thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8
2c765c9a45
Task 1.2: introduce a single path resolver so no harness script hardcodes `.specify/...` scattered across the tree. casan-paths.sh resolves four roots (HARNESS/STATE/GOVERNANCE/APP) by marker-based walk-up from its own location — never `git rev-parse` (git root is the repo PARENT here, not the app dir). - 101 bash scripts/tests: 238 hardcoded `$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/...` refs rewritten to CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT (code) / CASAN_STATE_ROOT (logs,state) / CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT. Sandbox test vars ($WORK/$TP/$FP/$T1_WORK) left untouched. - Roots are NOT exported: each script/subprocess self-resolves from its own tree, matching the original per-script semantics and preserving hermetic sandbox isolation (node casan-step.mjs, copied telemetry/rollback scripts must not inherit real roots). - Sandbox tests that copy a harness script now also copy casan-paths.sh (its new sibling dependency): adversarial (verify-audit-chain/verify-tool-audit/rollback) + track-a (security-check/telemetry-integrity). - control-plane-settings.json reclassified as STATE (untracked runtime store). Roots all still resolve to `.specify` in this monolithic layout, so behavior is unchanged. Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (adversarial 44/0, track-a 25/0). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
47 lines
1.6 KiB
Bash
47 lines
1.6 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-27 (X-02) — strip control/ANSI chars from log output.
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#
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# Log messages carry attacker-influenced data (action names, tool-output snippets).
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# A raw ESC/CSI sequence can rewrite a reviewer's terminal; a raw CR/LF can inject a
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# fake log line. casan_log now strips control chars (keeping tab). Proves the ESC
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# byte and embedded newlines are removed while the visible text survives.
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#
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# Deterministic; no model/network.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/casan-paths.sh"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
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PASS=0; FAIL=0
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pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
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fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
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echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-27: log control-char stripping ====="
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# shellcheck source=/dev/null
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source "$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/bash/casan-log.sh"
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PAYLOAD="$(printf 'start\033[31mRED\033[0m\nFAKE [ERROR] injected-audit-line')"
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OUT="$(casan_log error test "$PAYLOAD" 2>&1)"
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if printf '%s' "$OUT" | od -An -c | grep -q '033'; then
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fail "ESC byte survived into the log (terminal-escape injection)"
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else
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pass "ESC byte stripped from log output"
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fi
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LINES="$(printf '%s\n' "$OUT" | grep -c .)"
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[[ "$LINES" -eq 1 ]] \
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&& pass "embedded newline stripped — no injected second log line" \
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|| fail "log emitted $LINES lines (newline injection)"
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printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -q "start" && printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -q "RED" \
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&& pass "visible text preserved (only control bytes removed)" \
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|| fail "visible text lost"
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echo ""
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echo "===== SEC-27 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
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[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
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