#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -uo pipefail

# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-27 (X-02) — strip control/ANSI chars from log output.
#
# Log messages carry attacker-influenced data (action names, tool-output snippets).
# A raw ESC/CSI sequence can rewrite a reviewer's terminal; a raw CR/LF can inject a
# fake log line. casan_log now strips control chars (keeping tab). Proves the ESC
# byte and embedded newlines are removed while the visible text survives.
#
# Deterministic; no model/network.

SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"

PASS=0; FAIL=0
pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }

echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-27: log control-char stripping ====="

# shellcheck source=/dev/null
source "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash/casan-log.sh"

PAYLOAD="$(printf 'start\033[31mRED\033[0m\nFAKE [ERROR] injected-audit-line')"
OUT="$(casan_log error test "$PAYLOAD" 2>&1)"

if printf '%s' "$OUT" | od -An -c | grep -q '033'; then
  fail "ESC byte survived into the log (terminal-escape injection)"
else
  pass "ESC byte stripped from log output"
fi

LINES="$(printf '%s\n' "$OUT" | grep -c .)"
[[ "$LINES" -eq 1 ]] \
  && pass "embedded newline stripped — no injected second log line" \
  || fail "log emitted $LINES lines (newline injection)"

printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -q "start" && printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -q "RED" \
  && pass "visible text preserved (only control bytes removed)" \
  || fail "visible text lost"

echo ""
echo "===== SEC-27 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1