C1 (V17) action-gate.sh: gates the ACTION, not just the tool name. Outcome model ALLOW/WARN/REQUIRE_APPROVAL/BLOCK. BLOCK on sensitive-file writes (.env, *.pem, id_rsa, .github/workflows, .ssh, .aws/credentials, .npmrc) and destructive/ remote-exec commands (rm -rf /, curl|bash, chmod 777, git push --force); REQUIRE_APPROVAL on dependency installs and non-local network egress (clears only with an audited CASAN_ACTION_APPROVER). Decisions logged to action-gate.jsonl. C2 (V18) supply-chain-gate.sh + supply-chain-scan.py: diffs package.json / requirements.txt / pom.xml / build.gradle against a baseline (explicit or git HEAD). BLOCK on denylisted/known-malicious packages, typosquats (edit-distance 1 to a known package), and dangerous lifecycle scripts (pre/post/install); REQUIRE_APPROVAL on any new dependency. Emits a dep-diff report and records which live scanners (npm audit / pip-audit / osv-scanner) are available. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
18 lines
680 B
Plaintext
18 lines
680 B
Plaintext
# Known-bad / denylisted package identifiers. Format: one entry per line, either
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# a bare name (any version) or name@version for a specific pinned bad release.
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# This is a LOCAL denylist used when no live CVE/OSV scanner is available; a real
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# deployment should also run npm audit / pip-audit / osv-scanner (the gate runs
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# them when present and records tool availability in the report).
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#
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# The entries below are illustrative fixtures (documented malware families /
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# typosquat campaigns) so the gate has deterministic denials to test against.
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event-stream@3.3.6
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flatmap-stream
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coa@2.0.3
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rc@1.2.9
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ua-parser-js@0.7.29
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node-ipc@10.1.1
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colors@1.4.44-liberty-2
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crossenv
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cross-env.js
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