evidence-pack.sh {pack|verify-pack} assembles a per-run proof pack from REAL
on-disk logs (summaries only — no raw secret/PII copied; decision-log passes the
data-exfil guard or the pack aborts). Produces the standard set: run-summary,
h1..h7 reports, redteam-result, benign-fp-report, artifact-manifest, decision-log,
plus a signed manifest head (evidence-pack.sig).
Tamper-evident: verify-pack recomputes every file hash vs artifact-manifest.json
(any change fails) and verifies the RSA signature over manifest-head.txt (a
manifest re-forge fails without the off-repo key).
Certified run: run-summary.certified is true ONLY when required gates pass
(H4 exercised, H5 audit chain valid, H5 telemetry verified, no unresolved cost
spike, benign-FP within budget) and none was silently skipped — missing evidence
records an honest reason and does NOT certify.
CLI mapping: `casan pack <id>` -> evidence-pack.sh pack; `casan verify-pack <id>`
-> evidence-pack.sh verify-pack. phase3-evidence-pack-tests.sh covers it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
C3 (V19) data-exfil-guard.sh: destination-aware egress checkpoint built on the
H4 detectors. cloud/artifact boundaries fail closed on any secret; audit
boundary emits a PII-masked copy (fail closed on an unmaskable secret).
Covers secret-to-cloud, artifact-leaks-env, and PII-in-audit.
C6 (V22) sandbox-run.sh: static policy pre-check (BLOCK on reading ~/.ssh/creds,
network egress, fork bomb, writes outside workspace, huge-file/disk-fill) plus
ulimit file-size/CPU backstops and the wall-clock timeout. HONEST SCOPE: this
is not kernel isolation — the production target (docker --network=none
--read-only --pids-limit / nsjail) is documented as TODO(C6-prod). Process cap
is opt-in so it never breaks legitimate commands on a busy host.
phase2-track-c-tests.sh: 29 adversarial checks (C1 13, C2 6, C3 4, C6 6).
Baselines preserved: run-casan4 35/35, adversarial 44/44.
Running total: 35 + 44 + 25 + 29 = 133 checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause: tool-audit-lib.sh signs tool-calls-head.sig with a local RSA
key (~/.casan/audit-keys/), but sign-audit-head.sh (called as a CI step)
overwrites audit-public.pem with the Vault KMS public key. On the second
run inside security-gate.sh, the local key still exists so audit-public.pem
is NOT updated, leaving a Vault key vs local-key mismatch that causes
verify-tool-audit.sh to exit 1.
Fix 1 — sign-audit-head.sh: after signing the audit.jsonl chain via Vault
KMS, also re-sign the tool-calls chain head with the same casan-audit-key.
Both chains are now anchored to the same Vault public key in audit-public.pem.
Fix 2 — run-casan4-harness-tests.sh: call sign-audit-head.sh just before
the inline verify-tool-audit.sh check (line 217). This re-signs both chains
with Vault KMS so the inline check sees anchor=signed instead of mismatched
local key vs Vault pub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
T1 (H7): casan-step.mjs now calls rollback-manager.sh checkpoint before
overwriting plan.md at attempt-2, writes tx-id to plan.checkpoint.txid
sidecar, and executes rollback on REJECTED verdict. rollback-transactions.jsonl
records a real cp restore command. Adversarial test: checkpoint exists,
real cp command recorded, plan hash matches pre-overwrite content.
T4 (H6): casan-harness.sh exports CASAN_STEP_NAME=$ACTION_NAME before
agent-metrics.sh so nested model calls (model-call.py) and the provider-
cost-lookup.py query share the same step label. metrics.jsonl now writes
cost_source=provider_telemetry instead of word_count_estimate when a real
Ollama call is made within the same step. Adversarial test: verified with
CASAN_STEP_NAME=t4-telemetry-test end-to-end.
adversarial-harness-tests.sh: 40 → 44 PASS / 0 FAIL (+3 T1, +1 T4)
security-gate.sh: PASS=10 FAIL=0 SKIP=0 (verified, local ornith:9b)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
