Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8 2c765c9a45 feat(plan-01): Phase 0.5 — path indirection via casan-paths.sh (no file moves)
Task 1.2: introduce a single path resolver so no harness script hardcodes
`.specify/...` scattered across the tree. casan-paths.sh resolves four roots
(HARNESS/STATE/GOVERNANCE/APP) by marker-based walk-up from its own location —
never `git rev-parse` (git root is the repo PARENT here, not the app dir).

- 101 bash scripts/tests: 238 hardcoded `$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/...` refs rewritten
  to CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT (code) / CASAN_STATE_ROOT (logs,state) / CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT.
  Sandbox test vars ($WORK/$TP/$FP/$T1_WORK) left untouched.
- Roots are NOT exported: each script/subprocess self-resolves from its own tree,
  matching the original per-script semantics and preserving hermetic sandbox isolation
  (node casan-step.mjs, copied telemetry/rollback scripts must not inherit real roots).
- Sandbox tests that copy a harness script now also copy casan-paths.sh (its new
  sibling dependency): adversarial (verify-audit-chain/verify-tool-audit/rollback) +
  track-a (security-check/telemetry-integrity).
- control-plane-settings.json reclassified as STATE (untracked runtime store).

Roots all still resolve to `.specify` in this monolithic layout, so behavior is
unchanged. Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (adversarial 44/0, track-a 25/0).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 22:07:41 +09:00
thanhnvandClaude Opus 4.8 dbeb8e89d2 feat(track-c-mvp): C3 data-exfil guard + C6 sandbox scaffold + Phase 2 suite
C3 (V19) data-exfil-guard.sh: destination-aware egress checkpoint built on the
  H4 detectors. cloud/artifact boundaries fail closed on any secret; audit
  boundary emits a PII-masked copy (fail closed on an unmaskable secret).
  Covers secret-to-cloud, artifact-leaks-env, and PII-in-audit.
C6 (V22) sandbox-run.sh: static policy pre-check (BLOCK on reading ~/.ssh/creds,
  network egress, fork bomb, writes outside workspace, huge-file/disk-fill) plus
  ulimit file-size/CPU backstops and the wall-clock timeout. HONEST SCOPE: this
  is not kernel isolation — the production target (docker --network=none
  --read-only --pids-limit / nsjail) is documented as TODO(C6-prod). Process cap
  is opt-in so it never breaks legitimate commands on a busy host.
phase2-track-c-tests.sh: 29 adversarial checks (C1 13, C2 6, C3 4, C6 6).
  Baselines preserved: run-casan4 35/35, adversarial 44/44.
  Running total: 35 + 44 + 25 + 29 = 133 checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 22:57:09 +09:00