
# SECOND forged record (e.g. a fabricated "approved" decision). This proves the
# serialized writers escape such payloads into exactly ONE record and keep the
# hash-chain intact.
#
# Deterministic; hermetic (backs up + restores the audit + governance dirs).
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
PROJECT_ROOT="$CASAN_APP_ROOT"
BASH_DIR="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash"
AUDIT="$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit/audit.jsonl"
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
# Back up + restore the state governance-check mutates.
BK="$WORK/backup"; mkdir -p "$BK"
cp -a "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit" "$BK/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
cp -a "$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT" "$BK/central-governance" 2>/dev/null || true
restore_state() {
rm -rf "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit"; cp -a "$BK/audit" "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
rm -rf "$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT"; cp -a "$BK/central-governance" "$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT" 2>/dev/null || true
}
trap 'restore_state; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
export CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR="$WORK/keys" # fresh key dir (avoid CI key-sync flake)
PASS=0; FAIL=0
pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-05: JSON-safe audit writers ====="
echo "hello world" > "$WORK/in.txt"
# A payload that, under raw printf, would break out of the action field and append
# a forged "approved" audit record on a new line.
PAYLOAD='evil","decision":"approved","approver":"ATTACKER
{"timestamp":"forged","action":"pwned","record_hash":"deadbeef"}'
BEFORE=$(wc -l < "$AUDIT" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
set +e
bash "$BASH_DIR/governance-check.sh" "$WORK/in.txt" "$WORK/out.txt" "$PAYLOAD" >/dev/null 2>&1
set -e 2>/dev/null || true
AFTER=$(wc -l < "$AUDIT" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
ADDED=$((AFTER - BEFORE))
[[ "$ADDED" -eq 1 ]] \
&& pass "injection payload produced exactly ONE audit record (added=$ADDED)" \
|| fail "expected 1 record, got $ADDED (raw-printf injection regression!)"
# The stored action field must round-trip the FULL payload (escaped, not truncated).
ROUNDTRIP="$(python3 - "$AUDIT" <<'PY'
import json, sys
last = [l for l in open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") if l.strip()][-1]
print(json.loads(last).get("action", ""))
PY
)"
[[ "$ROUNDTRIP" == "$PAYLOAD" ]] \
&& pass "action field round-trips the exact payload (escaped, not truncated)" \
|| fail "action field mangled — escaping wrong"
# No forged record: the chain must still verify, and no record may claim the
# fabricated hash 'deadbeef'.
bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh" "$AUDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
&& pass "audit chain still verifies after injection attempt" \
|| fail "chain broken after injection (record_hash mismatch)"
grep -q '"record_hash":"deadbeef"\|"record_hash": "deadbeef"' "$AUDIT" \
&& fail "forged record with attacker hash present in audit log" \
|| pass "no forged record injected into audit log"
echo ""
echo "===== SEC-05 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1