feat: plan 16-01

2026-07-06 21:47:38 +09:00
parent 4419cd9eae
commit 8c3c5e8bff
30 changed files with 1646 additions and 66 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -uo pipefail
+
+# CASAN Plan-16 SEC-05 (H-04 / M-05) — JSON-safe audit writers.
+#
+# governance-check / agent-metrics / incident used raw printf to build JSON audit
+# records, so an actor/action/agent field containing `"` + newline could inject a
+# SECOND forged record (e.g. a fabricated "approved" decision). This proves the
+# serialized writers escape such payloads into exactly ONE record and keep the
+# hash-chain intact.
+#
+# Deterministic; hermetic (backs up + restores the audit + governance dirs).
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
+BASH_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/scripts/bash"
+AUDIT="$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit/audit.jsonl"
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
+
+# Back up + restore the state governance-check mutates.
+BK="$WORK/backup"; mkdir -p "$BK"
+cp -a "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit" "$BK/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
+cp -a "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance" "$BK/central-governance" 2>/dev/null || true
+restore_state() {
+  rm -rf "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit"; cp -a "$BK/audit" "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/logs/audit" 2>/dev/null || true
+  rm -rf "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance"; cp -a "$BK/central-governance" "$PROJECT_ROOT/.specify/level5/central-governance" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+trap 'restore_state; rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+export CASAN_AUDIT_KEY_DIR="$WORK/keys"   # fresh key dir (avoid CI key-sync flake)
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0
+pass() { echo "PASS: $1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
+fail() { echo "FAIL: $1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); }
+
+echo "===== Plan-16 SEC-05: JSON-safe audit writers ====="
+
+echo "hello world" > "$WORK/in.txt"
+
+# A payload that, under raw printf, would break out of the action field and append
+# a forged "approved" audit record on a new line.
+PAYLOAD='evil","decision":"approved","approver":"ATTACKER
+{"timestamp":"forged","action":"pwned","record_hash":"deadbeef"}'
+
+BEFORE=$(wc -l < "$AUDIT" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
+set +e
+bash "$BASH_DIR/governance-check.sh" "$WORK/in.txt" "$WORK/out.txt" "$PAYLOAD" >/dev/null 2>&1
+set -e 2>/dev/null || true
+AFTER=$(wc -l < "$AUDIT" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
+ADDED=$((AFTER - BEFORE))
+
+[[ "$ADDED" -eq 1 ]] \
+  && pass "injection payload produced exactly ONE audit record (added=$ADDED)" \
+  || fail "expected 1 record, got $ADDED (raw-printf injection regression!)"
+
+# The stored action field must round-trip the FULL payload (escaped, not truncated).
+ROUNDTRIP="$(python3 - "$AUDIT" <<'PY'
+import json, sys
+last = [l for l in open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") if l.strip()][-1]
+print(json.loads(last).get("action", ""))
+PY
+)"
+[[ "$ROUNDTRIP" == "$PAYLOAD" ]] \
+  && pass "action field round-trips the exact payload (escaped, not truncated)" \
+  || fail "action field mangled — escaping wrong"
+
+# No forged record: the chain must still verify, and no record may claim the
+# fabricated hash 'deadbeef'.
+bash "$BASH_DIR/verify-audit-chain.sh" "$AUDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && pass "audit chain still verifies after injection attempt" \
+  || fail "chain broken after injection (record_hash mismatch)"
+
+grep -q '"record_hash":"deadbeef"\|"record_hash": "deadbeef"' "$AUDIT" \
+  && fail "forged record with attacker hash present in audit log" \
+  || pass "no forged record injected into audit log"
+
+echo ""
+echo "===== SEC-05 SUMMARY: PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL ====="
+[[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1