Task 1.2: introduce a single path resolver so no harness script hardcodes
`.specify/...` scattered across the tree. casan-paths.sh resolves four roots
(HARNESS/STATE/GOVERNANCE/APP) by marker-based walk-up from its own location —
never `git rev-parse` (git root is the repo PARENT here, not the app dir).
- 101 bash scripts/tests: 238 hardcoded `$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/...` refs rewritten
to CASAN_HARNESS_ROOT (code) / CASAN_STATE_ROOT (logs,state) / CASAN_GOVERNANCE_ROOT.
Sandbox test vars ($WORK/$TP/$FP/$T1_WORK) left untouched.
- Roots are NOT exported: each script/subprocess self-resolves from its own tree,
matching the original per-script semantics and preserving hermetic sandbox isolation
(node casan-step.mjs, copied telemetry/rollback scripts must not inherit real roots).
- Sandbox tests that copy a harness script now also copy casan-paths.sh (its new
sibling dependency): adversarial (verify-audit-chain/verify-tool-audit/rollback) +
track-a (security-check/telemetry-integrity).
- control-plane-settings.json reclassified as STATE (untracked runtime store).
Roots all still resolve to `.specify` in this monolithic layout, so behavior is
unchanged. Full gate: PASS=64 FAIL=0 SKIP=3 (adversarial 44/0, track-a 25/0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- SEC-12: drift-detect adds semantic invariants — negation-flip detection (a dropped
"not" now FAILS despite high char-similarity) + env must-keep patterns.
- SEC-29 (X-05): governance-check audit write fails CLOSED — an unwritable audit log
denies the action and empties the output (no unaudited output).
- SEC-30 (X-06): approval-verify records a one-time-use nonce (sha of token/sig) and
rejects replays (enforced mode / when a nonce ledger is set); dev unchanged.
- SEC-15 (low): typosquat distance<=2 with the levenshtein length-sentinel bug fixed
(no false positives); tool-exec fails closed with no timeout backend in enforced
mode; validate-tool-input now validates nested objects/arrays recursively.
Verify: new SEC suites all green via gate, run-casan4 0-FAIL, adversarial 44/44,
track-c 29/0, h5-approval 12/0, no regressions.
Plan-16 P2 remaining: infra-gated only (SEC-14/22/23/24/25/26).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Under CASAN_APPROVAL_STRICT=1, a high-risk approval is trusted ONLY when a
REGISTERED reviewer cryptographically signs THIS exact request and their role is
authorized for the action — a plain env-var CASAN_APPROVER is no longer enough.
- approval-sign.sh: reviewer signs assertion
"casan-approval|v1|<action>|<actor>|<input_sha256>|<approver_id>" with their key.
- approval-verify.sh: gate looks up reviewer role+pubkey in reviewers.registry,
enforces role→action authorization, verifies the RSA signature (fail-closed).
- governance-check.sh: strict branch requires a valid signed approval; SoD still
enforced; default (non-strict) env-var path UNCHANGED (baseline preserved).
- reviewers.registry: role-scoped reviewer identity registry (pubkeys off-repo;
production replaces with OIDC/JWT from a real IdP).
- phase-h5-approval-tests.sh: 8 checks — valid/authorized approve; unsigned,
wrong-role, forged-key, unregistered, replay-to-other-request, self-approval
all denied; non-strict backward-compat.
Baselines: run-casan4 35/35, adversarial 44/44. Lifts H5 policy-approval (C4)
2.5 -> ~3.5-4 / 5. Total suites now 6 (+8 checks = 148).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
