feat(track-c-mvp): C1 action gating + C2 supply-chain gate
C1 (V17) action-gate.sh: gates the ACTION, not just the tool name. Outcome model ALLOW/WARN/REQUIRE_APPROVAL/BLOCK. BLOCK on sensitive-file writes (.env, *.pem, id_rsa, .github/workflows, .ssh, .aws/credentials, .npmrc) and destructive/ remote-exec commands (rm -rf /, curl|bash, chmod 777, git push --force); REQUIRE_APPROVAL on dependency installs and non-local network egress (clears only with an audited CASAN_ACTION_APPROVER). Decisions logged to action-gate.jsonl. C2 (V18) supply-chain-gate.sh + supply-chain-scan.py: diffs package.json / requirements.txt / pom.xml / build.gradle against a baseline (explicit or git HEAD). BLOCK on denylisted/known-malicious packages, typosquats (edit-distance 1 to a known package), and dangerous lifecycle scripts (pre/post/install); REQUIRE_APPROVAL on any new dependency. Emits a dep-diff report and records which live scanners (npm audit / pip-audit / osv-scanner) are available. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
thanhnv
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
cf2c42b9fa
commit
c51e0f88a3
+156
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Track C-MVP — Tool authorization / ACTION gating (C1, V17).
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#
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# tool-registry-gate.sh authorizes by tool NAME + agent. This complements it by
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# inspecting the ACTION itself — the command to run and the files it would
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# write — because a legitimately-named tool can still attempt an illegitimate
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# action (overwrite .env, curl|bash, rm -rf /, exfiltrate to an unknown host).
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#
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# Outcome model (per Plan-07 C0): ALLOW | WARN | REQUIRE_APPROVAL | BLOCK.
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# BLOCK sensitive-file write, destructive/remote-exec command -> exit 2
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# REQUIRE_APPROVAL network egress, dependency install -> exit 3
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# (becomes ALLOW+audit when CASAN_ACTION_APPROVER is set)
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# WARN noteworthy but permitted -> exit 0 (logged)
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# ALLOW ordinary action -> exit 0
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#
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# Usage:
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# action-gate.sh --command "<cmd>" [--write <path> ...]
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# action-gate.sh -- <cmd> [args...]
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#
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# BLOCK is never overridable. REQUIRE_APPROVAL clears only with an explicit
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# approver identity (audited) — approval is never silent.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd)"
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LOG="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/level5/action-gate.jsonl"
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mkdir -p "$(dirname "$LOG")"
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# shellcheck source=casan-log.sh
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/casan-log.sh"
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CMD=""
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WRITES=()
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while [[ "$#" -gt 0 ]]; do
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case "$1" in
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--command) CMD="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
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--write) WRITES+=("${2:-}"); shift 2 ;;
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--) shift; CMD="$*"; break ;;
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*) CMD="${CMD:+$CMD }$1"; shift ;;
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esac
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done
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if [[ -z "$CMD" && "${#WRITES[@]}" -eq 0 ]]; then
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echo "Usage: action-gate.sh --command \"<cmd>\" [--write <path>...] | -- <cmd...>" >&2
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exit 64
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fi
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APPROVER="${CASAN_ACTION_APPROVER:-}"
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RESULT="$(CASAN_AG_CMD="$CMD" CASAN_AG_WRITES="$(printf '%s\n' "${WRITES[@]:-}")" python - <<'PY'
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import os, re
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cmd = os.environ.get("CASAN_AG_CMD", "")
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writes = [w for w in os.environ.get("CASAN_AG_WRITES", "").splitlines() if w]
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low = cmd.lower()
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# Sensitive-write targets (BLOCK). Checked against both explicit --write paths
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# and any path-looking token in the command.
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SENSITIVE = [
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r"(^|/)\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$", r"\.pem$", r"\.key$", r"(^|/)id_rsa$", r"(^|/)id_ed25519$",
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r"\.p12$", r"\.pfx$", r"(^|/)\.ssh/", r"(^|/)\.github/workflows/", r"(^|/)\.git/hooks/",
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r"(^|/)\.aws/credentials", r"(^|/)\.npmrc$", r"(^|/)\.pypirc$", r"(^|/)\.netrc$",
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r"^/etc/", r"(^|/)\.dockercfg", r"(^|/)docker/config\.json$",
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]
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# Destructive / remote-exec commands (BLOCK).
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DANGEROUS = [
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r"\brm\s+-rf?\s+(/|~|\$home|/\*|\.\s*$|\.\s|\*)", r":\(\)\s*\{\s*:\s*\|\s*:", r"\bmkfs\b",
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r"\bdd\b[^\n]*of=/dev/", r"\bchmod\s+(-r\s+)?777\b", r">\s*/dev/sd", r"\bgit\s+push\b[^\n]*(--force|\s-f\b)",
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r"(curl|wget)\b[^\n]*\|\s*(sudo\s+)?(ba)?sh\b", r"\bshred\b\s+/", r"\bchown\s+-r\s+root",
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]
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# Dependency install (REQUIRE_APPROVAL) — imperative form; C2 covers manifest diffs.
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DEP_INSTALL = [
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r"\bnpm\s+(install|i|add)\s+\S", r"\byarn\s+add\s+\S", r"\bpnpm\s+add\s+\S",
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r"\bpip3?\s+install\s+\S", r"\bpoetry\s+add\s+\S", r"\bgem\s+install\s+\S",
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r"\bgo\s+get\s+\S", r"\bcargo\s+add\s+\S", r"\b(apt|apt-get|apk|brew|dnf|yum)\s+install\s+\S",
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]
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# Network egress (REQUIRE_APPROVAL) unless clearly local.
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EGRESS = [r"\bcurl\b", r"\bwget\b", r"\bnc\b", r"\bncat\b", r"\bscp\b", r"\brsync\b[^\n]*::", r"\bssh\b\s+\S"]
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LOCAL_OK = [r"127\.0\.0\.1", r"localhost", r"0\.0\.0\.0", r"::1", r"/api/tags"]
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def any_match(pats, text):
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return next((p for p in pats if re.search(p, text)), None)
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# 1. Sensitive writes -> BLOCK
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for path in writes + re.findall(r"[\w./~-]+", cmd):
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m = any_match(SENSITIVE, path.lower())
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if m:
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print(f"BLOCK|sensitive_file_write:{path}")
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raise SystemExit(0)
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# 2. Destructive / remote-exec -> BLOCK
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m = any_match(DANGEROUS, low)
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if m:
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print(f"BLOCK|dangerous_command:{m}")
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raise SystemExit(0)
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# 3. Dependency install -> REQUIRE_APPROVAL
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m = any_match(DEP_INSTALL, low)
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if m:
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print(f"REQUIRE_APPROVAL|dependency_install:{m}")
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raise SystemExit(0)
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# 4. Network egress -> REQUIRE_APPROVAL unless clearly local
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if any_match(EGRESS, low) and not any_match(LOCAL_OK, low):
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print("REQUIRE_APPROVAL|network_egress")
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raise SystemExit(0)
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# 5. sudo (non-destructive) -> WARN
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if re.search(r"\bsudo\b", low):
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print("WARN|privilege_escalation")
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raise SystemExit(0)
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print("ALLOW|ok")
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PY
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)"
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OUTCOME="${RESULT%%|*}"
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REASON="${RESULT#*|}"
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TS="$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")"
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# Approval clears REQUIRE_APPROVAL only with an explicit (audited) approver.
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EFFECTIVE="$OUTCOME"
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if [[ "$OUTCOME" == "REQUIRE_APPROVAL" && -n "$APPROVER" ]]; then
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EFFECTIVE="ALLOW_APPROVED"
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fi
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python - "$LOG" "$TS" "$OUTCOME" "$REASON" "$EFFECTIVE" "$APPROVER" "$CMD" <<'PY'
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import json, sys
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log, ts, outcome, reason, eff, approver, cmd = sys.argv[1:]
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with open(log, "a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
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f.write(json.dumps({
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"timestamp": ts, "harness": "C1-action-gate", "outcome": outcome,
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"effective": eff, "reason": reason, "approver": approver, "command": cmd[:400],
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}) + "\n")
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PY
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case "$EFFECTIVE" in
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BLOCK)
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casan_log error action-gate "ACTION_BLOCKED reason=$REASON"
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echo "ACTION_GATE outcome=BLOCK reason=$REASON" >&2
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exit 2 ;;
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REQUIRE_APPROVAL)
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casan_log warn action-gate "ACTION_REQUIRES_APPROVAL reason=$REASON (set CASAN_ACTION_APPROVER=<id> to approve)"
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echo "ACTION_GATE outcome=REQUIRE_APPROVAL reason=$REASON" >&2
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exit 3 ;;
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ALLOW_APPROVED)
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echo "ACTION_GATE outcome=ALLOW reason=approved_by:$APPROVER ($REASON)"
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exit 0 ;;
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WARN)
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casan_log warn action-gate "ACTION_WARN reason=$REASON"
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echo "ACTION_GATE outcome=WARN reason=$REASON"
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exit 0 ;;
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*)
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echo "ACTION_GATE outcome=ALLOW reason=$REASON"
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exit 0 ;;
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esac
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@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -uo pipefail
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# CASAN Track C-MVP — Supply-chain gate for generated dependencies (C2, V18).
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#
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# An agent that writes code can also add a dependency. This gate diffs a
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# dependency manifest against a baseline and decides:
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# BLOCK malicious/denylisted package, typosquat of a known package,
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# or a dangerous lifecycle script (postinstall/preinstall/install) -> exit 2
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# REQUIRE_APPROVAL a genuinely new dependency was added -> exit 3
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# (ALLOW+audit when CASAN_ACTION_APPROVER is set)
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# ALLOW no new dependencies -> exit 0
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#
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# Supports: package.json, requirements.txt, pom.xml, build.gradle(.kts).
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# When npm audit / pip-audit / osv-scanner are installed they are recorded as
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# available; otherwise the local denylist (malicious-packages.txt) is authoritative.
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# The diff/scan logic lives in supply-chain-scan.py (deterministic, no network).
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#
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# Usage: supply-chain-gate.sh <manifest> [baseline-manifest] [report.json]
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# If baseline is omitted, the manifest's committed git version is used.
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd)"
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SEC_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/security"
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# shellcheck source=casan-log.sh
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source "$SCRIPT_DIR/casan-log.sh"
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MANIFEST="${1:-}"
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BASELINE="${2:-}"
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REPORT="${3:-$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/level5/supply-chain-report.json}"
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mkdir -p "$(dirname "$REPORT")"
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if [[ -z "$MANIFEST" || ! -f "$MANIFEST" ]]; then
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echo "Usage: supply-chain-gate.sh <manifest> [baseline-manifest] [report.json]" >&2
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exit 64
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fi
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# Resolve baseline: explicit file, else the manifest's committed git version,
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# else empty (treat every dependency as new).
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BASELINE_TMP=""
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if [[ -z "$BASELINE" ]]; then
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BASELINE_TMP="$(mktemp)"
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REL="${MANIFEST#"$PROJECT_ROOT"/}"
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if git -C "$PROJECT_ROOT" show "HEAD:$REL" > "$BASELINE_TMP" 2>/dev/null; then
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BASELINE="$BASELINE_TMP"
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else
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: > "$BASELINE_TMP"; BASELINE="$BASELINE_TMP"
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fi
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fi
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# Record which live scanners are available (honest capability reporting).
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SCANNERS=""
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for pair in "npm:npm" "pip-audit:pip-audit" "osv-scanner:osv-scanner"; do
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command -v "${pair##*:}" >/dev/null 2>&1 && SCANNERS="${SCANNERS:+$SCANNERS }${pair%%:*}"
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done
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RESULT="$(python "$SCRIPT_DIR/supply-chain-scan.py" \
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"$MANIFEST" "$BASELINE" "$SEC_DIR/known-packages.txt" "$SEC_DIR/malicious-packages.txt" \
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"$REPORT" "$SCANNERS")"
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RC=$?
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[[ -n "$BASELINE_TMP" ]] && rm -f "$BASELINE_TMP"
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[[ "$RC" -ne 0 ]] && { echo "SUPPLY_CHAIN_SCAN_ERROR rc=$RC" >&2; exit 2; }
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OUTCOME="${RESULT%%|*}"
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REASON="${RESULT#*|}"
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APPROVER="${CASAN_ACTION_APPROVER:-}"
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case "$OUTCOME" in
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BLOCK)
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casan_log error supply-chain "SUPPLY_CHAIN_BLOCKED $REASON"
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echo "SUPPLY_CHAIN_BLOCKED reason=$REASON report=$REPORT" >&2
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exit 2 ;;
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REQUIRE_APPROVAL)
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if [[ -n "$APPROVER" ]]; then
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echo "SUPPLY_CHAIN_APPROVED by=$APPROVER new=$REASON report=$REPORT"
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exit 0
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fi
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casan_log warn supply-chain "SUPPLY_CHAIN_REQUIRES_APPROVAL new=$REASON (set CASAN_ACTION_APPROVER=<id>)"
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echo "SUPPLY_CHAIN_REQUIRES_APPROVAL new=$REASON report=$REPORT" >&2
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exit 3 ;;
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*)
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echo "SUPPLY_CHAIN_CLEAN reason=$REASON report=$REPORT"
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exit 0 ;;
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esac
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@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""CASAN Track C-MVP — supply-chain manifest diff + risk scan (C2, V18 core).
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Diffs a dependency manifest against a baseline and classifies the change.
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Prints "<OUTCOME>|<reason>" on stdout and writes a JSON report.
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Argv: <manifest> <baseline> <known-packages.txt> <malicious-packages.txt>
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<report.json> <scanners-space-separated>
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Outcomes: BLOCK (denylist / typosquat / dangerous lifecycle),
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REQUIRE_APPROVAL (new dependency added), ALLOW (no new deps).
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Deterministic: no network; a local denylist is authoritative when no live
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scanner is available (their availability is recorded honestly in the report).
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"""
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import json
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import os
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import re
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import sys
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def read(path: str) -> str:
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try:
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return open(path, encoding="utf-8").read()
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except OSError:
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return ""
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def load_list(path: str):
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out = []
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for line in read(path).splitlines():
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line = line.strip()
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if line and not line.startswith("#"):
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out.append(line)
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return out
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def parse_deps(text: str, name: str):
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"""Return ({pkg: version}, [dangerous lifecycle scripts])."""
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deps, scripts = {}, []
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base = os.path.basename(name).lower()
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if base == "package.json" or name.endswith(".json"):
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try:
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data = json.loads(text) if text.strip() else {}
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except ValueError:
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data = {}
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for sect in ("dependencies", "devDependencies",
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"optionalDependencies", "peerDependencies"):
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for k, v in (data.get(sect) or {}).items():
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deps[k] = str(v)
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for hook in ("preinstall", "install", "postinstall"):
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s = (data.get("scripts") or {}).get(hook)
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if s:
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scripts.append(hook + ":" + s)
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elif base == "requirements.txt" or name.endswith(".txt"):
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for line in text.splitlines():
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line = line.split("#", 1)[0].strip()
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if not line:
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continue
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m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z0-9._-]+)\s*([=<>!~].*)?$", line)
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if m:
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deps[m.group(1)] = (m.group(2) or "").strip()
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elif base == "pom.xml" or name.endswith(".xml"):
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for m in re.finditer(r"<artifactId>([^<]+)</artifactId>", text):
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deps[m.group(1).strip()] = ""
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elif base.startswith("build.gradle"):
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for m in re.finditer(r"""['"]([\w.\-]+):([\w.\-]+):([\w.\-]+)['"]""", text):
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deps[m.group(1) + ":" + m.group(2)] = m.group(3)
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return deps, scripts
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def levenshtein(a: str, b: str) -> int:
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if abs(len(a) - len(b)) > 1:
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return 2
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prev = list(range(len(b) + 1))
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for i, ca in enumerate(a, 1):
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row = [i]
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for j, cb in enumerate(b, 1):
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row.append(min(prev[j] + 1, row[-1] + 1, prev[j - 1] + (ca != cb)))
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prev = row
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return prev[-1]
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def main() -> int:
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manifest, baseline, known_path, deny_path, report_path, scanners_raw = sys.argv[1:7]
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scanners = [s for s in scanners_raw.split() if s]
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known = load_list(known_path)
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deny = set(load_list(deny_path))
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cur, cur_scripts = parse_deps(read(manifest), manifest)
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base_deps, base_scripts = parse_deps(read(baseline), manifest)
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added = {k: v for k, v in cur.items() if k not in base_deps}
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new_scripts = [s for s in cur_scripts if s not in base_scripts]
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findings = []
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approval = []
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for name, ver in added.items():
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clean_ver = ver.lstrip("=<>!~^ ")
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ident = (name + "@" + clean_ver) if ver else name
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denied = (
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name in deny
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or ident in deny
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or any(d.split("@")[0] == name and "@" in d and d.split("@", 1)[1] in ver for d in deny)
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)
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if denied:
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findings.append({"package": name, "reason": "denylisted_or_known_malicious"})
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continue
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if name not in known:
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near = next((k for k in known if levenshtein(name.lower(), k.lower()) == 1), None)
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if near:
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findings.append({"package": name, "reason": "typosquat_of:" + near})
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continue
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approval.append({"package": name, "version": ver})
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for s in new_scripts:
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findings.append({"package": "<lifecycle-script>", "reason": "dangerous_lifecycle:" + s[:120]})
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if findings:
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outcome = "BLOCK"
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elif approval:
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outcome = "REQUIRE_APPROVAL"
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else:
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outcome = "ALLOW"
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report = {
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"manifest": manifest,
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"scanners_available": scanners,
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"scanners_note": "local denylist authoritative when no live scanner present",
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"added": [{"package": k, "version": v} for k, v in added.items()],
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"new_lifecycle_scripts": new_scripts,
|
||||
"blocked": findings,
|
||||
"require_approval": approval,
|
||||
"outcome": outcome,
|
||||
}
|
||||
with open(report_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
||||
json.dump(report, f, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
|
||||
|
||||
if findings:
|
||||
reason = ";".join(x["package"] + ":" + x["reason"] for x in findings)
|
||||
elif approval:
|
||||
reason = ",".join(x["package"] for x in approval)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reason = "no_new_dependencies"
|
||||
print(outcome + "|" + reason)
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
sys.exit(main())
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
# Popular package names used for typosquat proximity checks (edit distance <= 1
|
||||
# to one of these, but not an exact match, is flagged as a likely typosquat).
|
||||
# Extend as the project's real dependency surface grows.
|
||||
express
|
||||
react
|
||||
react-dom
|
||||
lodash
|
||||
axios
|
||||
vite
|
||||
tailwindcss
|
||||
zod
|
||||
prisma
|
||||
@prisma/client
|
||||
bcrypt
|
||||
jsonwebtoken
|
||||
class-validator
|
||||
class-transformer
|
||||
@nestjs/core
|
||||
@nestjs/common
|
||||
@nestjs/jwt
|
||||
@nestjs/swagger
|
||||
@tanstack/react-query
|
||||
react-router-dom
|
||||
react-hook-form
|
||||
requests
|
||||
flask
|
||||
django
|
||||
numpy
|
||||
pandas
|
||||
pytest
|
||||
requests-oauthlib
|
||||
pyyaml
|
||||
cryptography
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
||||
# Known-bad / denylisted package identifiers. Format: one entry per line, either
|
||||
# a bare name (any version) or name@version for a specific pinned bad release.
|
||||
# This is a LOCAL denylist used when no live CVE/OSV scanner is available; a real
|
||||
# deployment should also run npm audit / pip-audit / osv-scanner (the gate runs
|
||||
# them when present and records tool availability in the report).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The entries below are illustrative fixtures (documented malware families /
|
||||
# typosquat campaigns) so the gate has deterministic denials to test against.
|
||||
event-stream@3.3.6
|
||||
flatmap-stream
|
||||
coa@2.0.3
|
||||
rc@1.2.9
|
||||
ua-parser-js@0.7.29
|
||||
node-ipc@10.1.1
|
||||
colors@1.4.44-liberty-2
|
||||
crossenv
|
||||
cross-env.js
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user