# CASAN Production Hardening — Implementation Status

> Live record of what has been **implemented and tested** from Plan-07
> (Production Hardening) and Plan-09 (Evidence Pack), versus what is still
> **planned**. Honest by design: a control is only listed as done when it has an
> executable test that would fail if the control were removed.
>
> Labels: **[implemented+tested]** · **[scaffold+tested]** (works, but a stronger
> production form is documented as TODO) · **[planned]** (not built).
>
> **Vai trò file (single source of truth):** file này là **nguồn chuẩn cho "control
> nào đã implement+test"**. "Còn gì phải làm" → `CASAN_BACKLOG_STATUS.md` (có legend
> chuẩn + ánh xạ nhãn). Mục lục plan → `CASAN_PLAN_00_INDEX.md`.

## 1. What is implemented now

### Phase 1 — Plan-07 Track A (low-risk hardening) — [implemented+tested]

| ID | Control | Where | Test |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | H4 semantic **strict fail-closed** (`CASAN_SECURITY_STRICT=1`): model unavailable ⇒ BLOCK, never silent SKIP; non-strict logs `SEMANTIC_SKIPPED` loudly | `security-check.sh` | phase1 A1 |
| A2 | H4 **unicode/encoding normalization**: NFKC + zero-width strip + homoglyph fold + base64/hex decode & rescan | `security-check.sh`, `unicode-normalize.py`, `decode-suspicious.py` | phase1 A2 |
| A3 | H4 **tool-output injection scan** before output re-enters model context (mode off/warn/block; strict⇒block) | `tool-output-scan.sh`, `casan-harness.sh` | phase1 A3 |
| A4 | H5 **telemetry integrity**: provider-usage + cost metrics bound to a signed manifest head (tamper ⇒ mismatch; re-forge ⇒ signature invalid) | `telemetry-integrity.sh`, `sign-audit-head.sh` | phase1 A4 |
| A5 | H6 **cost controls**: absolute per-call cap + cumulative budget + cold-start protection, keeping median×mult spike | `cost-spike-detect.sh` | phase1 A5 |
| A6 | **Benign corpus (EN/VI/JA, 95 samples) + FP budget gate**: FP ≤ 3%, adversarial block ≥ 95%, CRITICAL = 100% | `benign-fp-report.sh`, `benign-corpus/`, `redteam-vectors.jsonl` | phase1 A6 |

### Phase 2 — Plan-07 Track C-MVP (production minimum bar) — mixed

| ID | Control | Status | Where | Test |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | **Tool authorization / action gating** (ALLOW/WARN/REQUIRE_APPROVAL/BLOCK): sensitive-file writes, destructive/remote-exec commands, dep-install & network egress | [implemented+tested] | `action-gate.sh` | phase2 C1 |
| C2 | **Supply-chain gate**: manifest diff, denylist + typosquat + dangerous lifecycle-script block, new-dep approval, dep-diff report | [implemented+tested] | `supply-chain-gate.sh`, `supply-chain-scan.py` | phase2 C2 |
| C3 | **Data-exfil guard**: secret-to-cloud & artifact-leaks-env ⇒ BLOCK; PII-in-audit ⇒ mask | [implemented+tested] | `data-exfil-guard.sh` | phase2 C3 |
| C6 | **Runtime sandbox**: static policy block (read ~/.ssh, net egress, fork bomb, write-outside-workspace, huge-file) + ulimit/timeout backstops | [scaffold+tested] | `sandbox-run.sh` | phase2 C6 |

### Phase 3 — Plan-09 Evidence Pack (MVP) — [implemented+tested]

| Control | Where | Test |
|---|---|---|
| `casan pack` / `casan verify-pack` (mapped to `evidence-pack.sh`): standard 13-file pack incl. `traceability-matrix.json`, hash manifest, signed head, tamper-evident verify, certified-run gate (no false certification, no silent skip) | `evidence-pack.sh`, `evidence-pack-build.py`, `evidence-pack-verify.py` | phase3-evidence-pack |

### Phase 4 — H5 governance hardening (raises the lowest harness) — mixed

| ID | Control | Status | Where | Test |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C4 | **Approval-identity + mock IdP/OIDC**: high-risk approval trusted only when a REGISTERED reviewer signs the request OR an IdP-signed RS256 JWT proves approver identity/role/expiry and binds to this request — env-var approver no longer enough (SoD still enforced) | [implemented+tested] (mock IdP; production JWKS still planned) | `approval-sign.sh`, `approval-jwt-mint.py`, `approval-verify.sh`, `reviewers.registry`, `governance-check.sh` (`CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1`) | phase-h5-approval (12) |
| B3 | **KMS key management**: sign audit/telemetry head via Vault Transit (key `exportable:false` → never leaves KMS) + key **rotation**; validated live | [implemented+tested] (live when Vault present; skip-aware otherwise) | `vault-kms.sh` (`rotate`, `assert-nonexportable`), `sign-audit-head.sh` | phase-h5-infra (KMS) |
| C5 | **External WORM audit**: ship audit head to a hash-linked append-only ledger; detect local rollback (`AUDIT_GAP_DETECTED`) and ledger tamper (`AUDIT_LEDGER_TAMPERED`) | [implemented+tested] (local ledger MVP) | `worm-ledger.py`, `audit-ship.sh`, `verify-audit-gap.sh` | phase-h5-infra (WORM) |

### Phase 5 — H6 AgentOps hardening (raises the lowest harness) — mixed

| ID | Control | Status | Where | Test |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | **Live alert dispatch**: alerts POST to a real HTTP webhook (severity routing, dedup window, retry); undelivered alerts fail-loud (`ALERT_DELIVERY_FAILED`, strict) and queue to a **dead-letter** file with redelivery (`--flush-deadletter`); wired into `agent-metrics.sh` (failing step ⇒ live page) | [implemented+tested] (live local webhook; production points at Slack/PagerDuty + on-call) | `alert-dispatch.sh`, `agent-metrics.sh` | phase-h6-agentops (①) |
| D2 | **Provider-telemetry API + reconciliation**: pull usage from a provider usage HTTP API (all-or-nothing schema gate, `PROVIDER_API_UNREACHABLE`/`PROVIDER_USAGE_INVALID` fail-loud) + reconcile local metrics vs provider ground truth — under-reporting/hidden runs ⇒ `TELEMETRY_DISCREPANCY` | [implemented+tested] (live local API endpoint; production points at OpenAI/Anthropic usage APIs) | `provider-usage-fetch.sh`, `telemetry-reconcile.sh` | phase-h6-agentops (②) |
| D3 | **Hosted dashboard**: dashboard served over HTTP with a stale-aware `/healthz` probe (fresh ⇒ 200 ok; telemetry silent-death ⇒ 503 stale — page-able by any uptime monitor) | [implemented+tested] (local HTTP daemon; production host = nginx/container, same routes) | `dashboard-serve.sh`, `dashboard-server.py` | phase-h6-agentops (③) |
| D4 | **Sliding-window circuit breaker (V15)**: failure **rate** over the last N calls trips `CIRCUIT_OPEN_WINDOW` — interleaving successes no longer evades the consecutive-failure breaker | [implemented+tested] | `circuit-breaker-check.sh` | phase-h6-agentops (④) |

### Phase 6 — Deep-gap closers (Track B + C6/C7, post-competition) — mixed

| ID | Control | Status | Where | Test |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C7 | **Incident response + kill-switch (V23)**: `incident.sh raise` grades severity (LOW/MED/HIGH/CRIT via `incident-severity.map`), records a routed entry (owner), and for HIGH/CRIT auto-engages the scoped `kill-switch.sh` (project/model/provider/global) + fires an alert; `casan-harness.sh` refuses to run under an engaged switch (opt-in) | [implemented+tested] | `incident.sh`, `kill-switch.sh`, `incident-runbook.md`, `incident-severity.map` | phase-c7-incident (15) |
| B1 | **Multilingual VI/JA injection (V2)**: VI/JA block-patterns (matched on raw UTF-8, anchored on the injection object) catch injections English regex missed, with 0 false positives on the benign VI/JA corpus | [implemented+tested] | `prompt-filter.yaml` (PI-VI-*, PI-JA-*) | phase-h4-multilingual (7) |
| C6 | **TRUE runtime isolation (V22)**: container sandbox (`--network=none --read-only --pids-limit --cap-drop=ALL`, workspace-only mount) — the kernel neutralises host-file reads / egress / out-of-workspace writes; upgrades the static scaffold | [implemented+tested] (live via Docker; skip-aware) | `sandbox-container.sh`, `sandbox-run.sh` (`CASAN_SANDBOX_MODE=container`) | phase-c6-sandbox (6) |
| B2 | **Split + classifier injection (V5,V6)**: `context-assemble-scan.sh` scans the concatenated context so a payload split across benign pieces is caught on assembly; verdict-steering patterns (PI-CLS-*) block content that tries to hijack the evaluator | [implemented+tested] | `context-assemble-scan.sh`, `prompt-filter.yaml` (PI-CLS-*) | phase-h4-split-inject (8) |
| B4 | **Model-digest pinning (V16)**: approved Ollama model digest pinned; router verifies live digest before generation/classify/judge; mismatch blocks by default with warn mode for rollout | [implemented+tested] | `model-digest-check.sh`, `model-call.py`, `packages/casan-harness/security/model-digest.pin` | phase3-model-router (digest cases) |
| Plan-10 | **Traceability REQ→code→test**: parse `FR-*`, require code+test mapping per FR, generate matrix, include it in Evidence Pack, **plus symbol/line-level refs** (object form `{file,symbols,lines}`; missing symbol/line ⇒ gate FAIL) | [implemented+tested] | `traceability-matrix.py`, `apps/okr/domain/traceability-map.json`, `docs/output/casan/traceability-matrix.json` | phase10-traceability (6) |

### Phase 7 — Local production-like infra lab (Tier-2 emulation) — [implemented+tested]

| Control | Status | Where | Test |
|---|---|---|---|
| Docker Compose lab for Vault KMS, OIDC/JWKS IdP, MinIO Object Lock WORM, dashboard behind nginx basic auth, alert webhook, and provider billing API mock | [implemented+tested] (local-prod emulation; managed prod services still required for Strong claim) | `infra/local-prod/docker-compose.yml`, `infra-lab.sh` | phase-prod-infra-lab (2); `infra-lab verify` internal 7/0 |

### Phase 8 — Plan-16 security-audit remediation (P0/P1/P2) — mixed

> Adversarial audit of the harness scripts (`CASAN_PLAN_16`) turned into fixes.
> Each control listed has an executable fail-able test in `packages/casan-harness/tests/phase-sec*`
> wired into `ci-harness-gate.sh`. **24 SEC suites = 118 checks, 0 fail (WSL).**

| ID | Control | Status | Where | Test |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEC-01 | **Unsigned = FAIL** in enforced mode (verify-audit-chain / verify-tool-audit / telemetry-integrity / evidence-pack): tamper→recompute→strip-sig no longer passes | [implemented+tested] | those verifiers (`CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT`/prod) | phase-sec01 (10) |
| SEC-02 | **KMS-anchor** for heads, no local auto-gen key in enforced mode | [implemented+tested] | `vault-kms.sh`, `sign-audit-head.sh` | phase-sec02 (3) |
| SEC-03 | **rollback-manager**: no `bash -c`, structured argv only (RCE closed) | [implemented+tested] | `rollback-manager.sh` | phase-sec03 (3) |
| SEC-04 | **action-gate fail-closed**: Python RC checked, default DENY | [implemented+tested] | `action-gate.sh` | phase-sec04 (4) |
| SEC-05 | **JSON-safe writers** (no log-injection forged records) | [implemented+tested] | `governance-check.sh`, `agent-metrics.sh`, `incident.sh` | phase-sec05 (4) |
| SEC-06 | **Control-plane / governance-report signed head** (no false CERTIFIED) | [implemented+tested] | `control-plane-settings.py`, `governance-report.py` | phase-sec06 (5) |
| SEC-07..10 | **Approval-JWT**, **pii fail-closed**, **input-caps/fail-closed read**, **non-spoofable identity** | [implemented+tested] | supply-chain/self-improve/CP · `pii-mask.py` · security-check/drift/compress · tool-registry/agent-metrics | phase-sec07/08/09/10 (7/4/7/5) |
| SEC-11 | **Enforce-by-default** (tool-output-scan/kill-switch/preflight) | ✅ **consolidated into SEC-17** | `CASAN_PROFILE=prod` | phase-sec17 |
| SEC-12..15 | **drift-invariant**, **SSRF allowlist**, **model-digest env-override ignored in prod** (SEC-14), **low-cluster** (typosquat≤2 / tool-exec fail-closed / nested schema recursion) | [implemented+tested] | drift-detect · provider-usage-fetch/JWKS/dashboard · `model-digest-check.sh` · supply-chain-scan/tool-exec/validate-tool-input | phase-sec12/13/14/15 (5/6/5/7) |
| SEC-16..21 | **bundle-integrity** (ARCH-01), **prod-profile enforce-by-default** (ARCH-03), **test-integrity** (ARCH-02), **atomic-store flock** (ARCH-05), **toolchain path-pin** (ARCH-04), **model/run budget** (ARCH-07) | [implemented+tested] | `bundle-integrity.py`, `test-integrity.py`, atomic writes, `toolchain-verify.sh`, budget checks | phase-sec16..21 (6/6/5/4/5/4) |
| SEC-27..30 | **log control-char strip** (X-02), **path-traversal realpath** (X-04), **audit fail-closed on disk-fail** (X-05), **approval-replay nonce/jti** (X-06) | [implemented+tested] | log writers, path-guard, audit append, `approval-verify.sh` | phase-sec27..30 (3/4/3/3) |
| SEC-26 | **stored / second-order injection** (X-01): scan golden-runs/red-team corpus/traceability-map/requirement with H4 before prompt-load; stored injection → BLOCK, missing source → fail-closed | [implemented+tested] | `stored-content-scan.sh` (→ `artifact-scan.sh`) | phase-sec26 (5) |
| SEC-22 | ARCH-06 **trusted-time for `exp`** (clock-skew defeated; file error fail-closed) + ARCH-08 **untrusted-telemetry tag** in self-improve (unsigned metrics → untrusted; enforced apply of an untrusted proposal BLOCKED). ARCH-10 external attestation is an external track (like TIER-2) | [implemented+tested] | `approval-verify.sh`, `self-improve.py` | phase-sec22 (9) |
| SEC-23 | MT-01/02/03/04 **multi-tenant partition** (Phase 1–5 offline): tenant-store + cross-tenant guard + secure-by-default; per-tenant control-plane settings/audit-chain + telemetry; RBAC data-boundary + casan-harness tenant-scoping; tenant kill-switch + per-tenant cost/quota; **signed tenant registry** (unsigned/tampered/forged → refuse); **per-tenant encryption at rest** (local-key; tenant B cannot read tenant A's plaintext). Only 23.11 (Vault Transit non-exportable) needs infra | [implemented+tested] (offline; 23.11 KMS planned) | `tenant-store.sh`, `tenant-paths.sh`, `tenant-registry-verify.sh`, `tenant-crypt.sh`, `control-plane-settings.py`, `rbac-check.py`, `casan-harness.sh`, `kill-switch.sh`, `cost-spike-detect.sh` | phase-sec23-tenant-store (10), -state-isolation (9), -rbac-tenant (6), -scope (4), -registry-crypt (7) |
| SEC-24 | SC-05/06 (offline): **image digest-pin lint** (reject floating tags) + **signed/verified CI workflow** (unsigned/tampered/forged → refuse). Live CVE/OSV + real image scan need infra | [partial] | `supply-chain-integrity.sh` | phase-sec24 (8) |
| SEC-25 | SC-07 (offline): **build-artifact attestation** — sign artifact hash + verify tested==deployed (swap/forged/unsigned → refuse). Signed-commit enrollment + full SLSA chain need CI/key infra | [partial] | `artifact-attest.sh` | phase-sec25 (5) |
| SEC-24 | SC-04/05/06: SCA + pin runner/base-image + signed workflow | [planned] | — | — |
| SEC-25 | SC-07: signed commits + SLSA-style attestation | [planned] | — | — |
| SEC-26 | X-01: scan golden/corpus/map with H4 on prompt-load (stored injection) | [implemented+tested] | `stored-content-scan.sh` | phase-sec26 (5) |

## 2. Test inventory (all suites)

| Suite | Checks | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `run-casan4-harness-tests.sh` | 35 | Baseline happy-path + Level-5 evidence (unchanged) |
| `adversarial-harness-tests.sh` | 44 | Original adversarial battery (unchanged) |
| `phase1-track-a-tests.sh` | 25 | Track A hardening |
| `phase2-track-c-tests.sh` | 29 | Track C-MVP |
| `phase3-evidence-pack-tests.sh` | 7 | Evidence Pack MVP |
| `phase-h5-approval-tests.sh` | 12 | Approval-identity (C4) + mock IdP/OIDC JWT |
| `phase-h5-infra-tests.sh` | 7 | KMS (B3, live/skip-aware) + WORM (C5) |
| `phase-h6-agentops-tests.sh` | 20 | live alerting (D1) + provider-API/reconcile (D2) + hosted dashboard (D3) + window breaker (D4); against live local HTTP endpoints |
| `phase-c7-incident-tests.sh` | 15 | **New** — incident severity + scoped kill-switch (C7) + wrapper enforcement |
| `phase-h4-multilingual-tests.sh` | 7 | **New** — VI/JA injection block + benign VI/JA 0-FP (B1) |
| `phase-c6-sandbox-tests.sh` | 6 | **New** — TRUE container isolation (C6, live via Docker / skip-aware) |
| `phase-h4-split-inject-tests.sh` | 8 | **New** — split-injection assembly scan + classifier-inject (B2) |
| `phase10-traceability-tests.sh` | 6 | **New** — Plan-10 FR→code→test matrix + fail-able missing-test gate + **symbol/line-level** refs (missing symbol/line ⇒ FAIL) |
| `phase08-compression-tests.sh` | 9 | **New** — Plan-08 CASAN-native token-killer: dedup/extractive/structural + must-keep preserve + tee raw-passthrough + fail-able must-keep gate + **settings-govern-harness** (compression.enabled) |
| `phase-control-plane-tests.sh` | 9 | **New** — Plan-13 harness-owned governed settings: deny-by-default + approval gate + versioning/rollback + audit hash-chain tamper detection + effective-setting resolver |
| `phase-rbac-tests.sh` | 12 | **New** — Plan-14 harness-owned RBAC: deny-by-default + action gating + tenant isolation + sensitive-requires-org-admin + Separation of Duties + IdP-claim→role mapping |
| `phase-rbac-audit-tests.sh` | 5 | **New** — Plan-14 RBAC decision audit into an H5-style oversight log (ALLOW/DENY recorded, append-only, cross-tenant reason; opt-in `CASAN_RBAC_AUDIT_LOG`) |
| `phase-rai-tests.sh` | 12 | **New** — Plan-15 harness-owned Responsible AI & Data Governance: data classification + PII→cloud denial without approval + model-card enforcement + retention gate/purge-audit + RAI aggregate report |
| `phase-selfimprove-tests.sh` | 7 | **New** — Plan-04 self-improve core: telemetry→proposal (dry-run) + apply-requires-approval + governed-store application + sensitive-needs-approval |
| `phase-governance-report-tests.sh` | 5 | **New** — Plan-09 tie-in: unified governance evidence report (traceability+RBAC+RAI+audit+self-improve) + certified-run gate (tampered audit ⇒ NOT_CERTIFIED) |
| `phase-preflight-tests.sh` | 5 | **New** — Plan-15/13 enforcement wiring: harness preflight blocks PII→cloud without approval BEFORE the model call; `model-router` honors `CASAN_PREFLIGHT` (opt-in, short-circuits) |
| `phase-prod-infra-lab-tests.sh` | 2 | **New optional/local-prod** — Docker Compose infra lab starts + verifies Vault/IdP/MinIO/dashboard/alert/billing |
| `phase-sec{01..30}` + `phase-sec23-tenant-store/-state-isolation/-rbac-tenant/-scope/-registry-crypt` + `phase-sec24` + `phase-sec25` (33 suites) | 181 | **New — Plan-16 security-audit remediation P0/P1/P2** (each control has a fail-able adversarial test; wired into `ci-harness-gate.sh`): SEC-01..21 P0/P1/arch controls; trusted-time for JWT exp + untrusted-telemetry tag (SEC-22, ARCH-06/08); **multi-tenant partition (SEC-23 Phase 1–5 offline, MT-01/02/03/04)**; **supply-chain image-pin + signed workflow (SEC-24 offline)**; **build-artifact attestation tested==deployed (SEC-25 offline)**; stored/second-order injection scan (SEC-26); log control-char strip, path-traversal, audit fail-closed, approval-replay nonce (SEC-27..30) |
| `phase-loop-governor` + `phase-loop-convergence` + `phase-loop-gate` + `phase-loop-trace` + `phase-loop-metaloop` + `phase-loop-run` (6 suites) | 97 | **New — Plan-17 Agentic Loop Governance T1–T6** (deny-by-default, fail-closed; wired into `ci-harness-gate.sh`; state redirected via `CASAN_LOOP_STATE_ROOT`, repo `.specify/state` stays clean): **Loop Budget Governor** (loop-breaker: no/corrupt policy → strict ceiling/HALT, on_exceed halt/escalate) 15; **Convergence detector** (repeat/thrash → OSCILLATING, flat progress → STALLED, fail-closed) 15; **Per-iteration Verify Contract** (H4 block → DENY, unmet → FAIL, bounded correction → ESCALATE, no self-declared DONE) 20; **Loop Trace/Replay** (append-only hash-linked; edited record → chain BREAK; tampered artifact → replay DRIFT; KMS-anchor is TIER-2/A7) 16; **Meta-loop** (propose≠apply; SoD proposer≠approver; loosen>org-ceiling refused; applied via governed CP store → actually changes governor; rollback reverts) 15; **Orchestrator** `loop-run.sh` (gate→governor→convergence→trace per turn; DONE/HALT/ESCALATE; secure-by-default prod opt-out refused; between-turn compaction) 16 |
| **Total** | **563 core + 2 local-prod infra lab** | Baseline 79 preserved; +206 governance checks (traceability/compression/control-plane/RBAC/RBAC-audit/RAI/self-improve/governance-report/preflight) + **+181 Plan-16 SEC-remediation checks across 33 suites** (all fail-able; SEC-11⊂SEC-17; SEC-22 done ARCH-06/08 — ARCH-10 external; **SEC-23 Phase 1–5 offline done — only 23.11 Vault-KMS planned**; **SEC-24/25 offline slice done — live-CVE/image-scan + signed-commit/SLSA need infra**) + **+97 Plan-17 loop-engineering checks across 6 suites** (Governor/Convergence/Verify-contract/Trace-Replay/Meta-loop/Orchestrator — all 5 loop primitives + orchestrator, fail-closed; remaining infra-gated: T4 KMS-anchor head [A7], T6 Command Center widget 17.22 [C5], live H3-judge). Full-suite green verified on CI/Mac with Ollama+Docker; the deterministic new suites verify **in WSL** (msys+Python Windows path skew). Preflight wiring is opt-in (`CASAN_PREFLIGHT` default off). Direct `phase3-model-router-tests.sh` adds 11/0 (3 cases need live Ollama); `infra-lab verify` adds 7 internal infra checks. |

Run order note: `run-casan4-harness-tests.sh` does `rm -rf .specify/logs`, so run it
**first** and never concurrently with the other suites.

## 3. What is NOT done (still planned — do not claim as production-ready)

| Area | Status | Plan ref |
|---|---|---|
| Production model provenance beyond local Ollama digest | [partial] — local model digest pinning is implemented+tested; cloud provider model attestations/SBOM-style provenance still planned | Plan-07 B4 (V16) |
| Live alerting to a managed channel (Slack/PagerDuty + on-call rota) | [partial] — webhook dispatch + dedup + dead-letter done; managed channel & escalation are config away, incident workflow is C7 | Plan-07 C7 / Phase 5 D1 |
| Hosted telemetry dashboard | [partial] — HTTP-served dashboard + stale-aware `/healthz` done locally; deployed host (nginx/container, auth) planned | Phase 5 D3 |
| Provider billing-API telemetry | [partial] — API fetch + schema gate + local-vs-provider reconciliation done against a live local endpoint; real OpenAI/Anthropic usage-API calls (needs keys) planned | Phase 5 D2 |
| True runtime isolation | [partial] — real container isolation done + validated live via Docker (C6 phase-6); nsjail/rootless + a hardened base image for CI still planned | Plan-07 C6 (V22) |
| KMS key management (rotation, non-exportable) | [partial] — Vault Transit path implemented + validated live; not yet the default (local-key fallback), no HSM/short-lived IdP tokens | Plan-07 B3 |
| Reviewer approval workflow | [partial] — cryptographic **approval-identity** done + Docker mock **IdP/OIDC JWKS** done; enterprise IdP/JWKS + policy versioning/diff still planned | Plan-07 C4 (V20) |
| External append-only (WORM) audit | [partial] — hash-linked local ledger + rollback/tamper detection done; true WORM store (S3 Object Lock/QLDB) + trusted timestamp planned | Plan-07 C5 (V21) |
| Live CVE/OSV scanning wired in | [partial] — availability detected; local denylist authoritative offline | Plan-07 C2 follow-up |

## 4. Honest claim

Track A + Track C-MVP + Evidence Pack + H5/H6 hardening + the deep-gap closers
(C7 incident/kill-switch, VI/JA multilingual, true container isolation, split &
classifier injection) raise H4/H5/H6 from "PoC/demo (~3.0/5)" to **early
internal-production hardening**, with executable adversarial tests for every
control (**218 core checks, 0 fail** — last full harness run 2026-07-06; KMS + container
isolation validated live/skip-aware via Vault dev + Docker). Fair maturity score
(`00_SUBMISSION_PACKAGE/evidence/scoring-run-report.md`): **H4 80→83** (multilingual
+ split/classifier closed), **H2 80→82** (real sandbox isolation), C7 incident
dimension closed; **H5 and H6 remain at 80** (their remaining gaps are infra), so the
**lowest harness stays 80** — CASAN **Level 4**, proven by attack. This is **not** full
production readiness: crossing the whole pipeline into "Strong (81+)" still needs the
H5/H6 infra items — enterprise IdP/JWKS, a true WORM store (S3 Object Lock/QLDB),
KMS-by-default + HSM, a deployed dashboard host with TLS/OIDC + managed alert channel/on-call, and
real billing-API telemetry — the [partial]/[planned] rows above and in
`CASAN_PLAN_07_PRODUCTION_HARDENING.md`.