#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

# CASAN Level 5 unified harness wrapper.
# Usage:
#   casan-harness.sh <input-file> <output-file> [action-name] [-- <command> ...]
#
# Flow:
#   H4 input security -> H5 governance -> H6 metrics around execution/cache -> H4 output filter

INPUT_FILE="${1:-}"
FINAL_OUTPUT="${2:-}"
ACTION_NAME="${3:-agent_step}"
shift 3 || true
if [[ "${1:-}" == "--" ]]; then
  shift
fi

if [[ -z "$INPUT_FILE" || -z "$FINAL_OUTPUT" ]]; then
  echo "Usage: casan-harness.sh <input-file> <output-file> [action-name] [-- <command> ...]" >&2
  exit 64
fi

SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/casan-paths.sh"
PROJECT_ROOT="$CASAN_APP_ROOT"
KERNEL_CLI="$CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT/scripts/python/kernel_cli.py"
# SEC-23 (MT-01): make state (control-plane settings, telemetry, audit) tenant-scoped
# when CASAN_TENANT_ID is set, so a run for tenant A never touches tenant B's state.
# No-op when no tenant is set (baseline unchanged); invalid tenant fails closed.
# shellcheck source=tenant-paths.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/tenant-paths.sh"
TMP_DIR="$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/tmp"
CACHE_DIR="$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/idempotency"
mkdir -p "$TMP_DIR" "$CACHE_DIR" "$(dirname "$FINAL_OUTPUT")"

# Shared log taxonomy (error<warn<info<debug<trace via CASAN_LOG_LEVEL).
# debug shows each harness phase with its rc; stderr only, stdout untouched.
# shellcheck source=casan-log.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/casan-log.sh"

# Optional machine-readable phase report (one JSON object per invocation).
# The Boss orchestrator sets CASAN_PHASE_REPORT per step so it can log per-
# harness rc at debug level and persist them into pipeline-run.jsonl.
PHASE_REPORT="${CASAN_PHASE_REPORT:-}"
PHASE_LOG=""
CACHE_STATUS="none"

record_phase() { # <phase-name> <rc>
  casan_log debug harness "action=$ACTION_NAME phase=$1 rc=$2"
  PHASE_LOG="${PHASE_LOG:+$PHASE_LOG,}{\"phase\":\"$1\",\"rc\":$2}"
}

write_phase_report() {
  [[ -n "$PHASE_REPORT" ]] || return 0
  printf '{"action":"%s","cache":"%s","phases":[%s]}\n' \
    "$ACTION_NAME" "$CACHE_STATUS" "$PHASE_LOG" > "$PHASE_REPORT" 2>/dev/null || true
}

emit_failed_kernel() { # phase rc — best effort, never masks the original failure
  local failed_phase="$1" failed_rc="$2"
  [[ -f "$KERNEL_CLI" ]] || return 0
  local run_id="${EXECUTION_ID:-native-failed-${TRACE_SUFFIX:-$$}}"
  local mode="${NATIVE_MODE:-observe}"
  local event bundle path
  event="$(CASAN_NATIVE_RISK="${ACTION_RISK_JSON:-}" python3 - "$run_id" "$ACTION_NAME" "$mode" "$failed_phase" "$failed_rc" "${CASAN_ACTOR:-${CASAN_AGENT:-}}" <<'PY'
import json, os, sys
run_id, action, mode, phase, rc, actor = sys.argv[1:]
try: risk = json.loads(os.environ.get("CASAN_NATIVE_RISK") or "{}")
except ValueError: risk = {}
print(json.dumps({
  "run_id": run_id, "correlation_id": run_id, "action": action,
  "tool": action, "actor": actor, "mode": mode,
  "environment": os.environ.get("CASAN_PROFILE", "development"),
  "execution_status": "failed", "assurance_status": "failed",
  "certification_status": "non_certified", "policy_decisions": [risk] if risk else [],
  "extensions": {"failed_phase": phase, "exit_code": int(rc)},
}, separators=(",", ":")))
PY
)" || return 0
  bundle="$(printf '%s' "$event" | python3 "$KERNEL_CLI" adapt-native - 2>/dev/null)" || return 0
  path="$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/kernel/$run_id.json"
  CASAN_KERNEL_BUNDLE="$bundle" python3 - "$path" <<'PY' || return 0
import json, os, sys, tempfile
path = sys.argv[1]; payload = json.loads(os.environ["CASAN_KERNEL_BUNDLE"])
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".kernel-", dir=os.path.dirname(path))
try:
    with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
        json.dump(payload, handle, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")); handle.write("\n")
        handle.flush(); os.fsync(handle.fileno())
    os.replace(tmp, path)
finally:
    try: os.unlink(tmp)
    except OSError: pass
PY
}

run_phase() { # <phase-name> <command...> — preserves the failing rc exactly
  local phase="$1"; shift
  local rc=0
  "$@" || rc=$?
  record_phase "$phase" "$rc"
  if [[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]]; then
    emit_failed_kernel "$phase" "$rc"
    write_phase_report
    exit "$rc"
  fi
}

hash_text() {
  if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    sha256sum | awk '{print $1}'
  else
    shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}'
  fi
}

CMD_STR="${*:-no_cmd}"
NATIVE_MODE="${CASAN_ENFORCEMENT_MODE:-}"
if [[ -z "$NATIVE_MODE" ]]; then
  if [[ "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "prod" || "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "production" || "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "strict" ]]; then NATIVE_MODE="enforce"; else NATIVE_MODE="observe"; fi
fi
case "$NATIVE_MODE" in observe|enforce) : ;; *) NATIVE_MODE="enforce"; casan_log error harness "INVALID_ENFORCEMENT_MODE fail_closed=enforce" ;; esac
INPUT_HASH="$(cat "$INPUT_FILE" | hash_text)"
CMD_HASH="$(printf '%s' "$CMD_STR" | hash_text)"
IDEMPOTENCY_KEY="$(printf '%s|%s|%s' "$INPUT_HASH" "$CMD_HASH" "$ACTION_NAME" | hash_text)"
EXECUTION_ID="${CASAN_EXECUTION_ID:-native-${IDEMPOTENCY_KEY:0:24}}"
export CASAN_EXECUTION_ID="$EXECUTION_ID"
CACHE_META="$CACHE_DIR/$IDEMPOTENCY_KEY.json"
CACHE_OUT="$CACHE_DIR/$IDEMPOTENCY_KEY.output"

TRACE_SUFFIX="$(date +%s)-$$"
SAFE_INPUT="$TMP_DIR/security-input-$TRACE_SUFFIX.txt"
APPROVED_INPUT="$TMP_DIR/governance-approved-$TRACE_SUFFIX.txt"
RAW_OUTPUT="$TMP_DIR/raw-output-$TRACE_SUFFIX.txt"

casan_log debug harness "action=$ACTION_NAME input=$INPUT_FILE output=$FINAL_OUTPUT key=${IDEMPOTENCY_KEY:0:12}…"

# C7: honor an engaged kill-switch before doing any work (incident containment).
# Opt-in (default off) so the baseline is unchanged. SEC-17 (ARCH-03): under
# CASAN_PROFILE=prod it defaults ON (secure-by-default); an explicit =0 still wins.
if [[ "${CASAN_KILLSWITCH_ENFORCE:-0}" == "1" || ( -z "${CASAN_KILLSWITCH_ENFORCE+x}" && ( "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "prod" || "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "production" || "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "strict" ) ) ]]; then
  KS_SCOPE="${CASAN_KILLSWITCH_SCOPE:-project}"
  KS_ID="${CASAN_KILLSWITCH_ID:-${CASAN_PROJECT:-current}}"
  if ! bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/kill-switch.sh" check "$KS_SCOPE" "$KS_ID" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    casan_log error harness "KILL_SWITCH_ACTIVE scope=$KS_SCOPE id=$KS_ID — refusing to run $ACTION_NAME"
    : > "$FINAL_OUTPUT"
    echo "KILL_SWITCH_ACTIVE scope=$KS_SCOPE id=$KS_ID action=$ACTION_NAME" >&2
    exit 2
  fi
  # SEC-23 (MT-03): a tenant-scoped switch halts ONLY its own tenant (noisy-neighbor
  # isolation) — tenant A's emergency stop must not stop tenant B.
  if [[ -n "${CASAN_TENANT_ID:-}" ]] \
     && ! bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/kill-switch.sh" check tenant "$CASAN_TENANT_ID" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    casan_log error harness "KILL_SWITCH_ACTIVE scope=tenant id=$CASAN_TENANT_ID — refusing to run $ACTION_NAME"
    : > "$FINAL_OUTPUT"
    echo "KILL_SWITCH_ACTIVE scope=tenant id=$CASAN_TENANT_ID action=$ACTION_NAME" >&2
    exit 2
  fi
fi

# SEC-16 (ARCH-01): in enforced mode, verify the harness+policy bundle against its
# signed manifest and REFUSE to run on any drift — editing a gate/policy is a bypass
# that leaves no input trace. Only active when a manifest is provisioned (so dev and
# prod-without-a-manifest are unaffected); a present-but-drifted bundle fails closed.
if [[ ( "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "prod" || "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "production" || "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "strict" || "${CASAN_VERIFY_STRICT:-}" == "1" ) \
      && -f "$SCRIPT_DIR/bundle-integrity.py" ]]; then
  BUNDLE_MANIFEST="${CASAN_BUNDLE_MANIFEST:-$CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT/harness-bundle-manifest.json}"
  if [[ -f "$BUNDLE_MANIFEST" ]]; then
    if ! python "$SCRIPT_DIR/bundle-integrity.py" verify >/dev/null 2>&1; then
      casan_log error harness "BUNDLE_INTEGRITY_DRIFT — refusing to run $ACTION_NAME (harness/policy modified vs signed manifest)"
      : > "$FINAL_OUTPUT"
      echo "BUNDLE_INTEGRITY_DRIFT action=$ACTION_NAME (harness or policy modified vs signed manifest)" >&2
      exit 2
    fi
  fi
fi

run_phase "H4-in" "$SCRIPT_DIR/security-check.sh" "$INPUT_FILE" "$SAFE_INPUT" input
run_phase "H5" "$SCRIPT_DIR/governance-check.sh" "$SAFE_INPUT" "$APPROVED_INPUT" "$ACTION_NAME"

# Canonical action classification decides whether the H2 registry and isolated
# executor are required. A classifier failure is treated as unknown/high-risk.
ACTION_RISK_JSON=""
ACTION_RISK_RC=0
ACTION_RISK_JSON="$(python3 "$KERNEL_CLI" risk --action "$ACTION_NAME" --tool "$ACTION_NAME" \
  --command "$CMD_STR" --content-file "$SAFE_INPUT" --actor "${CASAN_ACTOR:-${CASAN_AGENT:-}}" \
  --environment "${CASAN_PROFILE:-development}" 2>/dev/null)" || ACTION_RISK_RC=$?
if [[ "$ACTION_RISK_RC" -eq 0 && -n "$ACTION_RISK_JSON" ]]; then
  ACTION_FIELDS="$(python3 - "$ACTION_RISK_JSON" <<'PY'
import json, sys
p=json.loads(sys.argv[1])
print("%s\t%s" % ("1" if p["side_effecting"] else "0", p["action_class"]))
PY
)" || ACTION_RISK_RC=$?
fi
if [[ "$ACTION_RISK_RC" -eq 0 && -n "${ACTION_FIELDS:-}" ]]; then
  IFS=$'\t' read -r SIDE_EFFECTING ACTION_CLASS <<< "$ACTION_FIELDS"
else
  SIDE_EFFECTING=1
  ACTION_CLASS="unknown"
  casan_log error harness "ACTION_CLASSIFIER_FAILED_CLOSED action=$ACTION_NAME"
fi

if [[ "$SIDE_EFFECTING" == "1" ]]; then
  REGISTRY_ARGS=(registry-config --mode "$NATIVE_MODE" --profile "${CASAN_PROFILE:-development}" \
    --evidence-log "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/policy/h2-registry-config.jsonl")
  [[ -n "${CASAN_H2_REGISTRY+x}" ]] && REGISTRY_ARGS+=(--explicit "$CASAN_H2_REGISTRY")
  REGISTRY_RC=0
  REGISTRY_JSON="$(python3 "$KERNEL_CLI" "${REGISTRY_ARGS[@]}")" || REGISTRY_RC=$?
  if [[ "$REGISTRY_RC" -ne 0 ]]; then
    record_phase "H2-config" "$REGISTRY_RC"
    echo "H2_REGISTRY_CONFIGURATION_DENIED $REGISTRY_JSON" >&2
    write_phase_report
    exit "$REGISTRY_RC"
  fi
  REGISTRY_ENABLED="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print("1" if json.load(sys.stdin)["enabled"] else "0")' <<< "$REGISTRY_JSON")"
  if [[ "$REGISTRY_ENABLED" == "1" ]]; then
    H2_ACTION="$ACTION_NAME"
    case "$ACTION_CLASS" in
      write) H2_ACTION="write_file" ;;
      delete) H2_ACTION="delete_file" ;;
      database_mutation) H2_ACTION="db_write" ;;
      deployment|release|infrastructure_modification) H2_ACTION="deploy" ;;
      external_network_side_effect) H2_ACTION="external_api" ;;
      unknown) H2_ACTION="unknown_tool" ;;
    esac
    run_phase "H2-gate" python3 "$KERNEL_CLI" h2-gate \
      --gate "${CASAN_H2_GATE_PATH:-$SCRIPT_DIR/tool-registry-gate.sh}" --mode "$NATIVE_MODE" \
      --actor "${CASAN_ACTOR:-${CASAN_AGENT:-}}" --action "$H2_ACTION" --tool "$ACTION_NAME" \
      --execution-id "$EXECUTION_ID" --enforcement-path "native_harness.pre_execution.h2_registry" \
      --idempotency-key "$IDEMPOTENCY_KEY" --timeout "${CASAN_H2_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS:-8}" \
      --evidence-log "$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/policy/h2-decisions.jsonl"
  else
    casan_log warn harness "HIGH H2 registry unsafe development/test bypass active; run is non-certifiable"
  fi
fi

# T4: propagate step name so any nested model calls (model-call.py) log against the same step
# name, enabling provider-cost-lookup.py to match real Ollama token counts in agent-metrics.sh.
export CASAN_STEP_NAME="${CASAN_STEP_NAME:-$ACTION_NAME}"

# WP-S5: wrap command execution under a hard wall-clock timeout (tool-exec.sh).
# Prevents runaway or hung tool calls from blocking the pipeline indefinitely.
TOOL_TIMEOUT="${CASAN_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECONDS:-30}"

if [[ -f "$CACHE_META" && -f "$CACHE_OUT" ]]; then
  CACHE_STATUS="cached"
  run_phase "H6-exec" "$SCRIPT_DIR/agent-metrics.sh" "$APPROVED_INPUT" "$RAW_OUTPUT" -- bash -c 'cp "$1" "$CASAN_OUTPUT"' _ "$CACHE_OUT"
elif [[ "$#" -gt 0 ]]; then
  CACHE_STATUS="stored"
  if [[ "$SIDE_EFFECTING" == "1" && "$NATIVE_MODE" == "enforce" ]]; then
    run_phase "H6-exec" env CASAN_ENFORCEMENT_MODE="$NATIVE_MODE" "$SCRIPT_DIR/agent-metrics.sh" "$APPROVED_INPUT" "$RAW_OUTPUT" -- \
      "$SCRIPT_DIR/sandbox-run.sh" --workspace "$PROJECT_ROOT" --timeout "$TOOL_TIMEOUT" -- "$@"
  else
    run_phase "H6-exec" "$SCRIPT_DIR/agent-metrics.sh" "$APPROVED_INPUT" "$RAW_OUTPUT" -- \
      "$SCRIPT_DIR/tool-exec.sh" "$TOOL_TIMEOUT" -- "$@"
  fi
else
  CACHE_STATUS="stored"
  run_phase "H6-exec" "$SCRIPT_DIR/agent-metrics.sh" "$APPROVED_INPUT" "$RAW_OUTPUT"
fi

TOOL_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES="${CASAN_TOOL_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES:-1048576}"
if [[ ! "$TOOL_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES" =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ ]]; then
  casan_log error harness "TOOL_OUTPUT_LIMIT_INVALID value=$TOOL_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES"
  : > "$FINAL_OUTPUT"
  exit 2
fi
RAW_OUTPUT_BYTES="$(wc -c < "$RAW_OUTPUT" | tr -d ' ')"
if [[ "$RAW_OUTPUT_BYTES" -gt "$TOOL_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES" ]]; then
  record_phase "H4-output-size" 2
  casan_log error harness "TOOL_OUTPUT_QUARANTINED bytes=$RAW_OUTPUT_BYTES limit=$TOOL_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES"
  : > "$FINAL_OUTPUT"
  write_phase_report
  echo "TOOL_OUTPUT_QUARANTINED reason=output_size_limit bytes=$RAW_OUTPUT_BYTES limit=$TOOL_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES" >&2
  exit 2
fi

# V7: tool output can carry indirect injection that would re-enter a downstream
# model's context. Scan RAW_OUTPUT for injection/secret patterns before it is
# reused. Mode: off | warn (default) | block. Strict mode upgrades to block.
# warn keeps existing behaviour (logged, non-blocking) so benign drafts are not
# broken; block enforces (fail-closed) for production/strict runs.
TOOL_OUTPUT_SCAN_MODE="${CASAN_TOOL_OUTPUT_SCAN:-}"
if [[ -z "$TOOL_OUTPUT_SCAN_MODE" ]]; then
  # SEC-17/M-02: prod profile defaults tool-output scanning to block (fail-closed).
  if [[ "${CASAN_SECURITY_STRICT:-0}" == "1" || ( -z "${CASAN_SECURITY_STRICT+x}" && ( "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "prod" || "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "production" || "${CASAN_PROFILE:-}" == "strict" ) ) ]]; then TOOL_OUTPUT_SCAN_MODE="block"; else TOOL_OUTPUT_SCAN_MODE="warn"; fi
fi
if [[ "$TOOL_OUTPUT_SCAN_MODE" != "off" ]]; then
  TOS_RC=0
  "$SCRIPT_DIR/tool-output-scan.sh" "$RAW_OUTPUT" "$ACTION_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || TOS_RC=$?
  record_phase "H4-tool-output" "$TOS_RC"
  if [[ "$TOS_RC" -eq 2 ]]; then
    if [[ "$TOOL_OUTPUT_SCAN_MODE" == "block" ]]; then
      casan_log error harness "TOOL_OUTPUT_INJECTION_BLOCKED action=$ACTION_NAME"
      : > "$FINAL_OUTPUT"
      write_phase_report
      echo "TOOL_OUTPUT_INJECTION_BLOCKED action=$ACTION_NAME" >&2
      exit 2
    else
      casan_log warn harness "TOOL_OUTPUT_INJECTION_SUSPECTED action=$ACTION_NAME mode=warn hint=set_CASAN_TOOL_OUTPUT_SCAN=block_or_CASAN_SECURITY_STRICT=1_to_enforce"
    fi
  fi
fi

run_phase "H4-out" "$SCRIPT_DIR/security-check.sh" "$RAW_OUTPUT" "$FINAL_OUTPUT" output

if [[ "$CACHE_STATUS" == "stored" ]]; then
  cat <<EOF > "$CACHE_META"
{
  "idempotency_key": "$IDEMPOTENCY_KEY",
  "timestamp": "$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")",
  "action": "$ACTION_NAME",
  "command": "$(printf '%s' "$CMD_STR" | sed 's/"/\\"/g')",
  "output_hash": "$(cat "$FINAL_OUTPUT" | hash_text)"
}
EOF
  cp "$FINAL_OUTPUT" "$CACHE_OUT"
fi

# Dual-emit the framework-independent kernel envelope. Legacy phase reports and
# outputs remain unchanged; the canonical contract is an additive artifact.
TRUST_JSON="$(python3 "$KERNEL_CLI" trust-capabilities 2>/dev/null || true)"
RUN_CERTIFICATION="non_certified"
RUN_ASSURANCE="passed"
[[ "$NATIVE_MODE" == "observe" ]] && RUN_ASSURANCE="degraded"
if [[ "$NATIVE_MODE" == "enforce" && -n "$TRUST_JSON" ]]; then
  TRUST_CERTIFIABLE="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print("1" if json.load(sys.stdin).get("certifiable") else "0")' <<< "$TRUST_JSON" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
  REGISTRY_BYPASS="$(printf '%s' "${REGISTRY_JSON:-{}}" | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print("1" if json.load(sys.stdin).get("unsafe_bypass") else "0")' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
  [[ "$REGISTRY_BYPASS" == "1" ]] && RUN_ASSURANCE="degraded"
  [[ "$TRUST_CERTIFIABLE" == "1" && "$REGISTRY_BYPASS" == "0" ]] && RUN_CERTIFICATION="certified"
fi
NATIVE_EVENT="$(CASAN_NATIVE_RISK="$ACTION_RISK_JSON" python3 - "$EXECUTION_ID" "$ACTION_NAME" "$ACTION_CLASS" "$NATIVE_MODE" "$RUN_ASSURANCE" "$RUN_CERTIFICATION" "${CASAN_ACTOR:-${CASAN_AGENT:-}}" "$INPUT_HASH" "$CMD_HASH" <<'PY'
import json, os, sys
run_id, action, action_class, mode, assurance, certification, actor, input_hash, command_hash = sys.argv[1:]
try:
    risk = json.loads(os.environ.get("CASAN_NATIVE_RISK") or "{}")
except ValueError:
    risk = {}
print(json.dumps({
    "run_id": run_id, "correlation_id": run_id, "action": action,
    "tool": action, "actor": actor, "mode": mode,
    "environment": os.environ.get("CASAN_PROFILE", "development"),
    "execution_status": "success", "assurance_status": assurance,
    "certification_status": certification,
    "policy_decisions": [risk] if risk else [],
    "extensions": {"input_hash": input_hash, "command_hash": command_hash, "action_class": action_class},
}, separators=(",", ":")))
PY
)"
KERNEL_RC=0
KERNEL_BUNDLE="$(printf '%s' "$NATIVE_EVENT" | python3 "$KERNEL_CLI" adapt-native -)" || KERNEL_RC=$?
if [[ "$KERNEL_RC" -ne 0 ]]; then
  casan_log error harness "KERNEL_CONTRACT_EMISSION_FAILED rc=$KERNEL_RC"
  if [[ "$NATIVE_MODE" == "enforce" ]]; then
    : > "$FINAL_OUTPUT"
    exit 2
  fi
  RUN_CERTIFICATION="non_certified"
else
  KERNEL_PATH="$CASAN_STATE_ROOT/logs/kernel/$EXECUTION_ID.json"
  python3 - "$KERNEL_PATH" "$KERNEL_BUNDLE" <<'PY'
import json, os, sys, tempfile
path, raw = sys.argv[1:]
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
payload = json.loads(raw)
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".kernel-", dir=os.path.dirname(path))
try:
    with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
        json.dump(payload, handle, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
        handle.write("\n")
        handle.flush(); os.fsync(handle.fileno())
    os.replace(tmp, path)
finally:
    try: os.unlink(tmp)
    except OSError: pass
PY
fi

write_phase_report
casan_log debug harness "action=$ACTION_NAME complete cache=$CACHE_STATUS"
echo "CASAN_HARNESS_COMPLETE cache=$CACHE_STATUS key=$IDEMPOTENCY_KEY execution=success assurance=$RUN_ASSURANCE certification=$RUN_CERTIFICATION output=$FINAL_OUTPUT"