Under CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1, a high-risk approval is trusted ONLY when a
REGISTERED reviewer cryptographically signs THIS exact request and their role is
authorized for the action — a plain env-var CASAN_APPROVER is no longer enough.
- approval-sign.sh: reviewer signs assertion
"casan-approval|v1|<action>|<actor>|<input_sha256>|<approver_id>" with their key.
- approval-verify.sh: gate looks up reviewer role+pubkey in reviewers.registry,
enforces role→action authorization, verifies the RSA signature (fail-closed).
- governance-check.sh: strict branch requires a valid signed approval; SoD still
enforced; default (non-strict) env-var path UNCHANGED (baseline preserved).
- reviewers.registry: role-scoped reviewer identity registry (pubkeys off-repo;
production replaces with OIDC/JWT from a real IdP).
- phase-h5-approval-tests.sh: 8 checks — valid/authorized approve; unsigned,
wrong-role, forged-key, unregistered, replay-to-other-request, self-approval
all denied; non-strict backward-compat.
Baselines: run-casan4 35/35, adversarial 44/44. Lifts H5 policy-approval (C4)
2.5 -> ~3.5-4 / 5. Total suites now 6 (+8 checks = 148).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
evidence-pack.sh {pack|verify-pack} assembles a per-run proof pack from REAL
on-disk logs (summaries only — no raw secret/PII copied; decision-log passes the
data-exfil guard or the pack aborts). Produces the standard set: run-summary,
h1..h7 reports, redteam-result, benign-fp-report, artifact-manifest, decision-log,
plus a signed manifest head (evidence-pack.sig).
Tamper-evident: verify-pack recomputes every file hash vs artifact-manifest.json
(any change fails) and verifies the RSA signature over manifest-head.txt (a
manifest re-forge fails without the off-repo key).
Certified run: run-summary.certified is true ONLY when required gates pass
(H4 exercised, H5 audit chain valid, H5 telemetry verified, no unresolved cost
spike, benign-FP within budget) and none was silently skipped — missing evidence
records an honest reason and does NOT certify.
CLI mapping: `casan pack <id>` -> evidence-pack.sh pack; `casan verify-pack <id>`
-> evidence-pack.sh verify-pack. phase3-evidence-pack-tests.sh covers it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
C3 (V19) data-exfil-guard.sh: destination-aware egress checkpoint built on the
H4 detectors. cloud/artifact boundaries fail closed on any secret; audit
boundary emits a PII-masked copy (fail closed on an unmaskable secret).
Covers secret-to-cloud, artifact-leaks-env, and PII-in-audit.
C6 (V22) sandbox-run.sh: static policy pre-check (BLOCK on reading ~/.ssh/creds,
network egress, fork bomb, writes outside workspace, huge-file/disk-fill) plus
ulimit file-size/CPU backstops and the wall-clock timeout. HONEST SCOPE: this
is not kernel isolation — the production target (docker --network=none
--read-only --pids-limit / nsjail) is documented as TODO(C6-prod). Process cap
is opt-in so it never breaks legitimate commands on a busy host.
phase2-track-c-tests.sh: 29 adversarial checks (C1 13, C2 6, C3 4, C6 6).
Baselines preserved: run-casan4 35/35, adversarial 44/44.
Running total: 35 + 44 + 25 + 29 = 133 checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
C1 (V17) action-gate.sh: gates the ACTION, not just the tool name. Outcome model
ALLOW/WARN/REQUIRE_APPROVAL/BLOCK. BLOCK on sensitive-file writes (.env, *.pem,
id_rsa, .github/workflows, .ssh, .aws/credentials, .npmrc) and destructive/
remote-exec commands (rm -rf /, curl|bash, chmod 777, git push --force);
REQUIRE_APPROVAL on dependency installs and non-local network egress (clears
only with an audited CASAN_ACTION_APPROVER). Decisions logged to action-gate.jsonl.
C2 (V18) supply-chain-gate.sh + supply-chain-scan.py: diffs package.json /
requirements.txt / pom.xml / build.gradle against a baseline (explicit or git
HEAD). BLOCK on denylisted/known-malicious packages, typosquats (edit-distance 1
to a known package), and dangerous lifecycle scripts (pre/post/install);
REQUIRE_APPROVAL on any new dependency. Emits a dep-diff report and records
which live scanners (npm audit / pip-audit / osv-scanner) are available.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A4 (V9): telemetry-integrity.sh binds provider-usage.jsonl + cost/metrics.jsonl
to a signed manifest head. Tampering a token flips the head (MISMATCH); an
attacker who rewrites the head cannot re-sign it (SIGNATURE_INVALID) without
the off-repo key. sign-audit-head.sh now also signs telemetry (best-effort).
Supports CASAN_AUDIT_PRIV/PUB overrides for self-contained verification.
A5 (V12/V13/V14): cost-spike-detect.sh adds an absolute per-call cap
(CASAN_COST_ABSOLUTE_MAX_TOKENS, enforced from record #1 → catches slow-boil
and cold-start) and a cumulative budget (CASAN_COST_CUMULATIVE_BUDGET_TOKENS →
catches under-threshold spray), keeping the existing median×mult spike test.
Backward compatible: <3 records with no caps still exits 3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The cloud branch of model-call.py was a stub (cloud_backend_not_implemented,
failed even with a key set); casan-step.mjs gated the judge on a hard-coded
Ollama ping. Wire up the real cloud path so a model can run without Ollama.
- model-call.py: add call_openai() and call_anthropic() (raw urllib, no new
dependency — matches the existing call_ollama). Endpoints hard-pinned to the
SSRF allowlist; keys read from env, never logged. Anthropic sends no
temperature/thinking (rejected as 400 on Opus 4.8/4.7; omitting thinking
keeps the terse one-word classify/judge answer). main() routes by
ollama:/openai:/anthropic: prefix; key-unset still fails closed honestly.
provider-usage.jsonl cost_source is per-backend, keeping ollama's exact
"ollama_local_real_tokens" tag that evidence/tests key on.
- casan-step.mjs: ollamaAvailable() -> modelAvailable() — when
CASAN_MODEL_PRIMARY is a cloud spec with its key set, the judge runs through
the cloud path; otherwise it pings local Ollama as before. Default
(unset CASAN_MODEL_PRIMARY) is unchanged.
- CASAN_MASTER_RUNBOOK.md: update sections 0/1/4/7/8 — cloud is now
implemented (not a stub); keep the honest "untested with a real key" +
CA-cert caveats.
Not verified against a live API key (none available); confirmed key-set makes
a real HTTPS call and key-unset fails closed. Gates unchanged:
security-gate PASS=11 FAIL=0, adversarial PASS=44 FAIL=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a shared log taxonomy (error<warn<info<debug<trace, default info) wired
through all three layers, plus a machine-readable per-step run log.
- scripts/casan-log.mjs + .specify/scripts/bash/casan-log.sh: shared logger
([LEVEL] ts [component] msg), stderr-only so stdout contracts and exit codes
are byte-identical. Node side includes trace-level redaction (secret/PII).
- run-casan-pipeline.mjs: per-STEP info line, loop-activation warnings
(BACK-TO-PLAN, FAIL->STEP6), debug harness rc + trace_id, trace payload
excerpt, end-of-run 13-STEP summary table, and one JSONL line/step in
.specify/logs/pipeline-run.jsonl. New --dry-run stubs all agents but keeps
the real wrapper in the loop (deterministic, offline, full 13 STEP + loops).
- casan-step.mjs: debug logs for judge verdict, checkpoint, rollback; logger
import degrades to noop when the file is copied standalone (T1 test).
- casan-harness.sh: debug-log each phase H4-in -> H5 -> [H2-gate] -> H6-exec
-> H4-out with its rc; optional CASAN_PHASE_REPORT JSON for the Boss.
Default level (info) keeps output close to before; behavior opt-in via env.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two comprehensive CI fixes:
1. Adversarial harness flake (PASS=42 FAIL=2, state-dependent):
governance-check.sh re-exported audit-public.pem only when GENERATING a
new signing key. On a CI runner where the off-repo private key PERSISTS
across runs, the checked-out (Vault-signed) audit-public.pem drifted out
of sync with the local re-signing key, so verify-audit-chain.sh rejected a
genuine head ("H5/H2 verifies the genuine signed chain"). Now always
re-export the public key matching the signing key — mirrors the same fix
already applied to tool-audit-lib.sh (c31987c). Reproduced the exact
FAIL=2 locally with a drifted persisted key; now deterministically 44/44.
2. Deploy docker.sock permission denied:
Added a self-healing preflight to deploy-okr that ensures the deploy user
is in the docker group on the web VPS (idempotent, passwordless sudo) and
proves a fresh SSH session can reach the daemon before streaming images.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously the public key was only written on first key generation.
If a CI step (sign-audit-head.sh via Vault KMS) overwrote audit-public.pem
after the key was generated, subsequent calls to append_tool_audit signed
with the local key while audit-public.pem held the Vault key — causing
verify-tool-audit.sh to fail with signature mismatch.
Now the public key is re-exported on every call so audit-public.pem always
matches the private key used to sign tool-calls-head.sig.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause: tool-audit-lib.sh signs tool-calls-head.sig with a local RSA
key (~/.casan/audit-keys/), but sign-audit-head.sh (called as a CI step)
overwrites audit-public.pem with the Vault KMS public key. On the second
run inside security-gate.sh, the local key still exists so audit-public.pem
is NOT updated, leaving a Vault key vs local-key mismatch that causes
verify-tool-audit.sh to exit 1.
Fix 1 — sign-audit-head.sh: after signing the audit.jsonl chain via Vault
KMS, also re-sign the tool-calls chain head with the same casan-audit-key.
Both chains are now anchored to the same Vault public key in audit-public.pem.
Fix 2 — run-casan4-harness-tests.sh: call sign-audit-head.sh just before
the inline verify-tool-audit.sh check (line 217). This re-signs both chains
with Vault KMS so the inline check sees anchor=signed instead of mismatched
local key vs Vault pub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Embedding $response as Python triple-quoted string caused json.loads()
to fail with 'Invalid control character' when Vault's JSON contained
\n sequences in the PEM public key (bash \n → Python newline → invalid
JSON control char).
Fix: write response to mktemp, pass path as argv, read with open().
Instead of skipping the frontend test when vitest is not installed,
security-gate.sh now runs `npm ci -w frontend` automatically.
Also add `cache: "npm"` to security-gate's actions/setup-node so the
npm cache from the frontend-tests job is reused — prevents OOM on
the 1GB VPS (cache restore is disk-only, not 300MB download).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
security-gate.sh checked only `command -v node` before running
`npm test -w frontend`. In the CI security-gate job, node is in PATH
(from actions/setup-node) but root node_modules are NOT installed
(npm ci was removed to prevent OOM). This caused the frontend test to
fail with "Cannot find module vitest".
Fix: also require node_modules/.bin/vitest to exist. Without it the
step SKIPs gracefully — frontend tests are already covered by the
dedicated frontend-tests CI job which runs first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
T1 (H7): casan-step.mjs now calls rollback-manager.sh checkpoint before
overwriting plan.md at attempt-2, writes tx-id to plan.checkpoint.txid
sidecar, and executes rollback on REJECTED verdict. rollback-transactions.jsonl
records a real cp restore command. Adversarial test: checkpoint exists,
real cp command recorded, plan hash matches pre-overwrite content.
T4 (H6): casan-harness.sh exports CASAN_STEP_NAME=$ACTION_NAME before
agent-metrics.sh so nested model calls (model-call.py) and the provider-
cost-lookup.py query share the same step label. metrics.jsonl now writes
cost_source=provider_telemetry instead of word_count_estimate when a real
Ollama call is made within the same step. Adversarial test: verified with
CASAN_STEP_NAME=t4-telemetry-test end-to-end.
adversarial-harness-tests.sh: 40 → 44 PASS / 0 FAIL (+3 T1, +1 T4)
security-gate.sh: PASS=10 FAIL=0 SKIP=0 (verified, local ornith:9b)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
