thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
2c765c9a45
Task 1.2: introduce a single path resolver so no harness script hardcodes `.specify/...` scattered across the tree. casan-paths.sh resolves four roots (HARNESS/STATE/GOVERNANCE/APP) by marker-based walk-up from its own location — never `git rev-parse` (git root is the repo PARENT here, not the app dir). - 101 bash scripts/tests: 238 hardcoded `$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/...` refs rewritten to CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT (code) / CASAN_STATE_ROOT (logs,state) / CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT. Sandbox test vars ($WORK/$TP/$FP/$T1_WORK) left untouched. - Roots are NOT exported: each script/subprocess self-resolves from its own tree, matching the original per-script semantics and preserving hermetic sandbox isolation (node casan-step.mjs, copied telemetry/rollback scripts must not inherit real roots). - Sandbox tests that copy a harness script now also copy casan-paths.sh (its new sibling dependency): adversarial (verify-audit-chain/verify-tool-audit/rollback) + track-a (security-check/telemetry-integrity). - control-plane-settings.json reclassified as STATE (untracked runtime store). Roots all still resolve to `.specify` in this monolithic layout, so behavior is unchanged. Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (adversarial 44/0, track-a 25/0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
49 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
49 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-28 (X-04) — path-traversal / symlink guard.
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#
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# path-guard.sh resolves the REAL path (following symlinks, normalizing "..") and
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# refuses anything that escapes the allowed root — so a tool file argument cannot be
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# a symlink to /etc/passwd or a ../.. escape. Proves in-root paths pass and escapes
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# (via .. and via symlink) are rejected.
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#
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# Deterministic; hermetic.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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PG="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash/path-guard.sh"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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rc_of() { set +e; "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; echo $?; set -e 2>/dev/null || true; }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-28: path-traversal / symlink guard ====="
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mkdir -p "$WORK/root/sub"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/sub/out.txt" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "in-root path accepted" || fail "in-root path rejected"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/../../etc/passwd" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "'..' escape rejected" || fail "'..' escape accepted"
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# A symlink inside the root that points OUTSIDE it must be rejected.
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ln -s /etc/passwd "$WORK/root/evil-link"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/evil-link" "$WORK/root")" -ne 0 ]] \
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&& pass "symlink escaping root rejected (realpath resolves the target)" \
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|| fail "symlink escape accepted"
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# A symlink that stays inside the root is fine.
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echo hi > "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt"
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ln -s "$WORK/root/sub/real.txt" "$WORK/root/ok-link"
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[[ "$(rc_of bash "$PG" "$WORK/root/ok-link" "$WORK/root")" -eq 0 ]] \
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&& pass "in-root symlink accepted" || fail "in-root symlink rejected"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-28 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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