feat: add tenant isolation pre-audit evidence

2026-07-18 09:04:39 +07:00
parent 36158c5e34
commit e50714d622
5 changed files with 105 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Tenant Isolation Review Packet
+
+Run the read-only pre-audit against the deployed tenant state root and retain
+the JSON output with the deployment evidence:
+
+```bash
+python3 packages/casan-harness/scripts/bash/tenant-isolation-review.py \
+  --root /srv/casan/state/tenants --out tenant-isolation-review.json
+```
+
+The tool checks partition permissions, unexpected entries, forbidden symlinks,
+tenant key permissions and reused local tenant-key material. A non-zero result
+blocks promotion until findings are resolved. It does not assess identity
+provider claims, database row-level controls, network isolation, application
+authorization logic or cloud KMS policy; those must be assessed independently.
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
 | APPI/data-processing documentation | 🟡 template ready | `docs/compliance/APPI_DATA_PROCESSING.md` records the customer/project/model data register, retention, transfer and incident-review evidence. Complete and approve it with the Japanese privacy/legal owner for each production tenant. |
 | Japanese SLA/support/escalation | 🟡 draft ready | `docs/jp-poc/07_本番SLA・サポート・エスカレーション案.md` defines severity, ownership and evidence expectations. Finalize service hours, credits, uptime, RPO/RTO and 24x7 coverage only after managed operations/DR are proven. |
 | Certification and audited operations roadmap | 🟡 roadmap ready | `docs/compliance/CERTIFICATION_ROADMAP.md` maps PoC → pilot → ISO/cloud privacy/AI management/government procurement evidence. It expressly forbids claims before the relevant accredited audit or procurement process completes. |
+| Tenant isolation pre-audit | 🟡 CLI + test ready | `tenant-isolation-review.py` checks filesystem partition permissions, symlink escapes and local key separation; retain its output for the independent review. It does not replace an independent identity/database/network isolation assessment. |
 ---

 ## Trần điểm & điều kiện lên "Strong (81+)"
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ run "phase-sec23-state-isolation" bash "$TESTS/phase-sec23-state-isolation-tests
 run "phase-sec23-rbac-tenant"    bash "$TESTS/phase-sec23-rbac-tenant-tests.sh"
 run "phase-sec23-scope"          bash "$TESTS/phase-sec23-scope-tests.sh"
 run "phase-sec23-registry-crypt" bash "$TESTS/phase-sec23-registry-crypt-tests.sh"
+run "phase-tenant-isolation-review" bash "$TESTS/phase-tenant-isolation-review-tests.sh"
 # Plan-16 SEC-24/25 supply-chain (offline slice)
 run "phase-sec24-supplychain"    bash "$TESTS/phase-sec24-tests.sh"
 run "phase-sec25-attestation"    bash "$TESTS/phase-sec25-tests.sh"
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Read-only tenant-isolation pre-audit for CASAN state partitions.
+
+It validates filesystem boundaries and records concrete findings. It is not an
+independent audit; use its JSON output as input to an independent review.
+"""
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+TENANT = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$")
+
+def mode(path: Path) -> int:
+    return stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)
+
+def insecure(mode_value: int) -> bool:
+    return bool(mode_value & 0o077)
+
+def review(root: Path) -> dict:
+    findings: list[dict] = []
+    tenants: list[str] = []
+    keys: dict[str, str] = {}
+    if not root.is_dir() or root.is_symlink():
+        findings.append({"severity": "critical", "code": "tenant_root_invalid", "path": str(root)})
+        return {"ok": False, "root": str(root), "tenants": tenants, "findings": findings}
+    if insecure(mode(root)):
+        findings.append({"severity": "high", "code": "tenant_root_permissions", "path": str(root), "mode": oct(mode(root))})
+    for candidate in sorted(root.iterdir()):
+        if not TENANT.fullmatch(candidate.name):
+            findings.append({"severity": "medium", "code": "unexpected_root_entry", "path": str(candidate)})
+            continue
+        tenants.append(candidate.name)
+        if candidate.is_symlink() or not candidate.is_dir():
+            findings.append({"severity": "critical", "code": "tenant_partition_not_directory", "tenant": candidate.name})
+            continue
+        if insecure(mode(candidate)):
+            findings.append({"severity": "high", "code": "tenant_permissions", "tenant": candidate.name, "mode": oct(mode(candidate))})
+        for current, dirs, files in os.walk(candidate, followlinks=False):
+            base = Path(current)
+            for name in dirs + files:
+                item = base / name
+                if item.is_symlink():
+                    findings.append({"severity": "critical", "code": "tenant_symlink_forbidden", "tenant": candidate.name, "path": str(item)})
+        key = candidate / "keys" / "at-rest.key"
+        if key.exists():
+            if key.is_symlink() or mode(key) != 0o600:
+                findings.append({"severity": "high", "code": "tenant_key_permissions", "tenant": candidate.name, "path": str(key), "mode": oct(mode(key))})
+            else:
+                keys[candidate.name] = hashlib.sha256(key.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+    values = list(keys.values())
+    if len(values) != len(set(values)):
+        findings.append({"severity": "critical", "code": "tenant_key_material_reused"})
+    return {"ok": not findings, "root": str(root), "tenants": tenants, "keyed_tenants": sorted(keys), "findings": findings}
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--root", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--out")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    result = review(Path(args.root).resolve())
+    payload = json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n"
+    if args.out:
+        Path(args.out).write_text(payload, encoding="utf8")
+    print(payload, end="")
+    return 0 if result["ok"] else 2
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+R="$SCRIPT_DIR/../scripts/bash/tenant-isolation-review.py"
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+ROOT="$WORK/tenants"; mkdir -p "$ROOT/alpha/keys" "$ROOT/beta/keys"; chmod 700 "$ROOT" "$ROOT/alpha" "$ROOT/beta"
+printf 'alpha-key\n' > "$ROOT/alpha/keys/at-rest.key"; printf 'beta-key\n' > "$ROOT/beta/keys/at-rest.key"; chmod 600 "$ROOT"/*/keys/at-rest.key
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+pass(){ echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); }; fail(){ echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); }
+if python3 "$R" --root "$ROOT" >/dev/null; then pass "isolated tenant partitions pass review"; else fail "valid partitions rejected"; fi
+chmod 755 "$ROOT/alpha"
+if python3 "$R" --root "$ROOT" >/dev/null 2>&1; then fail "world-readable tenant accepted"; else pass "world-readable tenant denied"; fi
+chmod 700 "$ROOT/alpha"; ln -s /tmp "$ROOT/beta/escape"
+if python3 "$R" --root "$ROOT" >/dev/null 2>&1; then fail "tenant symlink accepted"; else pass "tenant symlink denied"; fi
+echo "===== TENANT ISOLATION REVIEW SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="; [[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]]